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The Qing Invention of Nature: Environment and Identity in Northeast China and 
Mongolia, 1750-1850 
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation studies the nexus of empire, environment, and market that 
defined Qing China in 1750-1850, when unprecedented commercial expansion and a rush 
for natural resources – including furs, pharmaceuticals, and precious minerals – 
transformed the ecology of China and its borderlands. That boom, no less than today’s, 
had profound institutional, ideological, and environmental causes and consequences. 
Nature itself was redefined. In this thesis, I show that it was the activism, not the atavism, 
of early modern empire that produced “nature.”  Wilderness as such was not a state of 
nature: it reflected the nature of the state. 
Imperial efforts to elaborate and preserve “pure” ethnic homelands during the 
boom were at the center of this process.  Using archival materials from Northeast China 
and Mongolia as case studies, the dissertation reassesses the view that homesteaders 
transformed China’s frontiers from wilderness to breadbasket after 1850.  I argue instead 
that, like the Russian East and American West, the Qing empire’s North was never a 
“primitive wilderness” – it only seemed so to late 19th century observers.  Manchuria and 
Mongolia, in fact, had served local and global markets.  The boom years of the 1700s in 
particular witnessed a surge in poaching, commercial licensing, and violent “purification” 
campaigns to restore the environment, stem migration, and promote “traditional” land-use 
patterns.  Results were mixed; conservation succeeded in some territories, while others 
suffered dramatic environmental change: emptied of fur-bearing animals, stripped of wild 
pharmaceuticals, left bare around abandoned worker camps.   Beginning with changes in 
 iv 
material culture in the metropole, the dissertation follows the commodity chain to 
production sites in the frontier, providing a fresh look at the politics of resource 
production and nature protection in the Qing empire. 
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 1 
Introduction  
 
In 1886, H. Evan James discovered pristine nature in Manchuria. As he 
breathlessly reported to the Royal Geographic Society, “the scenery…is marvelously 
beautiful – woods and flowers and grassy glades – and to the lover of nature it is simply a 
paradise.” A glimpse of this world was a glimpse before the Fall: “it was like being 
transported into the Garden of Eden.” Climbing Changbaishan, he recalled,  
We came upon rich, open meadows, bright with flowers of every 
imaginable colour, where sheets of blue iris, great scarlet tiger-lilies, 
sweet-scented yellow day-lilies, huge orange buttercups, or purple 
monkshood delighted the eye. And beyond were bits of park-like 
country, with groups of spruce and fir beautifully dotted about, the soil 
covered with short mossy grass, and spangled with great masses of 
deep blue gentian, columbines of every shade of mauve or buff, orchids 
white and red, and many other flowers.1   
 
Other European travellers marveled that the land had been “hardly touched by man”; 
indeed it was virtually “uninhabited,” having long been “evacuated.”2  Uncorrupted, the 
land was a cornucopia of nature. A contemporary Russian explorer “encountered such an 
abundance of fish as he had never before seen in his life.  Salmon, trout, carp, sturgeon, 
husos,3 shad, sprang out of the water and made a deafening noise; the [Amur] river was 
like an artificial fish-pond.”4  In the skies, when the salmon and shad made spawning 
runs, “the swan, the stork, the goose, the duck, [and] the teal” followed them “in 
                                                
1 H.E.M James, “A Journey in Manchuria,” Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly 
Record of Geography 9, no. 9 (1887), 539, 542-3. 
2 A. R. Agassiz, “Our Commercial Relations with Chinese Manchuria,” The Geographical Journal 4, no. 6 
(1894), 538.  
3 “Husos” are type of sturgeon.  
4 M.M. Peschurof, MM, et al., “Notes on the River Amur and the Adjacent Districts,” Journal of the Royal 
Geographical Society of London 28 (1858), 387. 
 2 
numberless flocks.”5  Forests were so thick and untamed one needed a hatchet to cut 
through them. Gustav Radde, having chopped his way through the Hinggan Mountains, 
declared with pride and admiration that “nature in her full virgin strength has produced 
such a luxuriant vegetation” that it was “penetrated…with the greatest trouble.”6  The 
forests teemed with wild animals: tigers and bears, elk and boar, foxes and sable.  As A. 
R. Agassiz later advertised, “now that game is rapidly disappearing from most places, 
except where it is rigidly preserved, few countries offer the sportsman the attractions 
offered by Manchuria.”7  The only order in Manchuria was Nature itself. 
Two centuries prior, in his 1743 Ode to Mukden, the Qianlong emperor (r. 1735-
1795) celebrated Manchuria’s bounty using similar language.  Like James, Qianlong was 
taken by the diversity of native life: “tigers, leopards, bears, black bears, wild horses, 
wild asses, [four kinds of] deer, wolves, wild camels, foxes, [and] badgers.” He 
celebrated the lushness of plant life (reeds, thatch, water scallion, safflower, knotweed, 
etc.) and the multitudes of birds (pheasant, grouse, geese, ducks, herons, storks, cranes, 
pelicans, swallows, and woodpeckers).8  Yet to Qianlong, Manchuria’s generative power 
did not end with flora and fauna.  As he extolled: “Established on a grand scale, it 
promulgates the rule of great kings…Such a propitious location will last forever, 
generation after generation. It surpasses and humbles all [other] places and has united 
                                                
5 M. de la Brunière, “Manchuria, on the River Usuri, April 5th 1846,” in The Russians on the Amur, ed. 
Ernest George Ravenstein (London: Trübner and Co., 1861), 96.  
6 M.M. Peschurof, MM, et al., “Notes on the River Amur and the Adjacent Districts” (1858), 419, 427. 
7 A. R. Agassiz, “Our Commercial Relations with Chinese Manchuria,” 540. 
8 Quoted and translated in Mark C. Elliott, “The Limits of Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National 
Geographies,” The Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 3 (2000), 615. 
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[lands] within and [lands] without.”9  Being himself a “great king” from Manchuria, 
Qianlong thus shared something in common with its tigers, leopards, and bears.  Perhaps 
not surprisingly, then, he surrounded himself with a suite of products from Manchuria: 
sables, pearls, pheasant, foxes, and so on. 
Both Qianlong and James were struck by the natural vitality of the land: it had a 
power unto itself, apparently free of human intervention.  Both men published their 
writings because the nature of Manchuria seemed so unique: its environment stood out in 
their respective worlds. Yet where James and his contemporaries saw a land before time, 
and a landscape divorced from human agency, Qianlong saw Manchuria as a timeless 
source of sustenance and secular power.  For James, Manchuria was the frontier: it had 
yet to be touched by civilization.  For Qianlong, it was home: it nurtured civilization like 
the emperor himself.  The Jamesian vision of the modern frontier is relatively familiar: 
we recognize in it similar accounts from Asian, African, and American wildernesses.  
What, though, do we make of Qianlong’s vision?  Did Manchuria produce kings, or did 
kings produce Manchuria?  What constituted pristine nature in the Qing empire, and how 
did such spaces change over time?  
This dissertation studies the nexus of empire, environment, and market that 
defined Qing China in 1750-1850, when unprecedented commercial expansion and a rush 
for natural resources – including furs, pharmaceuticals, and precious minerals – 
transformed the ecology of China and its borderlands. That boom, no less than today’s, 
had profound institutional, ideological, and environmental causes and consequences. 
Nature itself was redefined. In this thesis, I aim to show that it was the activism, not the 
                                                
9 Ibid., 616. 
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atavism, of early modern empire that produced “nature.”  That is to say, wilderness as 
such was not a state of nature: it reflected the nature of the state. 
Imperial efforts to elaborate and preserve “pure” ethnic homelands during the 
boom were at the center of this process.  Using archival materials from Northeast China 
and Mongolia as case studies, the dissertation reassesses the view that homesteaders 
transformed China’s frontiers from wilderness to breadbasket after 1850. I argue instead 
that, like the Russian East and American West, the Qing empire’s North was never a 
“primitive wilderness” – it only seemed so to late 19th century observers.  Manchuria and 
Mongolia, in fact, had served local and global markets already for two centuries by the 
time that Englishmen like James appeared on the horizon.  The boom years of the 1700s 
in particular witnessed a surge in poaching, commercial licensing, and violent 
“purification” campaigns to restore the environment, stem migration, and promote 
“traditional” land-use patterns.  Results were mixed.  Conservation succeeded in some 
places, while others suffered dramatic change as they were emptied of fur-bearing 
animals, stripped of wild pharmaceuticals, and left bare around abandoned worker camps.  
If James found modern wilderness, it was because the Qianlong court and its successors 
had quite consciously created imperial “purity.” 
 
Environmental History: From Empire to Nation 
 
Like all Qing frontiers, historians have tended to study Manchuria with an eye 
towards to the twentieth century: today, Manchuria is not a bastion of nature, but of 
industry; its forests were cleared long ago for farmland.  The very word “Manchuria” is 
 5 
no longer even used: the region has become, more simply, “Northeast China.”10  The 
question then becomes: when did Manchuria become Chinese?   For many, the answer 
lies in the extent of China’s sovereign domains and the historical legitimacy of modern 
borders: the question of who controlled what, and when.  In studies of the Qing empire’s 
northern borderlands in particular, conflicting claims to territory have left the field 
fragmented into competing Russian, Mongol, and Chinese and schools.11  In terms of 
China-centered scholarship, two types of claims are made.  The first is statist: the Qing 
state was China, and thus its boundaries provide a basis for modern claims.  The second 
is nationalist: modern claims derive not from the presence of the state, but of people. 
According to this view, the Manchu Qing court worked to preserve Manchuria and 
Mongolia as imperial enclaves.  Such segregation policies (Ch: ŐÄŜ), however, 
ultimately prove unworkable, as China’s demographic and commercial expansion 
overwhelms the imperial infrastructure.  In the end, the court was obliged to accept a fait 
accompli: the frontier is already Chinese, and thus must be governed so.  Empire 
collapses; a nation is born.12   
                                                
10 For a critical discussion of the region’s historical nomenclature, see Mark C. Elliott, “The Limits of 
Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies,” 603-646.  On the centrality of Manchuria in 
modern Chinese nationalism, and the resonance of the claim that it is Northeast China, see Rana Mitter, 
The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance and Collaboration in Modern China (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2000). 
11 Uyama Tomohiko, “Research Trends in the Former Soviet Central Asian Countries” in Research Trends 
Trends in Modern Central Eurasian Studies (18th-20th Centuries), ), eds. Stéphane A. Dudoignon and 
Komatsu Hisao (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 2003), 51.  Uyama argues that “the dominant research trend here 
should be called not only nationalist but also explicitly statist.”  On Russian and Chinese scholarship, Mark 
Gamsa caustically asserts the maximalist position: “So intensely are Russian and Chinese historiographies 
preoccupied with conveying a self-flattering image of the nation, and so complete is each side’s isolation 
from the opposing historical narrative, that they omit every fact that does not suit their purpose, and 
rearrange the rest to their advantage.” See Mark Gamsa, “The Epidemic of Pneumonic Plague in Manchuria 
1910-1911,” Past and Present 190 (2006), 170. 
12 For works operating in this paradigm, see Lin Shixuan, Qingji dongbei yimin shibian zhengce zhi yanjiu 
(Taipei: Guoli zhenzhi daxue lishi xuexi, 2001); Xu Shuming, “Qingmo Heilongjiang yimin yu nongye 
 6 
For most, the nineteenth century marked the watershed moment when the Chinese 
nation began to outgrow the bounds of empire.  What made the nineteenth century so 
transformational?  The question has defined the field of Manchurian history and Qing 
history alike.  While initially focused on the Opium Wars and the impact of the West, the 
field moved to a more “China-centered” approach from the 1970s.  Historians turned to 
crises internal to the Qing order: local militarization, the phenomenon of guanggun 
(“bare sticks,” i.e., young single males), disruptions to the economy, colonization of the 
uplands and frontiers.  As Philip Kuhn wrote in his paradigm-setting book, these changes 
contributed not only to the collapse of the Qing dynasty, but of the imperial system 
itself.13  
Some of the most productive work on China’s environmental history has operated 
within this paradigm.14  In terms of the Qing period, the predominant narrative is that 
                                                                                                                                            
kaifa,” Qingshi yanjiu 2 (1991); Yang Yulian, Qingdai dongbeishi (Shenyang: Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe, 
1991); Zhao Zhongfu. Jinshi dongsansheng yanjiu lunwenji (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe youxian gongsi, 
1999); Guan Jie, Dongbei shaoshu minzu lishi yu wenhua yanjiu (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 
2007); Wei Ying, Qingdai jingqi huitun wenti yanjiu (Harbin: Heilongjiang daxue chubanshe, 2009); Liu 
Jiaxu, Qian-Guoerluosi jianshi (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2005).  For examples of works 
operating in the statist paradigm, see Wang Jianzhong, Dongbei diqu shi shenghuo shi (Harbin: 
Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 2004); Yang Yang, Mingdai dongbei jiangyu yanjiu (Changchun: Jilin 
renmin chubanshe, 2008); Christopher Isett, State, Peasant, and Merchant in Qing Manchuria, 1644-1862 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); James Reardon-Anderson’s Reluctant Pioneers (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2005); Thomas Gottschang and Diana Lary’s Swallows and Settlers: the Great 
Migration from North China to Manchuria (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of 
Michigan, 2000); and Robert Lee’s The Manchurian Frontier in Ch’ing History (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1970).  Chinese scholars have more disagreement on the timing of the rise of agriculture 
in the “Northeast,” with many emphasizing that agriculture has existed in the region since prehistory, and 
thus was always Chinese.   
13 Philip Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 
1796-1864. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. On the guanggun, see Matthew Sommer, Sex, 
Law, and Society in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). 
14 The field of Chinese environmental history has grown quickly over the past two decades. The most up-
to-date overview of the field can be found in Wang Lihua, Zhongguo lishishang de huangjiang yu shuhui 
(Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Co, 2007) and Chao Xiaohong, Shengtai huangjing yu Ming-Qing shehui 
jingji (Heifei shi: Huangshan shushe, 2004), 1-54.  For recent environmental histories of northern frontiers 
see, Zhao Zhen, Qingdai xibei shengtai bianqian yanjiu (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2005), and Zhu Sa, 
18-20 shijichu dongbu Neimenggu nongcun luohua yanjiu (Hohhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 2009), 
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imperial Chinese society reached its natural limits in the nineteenth century.15  Even prior 
to the Opium Wars (and ensuing crises in the period 1850-1950), China was pushing 
ecological limits.  During the eighteenth century in particular, the combination of peace, 
prosperity, and potatoes allowed for unprecedented commercial and demographic 
expansion: in the years 1700-1850 the population of Qing empire almost tripled while the 
acreage of cultivated land doubled.16  The dynamism and demands of the Chinese 
heartland increasingly drove settlers into the hills and onto the steppe, and new 
agricultural frontiers were established.  Pursuing this line of argument, the question has 
become: to what degree did the Qing state align itself with frontier expansion?  The 
answer requires a thesis about the Qing state itself: did it support pioneering settlers and 
attempt to integrate the polity through a “civilizing mission,” or did it back the natives 
and defend internal pluralism?  Was the empire “developmentalist” or not?17  
                                                                                                                                            
and Han Maoli. Caoyuan yu tianyuan: Liaojin shiqi xiliaohe liuyu nongmuye yu huanjing (Beijing: SDX 
Joint Publishing Company, 2006).  For English language scholarship, see See Mark Elvin and Liu Ts’ui-
jung, Sediments of Time (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Mark Elvin, The Retreat of the 
Elephants (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), Robert Marks, Tigers, Rice, Silt, and Silk (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997) and Peter Perdue, Exhausting the Earth: State and Peasant in 
Hunan, 1500-1850 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).   
15 While China-centered, much of this scholarship is at least implicitly comparative in outlook.  What, we 
have asked, were the essential “Chinese” dimensions to the human balance with nature?  Has China 
followed a unique path, or is its environmental history similar to other societies (whether they be East 
Asian, Asiatic, Eurasian, global, or otherwise)?  The comparative approach serves as a useful tonic in a 
subfield long dominated by European- and American-centered narratives.  As Kenneth Pomeranz and Peter 
Perdue have argued, putting China at the center challenges environmental histories that over-emphasize the 
standalone importance of the Enlightenment, the British economy, or European-style “capitalism” in the 
making of the global environment.15 no footnotes within footnotes!  Even prior to the Opium Wars (and 
ensuing crises in the period 1850-1950), China was pushing ecological limits, just as Europe was.  See 
Edmund Burke III and Kenneth Pomeranz, The Environment and World History (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2009).  
16 Ho Ping-ti, Studies on the Population of China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959).  Ho Ping-ti 
estimates that the population of China rose from roughly 150 million in 1700 to 430 million in 1850.  Ho, 
Studies on the Population of China, 279.  For estimated acreage, see Yeh-chien Wang, Land Taxation in 
Imperial China, 1750-1911 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), table 1.1, p. 7. 
17 The “developmentalist” framework is laid out in Burke and Pomeranz, The Environment and World 
History, 3-32. Pomeranz, “Empire and ‘Civilizing’ Missions, Past and Present” Daedalus 134, no. 2 (2005), 
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The discussion of frontiers in environmental history thus dovetails with parallel 
debates over nation building in political peripheries.  The phenomenon of states 
sponsoring settlement on their political frontiers was common to California, Australia, 
the Russian Far East, and the Qing North alike.18  Even to those at the time, Manchuria 
seemed to be another “California.”19  To the settlers, the landscapes were in essence 
rendered “empty and wild so that anyone can come to use and claim them.”20  The land 
was the wilderness peculiar to settler colonialism: “wilderness in its ideal form…free of 
people.”21  Manchus, Mongols, and other local peoples became invisible and their land a 
                                                                                                                                            
34-45; and Kären Wigen, “Culture, Power, and Place: The New Landscapes of East Asian Regionalism,” 
The American Historical Review 104, no. 4 (1999), 1183-1201. 
18 See Adam M. McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Erika Lee, At America's Gates: Chinese Immigration during the 
Exclusion Era, 1882-1943 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003) and Mae M Ngai, 
Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004).  In Medline Yuan-yin Hsu's review in the 2009 AHR notes that Chinese, Japanese, and Indian 
governments sympathized with the concern, but argued that "merchants, diplomats, intellectuals, and other 
elites...posed fewer threats."  On “settler colonialism” as a concept, see Jack P. Greene, “Colonial History 
and National History: Reflections on a Continuing Problem,” William and Mary Quarterly 64, no. 2 (2000), 
235-250.  Note also that J.H. Elliott makes a similar distinction between settling and conquering when it 
comes to the British versus Spanish empires in the Americas.  See J.H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic 
World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 3-28.  Discourse over land in “settler” colonies tends 
towards the extremes of discounting any claims – or even the presence – of others; the land becomes terra 
nullius.  
19 Mark Gamsa, “California on the Amur, or the 'Zheltuga Republic' in Manchuria (1883-86),” The 
Slavonic and East European Review 81, no. 2 (2003), 236-266.  See also Zhou Yan, “Qingchao de ‘yimin 
shibian’ yu Meiguo xijin yundong,” Lishi dang’an 192, no. 11 (2000), 33-34. 
20 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, “Natural Resources and Capitalist Frontiers,” Economic and Political Weekly 
38, no. 48 (2003), 5101. 
21 Carolyn Merchant, “Shades of Darkness: Race and Environmental History,” Environmental History 8, no. 
3 (2003), 381. For critiques of the frontier paradigm in the historiography of the American West, see 
William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992); William Cronon, et al., Under an 
Open Sky: Rethinking America’s Western Past (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992); Donald Worster, An 
Unsettled Country Changing Landscapes of the American West (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press, 1994); Richard White, "It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own”: A History of the American West 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); and Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, 
Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
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“vacuum;” they were as atavistic as the virgin land they had failed to capitalize upon.22  
The frontier, in this sense, was “an edge of space and time: a zone of not yet – not yet 
mapped, not yet regulated.”23  
Embedded in the national argument are key assumptions that wed national 
identity to natural environment.  The basic narrative is simple: Chinese farmers claimed 
the land for the nation through homesteading.  Farms serve as shorthand for Sinicization 
and wild forests and steppes as outposts of native Tungusic or Mongol life.  The land 
begins as brimming with the potential of virgin forests, fertile soil, and disparate 
communities of indigenous peoples, and ends with Han Chinese peasants realizing the 
land’s potential through agriculture.  A frontier is born: the ethnic minorities and 
wilderness alike become anachronistic, a reflection of an earlier stage of development.  
Wilderness, in this sense, represents the natural border of nation-states: the point where 
economic dynamism in the core no longer supports the extension of political control.24 
                                                
22 The language of the “vacuum” comes from John King Fairbank: “In spite of the inevitable overflow of 
Chinese migrants into the Three Eastern Provinces, Manchuria in effect remained a vacuum down the late 
nineteenth century.” John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: the Opening of the 
Treaty Ports, 1842-1854 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 41. 
23 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, “Natural Resources and Capitalist Frontiers,” 5100.  Even today, the national 
security project of building up the frontier and claiming it for the nation continues in much the same spirit, 
from the dispatching of soldier-colonists (bingtuan) to Xinjiang in the 1950s, to the population transfers to 
Heilongjiang and Inner Mongolia during the Cultural Revolution, to contemporary debates with Russian 
and Korean scholars over historical borders; a perception of its “not yet-ness” has endured.  Rose Maria Li, 
“Migration to China’s Northern Frontier, 1953-82,” Population and Development Review 15, no. 3 (1989), 
503-538.  Hundreds of thousands of Chinese and Soviet troops guarded the Manchurian border during the 
Cold War, with territorial disputes flaring up in the 1960s.  In July 1964, Mao challenged the Soviet 
union’s claim to 1.5 million square km of former Qing lands; in March 1969 fighting broke out over an 
island in the Ussuri; and in August 1969 the Chinese government protested hundreds of Soviet incursions 
across the border. Rose Maria Li, “Migration to China’s Northern Frontier, 1953-82,” 509. 
24 The idea of natural borders was first formalized by Friedrich Ratzel in his influential work, Politische 
Geographie (1897).  Friedrich Ratzel, Politische Geographie, (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1897). For 
contemporaries in agreement, see also Jean Brunhes and Camille Vallaux. La géographie de l’histoire: 
géographie de la paix et de la guerre sur terre et sur mer (Paris: F. Alcan, 1921), 329-364, and George 
Nathaniel Curzon, Frontiers: Delivered in the Sheldonian Theatre, Oxford, November 2, 1907 (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1976). As August Lösch described the project: “Impressed by the accidental way in 
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A competing, but consonant narrative is found in Mongol national scholarship and 
in more recent ethnic minority studies.  The alignment of ethnic and environmental 
identities remain the same (Mongols with the steppe, Tungusic people with the forest, 
Chinese with the farm), but their moral values are inverted: the Chinese are transient, 
cosmopolitan, minorities; Mongols are the majority, grounded in the land and its values. 
Their archetypal roles are reversed: Mongol and Chinese become primary producer and 
“service nomad,” Apollo and Mercury.25  Embracing the stereotypes, a new wave of 
scholarship is repackaging the Mongol and Tungusic folk traditions as a type of historical 
environmental awareness; the aim is to mine the Mongol and Tungusic traditions for 
resources to combat the modern environmental crises in ways congruent with the 
romanticism of American environmentalism since the 1960s, with its idealization of the 
American Indian’s relationship with nature, or the German environmental movement a 
half-century prior.26  National identity continues to share an alignment with 
environmental identity, but this time as a critique of modern development. 
                                                                                                                                            
which states are created and smashed, we are looking out for a more natural and lasting spatial order of 
things…It is independent economic regions that we here discuss, regions not derived from but equivalent to 
those political, cultural, geographical units.” August Lösch, “The Nature of Economic Regions,” in 
Regional Development and Planning: A Reader, ed. John Friedmann (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964), 107.  
For a critical survey of the idea of “natural borders,” see Juliet J. Fall, “Artificial States? On the Enduring 
Geographical Myth of Natural Borders.” Political Geography 29 (2010) 140-147. 
25 Yuri Slezkine, The Jewish Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) 4-39. 
26 See Boldbaatar, Z.  “Mongolchuudyn Baigal’ Orchnoo Hamgallah Zan Zanwhil, Huul’ Togtoomhilin 
Höghliin Tuuhen Toim,” Tuuh: Erdem Shinzhilgeenii Bichig 188, no. 14  (2002), 80–98; Gagengaowa and 
Wuyunbatu, Menggu minzu de shengtai wenhua (Hohhot: Neimenggu jiaoyu chubanshe, 2003); Ge Zhiyi, 
Zhidu shiyuxia de caoyuan shengtai huanjing baohu (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2008); He 
Qun, Huanjing yu xiaominzu shengcun – Elunchun wenhua de bianqian (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian 
chubanshe, 2006); Wu Feng and Bao Qingde, Mengguzu shengtai zhihuilun: Neimenggu caoyuan shengtai 
huifu yu chongjian yanjiu (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2009).  For a parallel project on Chinese 
heritage, see Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Berthrong, Confucianism and Ecology: the Interrelation of 
Heaven, Earth, and Humans (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).   On the German precedent, see 
Thomas Lekan, Imagining the Nation in Nature: Landscape Preservation and German Identity, 1885-1945 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). On nature and national myth-making, see Simon Schama, 
Landscape and Memory (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1995). 
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From Nation Back to Empire: The New Qing History 
 
The developmentalist narrative of Qing environmental history, while useful in 
some contexts, poses critical problems.  “Native officials” (Ch: ZK) in the southwest, 
for example, had a relatively limited stature and significance at court, and the court at 
times pursued civilizing missions amongst their natives.27  The context was radically 
different in Mongolia and Manchuria: Mongol and Manchu bannermen did not need 
civilization; they defended civilization.  Sitting at the apex of the imperial order, their 
classical ways of life (pastoralism and hunting) were instead promoted and protected, and 
assimilation was discouraged.  Not all frontiers were equal.28 
At the same time, a “China-centered” approach is problematic for areas in which 
most source material is not written in Chinese.  Migration and land reclamation are 
important stories, but they are not the only story: each frontier was also a homeland, and 
each homeland had its own, dynamic history.  Farmers did not expand into a vacuum, and 
nowhere was the land unclaimed.  Yet despite an abundance of source materials, 
relatively little is known about the histories of Qing frontiers prior to the arrival of 
Chinese settlers, in part because most sources were not written in Chinese, but in 
Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, and other languages.  Indeed, these languages were working 
                                                
27 On the southwest, see Charles Patterson Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing 
China’s Yunnan Frontier (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), and John E. Herman, Amid the 
Clouds and Mist: China’s Colonization of Guizhou, 1200-1700 (Cambridge, Harvard University Asia 
Center, 2007).  For Ming antecedents, see Leo Kwok-yueh Shin, The Making of the Chinese State: 
Ethnicity and Expansion on the Ming Borderlands (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
28 On the spectrum of state building and identity formation patterns in Qing frontiers, see Pamela Crossley, 
et al., Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity and Frontier in Early Modern China (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2006), 1-24. 
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languages of the Qing state, right up to the twentieth century.  How then should we 
conceive of the relationship between frontier and metropole in the Qing empire?   
Recognizing the plurality of Qing rule, and taking the Qing empire seriously as an 
empire, have been at the heart of the so-called “New Qing History.”  Historians have 
uncovered how efforts to define, delimit, and maintain ethnic groups – such Manchus, 
Chinese, and Mongols – were woven into the ideological and institutional fabric of the 
empire.29  Indeed, as Manchus, the emperors, considered the maintenance of ethnic and 
regional difference to be central to the imperial project, both to preserve their position as 
conquest elite and to consolidate expansion.  These studies build off a foundation of 
critical studies of race and ethnicity that put power dynamics and state institutions at the 
center of analysis.  Questions of identity are inseparable from the institutionalization of 
imperial hierarchy: the more privilege lost its distinctive marks, the more it was upheld 
by the court.  The Qing empire, in this sense, was like other empires: territorially large 
states engaged in “self-consciously maintaining the diversity of people they conquered 
and incorporated.”30    
Manchuria and Mongolia held a special place within this order.  Their special 
stature was in part strategic.  They had value, first, as military buffers between 
                                                
29 Major works include Mark Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late 
Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Pamela K. Crossley, The Translucent Mirror: 
History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Peter 
Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2005), and Evelyn Rawski, The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing 
Imperial Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).  For review essays, see Guy, R. Kent 
, “Who Were the Manchus? A Review Essay,” The Journal of Asian Studies 61, no. 1 (2002), 151-164.  For 
the work which branded and christened this scholarship, see Joanna Waley-Cohen, “The New Qing 
History,” Radical History Review 88 (2003), 193-206.  For recent scholarship from the PRC, see Liu 
Fengyun, Qingdai zhengzhi yu guojia renting (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2012), v. 1. 
30 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power the Politics of Difference 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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neighboring states, such as Russia and Korea, while also providing the ideal space for 
soldiers to train and hone their skills as warriors and men.  For this reason, emperors had 
cause to maintain the northern “wilderness” (Ma bigan): the denser the forest, the 
stronger the defensive deterrent.31  Manchuria and Mongolia also had unique stature as 
homelands of the Manchus, who ruled at court, and the Mongols, who had unique 
historical and personal ties with the ruling house.32  The emperors associated themselves 
and their ethnicity with the flora and fauna of their Manchu homeland, from magpies and 
birch trees to the so-called “three treasures:” ula grass, sable, and ginseng.33  This close 
connection of the Manchus to their ancestral homeland was featured in all manner of 
literature, from popular folktales to high-minded literature, and figured prominently in 
material culture, including fur clothing, birch-bark crafts, and distinctly boreal foods and 
medicines, such as elk tail and wild ginseng.  
Specific institutions were called upon to reinforce the distinctive position of 
Mongols and Manchus in particular, including segregation, sumptuary laws, language 
instruction, and military schooling.  Citing these strategic and cultural imperatives, the 
court took steps to militarize, monopolize, and conserve the natural frontier in its image.  
Movement into, or even through, Manchuria or Mongolia was strictly monitored and 
regulated.  Both frontiers were governed through military institutions: the Eight Banner 
system in Manchuria, and the Mongol banner system in Mongolia.  Reflecting the multi-
                                                
31 Nineteenth-century thinkers held the opposite view: strength lay in mass militias, so densely populated 
frontiers were ideal.  
32 David M. Farquhar, “The Origins of the Manchus’ Mongolian Policy,” in the Chinese World Order, ed. 
John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 198-205; Nicola Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu 
Bao, Manchu-Mongol Relations on the Eve of the Qing Conquest: A Documentary History (Leiden: 
Boston, 2003).   
33 Mark Elliott, “The Limits of Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies.”  
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ethnic character of the state, there was no one governing language.  Both Manchu and 
Chinese were used at court, while other recognized languages were used locally, 
including, Manchu in Manchuria, Mongolian in Mongolia, and Tibetan in Tibet.   
To study identity and ideology, the field is increasingly turning to sources that are 
not just in Chinese, but also materials written in the court language, Manchu, as well in 
regional languages such as Mongolian.  In Mongolia and Manchuria in particular, the 
extreme minority of archival documents were ever written or translated into Chinese until 
the second half of the nineteenth century.  In the case of Outer Mongolia, only trade 
registers and permits, produced under the aegis of the Trade Supervisor’s office used 
Chinese: the arrow, banner, and league offices all used Mongolian, while the offices of 
the Military Governor in Uliasutai and Imperial Representative in Khüree (modern Ulan 
Bator) used Manchu, which was further used to communicate with the emperor in 
Beijing. 
The research for this dissertation pursues this same direction and relies heavily 
upon the largely unexplored Manchu- and Mongolian-language materials held at the 
Mongolian National Central Archive (MNCA) in Ulaanbaatar and the First Historical 
Archive (FHA) in Beijing.  The foundation of my research there was fond M1D1, the 
records of the office of the Imperial Representative in Khüree (the office of the 
“ambans”).34  Further use was made of the records of the Military-General at Uliasutai in 
fond M2D1.  In Beijing, two Manchu-language sources were used primarily: the 
                                                
34 For a brief overview of the archives and M1D1, see Miyawaki Junko, “Mongoru kokuritsu chuō 
monjokan shozō no Manjugo, Mongorugo shiryō – toku ni Ifu-furē-Manju daijin no yakusho (Korin ichiji 
daijin gamon) bunsho ni tsuite,” Shi shiryō habu chiiki bunka kenkyū 2 (2009), 135-141, and Miyawaki 
Junko, “Report on the Manchu Documents Stored at the Mongolian National Central Archives of History,” 
Saksaha 4 (1999), 6-13.   
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Accounts of the Imperial Household Department (Ch: *9jǫê) and the Copies of 
Manchu Palace Memorials of the Grand Council (Ch: ǑéƢĆÆǬ4j¿).35  Taken 
as a whole, the archival documents present both a fuller, more detailed, and more 
complex picture of the frontiers that is altogether lacking from conventional accounts.  It 
is not too much to say that without these documents it would be completely impossible to 
reconstruct the story that is told in these pages. 
While since the 1980s scholars in the PRC have been publishing significant works 
using the Manchu and Mongol sources,36 most studies of Qing frontiers continue to rely 
on published Chinese-language materials, such as the Veritable Records, gazetteers, and 
accounts by exiles.  In both Manchuria and Mongolia, the vast majority of archival 
materials are in Manchu and Mongol.  At court, moreover, whole genres of state 
documents on the frontiers, such as confidential military communications, were never 
translated into Chinese.37  The intimacy of Manchu-language memorials could be lost in 
translation.  Still more problematic, Qing-period writers and translators often elided or 
transformed the meanings of Manchu words in Chinese, as both material objects and 
                                                
35 For a critical description of Manchu language archives in FHA, see Mark C. Elliott, “The Manchu-
Language Archives of the Qing Dynasty and the Origins of the Palace Memorial System,” Late Imperial 
China 22, no. 1 (2000), 1-70.  
36 For recent publcations using Manchu sources to write the history of Manchuria, see Tong Yonggong, 
Manyuwen yu manwen dang’an yanjiu (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2009); Wang Peihuan, Yige 
dengshang longting de minzu: manzu shuihui yu gongting (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2006); 
and Ding Yizhuang, Guo Songyi, Kang Wenlin [Cameron Campbell] and Li Zhongqing [James Lee], 
Liaodong yiminzhong de qiren shehui (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue yuanchu banshe, 2004).  For 
scholars using Mongol and Manchu to study Inner Mongolia, see Liang Lixia, Alashan Menggu yanjiu 
(Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 2005); Wurenqiqige, 18-20 shijichu guihuacheng Tumete caizheng yanjiu 
(Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2008); and Wuyunbilige, Shiqi shiji menggushi lunkao (Hohhot: Neimenggu 
renmin chubanshe, 2009). 
37 Beatrice Bartlett, “Books of Revelations: The Importance of the Manchu Language Archival Record 
Books for Research on Ch’ing History,” Late Imperial China 6, no. 2 (1985), 33. Pamela Crossley and 
Evelyn S. Rawski, “A Profile of the Manchu Language in Ch’ing History,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic 
Studies 53, no.1 (1993), 63-102. 
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abstract ideas sometimes lacked easy analogues or assumed new meanings altogether.  
Translation, that is, was a fundamental interface through which the Qing empire was 
integrated; the unity of its disparate realms was structured around such choices of 
translation.38  It is only through the study of the extensive non-Chinese materials, 
however, that the peculiar lens of the Chinese sources is revealed as historical reflections 
of empire.39 
From the vantage of archival documents, and with the insights of New Qing 
History, does the history of Qing frontiers appear different?  We have discussed two 
productive fields of inquiry: environmental history and New Qing history.  The first 
delves into the commercial expansion in the Chinese interior and the problem of resource 
depletion; the second investigates how the empire institutionalized ethnic and territorial 
distinctions.  Both processes were simultaneous.  How, then, were they related?  How do 
we make sense of the complex relationship between economic, environmental, and 
political geographies of the Qing empire?  
Environment and Economy: the Materiality of Qing Frontiers 
 
Translation was but one mechanism for integrating frontier and metropole; 
maintaining the Qing empire required various “repertoires of power.”40  Military 
garrisons, tribute and tax payments, the palace-memorial system, population transfers, 
                                                
38 Miyazaki Ichisada, “Shinchō ni okeru kokugo mondai no ichimen,” Tōhōshi ronsō 1 (1947): 1-56. 
Matthew W. Mosca, “Empire and the Circulation of Frontier Intelligence: Qing Conceptions of the 
Ottomans,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 70, no. 1 (2010), 147–207; Christopher Atwood, 
“‘Worshipping Grace’: the Language of Loyalty in Qing Mongolia,” Late Imperial China 21, no. 2 (2000), 
86-139. 
39 Mark C. Elliott, “Manwen dang’an yu xin Qingshi,” National Palace Museum Quarterly 24.2 (2006), 1-
18. 
40 I borrow the concept of imperial “repertoires of power” from Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World 
History: Power the Politics of Difference, 7, 16. 
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imperial cults, encyclopedic publishing projects, and the issuance of passports for cross-
regional trade all served as other important integrative mechanisms.  The Qing empire 
was built upon a range of technologies, epistemological, bureaucratic, and infrastructural; 
its success hinged both on its unprecedented productive capacity and its ability to 
mobilize these resources.41  
The sheer distance of the Inner Asian frontiers also helped define its material 
identity.  The diversity of these reportoires deployed for each region was in part a 
function of the Qing empire’s immense scale and its limited position at the local level.  In 
the Chinese interior, where the vast majority of imperial subjects lived, administration 
was small relative to population size.  This trend grew ever more pronounced as 
population boomed, but the size of government remained constant.  In Inner Asia, on the 
other hand, government was small relative to the land area. In the Chinese interior, 
magistrates appointed from Beijing were rotated between 1,549 counties, with further 
court-delegate officials nested at the prefectural, provincial, and regional levels.42  In 
contrast, Qing Inner Asia – a land area encompassing 7.3 million square kilometers, or 
nearly two-thirds of all Qing territory43 – was governed by only a handful of imperial 
                                                
41 Peter Perdue, China Marches West; Peter Perdue, “Military Mobilization in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-
Century China, Russia, and Mongolia,” Modern Asian Studies 30, no. 4 (1996), 757-793.  Empires are 
premised upon technologies and a concentration of resources that allow the projection of sovereign but 
limited power across space.  Different epochs provided different technological opportunities, such as the 
chariot or gunpowder, as well as different access to resources; from the last quarter of the 16th century on, 
early modern commercial and demographic expansion facilitated an unprecedented and simultaneous 
growth of state power across Eurasia.Marshall G.S. Hodgson, “The Interrelations of Societies in History,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 5, no. 2 (1963), 240, 248. 
42 The figure of 1,549 is taken from Zhou Zhenhe, Zhongguo difang xingzheng zhidushi (Shanghai: 
Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2005), 204.  
43 The vast majority of these officials were based out of Manchuria – the imperial enclave par excellence.  
The estimates were calculated for the period 1757-1858, when the empire was at its territorial apex.  A 
estimated total land area of 11,331,957 km2 for the Qing empire was arrived at by taking the sum of the 
modern-day land areas of China (9,565,961 km2), Mongolia (1,564,116 km2), and Primorsky krai (165,900 
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representatives and military governors, scattered in disparate outposts across Tibet, 
Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria.  In all of Outer Mongolia – a land area 
encompassing 1.5 million square kilometers – court-appointed officials were located in 
only four towns (Khüree, Khiakhta, Uliasutai, and Khobdo).   
A common feature to frontier commodity trades was the enormous distances 
involved.  Such great distances necessitated high degrees of capitalization to overcome 
transportation costs.  In Mongolia, the solution was provided by merchants and the 
caravan system, by which the great merchant houses assumed the risks of trade and 
supplied the necessary start-up funds.  In Manchuria, the Qing state itself provided the 
funds and assumed the risks, importing commodities through the tribute system.  
Crossing between frontier and metropole likewise required moving between jurisdictions, 
and thus also required mechanisms for passing in and out of the Chinese interior and 
across differing banners.  The trade itself required supra-jurisdictional coordination, 
which in the case of the Qing, was provided under the umbrella of empire.44   
                                                                                                                                            
km2) in Russia.  The estimate for Inner Asian lands was arrived at by summing the land area of modern 
Tibet (1,178,577 km2), Qinghai (720,459 km2), Xinjiang (1,743,441 km2), Inner Mongolia (1,181,104 km2), 
Heilongjiang (431,767 km2), Jilin (191,038 km2), Liaoning (147,451 km2), modern Mongolia, and 
Primorsky krai, yielding a figure of 4,451,632 km2, or 64.6% of total land area. Clearly, the estimates are 
crude – the reader should be wary of using these modern state and provincial boundaries as a basis for such 
a calculation.  Provincial boundaries, for one, have changed considerably since 1860.  Provincial level 
administration in the Qing period, moreover, did not entail a single type of local administration, whether 
“Inner Asian” or otherwise: thus parts of Qinghai were governed through the junxian system, while certain 
parts of Sichuan and Yunnan were governed as Tibetan. If the figures should thus be taken with a large 
grain of salt, being no more than rough estimates, they still illustrate the sheer vastness of territories 
commonly thought of as mere “frontiers.”  Sources: The World Factbook, “Geography: China,” China, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (accessed April 24, 2012); 
Statoids, “Provinces of China,” http://www.statoids.com/ucn.html (accessed April 24, 2012); and RIN.ru, 
“Primorsky Krai,” Map of Russia, http://map.rin.ru/cgi-bin/main_e.pl?Region=primorsk (accessed April 
24, 2012).  
44 Pomeranz, The World that Trade Created; Trade Diasporas, globalization, etc. 
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Indeed, despite their immense distances from the metropolitan core, the frontiers 
were long commercially integrated with the center: they were not only defensive 
bufferzones, or ethnic homelands, but productive spaces.  Since Owen Lattimore, Inner 
Asianists have long emphasized these economic and environmental dimensions to the 
Great Wall boundary: the steppes of Mongolia and forests of Manchuria were never 
autarkic.  As Emanuel Marx recently argued against the idea of nomadic autarky, 
“pastoralists are so deeply involved in the market economy that they should be seen as 
specialized segments of a complex city-based economy.”45  Prominent Inner Asianists 
since Owen Lattimore, including Anatoly Khazanov, Thomas Barfield, and Nicola Di 
Cosmo have similarly argued for an economic understanding of both nomadism and the 
Inner-Asia China frontier.46 
Provocatively, in Nature’s Metropolis, William Cronon likewise used the insights 
of economic geography to reconceptualize the American frontier as a spatialized form of 
market specialization.47  Cronon called for a return to classical center-place theory, which 
posits that “land will progressively be given up to products cheap to transport in relation 
to their value.”48  The model predicts concentric rings of land use, determined by 
transportation costs, which surround a city in free market conditions: first a belt of high-
                                                
45 Emanuel Marx, “Nomads and Cities: The Development of a Conception,” in Shifts and Drifts in Nomad-
Sedentary Relations, eds. Stefan Leder and Bernhard Streck (Wiesbaden: L. Reichert, 2005), 6. 
46 Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (New York: American Geographical Society, 1940); 
Khazanov (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994); Thomas Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: 
Nomadic Empires and China, 221BC to AD 1757 (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1989); and Nicola Di 
Cosmo Ancient China and Its Enemies: the Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
47 See William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis.  
48 Quoted in Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis, 48.   
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value agriculture, which gives way to lower-value agriculture, then pastoralism, and 
finally hunting and trapping.49  As Cronon argued, Frederick Jackson Turner’s famous 
theory of the frontier – which imagined a progressive development from trapping, to 
herding, to farming, to city life –works less as a teleology than a description of 
synchronous, spatialized responses to urbanization.  
In his classic study of the tribute system, John King Fairbank likewise represented 
the “Chinese world order” as a system of concentric circles radiating out from the capital, 
with each encircling ring representing ever increasing degrees of cultural marginality and 
political independence.50  As one’s distance from the center (i.e. the emperor) increased, 
so too did the type of material wealth demanded by the court.  These relations took ritual 
form through the tribute system.  Thus grain and silver were extracted from the “Middle 
Kingdom,” horses from the Inner Asian steppes, and fur from the taiga.  Fairbank’s 
tribute system was in part an idealization and formalization of economic space as seen 
from the capital: the farther one moved from the capital city, the greater the effort 
required to transport one’s product, and the greater the value of the commodity offered as 
tribute.   
But whereas center-place theory predicts the spatialization of economic relations, 
the tribute system assumes both a permanence of relations and an identity of not only 
place and product, but of people and polity as well.  The Oroncon were hunters organized 
into a fixed administrative-spatial unit in the Manchurian taiga; Kazaks were nomads 
living on the steppes west of Xinjiang, and so on.  While Fairbank’s model has been 
                                                
49 Ibid., 49. 
50 John King Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework,” in The Chinese World Order, ed. John King Fairbank 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 1-20. 
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justly critiqued for failing to recognize the plurality of Qing rule and approaches to 
foreign policy, the basic insight that people were imagined in relation to the land they 
lived and the products they produced did, in fact, characterize Qing ideology.  The nexus 
of people, product, and place was fundamental both at court and in the marketplace: the 
narratives implied in this nexus were central to the Qing imperial order, as a multiethnic 
empire; they also created value in the market place: wilderness and the frontier were 
marketable brands.51   
 For this reason, the study of resource production and commodities offer an 
important vantage on both the political and economic dimensions of frontier and 
metropole in the Qing empire: changes in production and exchange altered the balance 
between place, product, and people.  Recent scholarship on Qing frontiers has 
emphasized how, beneath the umbrella of empire, commercial exchanges helped bring 
the various homelands into contact with one another, and some of the most exciting 
scholarship in the field has centered on commodities.  Natural resources in particular 
were often at the center of frontier-metropole relations, from the lumber industry of the 
southwest, to the pharmaceutical and mineral industries of Xinjiang and Mongolia, to the 
ginseng trade in Manchuria.52  
                                                
51 On the relationship between desire and the existential longevity, see Michael Pollan, The Botany of 
Desire: A Plant’s Eye View of the World (New York: Random House, 2001).  In this view, plants have 
agency because they stimulate the desire to plant them.  Humans are not masters but hosts, safeguarding the 
survival of everything from wheat and rice to sugarcane and cotton to cocoa and coffee.  
52 For the Qing court in general see Lai Huimin, Tianhuang guizhou: Qing huangzu de jieceng jiegou yu 
jingji shenghuo (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1997). For sable, fur, and deer horn, 
see Cong Peiyuan, Dongbei sanbao jingji jianshi (Beijing: Zhongguo huanjing kexue chubanshe 1990); On 
fur, see Lai Huimin, “Qianlongchao Neifuyuan pihuo maimai yu jingcheng shishang,” Zhongyang 
yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan 21, no. 1 (2003), 101-134, and Yoshihiro Kawachi, “Mindai tōhoku 
Ajia chōhi bōeki” Tōyoshi kenkyō 30.1 (1971): 62-120.  On ginseng, see Chiang Chushan, Qingdai renshen 
de lishi: yige shangpin de yanjiu  (Ph.D. Thesis, National Tsing Hua University, 2006). On gold, see Mette 
High and Jonathan Schlesinger, “Rulers and Rascals: The Politics of Gold in Mongolian Qing History,” 
Central Asian Survey 29, no. 3 (2010), 289-304; for jade, see James Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, 
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Depending on the institutional relationship with the court, different jurisdictions 
had different official mechanisms to facilitate cross-regional trade.  Depending on the 
resource and the jurisdiction, different regimes were in place: one could submit the 
commodity as tribute, register with the state before trading it, or participate in the 
blackmarket.  The Inner Asian resource economy can thus be imagined as a matrix of 
political jurisdictions and economic institutions.  In its most simplified form, however, 
one can imagine four broad types of administrative space in the northern frontiers: 1) 
Eight Banner territory in Manchuria, 2) Mongol banner territory in Mongolia, 3) 
Urianghai and Hunting banner territory near the Russian borderlands, and 4) restricted 
areas, which included imperial hunting grounds, holy mountains, and the Russian 
borderlands themselves.  Before the resource boom, in 1750, we can represent the 
exploitation of the most valuable commodities as such (see Figure 1): 
Figure 1: Schema of Resource Production and Exchange Mechanisms in Mongolia and 
Manchuria, 1750 
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Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1795-1864 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); on 
lumber, see Ueda Makoto, “Fūkin, kaisei, chikin: Shindai chūki Kōsei ni okeru sanchi kaihatsu.” Toyoshi 
Kenkyu 61.4 (2003), 115-145; Aihara Yoshiyuki, “Keidai chūki, Kishu tōnanbu shimizu ryūiki niokeru 
mokuzai no ryūtsū kōzō,” Kyōkai keizai shigaku 72.5 (2007): 25-44; Zhang Yingqiang. Mucai zhi liudong: 
Qingdai qingshuijiang xiayou diqu de shichang, quanli yu shehui Beijing: Shenghuo dushu xinzhi sanlian 
shudian, 2006. 
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Mushrooms 
 
Environmental, market, and political pressure drove a reconfiguration of this 
matrix by 1850: some forms of exchange were prohibited altogether (Manchurian pearls); 
others were newly licensed and monitored by the state (pharmaceutical deer horn); and 
still others have become tributary items (fur) (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Schema of Resource Production and Exchange Mechanisms in Mongolia and 
Manchuria, 1850 
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 While we can identify three mechanisms by which frontier products entered the 
Chinese interior, the situation in practice was far more complex.  While the state made 
attempted to intervene in all these types of trade, the resource boom intensified the black 
market for all resources, even when there were legal mechanisms for obtaining the 
product.  Further, there were always shades of grey between the ideal types: licensed 
merchants collected tribute, tribute collectors became black marketers, poachers dealt 
with licensed merchants.  A key aim of this dissertation is to unravel tangled webs as they 
change over time.  Understanding the history of the frontier is impossible without doing 
so.  
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There were significant differences between jurisdictional types (centralized 
oversight in the Eight banner system, local noble rule in the Mongol banners), as well as 
within the jurisdictional types themselves (Inner Mongol banners were built around 
arrows, Outer Mongol banners were not; the place in the administrative and ideological 
hierarchy of the Urianghai and the various Manchurian hunting banners differed greatly).  
Yet common to all administrative units was an overarching concern with the integrity of 
the territorial and ethnic order.  The borders between banners mattered, and movement 
between banners was highly regulated.   
Rethinking the Nature of Frontiers: the Purity of Place, People, and Production 
 
Using Manchuria and Mongolia as case studies, this dissertation argues that 
resource depletion did not undermine the Qing imperial order.  Rather, it helped define it: 
China’s economic expansion and Qing empire building were mutually reinforcing, not 
conflicting, processes.  Prior to Chinese homesteading, growing consumption of natural 
resources in the metropole led to resource depletion and a sense of environmental crisis in 
the frontiers.  In the years 1750-1850, ginseng, than pearls, than fur-bearing animals 
disappeared from the wild in Manchuria, while furs disappeared from the northern 
Mongol borderlands at the same time, as certain Mongol banners became intensive 
production sites for products such as wild mushroom.  Through the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the state mobilized itself to establish a conservation order to rest the 
land, confront the environmental crisis, and return Mongols and Manchus to their proper 
way of life.  These efforts involved creating new territorial controls on the one hand, and, 
to use the language of Qing documents, making the land itself “pure” on the other, and so 
protect the constellation of people, flora, fauna, and other material objects which gave the 
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land its identity.  Environmental concerns were not tangential to the greater imperial 
project of defining, delimiting, and segregating ethnic groups; it was central to it.   
Central to this concept of purity was the idea that a certain way of life bound 
people to both their homeland and the material objects it produced. The “purity” project 
in Qing frontiers, however, was not simply a matter of strategic stability in the face of 
commercial change.  Significantly, the market did not work in a single direction: 
consumer demand inspired both depletion or conservation, depending on context.  When 
consumers demanded authentic forms and locations of production, for example, it 
provided grounds for sustainability. Indeed, the reproduction of Manchurian and 
Mongolian landscapes was impossible without the nature of this peculiar demand and the 
desire of consumers, including the Qing court itself.  Both the political and commercial 
orders demanded, for example, that the forests of Manchuria be inhabited by seasoned 
Manchu hunters and jet-black sables: empire, because seasoned Manchus were the state’s 
military basis; markets, because consumers thought the black sables from Manchuria to 
be best.  These two demands, moreover, were not unrelated: discourses of consumption 
and production were intimately connected. 
Environmental history revolves around the relationship between humans and 
nature: either humans change the environment, or the environment changes us.  In the 
classical formation, nature imposes limits on unchecked commercial and demographic 
growth: in a world of excess, people grow sick, rivers run dry, the climate becomes a 
furnace.  Nature in this sense has a creative agency outside humankind: one set of laws 
and objects belongs to humans, another to nature.53  In the European tradition, that is, 
                                                
53 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 1-48 
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nature implies a narrative about creation: to know whether something is natural requires 
understanding and authenticating its point of origin and subsequent history.  How was it 
created?  Where did it come from?  Has someone modified it, or is it free from outside 
intervention?  One must make distinctions and draw lines.54 
It is impossible to map the European vision of “nature,” with all its semantic 
implications, neatly onto the Chinese context.  In the Qing period, for one, environmental 
crises were perceived as political failures, not simply uncontrollable, “natural” disasters.  
As Peter Perdue and R. Bin Wong argued, “it is virtually impossible” to “distinguish 
unambiguously ‘natural’ and ‘human’ causes of crises.”55 Amidst the crises of the 
nineteenth century, that is, natural and human problems alike reflected a failure of 
statecraft.  In the official viewpoint, that is, there were only cases of maladministration, 
not of natural intervention.56   
Yet, at the same time, narratives about origins mattered tremendously in the Qing, 
serving as a crucial arbiter of moral and commercial value. The discourse of origins 
informed the bounds of ethnicity, territory, law, and political legitimacy.  Similar 
questions were asked of objects, places, and people as one would ask of “nature”: How 
was it created?  Where did it come from?  Has it ever been altered, or is it free from 
                                                
54 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern; William Cronon, Changes in the Land (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1983); Ramachandra Guha, Environmentalism: A Global History (New York: Longman, 2000).  
The story of nature as we know it is inseparable from the Scientific Revolution, the rise of early modern 
economy, and the Age of Empires: only then did the European idea of wilderness and naturalness come 
sharply into focus. The break reflected a new and institutionalized relationship to natural world, and a new 
sense of empowerment over natives and nature alike. 
55 R. Bin Wong and Peter C. Perdue, “Review: Famine’s Foes in Ch’ing China,” Harvard Journal of 
Asiatic Studies 43, no. 1 (1983), 295.  See also Lillian M. Li, Fighting Famine in North China: State, 
Market, and Environmental Decline, 1690s-1990s (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
56 Peter Perdue, “Official Goals and Local Interests: Water Control in the Dongting Lake Region during the 
Ming and Qing Periods,” 757-758. 
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foreign intervention?  Common origins implied shared identities.  The Qing state 
legitimated itself and constantly worked to keep people in touch with their roots: 
Manchus with Manchuria, Mongols with Mongolia, Han Chinese with China.  The most 
debased people were those divorced from their natural homes: the “rootless rascals.” 
While origins were not necessarily conceived of as “natural” vs. “cultural,” similar 
historical narratives were nonetheless constructed for all things produced: some people 
and products were remained untouched by foreign intervention, others did not, and still 
others remained untouched but their production sites – their homelands – were the objects 
transformed.  
In Qing documents, the state of being untouched by foreign intervention was 
described as being “clean” or “pure” (Ma: bolgo; Mo: ariγun; Ch: Ą). In practice, the 
concept of “purification” meant putting a place in order: returning the land to its original 
state, with its original people, and producing its original products.   Here Qing “purity” 
was similar in spirit to how Mary Douglas conceived it, as a process of making borders 
and clarifying social roles:  
Ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing 
transgressions have as their main function to impose system on an 
inherently untidy experience.  It is only by exaggerating the difference 
between within and without, above and below, male and female, with 
and against, that a semblance of order is created.57   
 
Just as when one we clean a house, “we are separating, placing boundaries, 
making visible statements about the home that we are intending to create out of the 
material house,”58 so too was the Qing empire making visible statements about empire 
                                                
57 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London: Routledge 
& K. Paul, 1966), 4.  
58 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger, 68.  
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out of material landforms and their products.   Where the land was holiest, or the 
potential danger of transgressions was greatest, the Qing state pursued its purity project 
with the greatest vigor.  The borderlands with Russia and Korea, sacred mountains, 
imperial hunting grounds, and tribute collecting sites in Manchuria long held this stature; 
as the pages below show, the ethnic homeland of Mongolia came to as well.  Studying 
environmental history requires studying borders. 
In this sense, this dissertation also speaks to scholarship on modern territoriality.  
A premium placed by states on territoriality helped define the modern period, from 
roughly 1860-1975.59  In the case of the Qing, we have long known that borders mattered 
as well, particularly on the northern, Inner Asian borders.60  Indeed, to a certain degree, 
the construction of these borders, and the Qing institutions established to separate space 
and segregate people were robust and prominent enough in 1860 to serve as analogues 
and precedents for China’s encounter with modern Europe after the Opium Wars.61  
Showing, first, that borders mattered in the Qing world, the dissertation moves on to ask: 
what were the sources of territorialization in the Qing?   
The drive to delineate and maintain boundaries was common to both Manchuria 
and Mongolia, though not always for the same reason.  As in the interior, resource 
management in Qing frontiers required a complex negotiation between local, regional, 
                                                
59 Charles Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern 
Era,” The American Historical Review 105.3 (2000), 807-831. 
60 Peter Perdue, China Marches West, 409-461.  See also Mark Mancall, Russia and China: Their 
Diplomatic Relations to 1728 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
61 For a full discussion, see Pär Cassel, “Excavating Extraterritoriality: the ‘Judicial Sub-Prefect’ as 
Prototype for the Mixed Court in Shanghai,” Late Imperial China 24.2 (2003), 156-182.  See also Joseph 
Fletcher, “The Heyday of the Ch’ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet,” in Cambirdge History of 
China: Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part I, ed. Denis C. Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: 
Cambirdge University Press, 1978), vol. 10, 377; and R. Kent Guy, “Who Were the Manchus?” Journal of 
Asian Studies 61.1 (2002): 151–64. 
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and imperial interests.62  In both regions, I argue, one common reason to establish 
boundaries and enhance territorial controls was resource depletion.  As jurisdictional 
conflicts over access and the costs of policing increased, the state produced more maps, 
markers on the ground, border patrols, and negotiations to establish jurisdictional 
authority.  In Mongolia, the process was largely bottom up: local noblemen cannot 
resolve a jurisdictional dispute, and regional authorities, as representatives of the Qing 
court, come in to mediate and establish a border.  In Manchuria, in contrast, the process 
was often top down: the imperial government mobilizes bannermen to cordon off the 
area.  In practice, that is, the administrative processes that defined, delimited, and 
segregated ethnic groups were often pushed by new forms of natural resource 
exploitation and environmental transformation in the frontiers, particularly during the 
years 1750-1850. 
Qing ideology, in this sense, was similar to frontier narratives: it relied on simple 
ethnic binaries and failed to capture the ambiguities, complexity, and multiplicity of 
perspectives in Qing frontiers.  Through the early nineteenth century, moreover, there 
was anxiety that not only were borders being crossed, but that local people themselves 
were changing.  Indeed, while the court institutionalized different administrative statuses 
of Mongols and Chinese, in practice people did not neatly fit into the basic binary.  
People were often more cosmopolitan than insular: intermarriage was common; Chinese 
                                                
62 On the complex political dynamics created by the shifting ecological balance, see Peter Perdue, 
Exhausting the Earth; Peter Perdue, “Official Goals and Local Interests: Water Control in the Dongting 
Lake Region during the Ming and Qing Periods,” The Journal of Asian Studies 41, no. 4 (1982), 747-765; 
and William Rowe  “Water Control and the Qing Political Process: The Fankou Dam Controversy, 1876-
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and Mongols were often bilingual or trilingual; Chinese took Mongol names; Mongols 
farmed and participated in trade caravans.  
In the years 1750-1850, in short, the impetus for drawing boundaries in Mongolia 
and Manchuria came from the burgeoning resource economy, whether to clarify who 
could profit from what land, or (just as often) to clarify who paid the costs for policing.  
Ultimately, territorialization and purification were flip sides of the same coin: both 
emerged as a response to the sense that the land, people, and ways of life of the frontier 
were getting dangerously “mixed up.”   
 
Chapter Summary 
 
The dissertation is composed of five chapters.  Chapter 1 opens with consumers in 
Beijing.  It argues that the eighteenth century saw a surge in consumption of furs and 
other frontier product as the frontier itself was appropriated as part of Qing identity.  
Where furs once represented something barbarian or specifically Manchu, they became 
an emblem of a more cosmopolitan, elite, and imperial culture of the high Qing.  Both the 
nature and intensity of consumer demand shaped the material history of the frontiers, 
both driving depletion and providing an impetus towards conservation.  Ultimately, the 
discourse of fur pelts and fur-bearing animals, game meat and game parks were 
intertwined. 
Chapters 2 and 3 follow the commodity chain to the production and movement of 
commodities in the frontiers.  Chapter 2 opens the discussion with a description of the 
“tribute” system in Manchuria with case studies of the fur, ginseng, and pearl trades.  All 
of the three of these natural resources were depleted in the wild between 1750 and 1850: 
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the pearl beds were stripped bare, ginseng was increasingly domesticated, and fur-bearing 
animals disappeared. Chapter 3 shifts focus to the creation and maintenance of the 
licensing system in Outer Mongolia.  In Mongolia, the court and the banners pursued the 
convergent strategies of licensing some types of resource exploitation, including wood-
cutting and the harvesting of medicinal deer horn, but banned others, such as mushroom-
picking.   
Chapters 4 and 5 then turn to perceptions of environmental crisis surrounding the 
illegal exploitation of resources, such as mushrooms, and the ensuing drive for “purity.”  
Chapter 4 uses a case study of the mushroom picking business to show how all of 
Mongolia’s pastureland was “purified,” in essence being protected like landscapes of 
holy mountains or imperial hunting grounds.  In both scenarios, the court and its imperial 
representatives worked with local officials to uphold the Mongol “way of life,” the 
institutions supporting segregation and the integrity of the banners. In the case of 
mushroom picking, where the environmental and social effects were perceived as too 
destabilizing, the state pursued a campaign of “purification.” 
Chapter 5 explores how amidst the depletion of fur-bearing animals, the taiga of 
the borderlands with Russia was “purified,” creating a “natural” border with Russia.   
Even prior to the early nineteenth century, “purity” was the watchword in restricted areas, 
such as holy mountains, imperial game parks, and the borderlands with Russia.  In all of 
these spaces, any form of human intrusion was prohibited; not only could one not hunt 
there, one could not even spook the animals.  Yet all of these spaces, like the rest of the 
frontier, were defined in practice against the poaching, corruption, and black market 
activity of the boom years.   
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The story of these dramatic material and discursive turns begins at court and with 
consumers in Beijing.  It is that story that we turn in Chapter 1.
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Chapter 1: Marketing the Frontier 
 
Introduction 
“Ah, it is lamentable!  It has been over a hundred years since China fell but, 
remarkably, the mode of dress is still the same as before the downfall.  It has come down 
through actors in the theater.”1  So mused Pak Chiwǒn (1737-1805), the Korean 
polymath and satirist, who visited China in 1780 and realized, to his horror, that there 
were but two types of men in China that dressed civilized: Koreans and period actors.  
Everyone else dressed rudely, like barbarians, in furs.  For Pak Chiwǒn, silk was 
civilized; fur was not.  Yet for the Qing emperor Qianlong (r. 1735-1795), for whom he 
had come to pay tribute, fur was the epitome of elite fashion.  Indeed, it was central to his 
identity as both a Manchu and ruler of a universal empire.   As a token of his generosity, 
he sent Pak Chiwǒn’s party home to Seoul with a parting gift: top-grade sable pelts.   
One could not separate the fur from the man: in the Qing empire, clothing and 
material culture were inseparable from personal identity.2  Clothing represented one’s self 
as much as the pockmarks on one’s face or the color of one’s skin; “name-age-
appearance” (Ma: gebu se arbun) bulletins for escaped slaves, lost wives, and military 
deserters mixed physical and sartorial descriptions, as if one never changed outfits.3  By 
law, fugitives were “captured and investigated according to their physical appearance and 
                                                
1 Pak Chi-wǒn, The Jehol Diary (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2010), 189. 
2 Antonia Finnane, Changing Clothes in China: Fashion, History, Nation (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2008). 
3 M1D1-3833.35 (DG6.9.29). 
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clothing” (Ma: banin muru, etuhe etuku de acabume baicame jafabuki).4  It was illegal to 
knock off someone’s hat (or tug on their tassels) during a fight.5  When a foreign man 
died in Qing Mongolia, his body and clothing alike were to be removed to his home 
jurisdiction.6  
It was because clothing represented identity, and because furs represented the 
frontier and Manchu identity in particular, that it aroused so such strong reactions. Even 
today, wearing furs is a loaded practice: is it civilized or brutal?   Today the debate is 
argued in terms of Enlightened liberalism: the value of fur hinges on questions of rights 
and abuse.  In imperial China, fur commanded a similar position as a civilizational 
flashpoint; like the Romans, Byzantines, and Umayyads, furs in China could represent 
the culture of barbarians,7 with the politics of fur refracted through relations on the 
frontier.  When the frontier epitomized war and exile, furs represented the style of 
China’s Inner Asian enemies and a life of hardship, loneliness, and brutality; to wear furs 
was akin to wearing primitive “skins” in English.  It is reminder that there is nothing 
inherently precious about furs or any other material object: value is not determined by 
functionality; furs are prized not simply for their warmth in winter or their resilience in 
rain, but for the prestige they confer upon the wearer.8  
                                                
4 M1D1-3833.33 (DG6.10.1). 
5 TGKH 55: 12a. 
6 M1D1-3697.34a (JQ25.3.1). 
7 James Howard-Johnston argues that prior to the Abbasid revolution, with its roots in Khorasan, the 
classical Mediterranean empires associated furs less with legitimate power than with Goths, Huns, Franks 
and Vikings.  James Howard-Johnston, “Trading in Fur, from Classical Antiquity to the Early Middle 
Ages,” in Leather and Fur: Aspects of Early Medieval Trade and Technology, ed. Esther Cameron et al 
(London: Archetype Publications Ltd, 1998), 70-74.   
8 Arjun Appadurai, “Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value,” in The Social Life of Things: 
Commodities in Cultural Perspective, ed. Arjun Appadurai et al (London: Cambridge University Press, 
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This chapter explores the shifting values assigned to fur and other frontier objects 
in the Qing empire as well as the common principles used to make appraisals.  
Throughout the Qing period, I argue, narratives of production were used to assign value: 
the significance of a pearl rosary or a fur hat lay in where it came from, who produced it, 
and how it was produced.  In the case of frontier objects from Manchuria, this narrative 
of production centered around a hunter’s tale.  The Qing emperors prized furs because it 
took a special person to successfully trap a sable: one had to be cunning, fearless, and 
manly – a master of the “Manchu way.”9  In this sense, furs belonged to a larger suite of 
Manchu products, including game meats and Manchurian pearls, all of which were 
obtained through hunting in the wild.  
In both Chinese and Manchu material cultures, fashion was neither static nor 
homogenous: depending on the social context and historical moment, Manchus wore silks 
and Chinese wore furs.  Yet through the early eighteenth century, Chinese and Manchus 
alike closely associated furs with the frontier in general and the Qing court in particular.  
Throughout this initial period, emperors gifted fur to those whose achievements bespoke 
the Manchu way, sumptuary laws compelled all officials to use Manchurian pearls and 
furs at court, and consumers in Beijing lacked basic information – and sometimes even 
translations –for the most exotic animal pelts arriving form the frontiers.   
Through the course of the eighteenth century, however, a momentous change 
occurred in China: fur became popular.  In this new order, sumptuary laws were used to 
                                                                                                                                            
1986), 3-63.  For a broader critical entry point into material culture studies, see Daniel Miller, “Materiality: 
an Introduction,” in Materiality, ed. Daniel Miller (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 1-50.  For a 
critique of “luxury items” as a concept, see Arjun Appadurai, “Introduction,” 38.  In Appadurai’s words, “I 
propose that we regard luxury goods not so much in contrast to necessities (a contrast filled with problems), 
but as goods whose principal use is rhetorical and social, goods that are simply incarnated signs.”    
9 Mark Elliott, The Manchu Way, 183-187. 
 36 
discourage consumption, not promote it; the emperors gifted to furs to bannermen and 
Chinese literati alike; and urban consumers had unprecedented access, familiarity and 
knowledge of precious furs.  Significantly, furs continued to be associated with frontier 
places, peoples, and ways of life, but were now valued as such in poetry, histories, and 
pawnshop appraisals.  In the confident world of the high Qing, however, they became 
emblematic of a greater imperial order: a world where frontier and metropole were 
linked, and Han Chinese and Manchu alike participated as, and dressed the part of, 
imperial elites. 
 
The Manchu Suite & Gift-Giving at Court 
 
In 1804, the Jiaqing emperor (r. 1795-1820) received a special tribute from the 
military governor of Jilin: two exceptionally large, adult tigers.  He was overjoyed.  
As the emperor wrote to Siolin, the military governor of Jilin, the bannermen of Jilin 
must truly be “well endowed with manly virtue” (Ma: daci hahai erdemu sain).   “I know 
well that hunting is difficult,” he enthused.  “Yet now you did not only capture tiger and 
bear cubs, you even took two adult tigers alive – how fierce and manly! (Ma: gemu haha 
sain fafuri).”  The emperor needed more details.  Rewards were in order.  Who were the 
hunters, and how had they accomplished the feat?10  For the emperor, the value of tigers 
was inseparable from the hunter’s tale: the men who did the work, the forest where they 
set the trap, the skill and brawn behind such a striking success.   
Siolin responded with narrative flare.  Jilin had a terrific amount of snowfall that 
winter.  One day, hunters had passed cub prints in the snow and began tracking.  They 
                                                
10 MWLF 3667.47.171.2651 (JQ9.4.8). 
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knew that “if there was a fully grown tiger, it could not be caught with brute force,” so 
the hunters relied on “cunning” (Ma: eiterešeme) instead.  When the time was right, they 
built wooden cages, dropped piglets inside, and raised a trap door.  When the tigers 
walked in to find food for their cubs, they sprung the trap and had their prize.  It had 
taken “fierce and manly” character as well as knowledge unique of the forest.11   
Such gifts were not unusual at Jiaqing’s court.  Three years later, in 1807, Siolin 
sent another gift of live tigers and bears, and again the emperor pressed for more 
information.  Siolin admitted the hunters’ names “had not been clearly recorded,” but an 
investigation was underway.12  Two months later when the names arrived, the emperor 
finally bestowed his gifts: five men received a large role of silken gauze (Ch: fBţ), 
nine received small rolls (Ch: Bţ).13  A month later, the Grand Council’s Manchu 
Affairs Office (Ma: coohai nashūn ba i manju baita icihiyara ba) was notified that yet 
another tiger cub was on the road to Beijing.  A patrolmen in Jilin’s imperial ginseng 
fields, Sicimboo, was making rounds through the “restricted mountains” (Ma: fafulaha 
alin) when he spotted tiny tracks.14  Again, the Jiaqing emperor was overjoyed: the tiger 
embodied the spirit the Manchu homeland, the unique skill and fortitude of Manchu 
bannermen.  Both, ultimately, were the basis of Qing rule and the Manchu court.15  
                                                
11 MWLF 3667.47.171.2651 (JQ9.4.8).  The documents fail to discuss what happens to these tigers in 
Beijing.  Further research will be necessary into lives of wild animals presented as tribute. 
12 MWLF 3724.25.176.2118 (JQ12.5.20). 
13 MWLF 3724.32.176.2160 (JQ12.7). 
14 MWLF 3727.28.176.2985 (JQ12.8.17). 
15 On Manchuria in the imperial imagination, see Mark Elliott, "The Limits of Tartary: Manchuria in 
Imperial and National Geographies," Journal of Asian Studies 59.3 (August 2000). 
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Tigers were only one of a suite of animals associated with Manchuria: other 
objects embodied the hunter’s tale as well.  The most prominent Manchurian products 
were furs, ginseng, and pearls.  As early as 1621, Nurhaci contended that Manchuria was 
uniquely “endowed by heaven” (Ma: abkai salgabufi) with three types of sable (Ma: 
seke), black, white, and red foxes, lynx, panther, sea otter (Ma: lekerhi), tiger, otter, 
squirrel, kolinsky, and raccoon-dog; the land (Ma: na) also provided buckskin and deer 
hide, as well as cotton (kubun and yohan), cloth (boso), grass linen, salt, gold, silver, and 
iron.16  The Qianlong-era compilation, Qingchao wenxian tongkao, recorded the 
importance of pearls, ginseng, sable, black fox, and lynx in particular as the region’s 
basis of prosperity.17  Later texts echoed the idea: Chen Kangqi (b. 1840) recorded in the 
Langqian jiwen that “Taizu’s court conquered all surrounding countries, and the eastern 
pearls, ginseng, jet-black sable, black fox (Ch: Ȯĝ), lynx and other exotic treasures 
produced within the borders was enough to clothe all.”18  In the 1910s, Xu Ke picked up 
the phrase almost exactly: “the Manchu homeland produced eastern pearls, ginseng, jet-
black sable, black fox (Ch: Īĝ), lynx and other exotic treasures.  All was open to trade, 
and generally there were no prohibitions.”19  When Hong Taiji offered peace with the 
Ming, he did so with an (outrageously unfair) exchange of pearls, sable, and ginseng for 
silver, silk, and cotton: the Jin would send ten tana pearls, one thousand sable pelts, and a 
thousand catties of ginseng to the Ming; the Ming would return ten thousand taels of 
                                                
16 MBRT 1.15.227. 
17 Qingchao wenxian tongkao, 5075-2.  
18 Chen Kangqi, Langqian jiwen, 2: 15.598. 
19 Xu Ke, Qingbai leichao, 2352. 
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gold, one million taels of silver, a million bolts of silk, and ten million bolts of fine blue 
cotton linen.20   
Beyond furs, ginseng, and pearls was a wider array of products associated with 
Manchus and the Manchu way.  The early palaces were decorated with tiger and bear 
skins, and the first throne was made of stag antlers.21  The emperor consumed delicacies 
from every region of the empire: a taste for wild honey from Manchuria was matched 
with an urbane sophistication for Chinese cuisine, Mongol liquors, and Hami melons 
from the far west.  Yet a special place on the menu was reserved for game meats, the 
fruits of the hunt.  Plates of venison (Ma: alikū buhū yali) and fatty deer tail were 
circulated to empresses, concubines, and officials in the field.22  The most precious cuts 
came from deer shot by the emperor himself.  Whenever the emperor killed a deer, the 
Imperial Household Department prepared six traditional cuts: tail, breast meat (Ma: 
kersen; Ch: )Ėã), croup (Ma: kargama; Ch: TĖRĳ), ribs, strips (Ȩſâ), and 
scraps (Ma: farsi; Ch: ľĖ), with separate cuts made for spotted deer (Ch: ȩſ).  It 
then dispersed them to selected princes, Grand Secretaries (fva), presidents of the Six 
                                                
20 MBRT 2.1.5.  Other exchanges were proposed: the Ming could supply 50,000 taels of gold, 500,000 taels 
of silver, 500,000 bolts of silk, and 5,000,000 bolts of blue cotton linen, the Qing would return ten tana 
pearls, two black foxes, ten brown foxes, 200 sable pelts, and 1000 catties of ginseng.  Or the Ming could 
provide 10,000 taels of gold, 100,000 taels of silver, 100,000 bolts of silk, 300,000 bolts of cotton linen for 
10 tana pearls, 500 sable pelts, and 1000 catties of ginseng.  MBRT 2.2.27. 
21 Mark Elliott, The Manchu Way, 186. 
22 On venison trays to members of the Imperial Household Department, see  NWFZXD 132.461.76 
(JQ18.9.5); on gifts to empresses and concubines, see 132.461.7 (JQ18.9.9).  On the prestige surrounding 
imperial gifts of deer tail, see Bartlett, Monarchs and Ministers: the Grand Council in Mid-Ch’ing China, 
1723-1820 (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991), 58, 220.  See also Spence, Emperor of China: 
Self Portrait of K’ang Hsi (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), 98.  As Kangxi lectured his son, “The people 
of the North are strong; they must not copy the fancy diets of the southerners, who are physically frail, live 
in a different environment, and have different stomachs and bowels. So when I first saw how ill Wang Zhi 
seemed to be looking—thin and white-haired—I recommended to him the simple foods that I take 
regularly—among them unrefined milk, pickled deer tongues and tails, dried apples, and cream cheese 
cakes.” great quotation 
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Boards (Î), or the heads of the Imperial Household department.  Though both 
Manchu and Chinese high officials were recipients, three cuts – breast, croup, and scraps 
– lacked Chinese translations altogether, and were described only in transliteration: ke-er-
sen, ka-er-ha-ma, and fa-er-shi.23   Game meat was served in Manchu.  
Game birds claimed a similarly esteemed place on the imperial menu; they, too, 
embodied the Manchu way.  Pheasants caught by sparrow-hawk (Ma: silmen) in Miyun 
county (near Beijing) awaited the emperor each year on his procession north to the 
Summer Palace, his welcome return to country living.24  The Imperial Household 
Department ordered that tribute birds come with memorials specifying how they were 
caught, as the most prized pheasants were those caught by falconry (Ma: giyahūn butara).  
Indeed, venison and pheasant were often bundled together as gifts; roe deer and pheasant 
trapped alive were forwarded to the Summer Palace for future enjoyment.25  Court 
women received a single annual allotment of each: two catties of pheasant, venison, and 
fish as a special award from the emperor.26  
The same narratives that made venison and pheasant so prized extended to furs: 
they embodied the Manchu inflection of the Qing court.  Elite Manchu fashion was 
composite, a bricolage of silks and fur.  It was the fur, however, which gave the clothing 
                                                
23 NWFZXD 134.471.57 (JQ20.8.23). 
24NWFZXD 132.460.177 (JQ18.7.19); NWFZXD 134.471.133 (JQ20.7.22).  In 1813 and again in 1815, 
Miyun county falconers presented to the court three pheasants and sixteen sparrow hawks.  For their 
efforts, eight total hunters were awarded one silver tael and two silver ingots (Ma: šoge) each.   
25 NWFZXD 132.461.79 (JQ18.9.5).  One roe deer and twelve pheasant were captured alive during the hunt 
of 1813.  
26 NWFZXD 133.462.236 (JQ18.12.15). 
 41 
its Manchu character.  The drive to blend high-fashions was epitomized by the dragon 
robes the later Jurchen court sowed sable into.27   
Furs remained ubiquitous in the material culture of the Qing court. On trips to the 
Summer Palace at Rehe, the emperor’s party included a baggage train of one-hundred 
gold-colored sable pelts.28  The Manchu character of the furs, moreover, was celebrated 
in formal dances, where groups of attendants dressed as first-rank officials in leopard-
skin robes and sable-fur hats, and sang about the founding of the Qing.29  The spectacle 
was witnessed by Tan Qian (1593-1657), who described the “Manchu dance” in detail: 
twenty to thirty people dressed in leopard-skin costumes and holding multi-colored fans, 
and another four dancing with poles in sable.30   
Manchurian pearls (Ma: tana; Ch: Øĭ) were likewise an important element in 
Manchu material culture.  At Nurhaci’s court, they belonged to a broader category of 
“things hunted” (Ma: butaha jaka), which included fur-bearing animals.31 Indeed, they 
were often discussed together with sable and ginseng in particular.  The Qingchao 
wenxian tongkao, for example, discussed them in the same group as ginseng and sable as 
the “the outstanding [product] of the rivers and drainages” (Ch: ĊŠƍ) of 
Mukden.32  They also carried a strong association with the emperor himself.  In one early 
examples, Nurhaci, upon forcing the walled towns of Jang and Gidangga to submit, 
                                                
27 Schuyler Cammann, China’s Dragon Robes (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952), 21. 
28 NWFZXD 134.470.26 (JQ20.6.28); 135.476.20 (JQ21.+6.29). 
29 Zhao Lian, Xiaoting zazhi, 1: 392. 
30 Tan Qian, Beiyoulu, 349. 
31 MBRT 1.45.653. 
32 Qingchao wenxian tongkao, 5211-2. 
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personally awarded the town’s leaders “hats with frontispieces studded with three tana 
pearls that the khan himself had worn.”33  
Such a gift was strategically tailored for the moment and the recipient: the place 
of the gifts’ recipients at court, and the nature of their relationship to the emperor, were 
reflected in the types of gifts exchanged.  Even prior to the conquest of Beijing, as rulers 
of Manchuria, the court leveraged the productive diversity of its domains to command a 
diverse and sophisticated array of products.  Silks, precious metals, tobacco, tea, and furs, 
both finished and unfinished, became tools of imperial consolidation.  On one occasion in 
1636, for example, Hong Taiji gave eighty-three Aru Kalka Mongols ninety-one different 
types of gifts, each tailored to the rank and service of the recipient.  Of the ninety-one 
gifts, only eight types involved fur (See Figure 3); more in demand were silks, silver, 
cotton, or tobacco comprised the overwhelming majority of gift-types.34  
Figure 3: Furs Given by Hong Taiji to the Aru Kalka Mongols, 1636 
Object 
Number 
of 
recipients 
Number 
given 
Sea otter 
lekerhi 10 13 
Tiger pelt 
tasha sukū 3 3 
Fox-fur robe 
dobihi dahū 1 1 
Dyed otter 
icehe hailun 1 1 
Green Japanese satin coat with squirrel 1 1 
                                                
33 MBRT 1.3.36. 
34 MBRT 3.36.1450 (CD1.11.26).  In the Gregorian calendar, the day was December 22, 1636, the day after 
the winter solstice.  1636 was the last year in which a lunar eclipse occurred during the winter solstice.  See 
http://www.thewintersolstice.co.uk/history-of-the-solstice/ (retrieved February 22, 2012). 
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lining and sable trimming  
niowanggiyan cekemu de sekei hayaha ulhu 
i doko i jibca 
Sable 
seke 1 10 
Dyed sable-fur hat 
icehe sekei mahala 1 4 
A pair of satin reddish-brown, dragon-
patterned satin robes with sable interior   
sekei doko haksan de ifiha teleri (juru) 1 1 
 
While most Mongols received other gifts, it is no accident that some received fur: not 
only was fur a unique product of Manchuria, it was used to underline the court’s ethnic 
and regional heritage.  
Through the early eighteenth century, furs were given primarily to those with the 
closest connection to Manchu rulership: members of the inner court, banner elites, 
Mongol allies, and prominent military men.  Gifts of Manchurian pearls, sable, and 
horses fitted with engraved saddles were long handed down from the emperor to 
members of the Manchu nobility and imperial family, with the value of the gift scaled to 
rank.35   Furs were likewise the betrothal gifts from the court to girls marrying into the 
imperial family.  Among other gifts, the brides of imperial grandchildren received set 
amounts of sable fur (fit for making either clothing or hats), fox fur (for sitting mats), and 
sea-otter fur (for trimming court clothing) (See Figure 4).  In each case, the father of the 
bride also received one fox-fur court outfit, one black sable-fur hat, a robe made of fox-
                                                
35 See, for example, MBRT 3.32.1360-1361. 
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underbelly fur, and a six sea-otter fur pelts for trimming court clothing (Ch: ŭÓÑāȲ
ł).36 
Figure 4: Fur as Imperial Wedding Betrothal Gifts  
 
Emperor’s 
grandson 
(ÏL) 
Emperor’s 
great-
grandson 
(ÏL) 
Emperor’s 
great-
great-
grandson 
(ÏL) 
Sable pelts for clothing (ĊĆěÐ) 140 140 120 
Sable pelts for hats (ĊaěÐ) 3 3 3 
Fox pelts for sitting mats (Ċćč¿Ð) 250 250 220 
Sea otter pelts for trimming court clothing 
(ç¨ŗÐ) 7 7 6 
 
Such furs represented a form of intimacy characteristic of Manchu rule.  When in 
1665 two girls, including the Kangxi emperor’s wet-nurse, accompanied the emperor on a 
hunt, he put in a special request to make “Jurcen-style sable jackets” (Ma: jušen seke 
dahū)37 for the occasion, as wearing such jackets was fitting “if going out to the 
wilderness” (Ma: bigan de tucici).  The generous gesture was refused by the empress 
dowager (taihuang taihou), who noted that “it was not yet the season for wearing sable 
jackets” (sekei dahū eture erin jaci unde).  Instead, the slave girl received a wool-lined 
silk gown (honci dokoi yacin pengduwan i sijigiyan) and sable-lined, black-satin coat 
(sekei girdan i dokoi isui kurume) and the wet-nurse a sable neck-warmer (sekei monggon 
                                                
36 Daqing huidian shili, 4: 835a-b. 
37 The Manchu word jušen is usually translated as “slave,” not “Jurchen.” “Jurchen” may serve as a better 
translation in this case.  In 1665, the Kangxi emperor presented a sable gown, described as a jušen seke 
dokoi undurakū sijigiyan, to a Mongol noblemen (Kalkai dargan cin wang) on the occasion of a New 
Year’s banquet.  The man received a range of other precious gifts, including a dyed sable fur hat and gold.  
In this context, it seems unlikely jušen means “slave.”  My understanding is that “Jurchen” here implies the 
association with the Manchuria’s ethnic and political past.  See NWFZXD 3.17.233 (KX3.12.27).  
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hūsikū), a gown of wool (sajigiyan arara honci), and “a coat of extra quality sable” 
(kurume arara yebken seke i girdan).  Two other girls on the party were additionally 
awarded sable hats and coats.38 
As Inner Asians, Mongol elites likewise received such special gifts of fur.  The 
founder of the imperial family, Nurhaci pushed for alliances between Jurchens and 
Mongols on grounds of their common dress: “only the speech of our two nations (Ma: 
gurun), Mongol and Jurchen, is different; in the clothes we wear and our way of life, we 
are alike.”39  Chinese and Koreans, on the other hand, shared a different set of common 
clothing and ways of life.  A full century later, while building alliances during the 
Dzungar Wars, the estranged Torgut leader, Ayuki Han, put forth strikingly similar 
language in his diplomacy with the Tulišen mission: “Though I am a person from a 
foreign country, the shape of our hat and the color of my clothes is not different from that 
of the Middle Kingdom (Ma: dulimbai gurun; Ch: Y)”40  It was thus better to align 
with the Qing than with Russia.   
In this spirit, gifts of fur from the Qing court to Mongol elites were usually 
bundled with other products associated with the northern frontiers.  Mongol noblemen, 
for example, were treated to annual feasts of “wild animals” (Ma: gurgu), such as during 
the Lantern Festival (the fifteenth of the first month), when a banquet was held for 
visiting Mongol dignitaries, and where game meat was served with bread (Ma: efen) and 
                                                
38 NWFZXD 3.17.183 (KX3.10.3). 
39 MBRT 1.10.160.  Cited and translated in Elliott, The Manchu Way, 68.  
40 Tulišen, Lakcaha jecen de takūraha babe ejehe bithe (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1983), 148. 
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fermented mare’s milk, or kumiss.41  As part of the ceremonies, the visiting Mongol 
noblemen received sable coats and coarse woolens.42  In 1651, it was mandated that all 
wives of Outer Mongol (Ch: cƝ) beile and taiji that personally escorted their noble 
husbands on a court visit to Beijing receive either a sable coat (Ch: Ǆ¾) or lynx coat 
(Ch: Ģġĥ¾), depending on the season.43  The full suite of Manchu products could be 
deployed, and alliances solidified with gifts of deer tail, “Mukden fish” (Ma: Mukden i 
nimaha), and calabash.44  In 1665, the Kangxi emperor honored a Khalkha Mongol prince 
(Ma: kalkai dargan cin wang) in this spirit with one “Jurchen-style, sable-lined satin 
dragon robe” (Ma: jušen seke dokoi undurakū sijigiyan), one dyed sable hat (Ma: icehe 
seke mahala).   
With the Mongols, the Inner Asian association of furs was reinforced by being 
bundled together with other emblematic gifts: knives, golden sash rings, and “rump 
leather” boots (Ma: sarin i gūlha).45  With “Jurchen style sable-lining” reserved for the 
highest ranking noblemen, and fox fur for lower emissaries, these gifts became part of the 
standard portfolio for Mongol aristocrats in the early Kangxi period.46  It was not 
uncommon, on the other hand, for Mongol nobility to reciprocate with a tribute of birds 
                                                
41 NWFZXD 134.467.229 (JQ19.12.8); 133.463.279 (JQ19.1.2). 
42 NWFZXD 133.462.110 (JQ18.12.12). Like precious furs, these woolens were kept in the Fur Treasury 
(Ch: Ðc).  Three types of wool were given: coarse wool (Ch: C*), wool sateen (Ma: inggaha suje; Ch: 
íæ) and Tibetan wool (Ma: puru or cengme; Ch: ). 
43 Shizu shilu, 67: 525a-b.  
44 Chuang Chifa, Qingdai zhungaer shiliao chubian (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1977), 158-159. 
45 NWFZXD 3.17.233 (KX3.12.27).  Another standard gift that came with fur was the kaiciri, a toothpick 
box hung from one’s belt. 
46 See for example, the list of items presented to the four sons of Korcin daraha batur cin wang in 
NWFZXD 3.19.71 (KX4.7.3). 
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of prey (Ma: silmen, giyahun).47  At the same time, the furs carried a strong association 
with imperial power. There were only a few, notable cases where a Mongol aristocrat 
presented fine furs to the court.  In 1680, after offering horses and camels the previous 
year, the Dzungar Bošoktu Han, Galdan, presented a grey fox-fur pelt, a sign of his 
growing stature.48  Just three years later, in 1683, he presented 300 sable, 500 ermine, 
three lynx, 100 corsac fox, and twenty yellow fox-fur pelts.49   In 1696, after the Kangxi 
emperor had turned the war against Galdan, order was restored: when the Oirat leader 
Norbujaisang (Ch: ƿĖì|ß) submit to Qing rule, he was rewarded with lynx and 
sable hats from the emperor.50 
Throughout the seventeenth century and the greater Ming-Qing transition, sable 
was also a special reward for virtuous generals. Hong Taiji granted the beile Abatai eight 
black sable pelts along with satin (Ƨƪ) and horses (it was a brief moment of good 
standing for Abatai).51  The gifts, moreover, were not strictly limited to Manchu warriors. 
Chinese generals who defected from the Ming likewise received special awards of fur.  
Kong Youde (tÐ, d.1652), Chi Zhongming (źË, 1604-1649), and Shang Kexi 
(HV, 1604-1676)– the great Chinese “feudatories” of the pre-conquest generation – 
                                                
47 For extensive lists of tribute items for each individual for each year, see Daicing gürün ü dotuγadu 
yamun u monγol bicig un ger ün dangse (Hohhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 2005). In 1680 (KX19), 
for example, the Karcin, Onggiyot, Korcin, and Jalait Mongols all presented birds of prey as tribute.  
Daicing gürün ü dotuγadu yamun u monγol bicig un ger ün dangse 2: 209, 218, 243, 245, 278, 383, 386, 
473, 475, 477-480. 
48 Daicing gürün ü dotuγadu yamun u monγol bicig un ger ün dangse, 2: 176, 473. 
49 Shengzu shilu, 111: 134b-135a. 
50 Shengzu shilu, 178: 910b-911a. 
51 Taizong shilu, 14: 189. 
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received twenty sable pelts each in 1637 on the occasion of emperor Hong Taiji’s 
birthday, and they received an additional ten pelts each in 1638.52  Hong Taiji likewise 
granted Shen Zhixiang (÷¢Ŏ) sable, lynx, and fox-fur pelts, and a leopard-skin coat.  
Four years later, in 1642, all four men were again granted black sable-fur coats and 80 
sable pelts.53  Throughout the Ming-Qing wars, sable continued to be awarded to the 
generals in high standing, and the rewards only grew more lavish.  In 1654, Kong Youde 
and Geng Jimao received three satin robes lined with sable; four robes lined with fox-
belly (ĝƁ) fur, and eight dyed sable hats.54 The martial and imperial character of the 
clothing was emphasized by including it in bundles with weapons, armor, saddles, camels 
and horses.55 The military associations of fur were reinforced by the Kangxi emperor, 
who set a precedent in 1704 of awarding sable pelts and silver to exceptional soldiers 
inspected during his imperial tours.56  The Yongzheng and Qianlong emperors continued 
the practiced during their tours of 1728 and 1739.57 
The martial associations of fur continued on throughout the Qing period.  In later 
military campaigns, the emperors maintained the tradition, sending gifts to generals in the 
field with wishes that they keep warm in the cold.  In 1731, Mongol allies, such as 
Cebden, received gifts of black fox-fur ( ĝ) hats and sable-fur riding gowns (ǄłȖƲ, 
                                                
52 Taizong shilu, 40: 524, 45: 593. 
53 Taizong shilu, 62: 850. 
54 Shizu shilu, 81: 637. 
55 Taizong shilu, 41: 553. 
56 Shengzu shilu, 215: 181. 
57 Shizong shilu, 76: 1126; Gaozong shilu, 104: 563. 
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or ǄłŉƲ) as rewards for service in the Dzungar wars.58  The Chinese general Yue 
Zhongqi (Ǯİ, 1686-1754) received the same.59  A century later, Changling and the 
men charged with putting down Jahanggir’s Rebellion in Xinjiang likewise received 
sable-fur riding gowns and “otter-skin war-skirts” (Ĩł­Ʈ).60  A living incarnation 
(hutuktu) who helped put down Jahanggir’s rebellion received a red sable-fur sitting mat 
(Ǆł+Ţ\Ƴ).61  Such gifts, moreover, were not limited to successful generals in 
distant borderlands.  At the turn of the 19th century, Nayancheng and Eldengboo, on 
campaign against White Lotus rebels in Hunan, received sable riding gowns.62  
For its part, the court deployed fur to diplomatic ends with the Ming and Chosǒn 
courts in the early 1600s.  The Veritable Records tells that Nurhaci and Hong Taiji 
presented Korean emissaries with furs forty-nine times in the years 1627-1643 alone, 
usually bundled together with horses, saddles, and silver.63   Black sables and foxes were 
reserved for the Chosǒn king and his sons; lesser sable pelts were offered to their 
emissaries.  The gifts often came in representative bundles: in 1627, for example, Nurhaci 
distributed fur to the ambassadors along with camels, horses, saddles, gold jewelry and 
                                                
58 Shizong shilu, 113: 509.  The Khorchin Mongols Sunggunjab and Lobzangcebdeng likewise received 
these gifts in 1731, as did Jambarjab and the Ujumucin Mongol Pungsukrabdan in 1732.  See Shizong shilu, 
111: 476, 113: 509, 116: 544-545. 
59 Shizong shilu, 112: 495-496. 
60 Xuanzong shilu, 109: 818, 109: 818, 177: 768. 
61 Xuanzong shilu, 132: 019. 
62 Renzong shilu, 55: 712, 89: 173-174.  Eldengboo’s gown was specifically described as “yellow” (œłě
Ð). The gifts were given in the depths of winter to protect them from the cold while out campaigning.  
63 Taizong shilu, 3: 45, 51; 8: 110; 18: 233; 23: 300; 25: 331, 28: 370, 33: 432; 36: 459; 37: 485; 38: 498; 
39: 507, 510 (see also 41: 540), 517; 40: 530; 41: 542, 548; 43: 574; 45: 592, 593, 49: 652, 50: 661, 51: 
674, 677, 683; 52: 702, 708; 53: 714; 54: 725, 728; 56: 750; 59: 798; 61: 837; 63: 871l; and Shizu shilu, 2: 
34-35. 
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bejeweled knives, and satin (Ƨƪ).64  The Korean king was given black sable, the king’s 
brother a lesser colored sable, and a high minister of rank sirang (ǟ) received lynx-fur.  
One week later, the king again received sable and fox, and his attendants lynx.65  In 1637, 
after Hong Taiji’s conquest of Korea, the Chosǒn king again was honored with the gift of 
a fox-fur robe, one hundred sable pelts, and – rarer still – a black fox-fur hat, a restricted 
symbol of imperial authority.66  The tradition continued throughout Qing rule.  By rule, 
Korean tribute missions received fur at every lunar New Year’s, the emperor’s birthday, 
imperial weddings, and irregularly at other holidays and special events.67   In 1743, when 
the Qianlong emperor met with Korean emissaries on his imperial tour of Mukden 
(Shenyang), he presented them with 100 sables together with bows and arrows and 
saddled horses.68  It was a powerful reminder of the martial and Manchu nature of the 
court. 
Through later tributary missions, the court’s furs would be distributed throughout 
East Asia.  In 1771, the court offered sable pelts and ginseng (together with fine silks, 
silver, and other objects) to ambassadors from the Lao court of Lan Xang (Ch: @½).69  
Tribute missions from the Ryukyu islands likewise received furs: in 1843 the Qing court 
                                                
64 Taizong shilu, 3: 45. 
65 Taizong shilu, 3: 51. 
66 Taizong shilu, 2: 34-35. 
67 Hae-jong Chun, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations in the Ch’ing Period,” in The Chinese World Order, 
ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968): 90-111. 
68 Gaozong shilu, 201: 582. 
69 Daqing huidian shili, 6: 866a-b. 
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offered 10 sable pelts to the Ryukyu king.70  In 1792, after the conclusion of the Vietnam 
war, the Qing court bestowed a “special gift” to the king of Annam that included fifty 
sable pelts.71  In 1869, the Qing court gave the Vietnamese ambassadors a dyed sable-fur 
hat, sable sleeves, and a silk robe lined with fox-fur (Ch: ťȉĝłƫ).72 Such gifts were 
less important for the quantity involved, which was miniscule, than for the work they did: 
give furs a Qing branding.  
The association between Manchus and a wild Manchuria was not lost on 
European observers.  Du Halde described “a vast Quantity of the finest Sort of Skinest,” 
and talked of how in the court’s treasuries “are kept many Habits lined with various Furrs 
of Foxes, Ermine, or Zibeline, which the Emperor sometimes bestow on his Servants.”73  
Neither was the story behind these animals lost on travellers: Du Halde also described the 
Manchus as “lately come from the midst of Woods and Forests.”74   
 
Classical Traditions: Gaps in Chinese and Manchu Material Culture 
 
For the Manchus, furs, pearls, and other frontier products were valued for their 
association with the frontier, the Qing court, and the way of life which brought the court 
to power.  In the classical Chinese tradition, such products were looked down upon as 
foreign for the same reason: they held a close association with the frontier, frontier 
                                                
70 Daqing huidian shili, 6: 897a. 
71 Daqing huidian shili, 6: 875b. 
72 Daqing huidian shili, 6: 899b. 
73 Jean-Baptiste Du Halde, The General History of China (London: J. Watts, 1741), 120. 
74 Ibid., 116. 
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peoples, and frontier ways of life.  This tradition of fur-as-barbaric extends back to at 
least the Han Dynasty.  Sima Qian (135?-86BCE) associated furs with the Xiongnu, who 
“dressed in clothes made of skins” and sleeping with “furs as quilts.”75  In later literature, 
the image became iconic.  The Tang poet Liu Shang captured a visceral sense of disgust 
with fur in his Eighteen Songs of a Nomad Flute, which lamented the tragic fate of Lady 
Wenji, a Han noblewoman forced into a Xiongnu marriage:  
I clean my hair with mutton fat, but it is seldom combed 
The collar of my lambskin robe is buttoned on the left; 
The fox lapels and badger sleeves are rank-smelling 
By day I wear these clothes, by night I sleep in them.76 
 
Likewise, the Song-period collectanea Taiping guangji (Ch: hƸ, first 
published 963) described the Turkic Doubo (Ch: ǢÁ) state where the people “know 
nothing of agriculture,” the poor dress in bird feathers, and the wealthy “wear sable and 
deer pelts.”77  Still more outrageous was the mythical Kingdom of Women (Ch: lY): 
there women take snakes as grooms and “sables are big like wolves, with pure black hair 
over a foot (chi) in length, in which [people] dress to ward off cold.”78  The Sanchao 
beimeng huibian (Ch: Ó>ŅÏŮ) by Xu Mengxin (Ch: eƐ, 1126-1207, zi Shang 
Lao Sŷ) paints perhaps the most detailed and marvelous picture of Jin material culture 
in the early twelfth century: 
                                                
75 Cited in Antonia Finanne, “Barbarian and Chinese: Dress as Difference in Chinese Art,” Humanities 
Australia 1 (2010): 37.  
76 Ibid.  Translation by Robert A. Rorex and Wen Fong, Eighteen Songs of a Nomad Flute: the Story of 
Lady Wen-chi (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1974). 
77 Taiping guangji, 480: 3956. 
78 Taiping guangji, 81: 520. 
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The winters are extremely cold so that [the Jurchen] mostly wear furs.  
Even if they catch one single mouse they strip off its skin and keep it.  
They all have thick furs for dress which they never take off unless they 
enter a house.79   
 
Yet it was an elite fashion: “The rich use pearls and jade for ornament and are clad in 
garments of black fur, fine linen, sable, grey squirrel, fox, and badger.  The poor are clad 
in skins of cows, horses, pigs, sheep, cats, snakes, dogs and fish.”80 
The larger suite of Manchu products figures in Song-period descriptions of the 
Jurchen world.  The Southern Song compilation Qidan guozhi describes early Jurchen 
frontier markets flooded with “northern pearls, ginseng, gold ore, pine nuts, and white 
aconitum.”81  These were only some of the most famous domestic products of Jurchen 
territory: “the land produces ginseng, honey, northern pearls, gold ore, fine cloth, pine 
nuts, white aconitum, birds such as the falcon (Ch: Ȧ), hawk (Ch: ȧ), and sea eagle (Ch: 
āØȇ), and beasts such as the ox, horse, elk, deer, wild dog, white hogs, squirrels (Ch: 
ȇȯ), and sables (Ch: Ǆȯ).82  The text associated both “raw” and “cooked” Jurchen 
alike with tributary gifts of “northern pearls, unworked gold, sable skins (ǄȊ), ginseng, 
and pine seed.”83   
                                                
79 Translated in Franke, “Chinese Texts on the Jurchen: A Translation of the Jurchen Monograph in the 
San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien,” Zentralasiatische Studien 9 (1975): 127.  
80 Franke, “Chinese Texts on the Jurchen,” 131. For more on the dress of Jurchen elites, see Jinshi, 4:15a-b 
and 43:16a.  Franke argues that Jurchen outfits where based in part on Khitan fashions. 
81 Qidan guozhi, 10: 102. 
82 Qidan guozhi, 26: 246.  The same list of natural products was offered in the Song-Yuan period Dajin 
guozhi (Ch:fǦY¢).  See Dajin guozhi jiaozheng, 39: 551. 
83 Dajin guozhi jiaozheng, 1: 11.  The description circulated again, quoted verbatim, in the Ming period 
Jinxiaoshi (Ch: ǦJ).   See Jinxiaoshi, 1: 14a. 
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Pearls, like fur, were associated with the strangeness and foreignness of the 
frontier they originated from.  Unlike “true pearls” (Ch: Ňĭ), “northern pearls” (>ĭ) 
were surrounded with an air of exoticness.84  Cited in later texts, such as the Dajin guozhi 
and Song-period biji such as the Qingbo zazhi Ąüȁ¢, the description from the 
Sanchao beimeng huibian is worth quoting at length:  
Not long after Liao Tianzuo began his reign (1101), in the time of 
China’s Chongning reign (1102-1107), extravagance was unbridled, 
and the imperial palace vied only for northern pearls.  Northern pearls 
all came from due north, from the frontier-market trade. …[they] are 
beautiful.  Big ones are like marbles, and small ones are like tung nuts.  
All come from Liaodong’s rivers and coastline.  On the fifteenth of 
every eight month, there is a bright full moon, and thus a great ripening 
[3¡fĒ], and so in the tenth month one can collect the pearl oysters 
[ĭƣ].  However the north is freezing cold, and by the ninth or tenth 
month the ice is already a chi (approx. ¼ meter) thick.  [So] they bore a 
hole through the ice, descend into the water, and hunt them, which 
causes the [pearlers] to become sick.   There are also swans that can eat 
the oysters, and they suck down the treasure, as well as great birds of 
prey [ȥ] called ‘haidongqing’ [āØȇ] that can attack swans.  
People thus use the birds of prey to catch swans, and so [catch] the 
pearls sucked up inside them.85    
 
Like “northern pearls,” scholars put similar emphasis on the frontier origins of fur 
bearing animals.  In the Shuowen jiezi (Ch: ƼÆƷu), the first dictionary based on 
radical analysis, Xu Shen (Ch: ƺ¨, 58-174CE) classified sable under rodents (Ch: ȯ
), and described them as “big and either gold or black in color, and they come from 
“northern countries” (Ch:ȄY).”86  The entry on “sable” in the Tang encyclopedia 
Yiwen leiju (Ch: ƜÆȔŻ), citing the Guangzhi (Ch: ¢), places the animal amongst 
                                                
84 Songshi, 145: 3407.  The distinction is echoed in the Song huiyao jigao, yufu: 123. 
85 Sanchao beimeng huibian Dajin guozhi jiaozheng, fulu: 3, 613. 
86 Li Shizhen, Bencao gangmu, 51: 2910. 
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the Fuyu (Ch: ´ȕ) and Yilou  (Ch: »r), foreign polities that controlled Manchuria 
after the collapse of the Han.  The Weishu (ȜÎ) likewise associated sable and hun (Ch: 
Ȱ) with the Xianbei, whose  “fur’s softness and lightness made it world famous.”87   
Yet, as the passage implies, fur was not universally reviled: just as Manchus 
dressed in silks and furs, but were defined by the fur elements, Chinese elites used fur but 
were defined by their silk.  In the Han, Song, and Ming courts, sable and Manchurian 
pearls were at times appreciated for their physical qualities, their exoticness, or their 
association with military traditions.  Two headpieces in particular incorporated elements 
of sable fur and were worn by imperial Chinese officials, the diaochan (Ch: Ǆƨ, lit. 
“sable-cicada”) and erdiao (Ch:ĮǄ).  Enyclopedists traced the diaochan hat back to 
Warring State period and King Wuling of Zhao (Ch: ǎíȅī, r.325-299BCE); when he 
ushered in the “dress as a barbarian, fight as a cavalryman” (Ch: ƀÑȘ) military 
reforms, sable-tails were first affixed to ear pieces.88   In the Hanguanyi, Ying Shao 
explained that the diaochan hat was worn by Han court attendants (Ch: ), and 
featured a cicada piece on the left and a black sable tail on the right; the sable in turn was 
understood as a the tributary gift from the Yilou.89  Fur rugs (Ch: Ƴ) and coats (Ch: ƭ) 
also had their place at court; the Taiping guangji, for example, references hundiao rugs 
(Ch: ȰǄƳ) at the court of Liang.90  References to black sable-fur coats extend back 
                                                
87 Yiwen leiju, 95: 1655. 
88 Yiwen leiju, 67: 1184. 
89 Yiwen leiju, 67: 1185. 
90 Taiping guangji, 226: 1816. 
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to the Warring States period.91  The court of Huizong may very well have been decadent 
when it came to Manchurian pearls: the twelfth-century statesman Cai Tao ƚŧ
described a palace treasury contains “two to three million” cash worth of northern 
pearls.92  
At the marketplace, their association with the frontier lent furs an exotic cachet.  
The Xiongnu sold horses and furs to Han merchants, who sold them in the markets of 
Chang’an.93  The Han historian Ying Shao (Ch: «6, 140-206), described the virtue of 
sable as having a “durable interior even when the exterior is wet.”94  To a limited degree, 
consumers also took to fur in the Song.95  The Ming appreciation for sable was noted in 
the Chosǒn dynasty’s Veritible Records in 1430: “The people of China (Y) treasure 
above all leopard (Zǃ) and sable furs.”96  Next to elements of classicism and novelty in 
Ming fashion, however, were Mongol influences, including the “barbarian hat” (Ch: 
humao), the bijia (a type of long vest) and zhisun (a type of single-colored military robe; 
cf. Mo: jisu(n)?).97   
                                                
91 Yiwen leiju, 67: 1190-1191. 
92 Cai Tao, Tieweishan congtan, 1: 6b. 
93 Xinru Liu, Ancient India and Ancient China: Trade and Religious Exchanges, AD1-600 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), 14, 16. 
94 Sun Xingyan, Hanguan liuzhong, Hanguanyi 2: 136-137. 
95 Zeng Weizhi, Songdai maopi maoyi.  MA thesis, Zhongguo wenhua daxue, 2008. 
96 Sejong sillok, 50.  In a debate three years earlier, in 1427, on the appropriate role of sable at the Chosǒn 
court, it was noted that “previous courts valued sable fur most.”   Sejong sillok, 38.  This matched the cash 
values set by the court in 1425 for purchasing pelts: 25 cash (æǊ) for sable; 12 for fox (ĝ) or raccoon-
dog (ğ); 5 for mountain otter (Ĩ).  Sejong sillok, 28. 
97 Finnane, Changing Clothes in China, 46; Finnane cites Chen Baoliang, Mingdai shehui shenghuo shi 
(Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2004), 206-207.  
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In fact, through tribute from Mongols and Jurchens, significant volumes of furs 
reached the court and consumer, and furs became somewhat prominent and fashionable.98  
It continued to hold strong associations with the northeasterners.  As Li Shizen discussed 
sable in the Bencao gangmu (Ch: ÕƎũņ): 
Today, there are sables in Liaodong and Koryo, and amongst the 
Jurchen, Tartars (Ȍȋ) and other northern barbarians (ƀ).  This [type 
of] rat is big like an otter but with a longer tail.  Its fur is up to an inch 
(~) thick.  It is jet-black, having color but lacking luster.  The fur is 
used for coats (ƭ), hats, and neck-warmers during the winter months.  
One can stay warm in the wind and dry when it is wet. If there is snow, 
it will dissolve it like a flame brushing across ones face.99 
 
Its association with barbarians did not mean that fur did not have value; beyond using it 
for warmth, he also recommends if dust gets lodged in one’s eye, to use the sleeve of a 
sable-fur coat to brush it out.100  Other fur-bearing animals from the north are discussed 
as well, such as  sea-otter (Ch: āĨ): “today sea otter fur is used for neck-warmers, but it 
is second-rate compared to sable.”101  
It was not just the fact of the element of fur, but how one used it and wore it that 
defined one’s identity – even if wearing of furs could serve as shorthand for the 
barbarian.  Yet the popularity of barbarian styles (alongside classical and novelty looks) 
was not simply emulation. Antonia Finnane argues persuasively that Ming “barbarian” 
styles for elite men can be fruitfully compared to courtesan styles for elite women: they 
                                                
98 Ch’iu Chung-lin, “Baonuan, huiyao yu quanshi: mingdai zhengui maopi de wenhuashi,” Zhongyang 
yanjiuyan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan 80.4 (2009): 555-631.  
99 Li Shizhen, Bencao gangmu, 51: 2910.  Li Shizhen also quotes the Song dynasty scholar Luo Yuan (Ų
ȓ, 1136-1184) to characterize sable: “This rat-type (Ch: ȯ) likes to eat millet and pine bark.  Barbarians 
(Ch: i) [thus] call it the millet rat or pine dog.”   
100 Li Shizhen, Bencao gangmu, 51: 2910. 
101 Li Shizhen, Bencao gangmu, 51: 2896. 
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appropriated outside forms for “provocative charm.”102  What was treasured as exotic and 
provocative in the Ming became an indispensible marker of status in the Qing: outer and 
inner forms were no longer so distinct.  Yet while fur commanded a certain degree of 
popularity and visibility in Ming material culture – and this has rightfully been pointed to 
as a sign of early modern Ming consumerism and contributing to the financial security in 
the nascent Qing (Jurchen) state – Ming fur consumption would be dwarfed by its 
ubiquity in Qing life after the rise of the Manchus.  
 
Sumptuary Laws and the Material Culture of Early Qing Court 
 
When the Qing conquered China, the gap in material culture was transformed into 
a problem of political integration and multiethnic empire.  Sumptuary laws, which 
belonged to a broader set of policies aimed at transforming the appearance of Chinese 
adult males, were a key component in the fashioning of the new order.103  The early Qing 
state used targeted largesse and sumptuary laws to delineate a community of subjects on 
the one hand, and make manifest internal hierarchy on the other.   
Prior to 1644, furs were an important marker of status and Manchu rule, with 
color, species, and cut all used to identify the place of the wearer within the state 
hierarchy.  The earliest travellers to Manchuria took note of fur fashions as well.  
Takeuchi Tōuemon, a Japanese sailor shipwrecked off the Pacific coast of Manchuria in 
1644, described in his Dattan hyōryūki (ȌȋćĀƸ) the ubiquity of fur hats amongst the 
                                                
102 Antonia Finnane, “Fashions in Late Imperial China,” in The Fashion History Reader: Global 
Perspectives, eds. Giorgio Riello and Peter McNeill (New York: Routledge, 2010), 368-369.   
103 Most prominent was the mandate to wear the queue: all men, whether Manchu or Chinese demonstrated 
loyalty to the Qing state by wearing their hair in the Manchu fashion.   
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Manchus.  Commoners wore wool, he reported, but noblemen dressed in fine furs 
unavailable in Japan.104  At Nurhaci’s court, distinctions were maintained between 
Manchurian pearls, sable, and lynx, which were particularly valuable, and other natural 
resources, such as squirrel (Ma: ulhu) and weasel (Ma: solohi), where were of a lesser 
class.105  A sense for the relative values of precious furs at the early court can be gathered 
from differing gifts Nurhaci gave to Cahar Mongol noblemen in 1622 (see Figure 5).  
Plaited sable jackets (Ma: jibca) and black sable robes (Ma: dahū) “Chinese” raccoon-
dog robes (Ma: nikan elbihe dahū), and lynx robes were assigned to the highest ranking 
noblemen.  Men of the second rank received plain raccoon-dog robes and coats lined with 
sable and inlaid with brocade, and men of the third rank received dragon robes lined with 
sable in the “Jurchen” style.106   
Figure 5: Fur Gifts from Nurhaci to Cahar Mongol Noblemen by Rank, 1622 
Gift 
Cahar 
Beise 
Second 
Degree 
Third 
Degree 
Plaited sable jacket 
(hūha seke-i jibca) 1   
Black sable robe 
(sahaliyan seke-i dahū) 1   
Chinese-style raccoon dog robe 
(nikan elbihe dahū) 1   
Lynx robe 
(silun dahū) 1 1  
Raccoon-dog robe 
(elbihe dahū)  1  
Sable-line brocade coat 
(seke haryaha gecuheri   1  
                                                
104 Sonoda Kazuki, Datta hyōryūki (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1991), 21, 27. 
105 MBRT 1.45.653. 
106 MBRT 1.40.592. 
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burihe jibca) 
Fox-fur robe 
(dobihi dahū)   1 
Jurchen style dragon robe lined with sable 
(jušen seke hayaha puse noho suje buriha 
jibca)   1 
  
Sumptuary laws mandating the use of Manchurian tana pearls at court had a 
similar double function of delineating the outer counters and internal hierarchy of the 
Qing community.  Both the size and quantity of pearls worn demarcated status in the pre-
conquest period.  The court awarded some noblemen pearls between three and eight fen 
(approximately between one and three grams), and other groups pearls weighing between 
two and six fen.107  Sumptuary laws for pearls were first elaborated in the summer of 
1637 (see Figure 6).  In the same edict in which five-clawed dragons, phoenixes, and the 
color yellow were forbidden from all clothing and riding gear, Hong Taiji’s court 
established special regulations for clothing, furs, and pearl ornaments on headgear.  
According to the new rules, men’s hats at court would be composed of four standard 
elements: finial (Ma: jingse), crown (Ma: julergi šerin), back “flower” (Ma: amargi ilha), 
and band (Ma: umiyesun).  Noble ranks, in turn, were marked by the components in each 
element (See Figure 6):108 
Figure 6: Sumptuary Laws for Manchurian Pearls in Male Headgear, 1637 
Noble Rank 
Finial 
Tiers 
Finial 
Pearls 
Crown 
pearls 
Back 
Flower 
pearls Sash gems 
Total 
Pearls 
                                                
107 MBRT 1.47.698. 
108 MBRT 3.12.1056-1057. 
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Prince of the first 
rank 3 8 4 3 tana pearls (4) 19 
Prince of the second 
degree 3 7 3 2 turqoise (4) 12 
Prince of the third 
degree 3 6 2 1 booši stones (4) 9 
Prince of the fourth 
degree 2 5 1 1 
blue fiyahan 
stones (4) 7 
 
Women’s headgear was divided into three elements: knob (Ma: jingse), large 
hairpin (Ma: amba sifikū), crown (Ma: šerin), and neckband (Ma: monggolikū).  The new 
sumptuary laws also regulated the total number of pearls allowed for noblemen’s wives, 
divided into senior wife (Ma: da fujin) and junior wives (Ma: asihan fujisa).  The rules 
made distinctions solely by the number of tana pearls allowed on the head (See Figure 
7).109  Almost without exception, women wore more pearls than men.  
Figure 7: Sumptuary Laws for Manchurian Pearls in Women’s Headgear 
Noble Rank Marital Rank 
Pearls 
per 
Element 
Total 
Pearls 
Prince of the first rank Senior wife 8 32 
Prince of the first rank Junior wife 7 28 
Prince of the second degree Senior wife 7 28 
Prince of the second degree Junior wife 6 24 
Prince of the third degree Senior wife 6 24 
Prince of the third degree Junior wife 5 20 
Prince of the fourth degree Senior wife 5 20 
Prince of the fourth degree Junior wife 4 16 
 
                                                
109 MBRT 3.12.1057. 
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Sumptuary laws were also promulgated for hats.  The first rules were passed in 
1636, a month after the inauguration of Qing rule, when the nascent Qing state was still 
confined northeast of the Great Wall.  That year, all officials of rank were ordered to 
wear a standardized golden finials on their hats, and gūsai ejen and ministers (Ch: Lǡ
¶Ä) were ordered to wear golden finials studded with jewels.  Three years later, in 1640, 
sumptuary rules were further elaborated: princes of the first rank (Ch: Ƶī) were ordered 
to wear three-tiered finials on their hats, the top tier studded with rubies, the middle tier 
studded with eight Manchurian pearls; in the summer these included four pearls on the 
front embedded in the crown (Ma: šerin; Ch: ƇÚ) and four on the back.  In 1644 (SZ1), 
all princes of the rank wang (Ch: ī) were ordered to wear ten Manchurian pearls on their 
hat, with a graded scale commensurate with their noble rank (see Figure 8):110 
Figure 8: Sumptuary Laws for Manchurian Pearls in Headgear, 1644 
Rank 
Tiers on 
Filial 
Number 
of Pearls 
Prince of the second degree 3 8 
Prince of the third degree 3 7 
Prince of the fourth degree 3 6 
Prince of the fifth degree 2 5 
Prince of the sixth degree 2 4 
ĵ7Sĥ 1 3 
 1 1 
 
After the Qing conquest, the court modified Ming sumptuary laws and mandated 
the use of fur for all robes and hats at court.  In the summer of 1651, in one case, 
sumptuary laws were applied to the sitting-cushions allowed in the palace (Ma: sektefun; 
                                                
110 Fuge, Tingyu congtan, 2: 47.  Imperial efu also wore a single eastern pearl on their finial. Xu Ke, 
Qingbai leichao, 6132.   
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Ch: Ƴ). While silk mats would continue to be used during summer, fur was mandated for 
winter.  Princes of the first rank (Ma: hošoi cin wang; Ch: QŌƵī) henceforth would 
use mats of sable fur, princes of the second degree (Ma: doroi giyūn wang; Ch: dŲǠī) 
lynx fur trimmed with sable, and princes of the third degree (Ma: doroi beile; Ch: dŲǇ
7) plain lynx fur; the lowest ranks would use deer skin. (see Figure 9).111 In 1765, the 
Qianlong emperor revised the rules governing sitting mats at court: princes of the first 
rank were ordered to use mats with lynx-fur cores and sable trimming, and princes of the 
second degree (Ch:	sǠī) mats with sable cores and lynx trimming.112   
Figure 9: Sumptuary Laws for Fur Mats at Court (Winter), 1651 
Rank 
(Chinese) Rank (English) 
Type of Fur 
Mat 
+ÓĒÇ 
prince of the 
first rank Sable 
BêįÇ 
prince of the 
second degree 
Lynx with sable 
trim 
Bêğ! 
prince of the 
third degree Lynx 
6YğJ 
prince of the 
fourth degree 
Snow leopard (Î
ę) 
ĵ7 
prince of the 
fifth degree 
Red leopard (á
ę) 
(Fq) ħ7 
prince of the 
sixth degree 
Leopard (minus 
head and tail) 
ř.DQ
ŌȒ ȗ 
    
Tiger (minus 
head and tail) 
- 
First Rank 
(bureaucratic) Wolf  
                                                
111 Shizu shilu, 57: 451. 
112 Gaozong shilu, 746: 211b. 
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	- Second Rank Badger 
- Third Rank Racoon-dog 
4- Fourth Rank Goat 

- 
Fifth Rank and 
Below Deer 
 
Fur became a primary marker of social status.  The highest quality Manchurian 
objects were displayed on the emperor’s person.  In winter he wore a hat made of black 
sable (ƛǄ) most weeks, but a hat made of black fox (Ȯĝ) from the eleventh month to 
New Year’s.  The three-tiered finials of his hat were studded with Manchurian pearls.  
His winter jacket (Ma: dahū; Ch: Řű) matched the hat: black sable each month except 
the last two before New Year’s, the months for black fox.  His winter dragon robes were 
trimmed with sea otter fur.  Other aspects of the wardrobe were perennial, including the 
Manchurian pearls embedded in his summer hat or strung along his 108-bead rosary.113  
The imperial princes (Łs) similarly dressed with the same elements: black sable and 
fox fur, sea otter trimming, and eastern pearl finials on their hats.114 Princes of the first 
degree (Ƶī) were limited to dark fox (ȇĝ) fur.  In 1670, the court ordered that all 
people of noble rank gong (Ch: ò.) and below be forbidden from wearing, among 
                                                
113 Xu Ke, Qingbai leichao, 6126.  See the case of the Yongzheng emperor’s 108-bead rosary made of 
eastern pearls, which in 2010 sold for 8.7 million HKD at a Sotheby’s auction in Hong Kong. See “A Very 
Important and Magnificent Imperial Pearl Court Necklace (Chao Zhu) Qing Dynasty, 18th Century,” 
Sotheby’s Fine Chinese Ceramics and Works of Art, 2010, Sotheby’s, March 12, 2012, 
http://www.sothebys.com/en/catalogues/ ecatalogue.html/2010/ fine-chinese-ceramics-works-of-art-
hk0323#/r=/en/ ecat.fhtml.HK0323.html+r.m=/en/ecat.lot.HK0323.html/1813/. 
114 Xu Ke, Qingbai leichao,  6129.   
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other elements (such as the color yellow), black fox-fur, while commoner military-men 
and civilians (Ǒò) were forbidden from wearing sable, lynx, and white leopard fur.115  
Chinese literati of the early Qing took note of the shift and duly recorded the 
changes in sumptuary laws.  Scholars and historians connected to the court, including 
Wang Shizhen (1634-1711), publicized the new order in their widely circulated writings: 
“This dynasty values most black fox (Īĝ), then sable, and then lynx,” Wang explained. 
“From the start, only those of princely rank wang or gong could wear black fox.  In 1672 
(KX11), sumptuary laws were newly established.  [Men of] the third bureaucratic rank 
and above could now wear sable and lynx.”116  
Korean travellers were also struck by the differences between Ming and Qing 
court fashions. The Chosǒn court had continued to abide by Ming sumptuary laws; the 
only difference was that they dressed two ranks more modestly than their Ming peers out 
of respect.117  After sneaking into the New Years ceremony at court, the Chosǒn emissary 
Kim Ch’angǒp (ǦÊå, 1658-1721), was immediately struck by the small carpets 
officials used to bow and kneel: “The rug for the highest rank was a tiger skin with the 
head and claws on it.  The next rank down had a tiger skin without head and claws, the 
next had a wolf skin, the next a badger skin, the next a raccoon-dog skin, the next a wild 
sheepskin, then a dog skin and lowest of all a mat of white felt.”118  Kim had disguised 
                                                
115 Shengzu shilu, 32: 433a-b. 
116 Wang Shizhen, Chibei outan £"ĕ, QDSKQS 870-62.   
117 Gari Ledyard, “Hong Taeyong and His Peking Memoir,” Korean Studies 6 (1982), 72.  
118 Richard Rutt, “James Gale’s Translation of the Yonhaeng-nok: An Account of the Korean Embassy to 
Peking, 1712-1713,” Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch 49 (1974), 102.  Kim 
Ch’angǒp went on the solstitial embassy to Beijing in 1712-1713 and kept a record of the trip in his Kajae 
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himself as a servant, but the plan backfired: he had misguidedly wore “a leopard fur 
which attracted the attention of some of the barbarians,” and, as he later wrote in his 
diary, “I had to take it off in the end to get rid of them.”119   
For many, there remained a distinction between what was acceptable as a garment 
for everyday use and what was acceptable at or for ritual purposes.  From the point of 
view of Han Chinese and Koreans, furs at court were at worst barbaric, at best decadent.  
Writing a decade after the conquest of Beijing in his Record of Travels North (Ch:>ą
Ǭ), Tan Qian (Ch: ƽǛ, 1593-1657) found himself trying to reorient to the new order.  
In a journal entry from March 15, 1654 – the Shunzhi emperor’s birthday – he recorded 
that officials at the Board of Rites honored the occasion by spending a week dressed in 
either sable- or fox-fur coats.  To Tan Qian, it was enough to drive a poor bureaucrat to 
ruin.  “I heard the emperor dressed in a black fox-fur robe (Īĝƭ), valued upwards of 
3000 jin (Ǧ), and that all the various ministers wore black robes worth no less than a 
1000 jin.”120  Yet they had no other choice: fur was the new order. 
Early travellers to Qing China often emphasized the contentiousness surrounding 
Manchu fashions.  The Jesuit Father Pierre Joseph D’Orleans (1641-1698), noted the 
indignity of Chinese having “to cut off their hair and adopt the Tartar dress” after the 
Qing conquest.121 Kim Ch’angǒp likewise looked for, and found, how frontier styles were 
                                                                                                                                            
yǒnhaengnok (œȱĕƩǬ); his older brother Kim Ch’angjip (ĳĽ), was the ambassador. See Gari 
Ledyard, “Hong Tae-yong and his Peking Memoir,” Korean Studies 6 (1982), 85. 
119 Ibid.  
120 Tan Qian, Beiyoulu, 383.  
121 Pierre Joseph D’Orleans, History of the Two Tartar Conquerors of China, Including the Two Journeys 
into Tartary of Father Ferdinand Verbiest, in the Suite of the Emperor Kang-Hi (New York: Burt Franklin, 
[1854] 1964), 24.  
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a flashpoint for ethnic tension.  One official at the Board of Rites, Pan Deyu, complained 
to him at length about the Kangxi emperor’s favoritism towards “Tartars,” using a 
character, ta (Ch:Ĩ), which literally meant “otter.”  Accusing the emperor of being 
frugal in word but not in deed, he derided the court for wasting money on Mongol “Otters” 
who lived “somewhere beyond Ningguta,” and receiving nothing but fur and ginseng in 
return.122  
Kim Ch’angǒp later joked with other Chinese companions, who ridiculed the 
Manchu love of fur: 
The Korean interpreter asked who was the General Deng in whose 
shrine the Emperor prayed at the beginning of each year.  The Chinese 
explained that Deng jiangjun did not mean “General Deng,” but was 
the name of a cap that had belonged to Nurhaci’s father, the ancestor of 
the Manchu Emperors.  It was kept in this shrine and the Emperor went 
to burn incense to it at the beginning of every year.  The Koreans 
thought it must be precious, but the Chinese said that on the contrary it 
was nothing but a moth-eaten piece of otter-skin.  And they all laughed 
about it.123  
 
Later Chosǒn emissaries would similarly look for any sign of difference Manchus and 
Chinese. In his descriptions of various ethnic groups and foreigners living in Beijing, 
Hong Taeyong, too, usually began with a description of color, cut, and fabric of gowns 
and hats.  Ambassadors from the Ryukyu islands, for example, pleased his eye with their 
long, flowing satin robes.124   When Hong Taeyong invited himself as guest into a 
                                                
122 Translated in Rutt, “James Gale’s Translation of the Yonhaeng-nok,” 111-112.   
123 Rutt, “James Gale’s Translation of the Yonhaeng-nok,” 143.  Note the double meaning of otter as 
meaning either “otter” or “Tartar” here.  The same source also claimed that the Empress Dowager was not, 
in fact, the Kangxi’s emperor’s real mother.  His real mother was “the wife of a Ming general, a very 
beautiful women whose surname was Tong.”  After meeting her at a banquet, he forced her to become his 
consort; her husband committed suicide, the Shunzhi emperor took her as a new consort, and the Kangxi 
emperor was born.  Rutt, 143.  
124 Hong Taeyong (¦CP), Tamhǒn yǒngi (¬Ħ¹Ĕ) in Yǒnhaengnok chǒnjip, 49: 93.  
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Mongol nobleman’s ger, Hong described the tent as “laid out everywhere with wool and 
various furs.”125  In contrast with Ryukyu emissaries and his own party, Beijing’s 
Mongols wore clothing and hats that that were “no different from Manchus.”126 All the 
Mongols who participated in New Year’s ceremonies, Hong explained, wore “dyed-
yellow fur-skin hats” (ÛȭłñĎ), which only added to their “terribly fierce 
appearance” (ĜǆȔdĦ¤).127 
This gap between Chinese and Manchu material cultures extended even to the 
very language used to describe the creatures and products of the northern frontiers.  
Neologisms had to be evented, such as shelisun (Ch: Ģġĥ) for lynx (Ma: silun; Mo: 
silügüsü(n)).  The Chinese term for “Manchurian pearl” (Ch: Øĭ), literary “eastern 
pearl,” was itself coined in the Qing.  Thus while Ming Veritable Records associate 
pearls with the material culture of Nurhaci’s growing state, as it does sable and horses,128  
and in 1614 notes that Nurhaci “used the profits from sable, ginseng, and sea-pearls (Ch: 
āĭ)” to build up his reserves of wealth, the term “eastern pearl” – or the knowledge of 
their freshwater origins – is absent.129  Precedents were found for the Qing period 
                                                
125 Ibid., 49: 95.  Given the extremely limited abilities of Hong’s interpreter, Hong was only able gather the 
minimum amount of information on this Mongol, such as that he came from “3,000 li from Beijing.”  The 
encounter was limited to mutual toasts, drinking, and smoking.  The general rudeness of the host (he 
laughed when Hong offered him two coveted Korean energy-pills) confirmed to Hong that he was “not far 
from being a wild beast” (ÙÅĭ).    
126 Ibid., 49: 94.  The word Hong choses for “Manchu” here is “®§.”   
127 Ibid.   
128 See Ming Shenzong shilu, 284: 7223. 
129 Ming Shenzong shilu, 519: 9775. 
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“eastern pearl” (Ch:Øĭ; Ma: tana) in the Song dynasty’s “northern pearl” (Ch: >ĭ), 
produced by the Jin.130  
Through the early eighteenth century, bilingual Manchu-Chinese texts reveal far 
greater elaboration in the Manchu descriptions of frontier flora and fauna.  Perhaps the 
most striking manifestation of the phenomenon can be found in the Daqing quanshu, the 
first Manchu-Chinese dictionary.  Published in 1683, thirty-nine years after the conquest 
of Beijing, bilingual dictionaries were in high demand. With the ruling elite speaking one 
language (Manchu) and most subjects speaking another (Chinese), administrators and go-
betweens needed a functional interface.  As its compiler, Shen Hongzhao, failed on one 
account: the text is littered with about 300 Manchu words left without any Chinese 
translation.  
Pointedly, many of the words left blank included flora and fauna common to the 
far north, including corsac fox (Ma: kirsa), stone marten (Ma: harsa), and saltbush (Ma: 
ule; also known as orache or atriplex in English).  Chinese translations were similarly 
missing for Manchu words related to the anatomy or behavior of animals, as with the 
words for “the hair on a sable’s chin” (Ma: baltaha) or for “deer brushing against trees 
during the mating season” (Ma: gūyambi).  Other problematic terms encompassed 
material objects unique to the Manchurian homeland, including willow-reed baskets for 
                                                
130 Even into the twentieth-century, references to tana in the Secret History of the Mongols and Yuanshi 
were continuing points of disagreement.  Modern annotated editions of the Secret History explain that the 
Mongol tan-a is none other than the eastern pearl. Zhaqisiqin, Menggu mishi xinyi bing zhuyi (Taipei: 
Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1979), 121. Fu Leshu also suggests that tana could be the “Tana” referenced 
in Marco Polo’s account of India, suggesting that the pearls were of Bengali origin.  Fu Leshu, Yuangong 
cibai zhangjian zhu (Beijing: Shumu wenxian chubanshe, 1995), 59.   
 70 
holding sewing materials (Ma: kaipi), millstones (Ma: niyeleku), and sleighs (Ma: 
huncu).131  
In contrast, a contemporary Manchu-Mongol dictionary, the Han-i araha Manju 
Monggo gisuni buleku bithe (Mo: Qaγan-u bicigsen Manju Mongγol ügen-ü toil bicig) 
(1708), includes sentence- or paragraph-length definitions of these missing terms.132  It 
describes the corsac fox (Ma: kirsa; Mo: kirsa) as “similar to the fox, [but] with whitish 
hue.”  It provides even more detail for the stone marten (Ma: harsa; Mo: suusar):  “Its 
length is like the sable.  It has a foul odor and a thick black tail, and it catches and eats 
honey by dipping its tail in it.” Other animals, such as the moose (Ma: kandahan; Mo: 
qandaγai), which lack Manchu and Chinese entries alike in the Daqing quanshu, also get 
extensive treatment.  Moose, for example, are described at length: they “belong to the 
deer family (Ma: buhū i duwali). The body is big with a hump on the back. There is a 
skin under its throat like a bridle decoration (Ma: kandaraha), the neck is short, and the 
antlers flat and wide.  The females are called eniyen.”  The text also includes entries for 
the moose’s young (Ma: niyarhoca; Mo: qotol), abnormally large moose (Ma: anami; 
Mo: manji), and standard adult moose (Ma: toho; Mo: toqi), none of which are described.  
The pattern made the two texts distinct: Manchu words for the female, male, and child 
variants of animals are given in the Mongol dictionary, but not in the Chinese (See Figure 
10). 
                                                
131 Daqing quanshu, 3.7a, 3.8a, 3.41a, 3.43a, 4.4a, 4.28b, 5.7b, 5.8a, 5.32b, 6.7a, 6.38a, 6.43b, 11.48a, 
11.59b, 13.8a, 13.22a, 13.38b. 
132 The following discussion is based on the Han-i araha Manju Monggo gisun-i buleku bithe / Qaγan-u 
bicigsen manju mongγol ügen-ü toil bicig (1708), 1: gurgu i hacin 2-4.  For a description of the text, see 
M.P. Volkova, Opisanie Man’chzhurskikh khisolografov Insituta vostokоvedeniia AN SSSR (Moskow: 
Nauka, 1988), 103. 
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Figure 10: Lost in Translation? Animals in the Manchu-Mongol Han-i araha manju 
monggo gisuni bileku bithe and not the Manchu-Chinese Daqing quanshu 
WORD 
(English) 
WORD 
(Manchu) 
WORD 
(Mongol) Dictionary Definition 
Manchurian 
moose kandahan qandaγai 
Deer family (Ma: buhū i duwali). The 
body is big with a hump on the back. 
There is a skin under its throat like a 
bridle decoration (Ma: kandaraha). The 
neck is short, and the antlers flat and 
wide.  Females are called eniyen. 
 niyarhoca qotol The moose's young 
 anami manji A moose with a big body and antlers 
 toho toqi A normal adult moose 
Type of roe 
deer bulduri iraol [sp?] 
Roe-deer (gio) that come from the 
Northeast coast 
Corsac fox kirsa kirsa Similar to the fox, whitish hue 
Lynx young luka noγool Lynx young 
A spotted 
wildcat murung borong 
Smaller than a lynx, but bigger than a 
malahi cat. 
 lunggu erkin A male sable 
 aihū ebsikin A female sable 
Yellow-
throated 
marten harsa suusar 
Its length is like the sable.  It has a foul 
odor and a thick black tail. It catches and 
eats honey by dipping its tail in it.  
A type of 
weasel jelken solongγ-a 
Similar to the weasel (kurune).  It is thin 
and small. Big jelken are yellow with 
white alaha. Normal jelken are yellow 
 imseke bor Otter's young 
 algin buir male otter 
 uki ebi female otter 
 yandaci γanisu The young of the badger 
 ahadan burki A large and old badger 
Seal huwethi usun u irbin 
Name for an animal. They live in the sea, 
with sparse, lightish green fur.  Similar 
to the stripped panther. 
Flying 
squirrel  deyere dobi niskü ünege 
Lives in dense woods outside the [Great 
Wall] frontier. Their long tails are two 
chi in length. From the mudan of the 
front feet to the sides of the backfeet are 
skin wings.  It skips and flies from tree 
to tree. [lit. “flying fox”] 
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Flying 
squirrel akjambulu olbo 
Similar to a mouse, but the body is 
slightly bigger.  It has wings, and jumps 
about trees. 
Flying 
squirrel omkiya 
niskü 
qoloγan-a 
Similar to the jumara, but with skin 
wings.  Like the flying fox, it lives in 
thick, dense forests. 
Flying 
squirrel; bat 
fereke 
singgeri banbaγai 
Similar to the mouse, but the color is 
black and has wings. They fly at night. 
 
Bilingual texts of the Kangxi period likewise glossed over in Chinese animals 
listed in Manchu.  In the most glaring cases, Manchu words received patently incorrect 
translations, such as a “marmot” (Ma: tarbahi) being translated as an “otter” (Ch: Ĩ) in a 
description of the early Dzungar Wars.133  Similarly, in Tulišen’s Record of a Mission to 
the Remote Frontier (Ma: Lakcaha jecen de takūraha babe ejehe bithe; Ch: Ļ^Ǭ), 
some species are left in Chinese transliteration, others are given different translations in 
each passage, and still others are left without any translation at all.  While travelling 
through far northern Manchuria, for example, Tulišen noted in the Manchu text eight 
different types of fish found in the rivers: salmon trout (jelu), salmon (niomošon), golden 
carp (onggošon), “yellow fish” (mušurhu, SEE NORMAN), tench (takū), dragon liver 
fish (can nimaha), and sturgeon (kirfu nimaha).  The Chinese edition, however, lists only 
five types of fish: lu fish,134 carp (Ƞ), crucian carp (ȡ), eel (ȣ), and (Yangzi) sturgeon 
(ȟ).135  In a later passage, Tulišen distinguishes between two types of sturgeon  in both 
texts (Ma: ajin and kirfu; Ch: Ȥȝ and ȟȝ), translates salmon trout (jelu) as qilu 
                                                
133 Chuang Chifa, Qingdai zhungaer shiliao chubian, 60-61. 
134 The character used is not listed in the Hanyu dacidian.  It is composed of a fish radical on the left, and 
the character lu (Ch: Ȟ) on the right.  
135 Tulišen, Lakcaha jecen de takūraha babe ejehe bithe, 23.   
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fish,136 and transliterates the dragon liver fish, pronounced “čan” in  manchu – into chan 
fish (Ch: őȝ) in Chinese.  Other animals, such as reindeer (Ma: oron buhū; Ch: !, 
e-lun)137 and moose (Ma: kandahan, Ch: `ǙŰ kan-da-han),138 are similarly only 
transliterated.139  Translating flora species was also a problem: Japanese larch (Ma: isi) 
became a type of fir (Ch: ÖÙ, lit. a type of pine).140   
By the mid-eighteenth century, however, scholars were filling in the gaps.  In the 
case of the stone marten, whose pelts were imported from the Urianghai lands of northern 
Mongolia, Qing documents only standardized the Manchu translation after the first 
decade of the conquest; through 1777, Manchu-language tribute reports described the 
animal first using the Mongol “saosar” and “soosar.” Only after did the documents begin 
to use the Manchu “harsa” or “ayan harsa,” while the Chinese term – again missing 
altogether from the Kangxi period Daqing quanshu – was standardized as “saoxue” (Ch: 
¼Ȃ, perhaps a transliteration of the Mongol).141  A similar stabilization of translation 
occurred for corsac fox, which also came in as an annual tribute from Urianghai lands.  
When the polyglot Qing wenjian dictionaries were published in the mid-18th c., the words 
                                                
136 The three characters for qilu fish are qi (Ch: Ȣ), lu (see note 134 above), and yu (Ch: ȝ). 
137 Ibid., 52. 
138 Ibid., 54. 
139 Ibid., 52. 
140 Ibid., 54, 61.  Chuang Chi-fa notes the discrepancy for isi and shansong, pointing to luoye song (ƔƕÙ) 
as a more accurate translation of the Manchu.  See Tulišen, 54, n. 53. 
141 MWLF 2441.14.94.209 (QL36.5.29), 2456.24.95.488 (QL37.5.17), 2521.24.99.468 (QL38.4.20), 
2854.26.103.11 (QL39.5.19), 2635.14.106.769 (QL40.5.24), 2717.7.111.2133 (QL42.5.22). 
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missing from the Daqing quanshu, including stone marten and corsac fox, all had 
standard Chinese translations (see Figure 11).142    
Figure 11: Comparing Animals in the Daqing quanshu and Qing wenjian 
Daqing 
quanshu 
Word English Definition (Norman) 
Qing 
wenjian 
(Chinese) 
Qing wenjian 
(Mongol) 
hirho corsac; cf. kirsa  øĝ kirsa 
jorho singgeri mole ĸȯ kereljegen-e 
ule orache, atriplex (a plant) čâƒ luuli 
baltaha sehe 
baltaha=the hair under the chin of a 
sable ǄȯȐ kömei 
harsa 
yellow-throated marten (Martes 
flavigula) Ʀȯ suusar 
gūyambi 
1. To brush against trees during the 
mating season (of deer); 2. To roar (of 
dragons) ħ5è orumui 
gūyandumbi to mate, to jump about (of mating deer) n/a n/a 
giyahalacame to move agily (of horses) 8 adamnamui 
uman 
1. gums  
2. the inner side of a hoof 
1. Ę 
2. ǐ  
1. aγurqai 
2. kederm-e 
borbo achilles tendon ÃŚ borbi 
semecen 
cf. semejen, the fat covering the 
intestines and inner organs 
1.  
2. ƃǋú semeji 
huncu sleigh, sled º cirgeül 
julhū reins ³° jiluγu 
kaipi 
a covered basket made of willow 
branches used to hold sewing materials ǧūƓş baγbur 
niyeleku 
1. A stone roller, upper millstone 2) a 
stick for washing (see also nieylek i 
alikū wehe & niyeleku wehe ōs ing 
 
                                                
142 Daqing quanshu 3.7a, 3.8a, 3.41a, 3.43a, 4.4a, 4.28b, 5.7b, 5.8a, 5.32b, 6.7a, 6.38a, 6.43b, 11.48a, 
11.59b, 13.8a, 13.22a, 13.38b; Yuzhi manzhu menggu hanzi sanhe qieqin qingwenjian 30.13b, 30.19a, 
26.26a, 23.34a, 30.16a, 30.25a, 30.62b, 10.62a, 30.52a, 10.71b, 30.51b, 10.78a, 26.8b, 25.76b, 9.65a, 
24.23b, 20.50b. 
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 This new familiarity with the Manchu lexicon of the frontier was accompanied by 
broader domestication of frontier objects in the metropole.  As the next section discusses, 
not only were frontier objects discussed with more elaboration and detail, but they were 
consumed to an unprecedented degree.  Consumption and familiarity were intertwined 
processes. 
 
The New Imperial Cosmopolitanism: From Manchu to Qing Fashions 
 
A sea change occurred in the Chinese consumption of frontier products in the 
early eighteenth century.  The court began to gift furs to Chinese civilians and bundle 
them together with other gifts befitting the literati elite.  At the same time, it also reissued 
sumptuary laws, but now not to compel literati to dress as Qing elites, but to prohibit 
regular people from dressing the part.  Chinese elites, moreover, no longer wore furs only 
at court; they wore it in the privacy of their homes.  Markets sprang up across Beijing to 
catering to the new demand in frontier products.  Indeed, it was these markets, and the 
wild objects they sold, which often left the most vivid impression upon visitors to the 
Qing capital from the mid-eighteenth century on.   It is to each of these phenomenon that 
we now turn. 
While furs were gifted to members of the inner court, Manchu and Mongol elites, 
and military men throughout the Qing period, others began to receive fur as well during 
the reign of the Yongzheng emperor (1722-1735). There were only a few notable cases of 
Chinese civil officials receiving furs in the seventeenth century.  In 1646, in the 
immediate aftermath of the conquest of Beijing, the court presented eminent Ming 
scholar-statesmen who had come over to the Qing, such as Hong Chengchou (þ¶ļ), 
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with 200 sable pelts for his service.143  A shift was signaled unmistakably in 1724, when 
the Yongzheng emperor awarded sable to the living descendants of Confucius.  Fittingly, 
it was no longer bundled with horses or armor.  Instead, the gift arrived with fine tea and 
ink – the objects befitting a scholar.144  New Year’s celebrations at court similarly began 
to mix genres.  With the highest court officials assembled (*fƄ, ĆĈfva, Î, 
ǟ, -ÈǢŨ, *ǳva, *ŵÚ) – a mixed group of Chinese and Manchus – the 
Yongzheng emperor ordered sable pelts be given to all, together with silk and copies of 
the Kangxi emperor’s Tongjian gangmu (Ǖǯũņ).145  In filial spirit, the Qianlong 
emperor followed the precedent in 1738, when sable, silk and the Tangjian gangmu were 
again handed out at New Year’s to the assembled officials.146   
The Yongzheng emperor started another precedent: he began to gift sable pelts to 
elderly women on their birthdays as a sign of filial piety.  A Chinese commoner’s wife 
received four sable pelts, along with two catties of ginseng, when she turned one 
hundred.147  The Qianlong emperor took up the practice with gusto.  A governor’s elderly 
mother was awarded four pelts of sable and bolt of silk in 1771.148  Another 
administrator’s mother, aged 91, was awarded ten pelts of sable and six bolts of silk as a 
                                                
143 Shizu shilu, 8: 85. 
144 Shizong shilu, 17: 284. 
145 Shizong shilu, 40: 586.  From the entry in the Veritable Records, it is unclear whether the Tongjian 
gangmu was in Manchu, Chinese, or both languages.  
146 Gaozong shilu, 61: 9. 
147 Shizong shilu, 71: 1066. 
148 Gaozong shilu, 879: 772. 
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measure of special favor the following year.149  Qianlong dispersed sable and silk to three 
officials’ mothers on their one-hundredth birthdays in 1780 alone.150  The practice 
transcended ethnicity.  In 1781, in newly conquered Xinjiang, news of a 108-year-old 
Muslim woman inspired the Qianlong emperor to send sable and satin to the frontier; 
seven years later, a 106-year-old Kyrgyz (Burut) woman received the same.151  And 
while venerable mothers were the most common beneficiaries, the occasional elderly 
father also received a package of sable and silk, with the first recorded precedent in the 
Veritable Records dating to 1751.152  That same year, the Qianlong emperor bestowed 
sable furs upon the descendants of the Song scholar Fan Zhongyan.153  Three years later, 
in 1754 (QL19), the Qianlong emperor further expanded the use of furs at court when he 
ordered that for two and half months surrounding New Years, from the first of the 
eleventh month through the sixteenth of the first, all those participating in the court 
sacrifices wear sable-trimmed court clothing (Ch: ŭǄÓƪ).154   
The court began to dispense furs throughout the empire to civilian and military 
officials alike.  The National Palace Museum in Taiwan holds fifty-six palace memorials 
(ŋµj¿) from the Yongzheng reign (1723-1735) in which officials in the field thank 
the emperor for sending sable.  The emperor sent only seventeen to officials serving in 
                                                
149 Gaozong shilu, 917: 296. 
150 Gaozong shilu, 1100: 734, 1102: 752, 1119: 944. 
151 Gaozong shilu, 1130: 112-113, 1309: 646. 
152 Gaozong shilu, 383: 39.  As with women, most elderly fathers who received sable birthday gifts were 
the parents of notable officials; cases recorded of commoners receiving gifts are few. 
153 Gaozong shilu, 385: 540. 
154 Daqing huidian shili 4: 462b. 
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northern China.  He sent thirty-nine – 70% of the total – to officials serving in the south, 
where wearing fur could hardly be regarded as a practical necessity.  This included 
fourteen pelts sent to Yunnan or Guizhou, eight to Guangdong, six to Fujian or Taiwan, 
and four to Guangxi.  Of the fifty-six memorials, twenty-two were sent from officials 
serving in a military capacity; most of the rest were governors (À) or governors-
general (ůň).155  Sable clearly denoted elite status.  It was no longer confined to the 
northern frontiers, the inner court, or the military. 
It was also during the Yongzheng reign that sumptuary laws began to target an 
over indulgence in fur.  From the outset, sumptuary laws were important because they 
made the imperial hierarchy visible and, ideally, the order was modest and frugal.  In 
1664, the Kangxi emperor decreed that new grey fox-fur hats, often awarded to favored 
officials of the inner court, be given only to officials who needed them: “if [the hat] is a 
good one, cancel [the order].  If it is worn-out, make a new one in replacement.”  In 
January of 1665, only fifteen officials thus received new hats, and another had his old hat 
mended.156  While fox was relatively humble fur, sable was another matter.  Too much 
                                                
155 These materials have all been published in the series Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao zouzhe (N
ľGu).  For originals see National Palace Museum (NPM) 402003433 (YZ13.5.28); 402009004 
(YZ5.5.12); 402008079 (YZ2.+4.21); 402017576 (YZ7.1.8); 402001497 (YZ5.8.12); 402001498 
(YZ7.1.24); 402003919 (YZ13.6.26); 402008503 (YZ5.5.26); 402013700 (YZ4.12.29); 402001067 
(YZ13.2.2); 402005221 (YZ7.9.15); 402012234 (YZ7.6.12); 402001060 (YZ11.2.24); 402012139 
(YZ1.12.3); 402018465 (YZ2.2.18); 402001746 (YZ7.7.8); 402002398 (YZ11.1.20); 402003678 
(YZ2.8.4); 402008792 (YZ7.4.26); 402002055 (YZ13.2.12); 402003512 (YZ13.+4.21); 402014194 
(YZ7.12.2); 402005336 (YZ3.8); 402005278 (YZ13.1.4); 402011892 (YZ6.10.27); 402012074-1 
(YZ7.11.16); 402015705 (YZ7.1.17); 402009487 (YZ1.6.3); 402011572 (YZ7.3.3); 402008984 
(YZ6.1.26); 402014524 (YZ7.11.12); 402014526 (YZ7.12.24); 402014951 (YZ3.2.16); 402004569 
(YZ7.4.11); 402004553 (YZ11.3.7); 402009440 (YZ2.5.18); 402009532 (YZ6.12.25); 402009536 
(YZ7.7.22); 402009547 (YZ7.11.26); 402021491-402021492 (YZ7.+7.28); 402001427 (YZ9.1.6); 
402001718 (YZ3.2.1); 402001738 (YZ13.3.20); 402016168 (YZ12.1.6); 402016177 (YZ12.10.25); 
402004206 (YZ7.9.28); 402002419 (YZ7.7.9); 402020722 (YZ2.1.25); 402002442 (YZ7.9.28); 402001740 
(YZ12.3.12); 402009269 (YZ5.1.25); 402010327 (YZ4.7.13); 402002135 (YZ7.7.18); 402006208 
(YZ4.12.21); 402012575 (YZ2.11.21); 402012576 (YZ2.12.22).  
156 NWFZXD 3.17.226 (KX3.12.4). 
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sable suggested decadence, not Manchu virtue.  As Kangxi tut-tutted a coterie of lavishly 
dressed officials after a policy discussion:  
Now about your clothing and headgear.  Your fondness for expensive 
things made of sable and silk is a minor detail, but it is a matter of 
being economical.  Don’t you know how many fox-fur hats one sable 
hat could buy?  Or how many sheepskin coats one silk garment is 
worth?  Why do you wear such costly items?157    
 
Annual gifting of sables to close officials (Ch: ǀx) of the court was thus briefly halted 
because the Three Feudatories Rebellion (1673-1681) was at hand, and sable’s decadence 
“portended trouble from within Yunnan.”  The gifting of sable returned, however, in 
1680 (KX19) when nine such officials were awarded pelts.158   
Where sumptuary laws in the wake of the Qing conquest mandated elite noblemen 
to wear furs, the Yongzheng emperor presided over a transformed empire.  People did not 
need to be compelled to wear fur to be elite: now even those without official status were 
buying them up and dressing the part.  Bannermen in particular were ignoring old 
sumptuary laws. To Yongzheng, it was a sign of profligacy: buying furs was beyond the 
means of the lower classes and would ruin them.  Thus, in 1725, he reissued the 
sumptuary laws for bannermen: wearing satin, sable and lynx robes were again prohibited.  
Sensing he was tilting at windmills, ministers at court argued that the policy was failing:  
Laws must be enforceable for prohibitions to work.  If the laws are 
clearly known but unable to be successfully applied, then prohibitions 
cannot work.  If former prohibitions have been failures, how can they 
be reissued?159   
 
                                                
157 Elliott, The Manchu Way, 284.  
158 Ibid.   
159 Shizong shilu, 35: 534a-b. 
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The Yongzheng emperor dismissed these arguments: “high ministers and officials 
can buy [satins and furs] when the price is low and after their households have earned 
money and become rich,” he explained.  Common soldiers, on the other hand, simply 
could not afford to be so “profligate.”  To protect their livelihood, the emperor argued, he 
had a moral duty to admonish “those who overstep their bounds” (Ch: 'Ǎ), to 
teach and to guide them, so that they may “come to their senses.”  He recognized it may 
take generations: “naturally, years in the future, they will reform themselves” and become 
frugal.160  
Over the course of the next hundred years, sumptuary laws would be reissued or 
revised.  In 1779, for example, the Qianlong emperor ordered that imperial princes (Łs), 
princes of the first degree (Ƶī) and princes of the second degree (Ǡī) were 
specifically forbidden from wearing either proper pearls (ëĭ) or Manchurian pearls (Ø
ĭ).  When granting noble status to princes, the court thus ended a practice of gifting 
Manchurian pearls.161  Likewise, prohibitions on wearing fur would later be extended to 
lamas.  The 1841 Lifanyuan zeli (but not the 1826 edition) specified that lamas were to 
keep to red, reddish-brown (Ma: haksan), or yellow cloth, and that only monks who 
received a degree of abbot in Tibet (Ma: g’ambu; Mo: k’ambu; Tib: mkhan po) could 
were sable and otter furs; all lower ranking lamas were prohibited from wearing the 
pelts.162  
                                                
160 Shizong shilu, 35: 534a-b. 
161 Gaozong shilu, 1079: 503; Daqing huidian shilu, 4: 894.2. 
162 TGKHbe dasara jurgan-i kooli hacin i bithe (1841), 59: 3a-4a; Jarliγ-iyar toγtoγaγsan γadaγadu 
mongγol-un törö-yi jasaqu yabudal-un yamun-u qauli juil-un bicig (1826), 59: 3a-b. 
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Popular literature reflects the growing popular consumption of furs.  The charged 
symbolism surrounding sable fur made it fit for caricature and absurdity in ways almost 
difficult to imagine outside the Qing context; in the Lamp at the Fork in Road (Ch: îǏ
ē), a popularly circulating story in the Qing, the protagonist is nothing less than a 
walking, talking, adventure-seeking sable pelt.163  In early novels, furs are strongly 
associated with the court.  The novel A Romance to Awaken the World (Ch: Xingshi 
yinyuan zhuan, Ǥ	pŭ%), popularly attributed to early Qing writer Pu Songling 
(1640-1715), opens with a prince dressed in sable fur, hunting.164  Ambitious officials fret 
about how they are expected to wear furs,165 and they were not cheap: Pu Songling gives 
the outrageous figure of 55 taels to buy a single sable-fur hat.166   
The relationship to fur in Hongloumeng is much more casual and domestic.  
Characters slip on fur in public when entertaining guests and in private to ward off cold; 
they present fur as gifts to friends and relatives; they chat about the quality, warmth, and 
upkeep of their jackets and robes.  Cao Xueqin delighted in the variety and style of fur 
clothing: he puts Lady Xifeng in a sable overcoat (Ch: k), squirrel jacket (Ch: ¾), and 
ermine skirt (ChƮ).167  The protagonist Baoyu dresses sometimes in fox-fur-lined 
archer’s vest with dark sable robe (Ch: ȇǄƭ).168  The identity-bending possibility of 
                                                
163 Li Lüyuan, Qiludeng (Taipei: Xinwenfeng chuban gongsi, 1979), passim.  
164 Pu Songling, Xingshi yinyuan chuan, 1.  
165 Pu Songling, Xingshi yinyuan chuan, 12. 
166 Pu Songling, Xingshi yinyuan chuan, 66. 
167 Hongloumeng, 6: 116. 
168 Hongloumeng, 19: 300. 
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dress was always at play: in one scene, Baoyu pushes Fangguan to experiment with her 
hair style and try a sable fur hat –  then whimsically imagines she is a frontiersman with 
the barbarian moniker Yelü Xiongnu.169  When officers arrive at Bao Yu’s home to take 
inventory of the [Wang] family’s possessions, the policemen read out a list of family 
valuables, which include gold, silver, jade, ivory and nine strings of Manchurian pearls.  
More than half the items listed were various furs:  
Eighteen black fox pelts, six dark fox belts; thirty-six sable pelts, thirty 
yellow fox pelts, twelve lynx pelts, three maye pelts (Ȭƕ), sixty 
imported squirrel pelts, forty pelts of squirrel and fox legs, twenty 
reddish-brown (ǥƊ) sheep pelts, two huli (ģğ) pelts, two yellow 
fox leg-fur pelts, twenty pieces of small arctic fox pelts, thirty pieces of 
foreign wool (ýO)…ten mountain weasel tubes (śs), four pieces of 
doushu (ǂȯ) pelts…one piece of meilu (áȨ) fur, two cloud-fox 
tubes (ȃĝśs), one role of badger cub fur…160 grey squirrel pelts, 
eight badger pelts, six tiger pelts, three fur seal pelts, sixteen sea otter 
pelts…ten black fox-fur hats, twelve wodao hats, two sable hats, 
sixteen small fox pelts, two aquatic raccoon dog (õǅ) pelts, two otter 
pelts, [and] thirty-five cat pelts.170  
 
The sheer diversity of animals was striking: with enough money, dozens of exotic 
animals could be at one’s fingertips.  Indeed, Beijing in particular was famous for its fur 
markets.  The traveller’s guidebook Guide to the Capital (Ch: Ǣǲšĺ, first published 
1845),171 helpfully detailed the locations of the city’s fur markets, explaining that  “the 
wealthy of the capital – including those famous for finishing first in the exams – regularly 
                                                
169 Hongloumeng, 63: 988-989.  “Yelu” is the family name of the Khitan imperial family in the Liao 
dynasty. 
170 Hongloumeng, 150: 1601. 
171 The author of the Dumen jilue is unknown.  On the history of the text, see Xin Deyong, “Guanyu 
‘Dumen jilue’ zaoqi banben de yixie wenti,” Zhongguo dianji yu zhongguo wenhua 4 (2004).  Accessible 
online at http://w3.pku.edu.cn/academic/zggds/004/004/007.htm.  
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wear sable-fur robes and palace pearls.”172   Indeed, sable had become part of the material 
culture of the scholar-elite: only second-rate brushes were made of chicken feathers, 
sheep wool, wolf fur, or mouse whiskers.173   
By the early nineteenth century, the great fur markets had emerged just outside 
Qianmen gate, on the south side of the inner city wall (See Figure 12).174   
Figure 12: Fur Markets in Beijing 
Market Neighborhood Location Items Sold 
Pearl 
ÈR^ 
Outside 
Qianmen 
ĸA 
Streets north, south, 
and west of Qianmen 
ģĐ#"ą 
Pearls, sable, 
ginseng 
Secondhand clothes 
Ć^ 
Outside 
Qianmen 
ĸA 
East Guazidian Road 
ËJbģ 
Embroidered 
robes, court 
clothing 
ĄĈ, Ć 
Fur 
ÐĆM  
Southern small market 
#T^³ 
(Disbanded) 
(\x^) 
 
One could buy all three of the most precious products of Manchuria – pearls, 
sable, and ginseng – at a single location: the Beijing Pearl Market.  It was a bustling 
scene:  
Pedestrians crowd and squeeze, people laugh and rub shoulders, and 
everywhere merchants are calling out to sell something.  One cannot 
help but smile.  The Pearl Market occupies three halls, with much of it 
coming out into the alleyways.175 
 
                                                
172 Dumen jilue, 594. 
173 Liang Zhangju, Langji congtan 9.164.  Liang Zhangju (Ch: àŗǩ, 1775-1849). 
174 Dumen jilue, 333. 
175 Dumen jilue, 613. 
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Other notable shops specializing in fur hats and neck warmers were based near 
Qianmen as well, as were the specialty ginseng shops (See Figure 13).176 
Figure 13: Specialty Shops for Frontier Objects 
Item Shop Neighborhood Location 
Winter hats 
a 
Majuxing 
Ŋïö 
Dongxi pailou 
Đ¼ 
Gongjian dayuan 
gßCĹ 
Inside-style  
winter hats 
fa 
Yongzengju 
¡@W 
Outside Qianmen  
ĸA 
Damochang, North 
Xikou Road 
sÕdĐ%ģ" 
Neck warmers 
Ņa 
Majuyuan 
Ŋï­ 
Outside Qianmen  
ĸA 
South Xianyukou Road 
Őŏ%ģ# 
Fur Neck-warmers 
ÐEŅJ 
Dongzhaokui 
Ŏ 
Outside Qianmen  
ĸA 
South Dazhalan Road 
Cģ# 
Deer horn & tiger 
bone paste 
ăŋ, őēô 
Leiwanchun 
tang 
ŀü= 
Liulichang 
ÉÊd 
North Ximanwai Road 
ĐĸAģ" 
Korean ginseng 
ōŒ$ 
Kuihe shenju 
Ŏ+$W 
Outside Qianmen  
ĸA 
North Liulichang Road 
ÉÊdģ" 
 
Other markets specialized in wild game.  As one eleven-year child recorded of 
Beijing in his Manchu schoolbook,   
This year there is lots of stuff coming from Mukden.  On the streets are 
piled up roe deer, four-year-old wild boar, deer, pheasant, hare, geese, 
and ducks, and other such things.  But while there are lots of people 
looking, few people are buying.  I don’t value these kinds of things too 
much.  But I am very fond of eating, [especially] sturgeon and crane.177 
 
                                                
176 Dumen jilue, 285-288, 297. 
177 Leping, Muwa gisun, 15b.  The Manchu text reads, “ere aniya mukden i jaka jihengge umesi labdu. 
sirga gio aidagan buhū ulhūn gūlmahūn niyongniyaha niyehe i jergi jaka giyai de jalu iktakabi. damu 
tuwara niyalma labdu. udara niyalma komso. ere jergi jaka be bi gemu hihalarakū. damu bi umesi jetere 
de amurangge. ajin nimaha jai bulehen.”  The text, housed in the Harvard-Yenching Library is undated, 
though eighteenth century or the first half of the nineteenth century is a reasonable guess.  For a description 
of the text, see Mark C. Elliott and James Bosson, “Highlights of the Manchu-Mongolian Collection,” in 
Treasures of the Yencheng, ed. Patrick Hanan (Cambridge: Harvard-Yenching Library, Harvard University, 
2003), 85. 
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Travellers to Beijing were similarly struck by the prominence of frontier products 
around town.  Describing Beijing in the years 1711-1723, the Italian priest Matteo Ripa 
wrote how in the coldest months the elite city-dwellers he knew “adopt the furs of 
ermine, sable, and fox, in the same gradation.  In the depth of winter, besides having both 
the ppow-zoo [ƫs] and why-ttao [ck] lined with foxes’ skin, they wear an under 
waistcoat of lambs’ skin, and the loose gown over it wadded; and when it snows they put 
on a long cloak covered over with seal-skin.”178   Beyond fur, Ripa marveled at the 
abundance of wild game in the markets of Beijing:  
During the period of frost, that is, from October till March, Northern Tartary 
sends to the capital an enormous quantity of game, consisting chiefly of stags, 
hares, wild-boars, pheasants and partridges; whilst Southern Tartary furnishes a 
great abundance of excellent sturgeon and other fish, all of which being frozen, 
can easily be kept during the whole winter.  At the close of the old year, and the 
beginning of the new, huge heaps of game and fish are exposed for sale in the 
streets, and it is surprising to see how cheap they are sold.  For seven or eight 
silver tchens, which are equivalent to four shillings, one may buy a stag; for 
trifle more a wild-boar; for five half-pence, a pheasant; and so on in the same 
proportion.179  
 
Even as far away as Nagasaki, accounts of domesticated elephants and fur 
clothing defined the image of Beijing.  Nakagawa Tadahide (1753-1830) in his Record of 
Qing Customs (Jp: Ąšż, 1799), a reference book using Chinese junk merchants as 
sources, depicts a world full of fur-lined winter hats and gowns, complete with pictures of 
long-sleeve gowns (Ch: paozi ƫs), short sleeve gowns (Ch: waitaock), tops (Ch: 
magua ȖƲ), and skirts (Ch: qunzi Ʈs) for both men and women.  The fur-lined hats 
                                                
178 Matteo Ripa, Memoirs of Father Ripa during Thirteen Years’ Residence at the Court of Peking in the 
Service of the Emperor of China (London, J. Murray, 1855), 49. 
179 Ibid., 49-50. 
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worn at court for both civil and military officials are depicted as well, noting that “hat 
brims have black or grey fur.”180 
By the nineteenth century, Europeans visitors struggled to find any differences in 
clothing between Manchu and Chinese men at all.  Yet Charles Gutztaff found the people 
of Tianjin in 1831 to be all dressed in “costly” furs,181 with even the poor in Jinzhou 
(Liaodong) “covered in rags and furs.”182   As explained to his readers, Manchus “differ 
very little from the Chinese” in appearance.183  Many wrongly assumed that the Manchus 
had simply sinified.  As John Barrow of the Macartney mission wrote, “The Tartars, by 
assuming the dress, the manners, and the habits of the Chinese, by being originally 
descended from the same stock, and by a great resemblance of features, are scarcely 
distinguishable from them in their external appearance.”184 Barrow did not realize that, at 
least in the case of clothing, the process of appropriation went in both directions: fur had 
become Chinese.  
Precedents were found in the past for the Qing experience, with most scholars 
pointing to the Liao (907-1125), Jin (1115-1234), and Yuan (1271-1368) states.  Fur 
culture was, indeed, a significant aspect of the material culture of these Inner Asian 
courts.  The Liaoshi records that Khitan “nobles wore sable furs, those of purplish black 
                                                
180 Nakagawa Tadahide, Shinzoku kibun (2006): 223. 
181 Charles Gutzlaff, Journal of Three Voyages along the Coast of China in 1831, 1832, & 1833 (1834): 
138.  Gutztaff and his Chinese junk-mates all purchased furs before departing for Liaodong.  Ibid., 143.  
182 Ibid., 147.   
183 Ibid., 144.   
184 John Barrow, Travels in China: Containing Descriptions, Observations, and Comparisons, Made and 
Collected in the Course of a Short Residence at the Imperial Palace of Yuen-Min-Yuen, and on a 
Subsequent Journey through the Country from Pekin to Canton (London: Printed for T. Cadell and W. 
Davies, 1806), 183.  
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being most prized, with plain black next.  They also had ermine of a very pure white.  
The lower classes [wore] the furs of the sable, sheep, mole, and corsac.”185  Reclaiming 
this past, poetry of the Liao court was republished which celebrated the virtues of 
wearing fur and hunting,186 or described luxurious sable-fur yurts handed down by the 
emperor in winter.187  The retrospective Yuan poetry compilation, Yuan shixuan (Ch: (
ƻǜ), first published in 1798, was particularly rich with references to sable coats under 
Mongol rule.188  Of these, while some are described as “golden” (Ch: ȭǦ), most coats 
are described as “black” (Ch: Ȯ, Ť).  Yet fur coats remained indelibly linked with the 
northern frontier; it continued to share an associations with war, the court, horses, and 
extreme winters.  As one republished Yuan poem read: 
With a look like jade, he bids farewell to the Golden Palace, 
his sable coat hugging an embroidered saddle. 
The general pauses before battle,  
 the frontier’s snow blowing in the cold.189  
 
 While popularized in the metropole, fur never lost its association with either the 
frontier or with frontier peoples.  Rather, their value continued to be based on the where, 
who, and how of their production.   
 
                                                
185 Karl Wittfogel, History of Chinese Society: Liao, 907-1125 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1949), 237.  
See Liaoshi, 56: 2b.   
186 See, for example, Liaojinyuan gongci, 2: 1.51, which places the protagonist in an otter-fur coat and 
sable-hat.  
187 Liaojinyuan gongci, 2: 1.62. 
188 Yuan shixuan, chuji: 54, 66, 97, 109, 364, 405, 879, 904, 925, 974, 1079, 1095, 1195, 1238, 1269, 1326, 
1336, 1459, 1489, 1525, 1763, 1891, 1896, 2082, 2190, 2218, 2301; erchu: 163, 466, 522, 590, 680, 827, 
1363; sanchu: 328, 447, 578.  For sable coats in a Yuan biography, see Taiping guangji, 323: 2562. 
189 Yuan shixuan, erji: 163. 
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Appraising Fur 
 
How did one know where a pelt came from and what type of animal it was?  It 
took a considerable amount of knowledge about animals to make an informed decision in 
the market place.  Those without any market knowledge were likely to be duped.  In A 
Romance to Awaken the World, Pu Songling describes a hatter named Luo Jiacai, who 
made his fortune selling fakes: 
He was a sable fur artisan.  For years sable was extremely expensive.  
He would construct hats by taking the most pretty part of the sable’s 
spine, stretching it out as big and wide as possible and piling a great 
many together.  Then, to cobble together the hat, he stitched the insides 
together with a string of dark ramie.  People see only that the fur is 
plush and the color is black; nobody knows that myriad strips of 
shoddy pelts compose the interior and fringes.  He made twenty to 
thirty taels silver selling each and so gradually built up the family 
business.190  
 
In this perilous market environment, pawnshop owners were perhaps the most hardnosed 
buyers with the most rigorous appraisal standards for fur coats, robes, and hats.  To make 
a proper appraisal, they had to know both the standard number of pelts per item and how 
to evaluate the quality of the individual pelts.  Guidebooks were thus published to offer 
descriptions of the various clothing items and pelt types, stating both size and cost (See 
Figures 14 and 15).191 
Figure 14: Number of Pelts Required for Standard Clothing Items, 1843 
Animal  
(English) 
Animal 
(Chinese) 
Units 
per 
robe 
Ĉ  
Units 
per  
H  
Units 
per 
Jacket
Ŋċ  
Units 
per 
dahu 
ČĘ  
Units 
per 
AH  
                                                
190 Pu Songling, Xingshi yinyuan chuan, 861. 
191 Lun piyi cuxi maofa, in Zhongguo gudai dangpu landing miji (Beijing: Quanguo tushuguan wenxian 
suowei fuzhi zhongxin), 158-161. 
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Marmot }Æ  25-26 15   
White elk ÎàJ   20   
Fox ¿   300   
 ºŔĝ 26 21 12   
Imported squirrel ¤µŕ 50 40 25   
 ŋÛ 30 20 12   
Cold-weather 
sheep Që 30 24 12   
Short-haired lamb Tìë 30 22    
Wuyun leopard ·Ŀę 160 120 60   
Jixiang leopard )Öę 160 120 60   
Solon grey 
squirrel (back) ãµò 180 140 80   
Grey squirrel 
(underbelly) µŕñ 120 90 50   
Fire-fox 
(underbelly) ´¿ñ 30 24 14   
Fire-fox (leg) ´¿ó 180 140 90   
Steppe fox ú¿ 31 25 15   
 ĐñÐ 80 52 32   
Steppe fox 
(underbelly) ú¿ 80 52 32   
Fox (head) ¿ 180 150 85   
Black fox ¿   6 12  
Flying squirrel ňŕ 40 30 18   
Import Sable ¤ě 180 140 80   
Western fox ĐÀ   3 6  
Steppe wolf úÀ   3 6  
Jinqian leopard ĳĴę   2  5 
Aiye leopard ÷þę  4 2   
Black cat äĞ 26 21 12   
Black sable äě 130 24 12   
Long-haired lamb Cìë 20 16 10   
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Chaozhou sly 
sheep ±[Äë 30 24 12   
 î 70 50 30   
 
Figure 15: Costs for Fur Clothing, 1843 
Animal (English) 
Animal 
(Chinese) 
Price per 
pelt  
(,）  
Total 
Price per 
Robe 袍  
(,）  
Total 
Price per 
套(,）  
Total 
Price per 
Jacket 
馬褂  
(,）  
Aiye leopard ÷þę 7  28 14 
Western wolf ĐÀ 4   12 
Steppe wolf úÀ 2   6 
Jinqian leopard ĳĴę 2   4 
Imported Squirrel ¤µŕ 0.5 25 20 12.5 
 ŋÛ 0.5 15 10 6 
Wuyun leopard ·Ŀę 0.5 80 60 30 
Jixiang leopard )Öę 0.5 80 60 30 
Black cat äĞ 0.5 13 10.5 6 
 ºŔĝ 0.4 10.4 8.4 4.8 
Cold-weather sheep Që 0.4 12 9.6 4.8 
Fire-fox (leg) ´¿ó 0.4 72 56 36 
White elk ÎàJ 0.3   6 
Short-haired lamb Tìë 0.3 9 6.6  
Marmot }Æ 0.2  5 3 
Solon grey squirrel 
(back) ãµò 0.15 27 21 12 
Grey squirrel 
(underbelly) µŕñ 0.07 8.4 6.3 3.5 
Fox ¿ 0.05   5 
 
In terms of appraising the animal pelts themselves, physical properties helped 
determine their value (waterproofness, weight, wear, etc.), but so too were the places the 
animals had originated from.  According to a pawnshop manual published in 1843, for 
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example, “top grade” furs invariably derived from “east of the [Great Wall] pass,” in 
Manchuria (ǶØ). The finest sables were from “Solon” lands, while the worst came from 
Korea (țȫ, Koryo). Top grade squirrels also came from Solon lands, as did the most 
luxurious river otters (óĨ) and lynx (Ģġĥ) – though Russian varieties of the latter 
two species were essentially of equal value.  Steppe foxes were best from the beyond the 
Great Wall (Fc).  Likewise, black fox (Īĝ), black wolf (ĪĠ), fire fox (Čĝ), 
chuanwo (ŕŖ), dark fox (ȇĝ), saoshu (șȯ), badger (ĩs), ermine (Ǫȯ), wolf, 
river otter (õĨ), and marmot (ÉĨ) were all most valuable when from “East of the 
Pass,” in Manchuria.  In a catalogue of fifty types of animal pelts, only two types were 
valued highest when from China proper: yellow foxes from Huguang, and flying squirrels 
from Shaanxi and Gansu.192  
Like pawnshop owners, consumers described similar valuation principles in their 
own writings.  From the eighteenth century onwards, moreover, these Chinese-language 
descriptions of furs assume new levels of detail and elaboration.  In his Talks with Guests 
Over Tea (Chayu kehua), for example, the former President of the Board of Punishments, 
Ruan Kuisheng ǷƘĶ (1727-1789)  devoted an entry to “[animal] types such as sable 
and fox” (diaohu zhi zhonglei).193  As a participant in the Four Treasuries project and a 
compiler of the official history of the Dzungar campaigns, Ruan was part of a new 
generation of Chinese officials with an avid interest in frontier affairs that rose to 
                                                
192 Ibid., 129-168. 
193 Ruan Kuisheng, Chayu kehua, Biji xiaoshuo daguan, v. 1.3, p. 9.3-4.  
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prominence in the late eighteenth century, and was thus uniquely well-qualified to write 
about fur.194  He opens his discussion on the origins and virtues of sable pelts:  
Russia and Wu-lan-hai (ďƠā, i.e. Urianghai lands]) all produce sable.  
People have long said that only a sable can stay warm lying naked in 
the snow – and that because one can kill them with but a soft blow (X
ÂŸð), they are ignoble gifts [lit. ‘similar to reckless gifts of 
Zheng,’ whose men delivered themselves into the hands of the enemy 
after imprudently driving into a well].  Those who say these things gave 
others a great pain for no good reason (ăĽĐƉ).  They speak 
broadly, but there is no truth to it.195  
 
In a later description of the “marten” (Ǆȯ) genus,196 he offers the reader an 
intimate description of both the animal’s natural habitat and an account of how they are 
hunted: 
They prefer eating pine-seeds and [so are found] in pine forests.  One 
type is called the ‘pine dog’ (ÙĞ), of which there are yellow and 
black varieties.  The jet-black ones [have fur that is] luxuriant but not 
shiny, and are especially difficult to procure.  Its den is either dug into 
the earth or hollowed from a tree.  Trappers rig a net at the entrance to 
the den, then smoke [the animal] out.  It fears the smoke and flees into 
the net.  There are also dogs that hunt martens.  The dogs sniff out the 
location of its tracks, guard [its den] without leaving, [then] wait for 
[the marten] to come out to catch it in its mouth.  Some people also use 
slings or snares.  The gazetteer for Mukden names one marten the ‘cone 
dog’ (ÜĞ), as it prefers to eat pinecones and bark.  There are many of 
these throughout the mountains of Ula.  Their pelt is light and warm, 
and can be made into coats or hats.  The Guangzhi [states that] martens 
arose from Fuyu.197 
 
                                                
194 On Ruan Kuisheng and his milieu, see Matthew W. Mosca, “Empire and the Circulation of Frontier 
Intelligence: Qing Conceptions of the Ottomans,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 70.1 (2010): 178-179.   
195 Ruan Kuisheng, Chayu kehua, Biji xiaoshuo daguan, vol.1.3, p. 9.3-4. More on Urianghai is found in 
Chapter 5 below. 
196 To clarify the types of various fur-bearing animals needed clarification, he lists animals in terms of 
“genus” (Û) and “species” ({). 
197 Ruan Kuisheng, Chayu kehua, Biji xiaoshuo daguan, vol.1.3, p. 9.3-4. 
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 The text mixes information both from classical and contemporary sources.  It 
references, for example, the Guangzhi (¢), the Jin dynasty (265-420) encyclopedia of 
Guo Yigong, which first connected sable to Fuyu.  He also references the Shengjing 
tongzhi, the seventeenth century gazetteer, produced under the Kangxi court’s 
sponsorship.  Yet despite its textuality, Ruan Kuisheng also fills in gaps with more 
immediate knowledge suggesting first hand impressions from the marketplace.198   In 
discussing the stone marten (Ch: ¼Ȃ) – an animal that lacks a Chinese translation in the 
Daqing quanshu – Ruan Kuisheng explained casually, “it is bigger than the sable. Its fur 
is white and the hairs are long, and its luster is inferior to them.  The price is also lower.”   
He was equally knowledgeable of a wide range of other animals for sale on the 
market.  Lynx (Ch: Ģġĥ) he divided into large and small varieties, respectively 
dubbed “horse lynx” (Ch: ȖĢġ) and “sheep lynx” (Ch: ųĢġ).199  Their pelts, he 
informed, “provide more warmth than sable, but are not as light (just as fleece coats are 
warmer and heavier than lynx ones).”  Fox he divided into seven species, of which two 
were Mongolian and five Russian.  The Mongol foxes were divided into “steppe fox” (Ch: 
Ǝĝ), with long yellow fur, and “desert fox” (Ch:øĝ) with short, off-yellow fur.  
Amongst the Russian species, the most exquisite was the black fox (Ch:(ĝ) with fine 
black fur.  There was also the wodao fox (Ch:Ĥ1; cf. "1, "ǘ, Ŗ1), with yellowish 
fur and black underbellies, “fire fox” (Ch:Čĝ), with yellowish bodies and dark 
                                                
198 Ibid.  
199 The very Chinese word for lynx, shelisun, appears to be a Qing neologism derived from the Mongol 
silügüsü(n); I have been unable to identify any use of the word prior to the Qing period.  Cf. the Manchu 
silun. 
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underbellies, as well as arctic and grey foxes.  Last, he also notes the mythical demon fox: 
(Ch: nĝ), which was also known as the “spirit fox” (Ch: ȅĝ); it was “like a cat but 
black, and old ones can appear like human infants.”200  Discerning buyers like Ruan 
Kuisheng knew how to appraise pelts: one had to know about both the species and its 
place of origin.   
Similar emphasis on regional branding applied to ginseng.  As the Jiaqing 
emperor explained, “the area of Shengjing, Jilin, and Ningguta around Mt. Changbai is 
this dynasty’s felicitous homeland.  It produces ginseng, surely an auspicious plant (Ch: 
duancao ŘƎ).201  Manchurian ginseng, for example, held a notable advantage over 
North American varieties, a phenomenon deplored by American merchants.  As the 
Boston merchant Sullivan Dorr explained in a letter home in 1802, Chinese buyers “say 
that one root of Tartar Ginseng posseses more virtue than a Catty of ours.”  Moreover, 
“neither does it lose its value in consequence of the quantities brought from America for 
they say their own is infinitaly [sic] better,” repeating again that “one root possessing 
more virtue than a catty of ours.”202  It was a common complaint.  The American 
naturalist J.C. Reinhardt, traveling aboard the US Frigate Constitution to China noted in 
1845:  
The root of the Panax quinquefolium has long been used in China in 
large quantities, being obtained in Tartary, and also brought from the 
United States.  That from Tartary they consider vastly superior to the 
                                                
200 Ruan Kuisheng, Chayu kehua, Biji xiaoshuo daguan, vol.1.3, p. 9.3-4. 
201 Renzong shilu, 226: 39a-b. 
202 Howard Corning, ed. “Letters of Sullivan Dorr.”  Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society 
67 (1942), 324-325, 346.  See also James R. Gibson, Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods: the 
Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast, 1785-1841 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992), 
100-101.   
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American, and think it altogether distinct, and are greatly surprized 
[sic] to hear that we think it identical with our own….I was informed 
by several Chinese, that their ginseng comes from the ‘cold country,’ 
(Tartary,) and is found but on one island, which is inhabited by tigers, 
making it very dangerous to visit it, and that the ginseng is without 
leaves, and therefore cannot be seen in the day-time, but at night a 
flame issues from it, at which time the island is visited by those who 
wish to procure it, and shoot arrows at the place, leaving them to mark 
the spot, until the next day, when the roots are dug up.203 
 
Both the Manchurian origins of the plant, and the story of its obtainment, informed the 
value of ginseng.   
The same logic of appraisal extended to Manchurian pearls: the story and setting 
of its production defined its commercial identity and brand.  Xu Ke’s encyclopedia, the 
Qingbai leichao (1916), notes that “pearls are produced in Jilin, Guangdong, and 
Yunnnan,” he explained, “but Manchurian pearls are only in Jilin.”204  Within Jilin, Xu 
Ke placed their production site “more than ten li northwest of Ningguta, at a location 
called E-fu-li, and sixty li away at Old Town and the Lin River.”  There, the pearls weigh 
two or three qian (10-15 grams) and they come in “rouge red, sky blue, or white” 
varieties.  Yet “if they are not for tribute, than one may not collect them.”  Still, he relates 
stories of people getting rich of the trade. In one account, he relates how during the 
Kangxi reign (1662-1722), “a young boy bathing in the river caught a mussel, cracked it 
open, and [found] a large pearl almost one cun (3.3 cm) big.”205  In another story, an old 
man, surnamed Wang, bought a red sandalwood ruler for his grandson at the Longfu 
Temple market in Beijing.  When the grandson took it home to play, a small tray popped 
                                                
203 J.C. Reinhardt, “Report of J.C. Reinhardt, Naturalist,” Bulletins (Washington: National Institute for the 
Promotion of Science, 1846), 554.    
204 Xu Ke, Qingbai leichao, 2280. 
205 Xu Ke, Qingbai leichao, 5700. 
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out, with ten Manchurian pearls hidden within.  The old man, “crazy with delight,” used 
the pearls build a fortune for his household.  The family thereafter became known as the 
“Pearl Wangs.”206 
Whether “northern pearls” of the Song were materially the same as “eastern pearls” 
was beside the question.  Modern attempts to pinpoint the mussel species that produced 
antique “eastern pearl” jewelry have failed.207  Both “northern” and “eastern” pearls were 
Manchurian pearls.  They were tied to a shared commercial brand, defined by a common 
association with a particular place, people, and state.   
Conclusion 
 
How should we understand fur consumption in the Qing?  Was indulgence in fur, 
as the Kangxi emperor dryly noted, a “minor detail” – an accident of fashion and 
vanity?208  Was it a simple case of conspicuous consumption or emulation of the elite, in 
line with Thorstein Veblen or Georg Simmel’s classic theory of fashion?209  Or was it 
more similar to the history of the suit, with its roots in a seventeenth-century attempt to 
balance English and “Eastern,” native and exotic fashions, or a broader early modern 
moment where elite fashions converged?210  Clearly, as Lai Huimin has argued, a form of 
                                                
206 Xu Ke, Qingbai leichao, 2126. 
207 The best guess for species came from George Frederick Kunz’s The Book of the Pearl, which offered 
unio mongolicus, unio dahuricus, and dipsas plicatus.  See “A Very Important and Magnificent Imperial 
Pearl Court Necklace (Chao Zhu) Qing Dynasty, 18th Century.” 
208 Elliott, The Manchu Way, 284.  
209 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class: an Economic Study of Institutions (New York: 
Macmillan, 1912); George Simmel, “The Philosophy of Fashion,” in Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings, 
eds. David Frisby and Mike Featherstone (London: SAGE, 1997).  Cited in Finnane, Changing Clothes in 
China, 47.  
210 On the history of the suit, see David Kutcha, The Three-Piece Suit and Modern Masculinity: England, 
1550-1850 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).  Cited by Pomeranz as an example, like 
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emulation was indeed at work: fashion spread from the apex of the social order down to 
the humble but hungry below.211  Yet an imperial dynamic was also at work: not only did 
empire provide the umbrella under which ethnic differences could persist, it also created, 
in the metropole, a new type of casual, cosmopolitan familiarity with the other.  The 
success of furs required recognizing and marketing ethnic difference, but in way which 
revealed a newfound identification, confidence and experience of empire.  The ethnic 
brand in the market place was safe, that is, only in a world of the high Qing.  There was 
no rival state in Inner Asia, as there was in the Han or the Song dynasties; barbarians 
were not at the gate – they were sitting comfortably in the house, rummaging through the 
wardrobe, hanging up their own clothes. 
The material culture of fur, in this way, was congruent with efforts to assemble 
the diversity of empire in other arenas.  When, in 1836, the Chinese bannerwoman Yun 
Zhu (¦ĭ) compiled Correct Beginnings: Women’s Poetry of Our August Dynasty (Ch: 
YÓǴŒëoǿ), she included a cross-section of ethnic and regional diversity.  
Contained within, for example, were the Poetry Manuscripts from White Mountain 
(Baishan shi chao ĿƻǨ), an anthology of Manchu women’s poetry compiled by the 
poetess Ruiyun.  Yet Zhu Yun’s identity as a poet extended beyond her sense of being a 
Manchu woman.  As she explained in the preface to her Correct Beginnings: “As time 
went on, my own collection grew larger, including some writers from Yunnan, Guizhou, 
Sichuan, and Guangdong, extending to wives of former Mongol officials and a talented 
                                                                                                                                            
Chinoiserie, of “reciprocal borrowings of a styles and fashions.”  Kenneth Pomeranz, “Social History and 
World History: From Daily Life to Patterns of Change,” Journal of World History 18, no. 1 (2007): 75-76. 
211 Lai Huimin, “Qianlongchao Neifuyuan pihuo maimai yu jingcheng shishang,” Zhongyang yanjiuyuan 
jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan 21.1 (2003), 101-134. 
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princess from Hami, female scholars from native chieftains’ families, a fisherwoman 
from the seacoast.”  The collection even included poetry by Korean women.   
Significantly, however, Korean poems were relegated to the appendix: “the tribal areas 
and Hami belong to the registered population.” Korea did not.212  For Yun Zhu, though 
the idiom of civilization was Chinese literary culture, the sense of shared community was 
imperial.  It was bound by Qing territory. 
The same can be said for fur: it, too, was naturalized as Chinese, just as 
Chineseness itself was transformed by it.  If originally associated with the Inner Asian 
and the foreign, the eighteenth century saw fur worn by the very epitomes of Chinese 
civilization – the descendants of the Confucius, or the descendants of the great Song 
scholar Fan Zhongyan.213  Fur was similar, in this way, to pearls, ginseng, and other 
products from Manchuria, whose value was a function of their origins.  Other Manchu-
inflected fashions took hold in the Qing; Antonia Finnane cites the example of jackets 
with a pipa cut (Ch: ıĲƴ) growing popular amongst women in Yangzhou, a style 
originally associated with Manchu riding clothes.214  Yet few changes in style had the 
material impact of fur.  
As we shall see in the coming chapters, both the scale and character of demand 
mattered in the history of frontier production sites.  Surging demand for fur in particular 
helped trigger a rush to the frontiers, with dramatic ecological and institutional 
consequences.  Likewise, the emphasis on authentic connections to a type of producer 
                                                
212 Quoted and analyzed in Susan Mann, Precious Records: Women in China’s Long Eighteenth Century 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997): 215-216. 
213 Gaozong shilu, 385: 540a. 
214 Finnane, “Fashions in Late Imperial China,” 375.  For a photograph, see Finnane, 376. 
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(hunters) and place (the taiga) itself was enormously important.  The tribute system, with 
rules against dying, poaching, and inter-jurisdictional trade was founded upon this 
premise of authenticity.  Following the commodity chain to Manchuria and Mongolia, the 
following two chapters examine the mechanism by which these commodities were 
produced and imported from frontier to metropole.  The next chapter opens the discussion 
with a close look at Manchuria in the years 1750-1850, as its stocks of fresh water 
oysters, ginseng, and furs grew depleted.  It is to that story that we now turn. 
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Chapter 2: Tribute and the Conservation Order in Manchuria 
 
Introduction 
 In Chapter 1, the discussion opened with a hunter’s tale: Manchurian hunters 
trapped a live tiger, and sent it as tribute to the emperor.  In telling the tale, one imagines 
a wild forest far from Beijing, a place where tigers still roam, and where tough, Manchu 
hunters can happen across such animals by chance.  Other commodities embodied similar 
tales.  Manchuria was special: oyster pearls populated the rivers, wild ginseng grew in the 
hills, and jet-black sables stalked the forest.  Absent in this vision are the myriad state 
interventions that made the hunter’s tale even possible: the making of restricted areas 
where trespassing was forbidden, the guard-stations around the perimeter, the patrolmen 
making arrests, confiscating contraband, razing illegal huts, and uprooting ginseng farms.  
The very infrastructure undergirding the “tribute system” is rendered invisible.   This 
chapter tells the story of how that infrastructure was put into place.  In doing so, it asks: 
How did the production of pearl-beds, ginseng-fields, sable populations change between 
1750 and 1850?  How did the Qing state control production and conserve the flora and 
fauna of Manchuria?   
 In many ways that infrastructure was unique to Manchuria.  Militarized under 
banner rule, resource management in Manchuria was conspicuously top-down. The most 
precious resources – pearls, ginseng, and furs – were all monopolized by the court 
through various forms of “tribute” or “things taken” (Ma: jafara jaka; Ch: ǉ), a flexible 
term meaning, in essence, a tax in kind.  As the chapter will show, however, there was 
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not one “tribute system” in Manchuria.  Rather, tribute requirements and practices 
differed by commodity and by commodity; further, practices in Manchuria were 
institutionally distinct from diplomatic forms of “tribute” managed through the Board of 
Rites.  Pearls, for example, where gathered through the Eight Banners, ginseng through 
licensed Chinese pickers, and sable through autonomous hunter-banners, such as the 
Dagūr or Oroncon.  In each case, the tribute system was regularly changed and reformed: 
the rules and practice of pearl-diving, ginseng-picking, and sable-trapping changed 
significantly throughout the course of the Qing. 
    Yet despite these critical differences, certain commonalities bound these 
disparate systems together.  Most importantly, I argue, were intensifying problems with 
scarcity: first ginseng, then pearls, then sable became increasingly scarce in the wild in 
the years 1750-1850.  This scarcity drove many of the key reforms to the system: efforts 
were made to lower quotas, “rest” the mountains, rivers, and forests, and create stronger 
territorial controls over production: placards marking borders were erected; patrols were 
dispatched to strategic choke points; and poachers, illegal cultivators, and other black 
market operators became the object of annual stings.  The stakes were high: Manchuria 
was the homeland of the Manchus, and the demand for its commodities was high, 
particularly at court.  
The chapter begins with a discussion of pearl tribute, the depletion of Manchurian 
pearl-oysters, and ensuing efforts by the court to better manage production and secure the 
territory around pearl-beds.  It then shifts to a discussion of ginseng tribute, where the 
court attempted to work with the merchants and Chinese laborers through a “tribute-
farming” system.  Finally, the chapter turns to a discussion of sable tribute of the far 
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north, using the Cicigar “gathering” (Ma: culgan) as a case study.  In each of these cases, 
the court was a central actor: it used its prestige and resources to ensure there was enough 
money and men to bring in required hauls each year.  In each case, however, the court 
had only so much control.  Money and men had their limits, profits could be made by 
subverting the system, and the land could only produce so much. Indeed, by 1850, the 
mountains and rivers of Manchuria had been worked to exhaustion.     
 
Pearls 
The Qing state, through the Eight Banner system, controlled pearl production in 
Manchuria.  In 1700 fresh water oysters were plentiful, and the policing infrastructure 
was minimal.  By 1800, the pearl beds were largely emptied, despite wide-ranging efforts 
to conserve them, but the policing infrastructure surrounding the pearling territories had 
grown enormously.  Three pressures drove this ecological and institutional shift.  First 
was the court’s sustained demand for pearls, which required intensive production of high-
quality Manchurian pearls.  Second were the high costs of the pearl harvest.  Third was 
the growing problem of resource depletion in scarcity, which defined the pearl harvest 
after the 1790s, and which was attributed to a rise in illegal poaching and the black 
market.   To deal with these pressures, the Qing court constantly reformed the pearl 
tribute system.  In the earliest period, between 1647 and 1701, banner pearling teams 
were established, and the state established an incentive structure at fixed government 
rates.  From 1701 to 1799, the number of pearling teams grew dramatically, poaching 
grew, the policing infrastructure was elaborated and expanded, and long-term 
conservation schemes put into place.  As the scarcity became the dominant issue, 
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between 1799 and 1812, rewards for successful hauls were lowered and commuted to 
silver, and state efforts at conservation and policing redoubled.  Let us examine these  
developments in more detail. 
 
Working the Rivers: Tribute as Corvée  
 
As the Song-era accounts cited in the previous chapter attest, Manchuria’s pearl 
beds had been worked since at least the Liao period, but almost certainly even earlier.  
The region was home to both “Manchurian pearls” (Ma: tana1; Ch: Øĭ, lit. “eastern 
pearls”) and “standard pearls” (Ma: nicuhe; Ch: ëĭ). Both species were the product of 
fresh-water mussels (Ma: tahūra).2  The Shengjing tongzhi makes a distinction between 
elongated “mussels” (Ch: ƣ) and rounded “clams” (Ch: Ƥ), which live in either the sea 
or freshwater, and singles out the freshwater varieties from long and narrow mussels from 
Ula as producing notably lustrous pearls.3  A later gazetteer, the Heilongjiang zhigao, 
describes Manchurian pearls as a product of Sunggari River mussels (ƣ), which live at 
the bottom of deep waters in clusters, with protective shells that make handling them 
                                                
1 The Yuzhi Manzhu Menggu Hanzi sanhe qieyin Qingwen jian (Ch: ƱĆĭƙGĈuM2ȍĄÆǰ, 
cf. Qingwen jian) gives the Mongol tan-a for tana and subud for nicuhe.  Note that subud is the common 
translation for the Buddhist “pearl,” cf. the “pearl rosary” (Mo: subud erike). Qingwen jian, 21: 60a.  
Lessing traces the etymology to the Turkic tana and Persian dāna.  Ferdinand D. Lessing, Mongolian-
English Dictionary (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), 776. 
2 I have given the customary translations used in bilingual Qing documents.  The Daqing quanshu 
translates tana as Øĭ or fĭ,  nicuhe as simply ĭ, and tahūra as ƣ (“mussel, oyster”).  Daqing 
quanshu, 8: 1a, 3: 37b, and 8: 2b.  The Qingwen jian translates tana as Øĭ, nicuhe as Ĭĭ, and tahūra as 
Ƥƥ (“clam”).  Qingwen jian, 21: 60a, 21: 60a, and 31: 44a. 
3 Shengjing tongzhi, 27: 36b.  Jilin tongzhi describes them the same, citing the Shengjing tongzhi verbatim.  
Jilin tongzhi, 34: 27b.  The Shengjing tongzhi says little else about the pearls – only that the mussels (Ch: 
ƣƤ) of the Hun and Tong rivers produce them, that they are harvested between the fourth and eighth lunar 
months, and that they are submitted as tribute in the first month. 
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dangerous if one is not careful. “The pearls are light blue in color.  Big ones are half a 
cun in length (approx. 1.67 cm) and small ones are pea-sized.”4   
Map 1: Qing Manchuria 
 
                                                
4 Heilongjiang zhigao, 15: 32a-b.  The text describes the pearl beds of the Little Yijimi River and the 
Suileng Mountains as famous for their notably large shells and lustrous pearls. 
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1644, the court maintained control of the resources through the banner system and 
the Imperial Household Department.   A the time of the Qing conquest, all noblemen of 
princely rank (wang or gong) were required to supply men to gather pearls and sable pelts 
in the Ula region.5  In 1650 (SZ7), members of the imperial lineage were excused from 
the obligation, and pearling became fully the responsibility of local bannermen.6  
Selected bannermen were pressed each summer into pearling teams and required to 
submit twenty pearls each.  Pearl tribute was operated on the ground through the Eight 
Banner system, divided into the “three upper banners” (Plain Yellow, Bordered Yellow, 
and Plain White) and the “five lower banners” (Bordered White, Plain Red, Bordered 
Red, Plain Blue, Bordered Red), with a disproportionate number of pearling teams 
belonging to the upper three banners, which were the personal property of the emperor.7 
Through the Eight Banners, a system of incentives encouraged production of high 
quality pearls demanded by the court. The bigger and brighter the pearl, the larger the 
reward: it was not enough that Manchuria produce pearls, it had to produce the large, 
luminous pearls needed at court.  For this reason, records were kept of the quantity and 
quality of all harvested Manchurian pearls (Ma: tana) and regular pearls (Ma: nicuhe); 
tana pearl quality was distinguished on a scale ranging from “poor quality” (Ma: ehe 
tana) to “slight brightness” (Ma: majige elden bisire), “one-sided” (Ma: emu dere), “two-
sided” (juwe dere), and “high-quality” (Ma: sain).8  As a rule of thumb (and as one might 
                                                
5 Daqing huidian shili, 10: 278.1. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid.  On the upper three banners, see Elliott, The Manchu Way, 79. 
8 In the published Hunchun records, only the tally from 1806 distinguishes between the latter four types of 
tana pearl.  See Hunchun fudutong yamen dang’an, 25: 64 (JQ11.8.10). Records for “poor quality” tana 
pearls are found under tallies for 1786 and 1790.  In 1786, sixty-five poor-quality tana were harvested at 
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expect), large pearls were exponentially fewer than smaller pearls; a year’s harvest in 
1797 took in 3 pearls weighing ten fen (.38 kilograms or 1.9 carats) and 261 weighing 
one fen (see Figure 16).9 
Figure 16: Tribute Pearl Sizes, 1797-1798 
 
 
In 1647 (SZ4), the value of tributary Manchurian pearls weighing eight fen (about 
3 kilograms or 40 carats) or more was set at ten sable pelts per fen, or the equivalent of 
eighty pelts for a single pearl.  Ounce for ounce, smaller pearls were valued less by the 
court; thus a pearl weighing .5 fen was worth a single sable pelt: it was sixteen times 
                                                                                                                                            
Burhatu, sixty-three at Gahari, and seventy-three at Hailan.  In 1790, the figures dropped drastically to 
eleven at Burhatu and ten at Gahari.  Hunchun fudutong yamen dang’an, 15: 155 (QL51.8.15), 18: 311 
(QL55.8.10). 
9 MWLF 3572.24.164.966 (JQ2.9.13), 3587.32.165.1553 (JQ3.9.27). 
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lighter but eighty times less valuable (See Figure 17).10  The value of regular pearls (Ĭĭ, 
as opposed to tana pearls, Øĭ) harvested in Manchuria was still less: one sable pelt per 
fen.  In 1673, the exchange rate was amended to account for luminosity: Manchurian 
pearls that were only moderately luminescent were set at two-thirds value; pearls that 
shined on only one face were made half value, and those without any shine made one-
third value.11  
Figure 17: Pearl to Sable Tribute Exchange Rates, 1647 
Pearl 
weight 
(fen) 
Sable 
pelts 
per fen 
of pearl 
Equivalent 
Sable to 
Pearl 
exchange 
rate 
8 10 80 
7.5 9 67.5 
7 9 63 
6.5 8 52 
6 8 48 
5.5 5 27.5 
5 5 25 
4.5 5 22.5 
4 5 20 
3.5 5 17.5 
3 5 15 
2.5 5 12.5 
2 5 10 
1.5 5 7.5 
1 5 5 
0.5 2 1 
 
Throughout the eighteenth century, strong incentives were put in place to 
encourage production over the minimum tribute quota.  In 1701, the system was 
                                                
10 Daqing huidian shili, 10: 278.2. 
11 Daqing huidian shili, 10: 279.1. 
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significantly reformed.  First, quotas were lowered.  That year, there were 33 pearling 
teams in action. Whereas each team previously was responsible for twenty pearls, the 
requirement thereafter was lowered to sixteen first- or second-class luminescent 
Manchurian pearls; regular pearls or insufficiently luminescent Manchurian pearls were 
not accepted.  Altogether, the thirty-three teams were thus annually responsible for 528 
top-grade pearls.12  For every pearl over the quota, the team’s foreman received two bolts 
of blue cotton cloth (Ch: ñȇ).  For every thirty pearls over quota, the court offered an 
additional two bolts of blue cloth, and the commanding brigadier (Ch: ůŝŶǱ) 
received in addition one bolt of satin (Ŭ), the lieutenant (Ch: ȚȘÝ) a bolt of silk 
(Ch: ĉť), and corporal (Ch: ȏ$) were rewarded in accordance with their banner’s 
share.  If they presented a thousand pearls over quota, the commanding brigadier received 
a full promotion.  For every pearl under quota, on the other hand, the team foremen were 
whipped ten times.  Likewise, for every ten pearls under quota, the commanding 
brigadier was docked a month pay, and the corporal whipped ten times; if twenty pearls 
under quota, the brigadier was docked a year’s salary and demoted in rank, and the 
corporal whipped 100 times.13   
The system was increasingly streamlined to manage the physical and financial 
costs per bannerman.  More men were drafted into the system, with each given higher 
compensations and a lower expected output of pearls.  In 1733, there were altogether 
seventy-six pearling units (42 in the top three banners, 34 in the bottom five).14  By 1799, 
                                                
12 Daqing huidian shili, 10: 278.1. 
13 Daqing huidian shili, 10: 282.1. 
14 Daqing huidian shili, 10: 279.1. 
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there were ninety-four.   Other tributary obligations were eliminated to allow for growth.  
A team of 300 honey-gathering households in 1750, for instance, were divided into 12 
pearling units, required to annually submit 16 pearls each; there had originally been 450 
honey-households, of which 150 were to keep collecting honey, and the designated three 
hundred, which were then assigned to ginseng picking, were to switch to pearling.15  In 
1767, an additional 150 honey gatherers were ordered to switch to pearling, with the men 
divided into teams of thirty; these included one foreman (Ch: ȑņ) and two assistant-
foremen (Ch: 4ȑņ).  At the same, the quota per hunters were lowered: in 1754 each 
hunter was responsible for an average .667 pearls per person; in 1767, the quota per 
person had dipped to .5 pearls per person.16  The foremen were paid 1.5 taels per moth; 
the vice-foreman 1 tael per month, and and pearlers .5 taels per month.  (By comparison, 
Eight Banner pearling teams were better off: foreman were paid two taels of silver per 
month, and pearlers one tael of silver per month; in 1690 the salary for bottom banner 
and top banner officials on both pearling and sturgeon fishing missions was equalized.17).  
In 1767, they received a raise: from .5 to 1 tael per month, and the foreman raised to 2 
taels per month.18 
Quotas were lowered and rewards for successful hauls grew, in part, because the 
burden of pearling service could be ruinous for bannermen.  The work was difficult, and 
the distances travelled, over harsh terrain, were immense.   The rivers used for pearl-
                                                
15 Daqing huidian shili, 10: 278.1, 279.2. 
16 Daqing huidian shili, 10: 278.2, 279.2. 
17 Daqing huidian shili, 10.283.2 
18 Ibid. 
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harvesting in Jilin were located between the Sunggari River and Ilan Hala (Sanxing), 
along the Wengke and Ton rivers.  In 1796, Gilu described the pearl harvesting grounds 
as “vast” (Ma: onco leli), with the distances between the harvested rivers “ranging widely 
between several hundred li and two or three thousand li.”  The enormous distances 
rendered thorough policing of the waterways impossible.  Flooding could similarly make 
the rivers impassable, disrupting policing and harvesting alike.  In some cases, such as 
when local beds were being rested, it could take months for a team to arrive at their 
designated harvesting site.  In 1796, for example, the teams from Lalin and Alcuka 
departed on May 16, but did not arrive at the pearl beds at on the Elcuke River until 
August 7.   The harvested pearls through September 4, then set back off for the return 
journey home. 19 
Local archival records from Hunchun, only recently made available, provide a 
uniquely fine-grained look into the mechanics of the pearl tribute in action.  Pearling 
teams departed from Hunchun each spring in the third lunar month.  Each military 
department in Jilin was responsible for maintaining its own pearling teams.  In the late 
Qianlong period, teams split up along riverine and land routes, forming long trains of 
either canoes or horses.  On average, there was one officer for every twenty regular 
bannermen, and only the officers rode horses; everyone else marched.  Most teams kept 
relatively close to Hunchun, heading west to the Burhatu, Gahari, and Hailan Rivers, 
which drained south into Tumen, or heading northeast to the Suifun River (Ru: 
Razdalnaya) system, which flowed into Amur Bay and the Pacific.  One or two teams, 
                                                
19 MWLF 3541.36.162.872 (JQ1.4.9), 3549.30.162.2717 (JQ1.9.13). 
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totaling up to thirty-five men, sometimes travelled to Ningguta to work the Mudan, 
Fulgiyaha, and other rivers further northeast of Hunchun.20   
Map 2: Manchuria’s Pearling and Ginseng Picking Zone 
 
The pearling teams (Ma: tana butara meyen) were treated as military units, with 
strict supervision and discipline demanded from start to finish.  Before departing from 
Jilin city, the highest ranking authorities in the district inspected the marching trains; in 
Jilin’s provincial seat, the military governor himself reviewed the assembled bannermen.  
While in the field, the catch of tana and nihuhe were wrapped up, with the seal of the 
Jilin military governor’s yamen affixed to the outside, the total catch recorded in a 
                                                
20 In the Qianlong period, pearling teams that took the water route to Ningguta went to the Hairan and Šansi 
rivers (1786), Hairan, Šansi, and Malhūri rivers (1790), and the Little Hairan and Hūlan Geo region of the 
Hairan’s main branch (1795).  Hunchun fudutong yamen dang’an, 15: 19 (QL51.5.20), 18.311 
(QL55.8.10), and 19.375 (QL60.3.14). 
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register, and a summary report forwarded to Beijing each month.  The supervising 
commandant (Ma: uheri da) was responsible for maintaining discipline, and conducted 
personal tours of the selected sites in the Sunggari and Sahaliyan River regions.21  The 
pearling teams themselves doubled as police units, sweeping through and inspecting the 
villages and strategic chokepoints (oyonggo kamni bade) they passed through on their 
return.22  Upon their return, troops were dispatched to all key strategic passes and towns 
in the area, and written messages sent to Sahaliyan Ula, Ningguta, Bedune, Ilan Hala, and 
Alcuka alerting local officials of their planned movements.   Within days of returning, the 
supervising commandant was required to make a tally of the types and sizes of all pearls 
collected, send a summary memorial to the throne, then dispatch the box of pearls under 
guard to Beijing.  Tallies from Aihūn and Ningguta were compiled and sent separately.23 
The financial burden was significant.  As they spent the whole summer in the 
backcountry, each person was allotted .6 hule of grain and a pack horse.  The train was 
enlarged further by additional pack horses to carry camp supplies.  They also travelled 
with muskets for guarding the camps, with one catty of gunpowder and one catty of lead 
balls. Throughout the Jiaqing reign, records were kept of the names and ranks of all 
commanding officers, the total number of bannermen, horses, grain, and muskets for each 
                                                
21 MWLF 3667.47.171.2659 (JQ9.4.30). 
22 Ibid. 
23 MWLF 3549.30.162.2717 (JQ1.9.13). A funde bošokū was responsible each year for supervising the 
transport of the box of pearls to Beijing.  
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marching train (see Figure 18).24  Separate tallies were kept for trains to the pearl beds 
around Ningguta (see Figure 19).25  
Figure 18: Hunchun Marching Trains to the Suifun and Burhatu Pearl Beds, 1798-1819 
Year Rivers Harvested People 
Pack 
Horses 
Grain 
(hulu) 
Musket 
sets 
1798 Suifun, Burhatu, Gahari, Hailan 112 n/a 67.8 2 
1805 Muren, Burhatu, Hailan, Gahari 100 104 60 2 
1807 Muren, Burhatu, Hailan, Gahari 66 67 39.6 2 
1812 Burhatu, Gahari 66 69 39.6 1 
1814 Little Suifun, Burhatu, Hailan 88 92 52.8 2 
1815 Little Suifun, Burhatu, Hailan 88 92 52.8 2 
1818 
Muren, Little Suifun, Burhatu, 
Hailan 85 89 51 2 
1819 Muren, Burhatu, Hailan, Gahari 85 89 51 2 
 
Figure 19: Hunchun Marching Trains to Ningguta Region Pearl Beds, 1798-1819 
Year Location People 
Pack 
Horses 
Grain 
(hulu) 
Musket, 
powder, 
and ball 
1798 Emhen Sorbi, Dogon, Mudan 13 20   
1807 Mudan, Fulgiyaha 32 34 19.2 1 
1812 Mudan, Fulgiyaha 32 34 19.2 1 
1814 Emhe, Juru, Dogon, Fulgiyaha 35 37 21 1 
 
Pearling itself was difficult labor.  The work began and ended with the long 
march through difficult terrain to the harvesting site.  It then required diving in ice-cold 
streams, rushing with fresh snowmelt from the Changbai and Sikhote-Alin mountain 
                                                
24 Hunchun fudutong yamen dang’an, 21: 6 (JQ3.5.1), 23: 167 (JQ10.4.5), 25: 64 (JQ11.8.10), 25: 263 
(JQ12.5.1), 26: 117 (JQ17.4.1), 27: 468 (JQ19.8.10), 28: 298 (JQ20.4.24), 29: 271 (JQ23.8.25), 32: 302 
(JQ24.8.10).  
25 Hunchun fudutong yamen dang’an, 21: 6 (JQ3.5.1), 25: 263 (JQ12.5.1), 26: 117 (JQ17.4.1), 27: 468 
(JQ19.8.10), 26: 469 (JQ17.8.15), 27: 468 (JQ19.8.10). 
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ranges.  The difficulty of the work, and the isolation of the sites, pushed others to desert.  
In 1798, for example, a thirty-six year old pearl-hunter named Ajingga (described as 
dark-skinned, pockmarked, and wearing blue pants, a felt hat, and sheepskin boots) 
disappeared just four days into his tour.26    
The work was also dangerous, and deaths occurred on the job.  Given the 
seriousness of the tribute, the court required all drownings to be reported.  In a disaster in 
1809, for example, a man was killed and pearls lost when a canoe capsized in the Arcin 
river basin, in the jurisdiction of Aihūn.  That year, corporal (Ma: funde bošokū) 
Bayamboo’s team had managed to collect six tana pearls between .8 and 2 fen (.3 to .76 
kilograms, or 1.5 to 3.8 carats) as well as two regular pearls.  Having packed the pearls in 
sacks affixed with official seals, they started up the Jan River, when Bayamboo’s canoe 
crashed into a rock: Bayamboo, three pearlers, and the box containing the tribute – as 
well as all the remaining food and supplies – plunged into the water.  One man drowned 
and all the supplies, as well as the pearls, were lost.  Bayamboo, for failing to avert the 
accident, was charged with recklessness: “Manchurian pearls are the emperor’s 
tribute….he should have been [extra] cautious, and not causing a man to drown.”  The 
deceased bannerman’s family was awarded 12 taels of silver for suffering a death in 
service.27   
 
The Rivers Rest 
 
                                                
26 Hunchun fudutong yamen dang’an, 21: 69 (JQ3.7.6). 
27 MWLF 3775.28.179.3221 (JQ14.10.13).  Per the practice of the FHA, the original rescript was not 
included in the microfilm, and I was unable to follow up on the case.  
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The human and material costs of pearl harvest were major concerns of the Qing 
court.  Another major concern was non-state actors trespassing on the pearl beds and 
destroying them.  When moratoriums on pearl harvesting began in the late nineteenth 
century, both were cited as primary justifications for a new practice.  They were, in fact, 
inseparable problems: the harder it was to find productive pearl beds, the greater the 
burden on bannermen.    
One solution lay in tightening state controls over the pearl-producing territories.  
As early as 1682 (KX20), the Kangxi emperor ordered that any “Ula man” in Ningguta 
found guilty of entering restricted rivers to collect mussels (Ch:Ƥƥ), honey, river otters, 
or Manchurian pearls would be punished using the rules used for ginseng poaching: death 
by strangulation of leaders, two months in the cangue and 100 lashes for followers; two 
months in the cangue and 100 lashes was also reserved for anyone found guilty of buying 
or selling government passports allowing entry into the area.28   
Increasingly, however, the court began to see rogue bannermen, rather than illegal 
Chinese migrants, as the key threat to the system.  In 1724, the Yongzheng emperor 
attempted to deal with pearl trafficking using the Great Wall, incentivizing guardsmen 
posted at the Shanhaiguan gate to intercept contraband.  If guardsmen captured small 
amounts of pearls, no extra reward was called for.  Yet guardsmen who captured 400 fen 
of pearls or more were rewarded with five times their weight in silver, while their 
commanding officers received citations or, if they oversaw the capture over 1,600 fen of 
pearls, a full promotion.  Since the value of Manchurian pearls depended both on their 
size and luster, rewards were adjusted accordingly.  On the hand, in cases were pearl 
                                                
28 Daqing huidian shili, 10: 280.1. 
 116 
smugglers successfully crossed into China, the commanding officers were demoted three 
ranks, and the patrolmen caned 80 times, in accordance with punishments for not 
following the most important laws.  If collaboration and corruption were brought to light, 
the commanding officer was removed from office and the patrolman caned 100 times, 
with a month in the cangue.29   
Despite these prohibitions, in 1733 (YZ11), freshwater mussels (Ch:ùƣƤ) 
were reported to have become relatively scarce, prompting the first conservation effort.  
After an investigation, the Yongzheng emperor ordered that an exchange be established 
for top-grade pearls: 1st rank pearls were made equal to five regular pearls; 2nd rank equal 
to four pearls, 3rd rank equal to three, and 4th equal to two, to make compensation more 
fair 
In the early Qianlong period, poaching grew increasingly serious.  In 1741, the 
assistant military lieutenant-governor of Fengtian, Jakuna, described Jilin as “the Manchu 
homeland” (Ch: ĆÿÞÕ; lit. “the Manchu root”) and argued that having a floating 
civilian population (Ch:Āò) was to no benefit (Ch: ưŃ), and pushed for a closing off 
of Bedune to immigration; it was to be maintained as homesteads and pastures of 
bannermen.  In the same memorial, he further proposed redoubling of the patrolling of 
Jilin’s production sites of ginseng and Manchurian pearls as well as roads and waterways 
leading to the Changbaishan and Ussuri.  With the danger posed by poaching already 
apparent, the Qianlong emperor agreed.30  It was a costly option: karun were established 
near the pearl beds in the Muleng and Suifen regions to capture ginseng poachers.  Then, 
                                                
29 Daqing huidian shili, 10: 280.2. 
30 Gaozong shilu, 142: 1045. 
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in 1755, the practice of staffing the karun and the pearl collecting missions separately 
was abandoned: the Qianlong emperor ordered that the Ula hunters collecting pearls take 
on the double duty of patrolmen themselves.31  Finally, in 1781, the Qianlong emperor 
ordered a five-year moratorium on the pearl harvest.   
Yet the pearl beds continued to suffer.  Not only was the quantity of pearls 
decreasing each year, their size and luster was as well.  Manchuria’s rivers, it seemed, 
were losing their character.  In the summer of 1795, the Qianlong emperor fumed that 
high quality pearls in Manchuria had become scarce:   
During the Shunzhi, Kangxi, and Yongzheng reign periods, the tana 
pearls in storage were each high quality (Ma: sain), and the harvest of 
high-quality tana pearls was plentiful.  Yet for several years the pearls 
hunted have not been high-quality at all.  It will not do if the pearl beds 
(Ma: tana tucire ba) in the Sunggari River area do not produce pearls 
anywhere.  If we rest [the pearl beds] for several years, we will get 
high-quality pearls [again].  Yet because the territory is vast and there 
are many rivers and creeks, it cannot be guarded in its entirety, and it is 
impossible to quash poaching….[High-quality tana pearls] are most 
certainly sold to the rich merchants in this territory (Ma: golo) [i.e. 
Jilin] and other merchants who buy ginseng, and then they are 
smuggled into the interior.  There must be no allowance for crossing 
the border and then conducting these sales (Ma: ainaha seme jecen ci 
tucimbi teni uncara kooli akū).32   
  
 
He thus ordered the military governor of Jilin, Siolin, to crackdown on the people from 
the Chinese interior running the black-market.  The edict was passed down to Siolin, and 
from Siolin to all of the territory’s assistant military lieutenant-governors (Ma: meiren i 
janggin).33   Conservation involved more than just policing for poachers and illegal 
                                                
31 Gaozong shilu, 493: 194. 
32 Hunchun fudutong yamen dang’an, 19.468 (QL60.6.14). 
33 Ibid. 
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sellers. It also included strategies such as resting the river beds and expanding operations 
to new sites: production was to remain high.  
In 1796, in line with the new imperial orders, Siolin confirmed that his men were 
“resting the rivers where oysters have grown scarce from previous harvests” (fe butaha 
tahūra seri oho bira be teyebufi) and “strictly investigating illegal pearl-harvesting” 
(hūlhame butara be ciralame baicabume).  In the meantime, Jilin bannermen had 
expanded pearling operations to the Ercuke River, where mussels were “plentiful, of 
good quality, and large” (elgiyen sain amba).  That year, fifty-eight teams departed for 
the hunt.34 In 1797, fifty-eight teams departed the provincial seat for the Ercuke River in 
a train of 70 canoes.35  It was hardly a drop off: the previous summer, eighty canoes had 
been active.36  The proved almost as productive.  They split up along the Sarin, Ton, Jari 
and other productive rivers between the Sunggari and Amur and hunted through chushu 
in late August.37  That year, however, the White Lotus Rebellion in Sichuan erupted.  
News reached the pearl harvesters on JQ2.7.20 that they would be pressed into service, 
and that they should begin sending by the postal route horses, carts, and men.  As the 
news arrived at the tail end of the harvest, the pearling teams managed to bring in 742 
tana and regular pearls combined.38  
                                                
34 MWLF 3541.24.162.814 (JQ1.4.10). 
35 MWLF 3562.5.163.2235 (JQ2.4.9), MWLF 3562.10.163.2255 (JQ2.4.9). 
36 MWLF 3541.24.162.814 (JQ1.4.10). 
37 MWLF 3562.5.163.2235 (JQ2.4.9). The date referenced for their return is the fourteenth solar term (Ch: 
ƢÍ; Ma: halhūn bedereke).  Defined as the day the sun reaches an ecliptic longitude of 150º, a month 
before the autumn equinox, the term falls usually around August 23 in the Gregorian calendar.  
38 MWLF 3571.28.164.742 (JQ2.9.6). 
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Yet achieving minimum quotas remained a problem. In 1799, the Jiaqing emperor 
ordered another moratorium on pearl harvesting, this time for three years, starting the 
summer of 1800.  The moratorium was reinforced with the establishment of karun and 
the policing of chokepoints along the waterways. The policy was justified on three 
grounds: first, it granted a reprieve to the pearl harvesters; second, it allowed the mussels 
to recuperate; and third, it reflected a life-affirming empathy of the emperor.  “I have a 
tenderness toward life” (Ch: Òª¥ęP), the emperor explained, “it is not for treasuring 
my pearls.” (Ch: 
ȈĬ§/ĭ).  It was worth emphasizing: the emperor was not 
driven by greed, but for love of life.39   
The year 1799, in this regard, marks a major turning point.  For the first time 
incentives were lowered: thereafter, the return rates established in 1701 were diminished 
by 30%.40  In 1812, finding that the pearling teams were simply trading away the vast 
sums of silk they received each year anyway, the court commuted the silk payments to 
the equivalent market rate in silver.41    
Yet throughout the first decade of the nineteenth century, oysters continued to be 
reported “scarce” (Ma: seri) on the Hūlan and Neme Rivers in Heilongjiang district, the 
Suifun and Muren Rivers in Ningguta district, and pearl beds were ordered to be rested 
for “several years” to allow the mussels to be better “cultivated” (Ma: fesumbure ujime).  
                                                
39 Renzong shilu, 56: 741. 
40 Daqing huidian shili, 10: 283.1. 
41 Renzong shilu, 254: 429-430; Daqing huidian shili, 10: 283.1. 
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The problem was growing increasingly severe, as pearl harvests failed to recover. Pearl 
bed production around Hunchun fell precipitously after 1786 (See Figure 20).42  
Figure 20: Pearl Harvests from the Burhatu, Gahari, and Hailan Rivers, 1786-1819 
 Burhatu Gahari Hailan TOTAL 
Year 
tana 
pearls  
regular 
pearls  
tana 
pearls  
regular 
pearls  
tana 
pearls  
regular 
pearls  
tana 
pearls  
regular 
pearls  
1786 87 14 78 21 75 15 240 50 
1787 36  25  42  103  
1790 18 8 17 7   35 15 
1806 18 16 10 16 16 18 44 50 
1812 53 49 20 12   73 61 
1814 42 44     42 44 
1818 13 0     13 0 
1819 16 11   20 11 36 22 
 
The declines in Hunchun were matched by declines from throughout Jilin; after 
1795 the pearl yield dropped threefold (See Figure 21).  
Figure 21: Pearl Harvest Tallies, 1795-181543 
Year 
Total 
Pearls 
1795 2890 
1796 2753 
1797 2042 
1798 1975 
1801 369 
1813 1158 
1814 642 
1815 895 
 
                                                
42 Hunchun fudutong yamen dang’an, 15: 155 (QL51.8.15), 16: 226 (QL52.8.21), 18: 311 (QL55.8.10), 25: 
64 (JQ11.8.10), 29: 271 (JQ23.8.25), 15: 19 (QL51.5.20).  
43 NWFZXD 131.560.125 (JQ1.10.26), 131.560.125 (JQ1.10.26), 131.455.45 (JQ6.9.28), 132.462.1 
(JQ18.11.1), 133.466.93 (JQ19.10.29), 135.473.142 (JQ20.11.3); MWLF 3572.24.164.966 (JQ2.9.13), 
3587.32.165.1553 (JQ3.9.27). 
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What was causing such precipitous declines?  To the court, the answer was 
simple: poachers and the black-market were to blame. Scarcity signaled an enforcement 
problem, and so as pearl production declined, the policing infrastructure grew.  In 1808 
Gilu was thus ordered to dispatch troops to police for mussel poachers around the 
surviving pearl beds.  That year, 61 teams of legal harvesters proceeded to the Erecuke 
River, where there were “still good mussels for pearling.”  They departed on JQ13.4.28, 
while Gilu led a group of separate teams to the Sunggari, Neyen, Salun, and Lalin Rivers 
as well as the Itun and Lipcun Rivers in Mukden territory.  While hunting pearls, the 
teams were ordered to be on the lookout for poachers.  After August 23, the bannermen 
were ordered to continue patrolling strategic passes (Ma: oyonggo kamni) before 
returning to their home posts.44      
In 1821, nineteen years after the previous three-year moratorium on pearl-
harvesting was lifted, and in anticipation of the twenty-year anniversary, the Daoguang 
emperor reinstated another three-year ban on pearling.  As in the years 1800-1802, there 
was again a need to “restore the oysters” (Ma: tahūra be mutubume ujibume).  The 
justification was twofold: to “conserve the energy of hunters and lovingly care for the 
lives of oysters” (Ma: buthai ursei hūsun be malhūšara tahūra i ergen be hairara gūnin).  
To enforce the edict and curb poaching, he ordered karun established at river mouths and 
mountain passes.  In the summer of 1822, the first year of the three-year moratorium, 
troops were dispatched to survey the area, and the authorities in Heilongjiang and Jilin 
clarified which jurisdictions were responsible for which territories.  Guardsmen were to 
maintain their posts at karun throughout the summer.  Hunchun, for one, was divided into 
                                                
44 MWLF 3738.33.177.2256 (JQ13.4.9). 
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six policing zones, each with its own karun: the Burhantu and Hailan Rivers were 
patrolled from Darhūwan Holo karun; the Gahari River from the Gahari karun; the 
Hunchun River from Amidan karun; the Fiyan, Niowanggiyan Šeri, and Mongol Rivers 
from Mongol karun; the Gihin and Yancu Rivers from Situ karun; and the Jurun River 
from the Jurun karun.45 
In 1825, with the conclusion of the resting period, the pearl harvest resumed.46  
Yet the harvest proved a disappointment.  In 1827, the military governor of Jilin, Luceng, 
reported the river’s tribute pearls to be “small and utterly useless.”  The emperor 
concluded that “if we hunt [for pearls] annually, then the mussels will be ravished,” while 
the effort and suffering of the pearl harvesters only increased. He thus proposed resting 
the pearl beds to “allow the mussels to be nurtured and grow.” At the same time, he 
ordered that the military governors of Heilongjiang and Jilin reorganize karun along the 
roads and waterways leading to the pearl-beds, situated at strategic passes and the river’s 
mouths: poachers had to be put under arrest.  Troops were dispatched to the new guard-
posts that summer.47  Another three-year moratorium was issued in 1827, by now the 
standard response to the crisis.48  The pearl beds were rested continuously thereafter: the 
moratorium was reissued from 1830-1832, and still again in the years 1833-1835.49  
Every three years, requests were put in to open up the pearl beds, and each time the 
                                                
45 Hunchun fudutong yamen dang’an, 33: 333 (DG2.2.5). 
46 Hunchun fudutong yamen dang’an, 37: 50 (DG5.2.22). 
47 MWLF 4045.37.197.1818 (DG7.3.25). 
48 Hunchun fudutong yamen dang’an, 38: 68 (DG8.4.21), 39: 8 (DG8.5.1). 
49 See Hunchun fudutong yamen dang’an, 43: 338 (DG.14.10.15) for the Manchu text of the edict.  The 
edict was also recorded in the Veritable Records; see Xuanzong shilu, 222: 319.   
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emperor declined.  As he succinctly rescripted in 1842: “Stop the hunt for these 
upcoming years!” (Ma: jidere aniya kemuni butara be joo).50  Jilin’s pearl beds were 
depleted.   
 
Ginseng 
As with pearls, ginseng production was likewise a reflection of the strong top-
down structure of the Manchurian political system, premised upon robust territorial 
controls.  Moreover, as with pearls, the nature of demand shaped the methods of 
production.  High sustained demand necessitated long-term conservation strategies, while 
the desire for authenticity inspired significant quality controls: access to the ginseng-
producing mountains was restricted; farming and alternative methods of production were 
prohibited.  Yet, again, the high costs of maintaining the system, and inability to control 
corruption and black market activity, revealed limits to the Manchurian conservation 
order, and throughout the years 1750-1850, wild ginseng grew increasingly scarce; 
indeed, the decline of wild ginseng stocks became pronounced at least a half-century 
prior to collapse of oyster populations.  Significantly, however, the logic of conservation, 
driven by costs, demand, and by what appears to be a nascent ideology of “loving 
nature,” along with the toolkit of conservation, including rotating harvests and border 
controls, were similar for both pearls and ginseng. 
                                                
50 Hunchun fudutong yamen dang’an, 46: 286 (DG18.11.28).  In 1846 and 1848 the moratorium was yet 
again reinstated.  Hunchun fudutong yamen dang’an, 58: 230 (DG26.11.20), 61: 273 (DG28.4.9). Further 
research is needed into the pearl harvest in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  One-year 
reprieves are recorded in the Veritable Records for 1874, 1893, 1895, 1899, 1907, 1909, and 1910.  
Muzong shilu, 1: 84; Dezong shilu, 331: 252, 379: 958, 452: 966, 580: 679; Sundi shilu, 24: 458, 44-798.  
In 1846 and 1848 the moratorium was yet again reinstated.  
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These overarching similarities tied pearl and ginseng production despite the fact 
that the mechanisms and practice of “tribute” were significantly different.  In the case of 
pearls, the resource was extracted through the Eight Banners; bannermen pressed into 
service had no choice in the matter.  Ginseng tribute, on the other hand, was collected 
through a form of tax farming: after 1744, the Qing state granted licenses to private Han 
Chinese collectors, who were obliged to submit a quota of ginseng to the local 
government.  Licensed pickers could then sell all surplus ginseng on the open market, 
unlike pearl collectors, who exchanged all extra pearls for set exchange rates of silk or 
silver.  
Working the Mountains: “Tribute Farming” 
 
This “tribute farming” system took shape over the course of the first century of 
Qing rule, and was inseparable from broader efforts to protect the Qing court’s monopoly 
and manage poaching.  Prior to 1744, a variety of mechanisms were used to collect 
ginseng, including both banner corvee and licensing.   The Three Banner Bondservant 
Captain of Shengjing (Ch: ńÈ<ƪȏ) was charged with oversight, and 150 
ginseng pickers drafted to collect tribute each year.51  Only one location was open to the 
harvest: the Ussuri region.  In 1744, a major reform was pushed through. First, a Ginseng 
Bureau (xC) was established, operated under the military governor of Shengjing’s 
yamen.  Second, legal production sites were expanded to include Suifen and Elmin, and 
fifteen years later, in 1759 (QL24), the Halmin area was opened as well (Ussuri and 
Suifen were under the jurisdiction of Jilin, Elmin and Halmin of Shengjing).  Expanding 
                                                
51 Prior to 1667 (KX6), ginseng tribute was jointly administered under both the Manager of the Imperial 
Household Department (Ch: ŝ0) and the Three Banner Bondservant Captain of Shengjing.   
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the legal territory was designed to facilitate sustainability: by rule every 20 years each 
locality was to lay fallow.   
To better manage poachers, the third major reform of 1744 was to institute tribute 
farming, whereby Han Chinese would be charged with collecting ginseng under the 
supervision of Eight Banner officials.  Five types of permits were put into operation.52  
There were first and foremost standard permits for entering the mountains (Ma: temgetu; 
Ch: ǖđŏ), which were obtained prior to departure.  The permits issued in Shengjing 
were land-route permits, good for the Shengjing-Xingjing-Hoifa-Elmin-Halmin circuit.  
Those issued in Jilin and Ningguta were for the water-route, used to travel from Jilin Ula 
to Ussuri and Suifen.  Each year, they were sent from the Board of Revenue to Shengjing, 
then onwards to Jilin and Ningguta; all unused permits were returned to the Board of 
Revenue to be destroyed.  In addition, there were also “permits to return from the 
[ginseng] mountains” (Ma: alin ci bederere temgetu bithe; Ch:đŏ), to be presented 
after the harvest.  There were permits for bodyguards (Ma: fiyanjilara temgetu bithe; Ch: 
¹ŏ), who were brought into the mountains for protection.53  There were wooden 
plaques used for identification around one’s belt (Ma: ashara šusihe; C: Ƃė).  And 
there were permits issued to merchant resellers (lit. “red permits,” Ma: fulgiyan temgetu 
bithe; Ch: Ţŏ.  What the pickers took in beyond quota, they were allowed to sell for 
themselves.  Merchants who dealt in surplus ginseng, when crossing through 
Shanhaiguan, had to have licenses stating the quality, grade, and quantity of the ginseng.  
                                                
52 On the importance of 1744 as a turning point and a full description of the 1744 reforms, see Tong 
Yonggong, Manyuwen yu Manwen dang’an yanjiu (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2009), 264-269. 
53 Very few were issued each year.  In 1755, altogether 6000 “entrance permits” 6000 permits, compared to 
only ten for bodyguards.   
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In Beijing, they returned the permits to the Board of Revenue.  They were used both to 
better police the black market and for generating customs revenue: from each catty of 
ginseng, six taels silver in fees were assessed.54 
Imperial-level supervision of the system was constant.  In Jilin, after 1744, 
communications with the court operated according to a fixed schedule.  Just before New 
Year’s, the military governor sent a memorial (Ch: j¿) to Beijing requesting the 
release of the coming year’s ginseng licenses.55  When the temperature warmed between 
the fourth and fifth months and the picking season began, the military governor sent 
tallies of licenses issued.  In early autumn (usually in the seventh month), his office 
memorialized again with lending notices of debts incurred through the summer.  When 
the season was over, in the early winter, the office issued an accounting statement.  All 
communications were in Manchu, even through the nineteenth century.  From the 
Qianlong period on, the Imperial Household Department compiled separate accounting 
records (Ch: *9jǫê), of the quantities and grades of ginseng received each 
summer.  The entire system was designed to check corruption; if an official failed to 
make any of the reports, he was censured.56 
Tallies of issued licenses were compiled at the military-department level, at 
Alcuka, Bedune, Jilin hoton, Ilan Hala, and Ningguta.  All reports required, at a 
minimum, a record the number of standard licenses issued to Chinese pickers, the number 
                                                
54 Tong Yonggong, Manyuwen yu manwen dang’an yanjiu, 266-267. 
55 MWLF 3651.37.170.1514 (JQ7.12.28). 
56 Siolin, for example, was censured for failing to send a report on ginseng conditions, a nod to imperial 
anxiety about keeping control over both officials in Jilin and the ginseng trade.  MWLF 3637.37.169.1217 
(JQ7.3.23). 
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of non-standard “stamped forms” (Ma: doron gidaha bithe) issued, a comparison with the 
previous year’s output, and amount of unused licenses left remaining.  In the military 
departments of Ningguta and Jilin, where the ginseng picking was more extensive and the 
management infrastructure was more elaborate, tallies were also kept of the number of 
brewer’s licenses (Ma: arki bureku temgetu bithe), and merchant’s licenses (Ma: hūda 
salibuha temgetu bithe).  Tallies were then forwarded to the military governor’s office 
twice: once in the middle of the season, once at the end.57 
At least nominally, the Qing state kept oversight over production, despite the 
relative autonomy of ginseng pickers in the field.  Legally, there were three types of 
ginseng: “tribute ginseng” (Ma: alban orhoda), “state-use ginseng” (Ma: siden de 
baitalara orhoda), and “surplus ginseng” (Ma: funcehe orhoda).  Each permit came with 
the requirement that the recipient return two taels of ginseng in weight (about eighty 
grams) back to the office of the military deputy lieutenant-governor.  At the end of the 
summer, five-sixths of the submitted tribute was immediately dispatched to the Imperial 
Household Department in Beijing, with one-sixth set aside in the locality to cover banner 
expenditures.  Cash used for managing ginseng affairs in the two military departments of 
Jilin and Ningguta was taken from the various department’s storehouses (namun). In the 
seventh month, a tally was taken of the total number of temgetu bithe and doron gidaha 
                                                
57 Based on a synopsis of MWLF 3541.22.162.802 (JQ1.4.10), 3544.16.162.1465 (JQ1.5.27), 
3546.46.162.2041 (JQ1.7.17), 3562.14.163.2270 (JQ2.4.20), 3564.35.163.2794 (JQ2.5.29), 
3567.2.163.3194 (JQ2.+6.6), 3575.34.164.1729 (JQ2.12.7), 3580.42.164.3211 (JQ3.4.16), 3583.3.165.230 
(JQ3.5.28), 3584.38.165.718 (JQ3.7.15), 3612.22.167.952 (JQ5.6.21), 3627.2.168.1519 (JQ6.6.10), 
3651.37.170.1514 (JQ7.12.28), 3669.45.171.3196 (JQ9.6.6), 3675.10.172.1205 (JQ9.10.27), 
3683.17.173.214 (JQ10.5.24), 3691.8.173.2768 (JQ10.11.4), 3703.14.174.2967 (JQ11.6.11), 
3710.14.175.1710 (JQ11.11.4), 3720.28.176.1232 (JQ12.5.21), 3723.33.176.1852 (JQ12.7.3), 
3726.24.176.2667 (JQ12.8.21), 3730.49.177.420 (JQ12.11.25), 3742.8.177.3022 (JQ13.5.21). 
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bithe, and those which had not been dispersed were sent back to the Board to be 
destroyed.58   
The venture was thus extremely risky: a poor harvest meant financial ruin for the 
pickers, and crippling deficits for the banner government.  Risk was gradually shifted 
away from the government office.  Liquor dealers (Ch: Ĕǭƈ¯), for one, were 
gradually institutionalized as the ginseng picker’s guarantors in cases of poor harvests.  
Further, in 1800, Shengjing’s ginseng licenses began to be subsidized using customs 
taken from grain shipments.  For every grain boat, 20 taels of silver were assessed, of 
which 17 was used to subsidize ginseng licenses.  In 1807 (JQ12), a fixed quota of cash 
from grain shipment customs was set at 44,372.01 taels silver, with 75 taels silver 
allocated for each ginseng license.59   
Despite the incentives to promote participation, in the half century after the 
system was institutionalized, the issuances of licenses plummeted (see Figure 22).  
Between 1744 and 1789, licensing fell by 75%, from a 9000 licenses to 2330.  Between 
1789 and 1852, license issuances fell an additional 68% to as few as 753 per year.60     
Figure 22: Ginseng Permits Issued, 1744-1852 
Year 
Licenses 
Issued 
1744 9000 
1760 6000 
1777 2900 
1789 2330 
                                                
58 MWLF 3546.46.162.2041 (JQ1.7.17). 
59 A document from 1847 (DG27) put the figure at 44,325 liang, thus giving exactly 75 taels of silver for 
591 ginseng licenses. Tong Yonggong, Manyuwen yu manwen dang’an yanjiu, 273. 
60 Wang Peihuan, “Qingdai dongbei caishenye de xingshuai,” Shehui kexue zhanxian 4 (1982): 191.  
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1799 2287 
1846 1752 
1852 753 
 
The decline varied by locality.  In Jilin, most of the losses were reported in the 
military departments of Jilin and Ningguta (See Figure 23).  The quantities of brewer’s 
permits and merchants permits issued held constant: in Jilin department, 150 brewers’ 
permits, 114 šen ioi, and thirty five merchant’s permits; in Ningguta twenty brewers’ 
permits, thirty-five šen ioi, and fourteen merchant’s permits.61   
Figure 23: Jilin Ginseng Permit Tallies by Military Department, 1796-1808    
Year Alcuka62  Bedune 
Ilan 
Hala 
Jilin 
(hoton) Ningguta TOTAL63 
1796 29 34 36 507 209 815 
1797 29 34 36 508 210 817 
1798    509 101 821 
1801 24 20 23 207 113 387 
1804 27 24 20 170 102 343 
1805 27 26 21 161 104 339 
1806 27 26 21 166 85 325 
1807 27 26 21 168 88 330 
1808 27 27 21 168 89 332 
 Two factors drove these declines.  First, the amount of ginseng in the wild was 
plummeting: there was simply not enough product to pick.  Second, people were opting 
out of the system altogether: there were more opportunities in the black market.  To the 
Qing court, both problems were interrelated and required a common solution: stepped-up 
                                                
61 MWLF 3627.2.168.1519 (JQ6.6.10), 3669.45.171.3196 (JQ9.6.6), 3541.22.162.802 (JQ1.4.10), 
3544.16.162.1465 (JQ1.5.27), 3562.14.163.2270 (JQ2.4.20), 3564.35.163.2794 (JQ2.5.29), 
3580.42.164.3211 (JQ3.4.16), 3583.3.165.230 (JQ3.5.28), 3669.45.171.3196 (JQ9.6.6), 3683.17.173.214 
(JQ10.5.24), 3703.14.174.2967 (JQ11.6.11), 3720.28.176.1232 (JQ12.5.21), 3742.8.177.3022 (JQ13.5.21). 
62 The Alcuka tally began to include Lalin jurisdiction in 1804. MWLF 3669.45.171.3196 (JQ9.6.6). 
63 The report for 1798 gave a tally of 211 permits for Alcuka, Bedune, and Ilan Hala combined.  MWLF 
3583.3.165.230 (JQ3.5.28). 
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policing, enhanced territorial controls, and rehabilitation of the ginseng-producing 
mountains.  
The Mountains Rest 
 
State controls over production were a long-standing concern.  Two decades prior 
to reforms, in 1724, the Yongzheng emperor had started a major crack-down on illegal 
ginseng trafficking, and the military governors of Jilin and Heilongjiang began to send 
palace memorials on all poachers arrested and contraband seized.  In the first ten months 
of 1731 alone (YZ8.12 to YZ9.10.1), for example, Jilin reported the arrests of thirty 
groups of ginseng poachers, comprised of 69 men, who had been dispatched to Ningguta.  
From these teams, a total of 620.3 taels of ginseng, 72.45 taels of se solo, and 62 sable 
pelts were confiscated.  Then, in the eleventh month alone (YZ9.10), another nine teams 
of thirty-six were arrested, bringing in another 446 taels of ginseng and 98.5 taels se solo.  
In the first ten months of 1731, a total of 105 men, 1066.3 taels ginseng (about 40 kilos), 
170.95 se solo (6.5 kilos) and 62 sable pelts were sent to the Imperial Household 
Department from Ningguta.64  The value would depend on the quality of the ginseng; in 
this case, given a possible range of between 60-280 silver taels per catty,65 the haul would 
have equaled, conservatively, at least 4,000 silver taels.    
The anti-trafficking measures extended to the patrolmen at the Willow Palisades.  
In 1732, the guardsmen, based at the six gates centered on Fort Weiyuan (Ma: Wei Yuan 
Pu; Ch: qǚ_), captured a similar range of items while patrolling for pickers coming 
                                                
64 MWLF 900.1.19.126 (YZ10.1.6). 
65 Chiang Chushan, Qingdai renshen de lishi: yige shangpin de yanjiu.  Ph.D. Thesis, National Tsing Hua 
University (2006), 215. 
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from Elmin and Halmin.  Altogether, they arrest 72 men and seized 57.72 taels of ginseng, 
190 stems of “raw” (Ma: eshun) ginseng; 1.22 taels of se solo, 84 sable pelts, 5 muskets, 
4 san ban cuwan, 25 catties of hosiyoo, 31 catties of tiyei šan, 27 racoon-dog pelts, 2 
horses, 4 bushels of grain, cooking supplies, and tents.66 
Yet ginseng continued to illegally cross out of Manchuria, and the problem only 
increased in scope and degree.  In 1738, the assistant military lieutenant-governor of 
Mergen memorialized that ten ginseng poachers, led by one Zhang Jihui, had been caught 
in the Saddle Mountain (Ma: enggemu alin) region.  Two taels of ginseng and an 
additional .5 taels of se solo were confiscated.  Zhang Jihui was interrogated and 
dispatched to the Mukden Board of Punishments for sentencing.  Zhang’s team was 
equipped with six horses, one bow, a quiver of arrows, two cooking pots, and two tents; 
this was dispersed to the troops who arrested them.   There most valuable items were 
given over to the state, including a musket (which was entered as “tribute” [Ma: alban]), 
and the ginseng, which was sent to the Imperial Household Department at the end of the 
year.67  In the summer of 1748 alone, patrolmen based in Hunchun arrested 176 poachers, 
all of whom were processed and sent to Ningguta.68  
As poaching continued, the court experimented with new strategies to stamp it out, 
particularly from the late Qianlong period on.  In the Ussuri and Suifun regions, for 
example, between 1748 and 1792, troops had been making seasonal patrols, setting off in 
the spring and returning in the autumn in rhythm with the picking season.  Because the 
                                                
66 MWLF 900.2.19.127 (YZ10.1.6). 
67 MWLF 905.4.19.1437 (QL3.10.1). 
68 Hunchun fudutong yamen dang’an, 1: 337, 348, 351, 354, 362, 365, 370, 372, 376, 379, 390, 413, 415, 
419, and 454. 
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patrols were deemed too predictable, however, in 1793, the military governor of Jilin, 
Hengsio, memorialized that the troops dispatched to the Usuri and Suifun mountains 
establish posts in the region, so that they could make sudden and irregular raids into the 
mountains to seek out diggers without proper documentation.  According to precedent, 
they would call up two colonels (Ma: gūsai da) from Ilan Hala to lead the patrols on 
year-long tours of duty.69   
The patrolmen left for the restricted hunting grounds, splitting up on the mountain 
roads, in the seventh month, in the late summer when the ginseng harvest was at its peak.  
The main target of their inspections were the diggers’ camps (lit. the place where they 
“nested” (Ma: tomobure)).  When they reached designated high grounds, they made 
winter camp, and commenced “thorough roving inspections of the mountains and 
valleys” (Ma: alin holo be meleburakū were heceme giyarime baicabufi). A year later, 
the following autumn, as licensed ginseng pickers returned from the mountains, the 
troops followed behind them in a rear-guard action patrolling for poachers and diggers 
who might have overstayed their permits.  When they returned, they were required to 
issue a report of their inspection.  For their work, they were to received an [extra] half 
year’s salary.70   Other troops, called up just for summer tours, received three months 
salary.71  The patrolmen were specially selected for being “capable soldiers and police” 
(sain mutere hafan cooha hūjaci); their mission was to capture poachers and participants 
                                                
69 MWLF 3596.16.166.0150 (JQ4.5.28). 
70 MWLF 3596.16.166.0150 (JQ4.5.28). 
71 MWLF 3730.47.177.408 (JQ12.11.25). 
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in the black market (Ma: hūlhame cisui orhoda guruhe, udaha deyebure weilengge 
niyalma).72 
It was expected that arrests and seizures be made annually, with tallies of 
confiscated contraband and captured poachers and black-marketers awaited in the weeks 
following the lunar New Year when the licensing tribute-ginseng pickers returned from 
the mountains.  Local authorities navigated the Scylla of arresting too few and appearing 
corrupt and the Charybdis of arresting too many and appearing to have fostered a new 
problem.  Their aim was not to stamp out the illegal behavior but to manage it. 
To incentivize the guardsmen, all arresting officers were rewarded with captured 
loot.  Seized goods from the poaching raids were divided into four categories.  The first 
was reserved for the most valuable commodities, sable and ginseng, which the court had 
special claims over; all sable, ginseng, and pearls were thus put into the local treasury 
and, at the end of the year, dispatched under guard to the Imperial Household 
Department.  A second category of seized good, which included captured muskets, were 
to be kept by local yamens.73  A third category was for items to be destroyed on site, 
including cultivated ginseng and the pickers’ huts.74  Everything else was awarded to the 
arresting guardsmen: horses, tents, and cookware.  They also could keep all second-tier 
furs, such as raccoon-dog (Ma: elbihe) pelts.  
Arrest reports from the turn of the 19th century, when participation in the tribute 
system plummeted, reveal extensive poaching networks, and ginseng poachers were 
                                                
72 MWLF 3575.34.164.1725 (JQ2.12.7). 
73 The category also included hosiyoo, and tiyei šan.   
74 MWLF 900.2.19.127 (YZ10.1.6). 
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involved with illegal fur trapping and vice versa.  Poachers were caught often with over 
half a pound of ginseng on them.  In 1796, Siolin reported that the first haul of captured 
“privately obtained” (Ma: cisui) ginseng totaled 16.5 taels of korofi, and 2.1 taels of se 
solo, and that the second round of patrols by troops and policemen (Ma: hūjaci) seized an 
additional 12.1 taels korofi and 1.5 taels of se solo, yielding a grand total of 28.6 taels 
korofi and 3.6 taels se solo.75  Later that winter, policemen arrested a man in the act of 
illegally buying 10.7 taels of ginseng and korofi; the guard who made the sting was 
rewarded and the ginseng forwarded to the Imperial Household Department.76  In 1797, 
patrolmen caught three people carrying unlicensed ginseng, totaling 18.5 taels ginseng 
and korofi and 2.3 taels se solo.77  1798, the two raids yielded 31.6 taels of orhoda and 
kofori and 3.9 taels of se solo, with one man carrying 2.7 taels of orhoda captured 
separately later.78   At the end of the year (JQ3.11.26), a total of 37.43 taels of orhoda 
and kofori and 7.85 taels of se solo were reported detained; these were securely bundled, 
affixed with a seal, and dispatched under guard to the Imperial Household Department.79   
Yet these hauls proved to be relatively modest, and the guardsmen were exhorted 
to capture larger numbers of poachers and contraband.  In 1800, 320 guardsmen (Ma: 
cooha) were called up for a thirteen-month tour; the were divided into twelve teams, each 
under the command of an officer (Ma: hafan), and put under the ultimate command of 
two officials of rank colonel (Ma: gūsai da): Funghai and Uyumboo. That autumn, 
                                                
75 MWLF 3557.7.163.1051 (JQ1.12.18). 
76 MWLF 3558.17.163.1332 (JQ2.1.21). 
77 MWLF 3575.34.164.1725 (JQ2.12.7). 
78 MWLF 3576.47.164.2023 (JQ3.1.19). 
79 MWLF 3590.13.165.2228 (JQ3.11.26); 3590.29.165.2315 [JQ3.12]. 
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Funghai’s men caught twenty poachers (Ma: hūlha) and seized 2.24 taels of ginseng, .4 
taels of se solo, two stems of eshun orhoda, thirty-nine sable pelts (seke sukū), two lynx 
pelts, and three otter pelts.  At the same time, Uyumboo’s men caught twenty-two 
poachers with 3.1 yan of ginseng, .5 taels of se solo; an additional branch unit captured 
nineteen more men.  The pickers’ camps and domesticated ginseng fields were 
discovered in the mountains of Nentun, Fantun, and Sikada.  When found, the guardsmen 
razed the huts, and dug up the small plantations.  The season’s haul was relatively 
modest; in their report to the military governor, they conceded that a total of sixty-one 
poachers caught was “not a large number” (ton labdu akū).  Higher authorities agreed: 
the low turnout, plus the fact that the additional branch unit had arrested nineteen men but 
failed to seize any contraband, aroused suspicison.  Following a precedent from 1789, an 
investigation into possible corruption or negligence was demanded, as none of the 
arrested men were captured in the backcountry; they were all found along the established 
routes (jūgun de jafame baha).80   
In 1801, the commanding officers were under renewed pressure to increase 
seizures and arrests.  The previous year’s tours had not been able to “purge” (Ma: 
geterembume) the area of illicit activity and men.  This year, they were ordered to ensure 
that “the interior of the mountains was thoroughly searched and purged (Ma: fere 
hecereme geterembume baicaha), and there were no illegals wintering [there].”  Under 
the command of the assistant military lieutenant-governor of Ningguta, Golmingga, and 
the assistant military lieutenant-governor of Ilan Hala, Elhengge, more inspection teams 
were added so more ground could be covered.  This time, the tours went far to the west, 
                                                
80 MWLF 3621.28.167.3574 (JQ6.1.11). 
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from Dekdenggi mountains and Usuri River clear to the Pacific coast.  Golminga 
departed in the late spring (JQ7.4.20), returning about five and half months later 
(JQ7.10.1).  In the intervening months, his troops marched up the Juci River and along 
the Pacific coast, hanging new placards (Ma: ice šusihe) on trees to mark the borders of 
the restricted areas and warn trespassers of the law.  While on patrol, they arrested 
eighty-three men and seized 24.41 taels of ginseng, 2.45 taels of se solo, 5.5 taels of 
abdaha, nine sable pelts, two otter pelts, four racoon-dog pelts, and sixteen squirrel pelts.  
When they discovered poacher’s huts and cultivated ginseng fields, they burned them 
down and destroyed the fields (Ma: fetehe usin be gemu fehuteme efulehebi). His second 
in command, commanding his own branch unit, captured twenty-two men, 8.3 taels of 
ginseng, and five yan of se solo.  Elhengge, for his part, caught sixty-two poachers, 1.6 
yan of ginseng, .4 yan of se solo, fifty-three sable pelts, one otter pelt, one fox pelt, ten 
raccoon-dog pelt; his second in command arrested an additional three men and 2.2 yan of 
ginseng.  He too reported that he had burned down houses, destroyed ginseng fields, and 
left placards in the “designated high grounds” (Ma: joriha ten i ba).81   
The state aimed to ensure sustainability by tightening territorial controls, 
increasing the police presence, and stamping out corruption.  Conservation schemes were 
also pursued: in 1802, for example, the Jiaqing emperor endorsed a plan to “rest the 
mountain which produce ginseng” (orhoda gurure alin be teyebure), on the principle that 
“if there is little ginseng production, the mountain must be rested” (aika orhoda 
tucirengge seri oho, urunakū alin teyebure) with the permission of the emperor.82    
                                                
81 MWLF 3651.36.170.1503 (JQ7.12.8). 
82 MWLF 3637.37.169.1217 (JQ7.3.23). 
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* * * 
The flipside of chronic poaching was endemic corruption.  Corruption at the 
Ginseng Office (Ch: Ɨ) was rampant; some cases were reported, others never came to 
light.83  Serving as military governor of Jilin was likewise a a posting fraught with 
corrupting opportunity, and corruption (or the inability to stem it) brought down the 
careers of many officials, particularly from the late eighteenth century on. In 1777, the 
fuguogong Fu Chun (Ch: {ä) submitted his own resignation after failing to stop 
widespread poaching.84  In 1785, the military governor of Jilin Duo-er-jia (Ch: ǢĖW) 
was implicated in a ginseng corruption scandal.85  Two regiment colonels (Ch: ?ȏ) at 
the Ginseng Office in 1794, Nomsan (Ch: ƿŔ) and Tomengga (Ch: ²ƙǸ), were 
similarly brought down on corruption charges, an event which precipitated the dispatch 
of Fuk’anggan, Sungyūn (Song-yun), and Lin Ning from Beijing to inspect and take 
charge in Mukden.86  In anticipation of their arrival, Siolin reported, they were already 
cooking the books.87  
Fuk’anggan was sent to deal specifically with the corruption case, which was a 
repeat of the Dorjya affair.  The problem revealed in 1785 and 174 alike centered around 
how the licensing system was used to launder extra taxes on Jilin’s residents. The scheme 
was simple: the military governor’s office often had insufficient “official ginseng”  (Ch: 
                                                
83 On the corruption case of 1762, see Gaozong shilu, 789: 694b. 
84 Gaozong shilu, 1045: 988a. 
85 Gaozong shilu, 1244: 726a. 
86 Gaozong shilu, 1444: 271b-272a. 
87 Gaozong shilu, 1444: 272a. 
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xƗ), and the ginseng pickers often needed to borrow funds for financial assistance.  The 
Ginseng Office could then borrow funds from the public coffer and buy the surpluss 
ginseng at market prices to make up the difference.  The Ginseng Office could make 
money from the exchange if the full difference was not fully compensated for.  This final 
amount was raised through extorting extra trax money from ordinary households.88    
Both Nomsan and Tomengga had become quite rich.  Though neither owned any 
land or had exceptionally flashy clothing or jewelry, both were landlords: Nomsan leased 
out over eighty units; Tomengga leased out over ninety.  Between the two of them, they 
had collected 37,000 taels of silver.   The amount needed to balance funds at government 
coffer was 20,000 taels.  The Ginseng Office used over 12,000 taels, with over a 1000 
taels remaining as surplus.  They sold 82 taels of ginseng.  In the twelfth month, they paid 
back the government coffers 9000 taels.89 
According to Siolin’s investigation, the government coffers were down by 14,000 
taels.  In Fuk’anggan’s reckoning, the amount needed to balance the accounts was over 
29,000 taels of silver. Beyond this amount needed, they were still short an additional 
110,000 taels.  How exactly all this money went missing was unclear, though Fuk’anggan 
doubted it was simply through the laundering mechanism.90 
Corruption extended down to bannermen themselves.  In 1783, beyond the 600 
poachers captured that year, were sixty-seven gaurds (Ch: w) from Kaiyuan were 
discovered to have built homes within the restricted ginseng-producing moutnains and 
                                                
88 Gaozong shilu, 1444: 272b-273a. 
89 Gaozong shilu, 1445: 279a-280b. 
90 Gaozong shilu, 1445: 279a-280b. 
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were harvesting the product, and the seventy-eight patrolmen (Ch: ȚȘÝ) from Fuzhou 
(Ch: ) charged with patrolling had made two runs and turned up only two ginseng 
poachers and one poacher of Jew’s ear mushrooms (Ch: ÔŹ); they had not discovered 
or reported the impromptu pickers’ village built by the guards.  When discovered, both 
groups were banished to the far west: the sixty-seven gaurds were exiled to Ili, while the 
78 patrolmen were dispatched to Uliasutai.91   
As with pearling, maintaining the restricted ginseng grounds was costly. 
Supplying the men and paying their bonuses was expensive, as “entering the mountains” 
required special allotments of gear and grain.92 In 1799, Siolin, the military governor of 
Jilin, requested that the annual inspections of the Suifen and Usuri regions with troops 
from Ningguta and Ilan Hala be eliminated in favor larger sweeps every four to five 
years.  Fewer inspections would be cheaper and was critical “so as not to squander state 
expenses” (Ma: gurun i caliyan be fulu fayara de isinarakū ombime).  By limiting the 
expenditures on policing, he argued, “it would also be beneficial to the ginseng business” 
(Ma: orhoda i baita de inu tusa ombi).93         
The costs also spurred local authorities to pinpoint the exact jurisdictions for 
which they were responsible.  Borders were standardized and clarified.  A case from 1732 
was typical in this regard.  That year, the Yongzheng emperor had a decision to make: 
should the mountains of Hulan be opened to ginseng picking and trade, or should it be 
made illegal?  The matter was submitted to the Grand Council for review.  Having 
                                                
91 Gaozong shilu, 1192: 938a-b. 
92 MWLF 3634.14.169.158 (JQ6.12.11). 
93 MWLF 3651.36.170.1503 (JQ7.12.8). 
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investigated the matter, the Grand Council held that that the “mountains and rivers of 
Hulan were originally hunting and pasturing grounds (Ma: nuktere buthašara ba) of the 
Gorlos and Durbet Mongols.”  It was recorded that it had been put under the jurisdiction 
of the Gorlos prince (gung) Batu, karun had been established, with the Lifanyuan 
coordinating.  Yet because the land in question was on the Manchurian side of the 
Sunggari river, it was recorded in the Daqing yitong zhi (Ch: fĄŨ¢) as being part 
of Hulan, and thus Heilongjiang territory.  Although it was administratively Manchurian, 
its sheer distance from the administrative centers, and its ambiguous status, rendered the 
ginseng picking rules in “these mountains and rivers” unclear.  State management was 
necessary: the land was rich in ginseng, making “strict prohibitions impossible” 
(ciralame fafularakū oci ojorakū) without the proper apparatus in place, starting with a 
karun line.94 
Indeed, troops had been placed along a string of eight karuns, stretching from the 
mouth of the Nioman River, to the mouth of the Sun River, Nemer Spring, Hamni Hada, 
Mt. Suilengge, Sukcin i susu, Laha Oforo, and Unduhun.  Each year when the sprouts 
appeared (Ma: niyanciha tucime), they guardsmen would set off on their rounds; when 
the plants withered with the coming of winter, they returned.  Mongols of the Durbet and 
Gorlos banners charged with guard duty were to investigate and punish “the roving of 
ginseng poachers” (Ma: hūlhame orhoda gurire urse nambuha).   In a previous case, 
involving the ginseng poacher Tang Guizhu in Hulan, the question of Hulan’s status in 
the ginseng trade had come into question.  Now, the military governor of Heilongjiang, 
Jorhai (jiangjun 1730-1732), memorialized on the crux of the confusion: “Although these 
                                                
94 MWLF 900.3.19.127 (YZ10.2.18). 
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mountains and rivers in Hulan were originally the hunting and herding grounds of the 
Gorlos and Durbet Mongols, when we investigated the local Mongol records, it was not 
recorded that this was a Mongol land.  When we questioned the Durbet Mongols, they 
too said that this was not their subject land.”  The Yitong zhi only confirmed that being on 
the near side of the Sunggari River, it was indeed subject to Heilongjiang. The karun 
responsibilities should fall on Heilongjiang, not the Mongol banners.  Merchants and 
“idle Chinese” would be prohibited from the area.  The decision was sent to the imperial 
Archival Office (guoshi), Fengtian, and Ningguta.95   
The following year, with regard to the Sunggari and Nonni Rivers, east along the 
northern edge of Bedune hoton, those living to on the southern shores included the people 
of Beduna, Alcuha, Ilan Hala, Jakūn Hala, Heje, and Fijaka; the northern shore belonged 
to Heilongjiang territory.  There, in the region of the Holon River, there was ginseng 
picking.  Troops were placed at the eight karun, but the military governor of Heilongjiang 
still believed it was insufficient to deal with the poaching problem: “In my humble 
opinion, if [we] dispatch 500 troops to the Holon River area, there will no longer be 
ginseng poachers, and it will also bring great benefit to the locality (Ma: ba na de inu 
labdu tusa).  The Grand Council was not so sure, and they demanded more information 
from the military governors of Jilin and Heilongjiang.  Which troops would they use?  
How would they be deployed?  While the state aimed to bring order and prosperity to 
every jurisdiction, what was “truly beneficial for the locality and what was not” (Ma: 
yargiyan i ba na de tusa bisire akū) was contingent and debatable.96  The manner in 
                                                
95 MWLF 900.3.19.127 (YZ10.2.18). 
96 MWLF 901.1.19.129 [YZ11]. 
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which one benefitted was essential to the imperial order: it was inseparable from the 
Manchu way of life.  
The fact that the land was proven to be under the jurisdiction of Heilongjiang, and 
not the Mongol banners, was less significant than the act of border-making itself.  For, as 
this case makes clear, different rules, standards, and procedures applied to the Mongol 
and Manchurian territories.  If the land was indeed Mongol lands, than allowing ginseng 
picking was improper.  Now that the area was valuable and source of disorder, its exact 
proprietary status had to be clarified: ambiguity was unacceptable, because the special 
rules governing ginseng, pearl, and fur producing required precision.  Like imperial 
hunting grounds and the borderlands Russia and Korea, they were specially favored and 
monopolized by the court and the military.  As such, they were excluded from land 
reclamation schemes.  In 1790, for example, Songčun (Song-chun) conducted a survey of 
the unused “wilderness” (Ch: Ə[).  The plan was to reclaim the lands between Yingge 
(Ch: ƍȒ) and Aiyang (Ch: ȆǺ) to agriculture and give it to landless bannermen of 
Mukden.  The court, however, expressed concerns that opening the “immense” (Ch: ǝǵ) 
territory might lead to problems at military hunting grounds and the mountains for 
picking ginseng; to be doubly sure, it dispatched another official, Jicing (Ch: Ji-qing N©) 
to review the land in question.97  When it came to ginseng, territorial jurisdictions had to 
be precise.   
 
Sable: Tribute, Culgan, and Sustainability 
 
                                                
97 Gaozong shilu, 1352: 105b-106a. 
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Compared with pearls and ginseng, the institutional history of sable tribute in 
Manchuria was in many ways distinct.  For one, sable populations remained high until the 
1820s, when they began a sharp decline; the crisis thus came seventy years after the 
beginning of the ginseng problem, and thirty years after the beginning of the fall in pearl 
harvests.  Whereas pearls and ginseng were collected from designated sites, sable-hunting 
grounds lacked a jurisdiction.  Selected bannermen collected pearls; licensed Chinese 
collected ginseng.  Sable came from neither. Rather it was mostly the product of special, 
ethnically defined banner units: the Solon, Oroncon, Dagūr, Birar, and other hunting (Ma: 
butha) banners.  Most, like the Solon, lived unambiguously under Qing rule, and were 
subject to corvee labor, military duty, and regular exchanges with the court.  Others, 
including groups from Sakhalin Island, regularly presented fur tribute, but were neither 
incorporated into banner nor subject to state responsibilities, and their lands were not 
guarded and policed for poachers.  If for Ula Hunters fur tribute was a domestic tax 
obligation, for more distant groups it was a profitable alliance strategy. 
Despite its distinctive trajectory, the history of domestic fur tribute, centered on 
Heilongjiang, runs in many ways parallel to that of pearls and ginseng.  Like pearls and 
ginseng, sable was a state monopoly: the state had first claim over the resource, and 
unlicensed trade was prohibited.  Poaching and the black market, however, were constant 
problems, and in the first half of the nineteenth century uncontrolled exploitation led to 
declining yields.  While the mechanisms and infrastructure of fur tribute will be explored 
at greater length in Chapter 5, it is worth highlighting first the overlapping histories of fur, 
ginseng, and pearls.     
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As with ginseng and pearls, the early history of fur in Manchuria was inextricably 
tied to processes of state building.98 Each time the Later Jin state expanded into a new 
village, it recorded not only the number of people and livestock captured, but the 
quantities and types of furs as well. An entry from 1632 in the court’s records is typical; 
the names of the conquered villages (Ma: gašan) of Ningguta, Lafa, and Hoifa is 
presented with a tally of pelts: 5,396 sable, 12,900 squirrel, 155 lynx, 368 otter, eighteen 
wolf, eighteen tiger, four wolves, forty-eight eagle pinions.99  Of all the peoples 
conquered in the early years, the Warka were the closest to the forests and most well-
endowed with furs, though their villages varied greatly in terms of productivity (See 
Figure 24).100   
Figure 24: Fur Captured from Warka and Neighboring Villages, 1632-1636  
Village 
Resource 
Kereci 
and 
Bolgo 
Ujala 
golo 
Warka 
Village 
1 
Warka 
Village 
2 
Warka 
Village 
3 
 
Warka 
Village 
4 
Warka 
Village 
5 TOTAL 
Animal 
per 
person 
People  700 312 2800 795 601 861 6069 1.00 
squirrel 1480 800 2570 2010 140 566 1500 7586 1.25 
sable 174 78 561 982 106 201 486 2588 0.43 
                                                
98 As Nicola Di Cosmo has argued, the Later Jin state built itself upon Manchuria’s natural resources, not 
the pastoral or agricultural economies; ginseng exports to the Ming alone accounted for more than thirty 
times the value of all Chinese imports. Nicola Di Cosmo, “The Rise of Manchu Power in Northeast Asia (c. 
1600-1636).” Talk presented at the University of California, Berkeley, October 12, 2007.  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gl1-vop7ipY.  See 39:30-52:15. By Liao times, fur trade was already 
extensive.  Under Liao rule, in 988, there were even signs of overhunting.  The Liaoshi records that “the 
Wuwei Yujue tribe, because the sable and gray mole furs which they annually offered as tribute wer not 
produced locally but were all purchased from other places for presentation, requested that the tribute be 
changed.”  Like the Qing court when faced with similar problems, the Liao emperor proved flexible, and 
the fur tribute was switched to one of horses and oxen.  In 1018, the Liaoshi records that “the five 
northeastern tribes of Yue-li-tu, Pou-a-li, Ao-li-mi, Pu-nu-li, and Tie-li were ordered to render an annual 
tribute of sixty-five thousand ermine furs and three hundred horses.”  Karl Wittfogel, History of Chinese 
Society: Liao, 353, 357.   
99 MBRT 2.45.268. 
100 MBRT 2.60.278 (TZ6.12.12), 3.5.955 (TZ10.3); 3.7.990 (TZ10.4.10); 3.8.995 (CD1.4); 3.8.995 
(CD1.4.15); 3.9.1023 (CD1.5.27); 3.10.1036 (CD1.5.5). 
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horses  373 27 327 10 24 61 822 0.14 
weasel   99 146 42 187 200 674 0.11 
cattle  102 3 180 17 5 41 348 0.06 
otter 13 38 8 79 19 48 67 259 0.04 
raccoon-
dog 
4  17 57 42 66 1 187 0.03 
fox 14 22 44 34 2 4 10 130 0.02 
lynx 1 15  14 3 9 12 54 0.01 
wolf   2 2  2  6 0.00 
tiger      4  4 0.00 
seal     2   2 0.00 
 
After the conquest, set compensation rates were established for Manchurian 
bannermen assigned to fur trapping.  In 1647, the Shunzhi emperor’s court also 
formalized the exchange values of tribute furs submitted to the court, whereby a function 
of species and pelt quality determined compensation (see Figure 25).  All pelts had to be 
undamaged.  The annual quota was set at 2 sable pelts per head in the summer and three 
sable pelts per head in the winter.101  
Figure 25: Exchange Rates for Fur Tribute, 1647 
Pelt Type 
(English) 
Pelt 
Type 
(Chinese) Grade 
Value 
in Sable 
Pelts  
Lynx ÂÁÃ 1 6 
Lynx ÂÁÃ 2 5 
Lynx ÂÁÃ 3 4 
Lynx ÂÁÃ 4 3 
River Otter  Æ 1 3 
River Otter  Æ 2 2.5 
River Otter  Æ 3 2 
River Otter  Æ 4 1.5 
                                                
101 Daqing huidian shili, 10: 278.2. 
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River Otter  Æ 5 1 
River Otter  Æ <5 0.5 
Leopard ę 1 5 
Leopard ę 2 4 
Leopard ę 3 3 
Tiger ă 1 4 
Tiger ă 2 3 
Tiger ă 3 2 
Tiger ă 4 1 
Fox ¿  2 
Wolf À 1 3 
Wolf À 2 2 
Wolf À <2 1 
Badger Ĝ  0.5 
Short-
haired 
Sable Tě  0.5 
coyote? 
Wolverine? ĚÀ  1 
Top grade 
squirrel Iµŕ  0.05 
Short-
haired 
squirrel Tµŕ  0.04 
 
Tribute was obtained through two methods: having tribute-bearers deliver the furs 
themselves to a yamen, or dispatching an official to collect it.  Through the course of the 
eighteenth century, the bulk of fur tribute in the Northeast came to be processed by 
having it delivered to yamens, with Cicigar (Qiqihar) and Ilan Hala (Sanxing) serving as 
the key processing points.102  Cicigar was the nexus for tribute from Heilongjiang, 
                                                
102 In the early Qing, the mechanics of the tribute system changed as administrative control over the 
Northeast was elaborated and standardized.  Following the conquest of Beijing in 1644, fur tribute was 
required to be delivered in person in Beijing.  After the creation of the Ningguta region in 1653, Ningguta 
became the primary collection point unless the tribute-bearers chose to make the trip to Beijing.  In 1683, 
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including the Xinggan Mountains and the upper Amur, while Sanxing served southerly 
and easterly communities from Jilin military department, the Ussuri, the Lower Amur, 
the Pacific coast, and Sakhalin.  In either the fourth or fifth month, an official “gathering” 
(Ma: culgan) was held.  
 The culgan had two components.  The first was the presentation and selection of 
tribute furs.  The ceremony began with the Qing official welcoming the tribute-bearers on 
the road outside the gates of the town; an archery contest was among the festivities which 
followed.  Food and provisions were provided as a form of largesse.  While a fixed quota 
of furs were levied, the tribute-bearers always brought more fur than necessary.  The best 
pelts were selected by the yamen.  These would then be individually presented by the 
individual bearer, who performed the kowtow and offered the tribute up as a gift to the 
emperor.  The gift was reciprocated with gifts of silk and fine cloths.103  Slightly differing 
quotas were in effect for each community.  In Sanxing, for example, each household 
presented a tribute of one sable pelt, but each ranking official giving an additional fur pelt 
on a per-man basis.104  With the finest sables selected, a leg was removed from the 
remaining sable pelts (Ma: maktaha seke), and, thus marked, were free to be traded at 
market.  Witnesses reported seeing enormous piles, thousands of pelts high.  Indeed, 
special pelt-treasuries would soon be built to accommodate the enormous volume of skins 
                                                                                                                                            
after the creation of Heilongjiang, Cicigar arose as the collection point in the north.  Finally, with the 
creation of the Sanxing (Ilan Hala) prefecture in 1729, southern-route fur tribute was diverted from 
Ningguta to Sanxing. Cong Peiyuan, Dongbei sanbao jingji jianshi (Beijing: Zhongguo huanjing kexue 
chubanshe, 1990), 215-216.  
103 Cong Peiyuan, Dongbei sanbao jingji jianshi, 207-209.  
104 Ibid., 203. 
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that accumulated.105  A month-long trading fair ensued, the biggest of the year. With the 
gathered tribute-bearers came Mongol nomads with leathers and livestock and Chinese 
merchants with goods from the interior.  Furs were a key item for trade, but the tribute-
bearers also sold other specialty items.  The state itself was important buyer at the market 
place, with the yamen having first choice over the available furs for sale. 
Fur trade was similarly forbidden. The Lifanyuan zeli specifically targeted the 
illegal poaching, buying, or selling of sable as a crime.  The punishments for allowing 
illegal sable and ginseng trade in a Mongol banner were comparable to those for 
sheltering illegal migrants.  The Lifanyuan zeli from 1841 made the prohibition explicit: 
“In cases of illicitly going to prohibited areas to poach sable or ginseng, or where illicit 
buying or selling [of such products] arise, the illegally poached goods will be entered as 
tribute, and the criminals sentenced according to the laws of the Board of Punishments.” 
The law further specified that the banner nobility of rank wang, beile, beise, gung, taiji , 
and tabunang should lose one year’s salary, and the banner officials of noble rank wang, 
beile, beise, gung, taiji, and tabunang should pay an indemnity of two “nines” of 
livestock.   If they knowingly covered up the matter, their punishment was made one 
level more severe.106 
Mongols were likewise specifically prohibited from buying sable in 
Heilongjiang’s Solon lands.  Noblemen found guilty of illegally buying or trading for 
sable were penalized a year’s salary, the banner officials charged with their oversight 
                                                
105 The first of these storehouses was built in 1726 in Ningguta, with another being built in Sanxing in 
1780.  The Ningguta storehouse, with Ningguta superseded by Sanxing as a collection point, would be 
switched to a storehouse for fruit in 1783.  Cong Peiyuan, Dongbei sanbao jingji jianshi, 216-217.   
106 TGKH 53: 5a-6a. 
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paid indemnities of two “nines” livestock, and commoners were whipped 100 times.  The 
capture sable became tribute.  Even a man dispatched as a middleman to pick up sable for 
a Mongol bannerman was to whipped eighty times.107  
Through the first half of the nineteenth century, however, the Sanxing culgan 
became increasingly unsuccessful in drawing in crowds, and tribute collectors had to be 
dispatched into the field, with up to four officials each year making the trip (see Figure 
26).  If in 1790s over 70% of the fur was delivered to the culgan, by the 1840s, less than 
a quarter was.  The state was assuming transportation costs to maintain steady levels of 
tribute.108 
Figure 26: Sable Tribute at Sanxing, 1791-1867   
Year 
Collected 
in Sanxing 
 
Hezhe, 
Jilar  
Hezhe, 
Jilar 2 
Hezhe, 
Kuye 
Erhan, 
Hekela Total 
Percent 
Presented 
at 
Sanxing 
1791 1714 1714  623 90 2427 70.62% 
1794 1713 1713  623  2336 73.33% 
1803 1193     2512 47.49% 
1804 940     2162 43.48% 
1825 729     2443 29.84% 
1841 453     2443 18.54% 
1845 450 470 800 627 91 2443 18.42% 
1857 77     2443 3.15% 
1866 574 652 500 627 90 2443 23.50% 
1867 598 563 565 627 90 2443 24.48% 
 
                                                
107 TGKH 53: 7a-8a.  
108 Sanxing fudutong yamen manwen dang’an yibian, 70 (QL56.11.5), 71 (QL5911.5), 72 (JQ8.11.1), 73 
(JQ9.10.25), 75 (DG5.10.20), 76 (DG21.10.25), 77 (DG25.11.5), 85 (XF7.11.12), 88 (TZ5.3.21), and 90 
(TZ6.11.17). 
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Officials in Heilongjiang struggled over issues of corruption and transportation 
costs.  With so much at the discretion of the yamen, there was much room for corruption. 
Perhaps the most visible case of corruption, because it was discovered by the court, came 
to light in 1795, in the final year o the Qianlong emperor’s reign, when it was discovered 
that [an official] was unfairly judging and rewarding the tribute-bearers in Cicigar.  For 
the historian, perhaps the most important change brought on by the 1795 corruption 
scandal was a new outpouring of paperwork that thereafter accompanied the Cicigar 
culgan.  In that year, local authorities were found to over-assess tribute quotas and keep 
the extra returns to themselves; such was the case in a scandal from 1795, in which the 
assistant military lieutenant-governor (Ma: meiren-i janggin; Ch: 4ǢŨ) of Cicigar was 
found guilty of over-assessing the Solon, Dagūr, and Oroncon communities who paid 
tribute through him.  The result was a more public ceremony of the tribute’s presentation, 
and a revamped system for reporting tribute tallies was initiated, providing a new 
outpouring of statistics on the quantities and qualities of animal pelts that poured into the 
Imperial Household Department thereafter.109 
Previously, the Heilongjiang military governor was required to report on the 
number of sables collected (divided into first class, second class, and quality third class).  
From 1796 on, the memorialist also had to report on the number of tribute-bearers, the 
total number of sables they brought to the culgan, the number accepted, and the number 
rejected; the system remained in place until 1899.  While the reports were written in 
Manchu exclusively, beginning in 1823, these records were to supplemented by Chinese-
language tallies of the population, tribute, and overall sable catches divided into three 
                                                
109 On the 1795 reforms, see Cong Peiyuan, Dongbei sanbao jingji lishi, 208. 
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constituencies: Solon and Dagūr, Mounted (Moringga) Oroncon, and Infantry (Yafahan) 
Oroncon. 110 
The period 1815-1850 marked the culgan at its peak.  It was only in this period 
that participants brought, on average, two or more sables each year: one to present as 
tribute, one to sell on the open market afterwards.  In the period 1790-1815, the records 
were imperfectly preserved, but the limited evidence suggests that the culgan market was 
less active: people came just to fulfill their tax obligation.  After 1850, on the other hand, 
almost nobody came to the culgan to trade: the average man brought one sable pelt, and 
some years they brought none.  Not only was the sheer number of participants shrinking, 
the number of sables they came with declined twice as fast (see Figure 27).  The draft in 
the Taiping wars brought an end to era.  
Figure 27: Sables Brought to the Cicigar Culgan, 1696-1899 
                                                
110 The following analysis of tributary records is based on Manwen lufu held in the First Historical Archives 
in Beijing, Manchu palace memorials held in the National Palace Museum in Taipei, and published 
archives from Harbin and Beijing in Qingdai Elunchunzu Man-Hanwen dang’an huibian (Beijing: Minzu 
chubanshe, 2001).  For a full citation and description of the sources, see Appendix A.  
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The figures show that the court was able to extract tribute throughout this time 
period – the number of furs brought to the culgan always exceeded the minimum of one 
pelt per hunter.  However, the number the absolute number of sables brought to the 
culgan show a general decline in the 1820s, plunge dramatically in the early 1850s, and 
fail to recover thereafter, losing on average almost half their number. The overall haul in 
sables was strongly correlated to the number of men participating in the culgan.  The 
major decline, that is, reflects the decline in the number of men, as the Solon were drafted 
into the Taiping Wars.  Yet while both began to decrease in the 1820s, and experienced a 
marked decrease after 1851 sable hauls plunged significantly faster the population of 
men.  If each hunter, that is, brought an average of two pelts to the culgan prior to 1850 
(presenting one as tribute and keeping one for the marketplace), hunters from the 1860s 
onwards brought only one pelt, with nothing leftover to sell for themselves.  The 
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marketplace component of the culgan system had collapsed.  The quota, however, was 
not to blame.  
The records also reveal other trends.  The sables were ranked according into four 
categories: “top class” (Ma: uju jergi; Ch: ȑř), “second class” (Ma: jai jergi; Ch: 
ř), “good quality third class” (Ma: sain ilaci jergi; Ch: mř), and “regular third 
class” (Ma: an i ilaci jergi; Ch: ř); nothing below regular third class was accepted 
as tribute.  From the 1820s, at the same time that the overall number of furs submitted 
was declining, the overall percentage of higher grade furs rose.  Thus through 1820, over 
90% of the furs accepted as tribute were graded as regular third class: on average, 5% of 
the sables were quality third class, 2.5% second class, and 0.75% top class.  By 1832, 
twice the number of each high grade sable were taken (see Figure 28). 
Figure 28: Percentage Top-Quality Sable Accepted as Tribute, 1785-1888 
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 Looking into the tallies for each ethnic group, the declines were more pronounced 
for some groups, and non-existent for others, such as the Yafahan Oroncon and Birar, 
who maintained a steady tribute of about 600 pelts each year (See Figure 29).  
Figure 29: Sable Tallies from the Cicigar culgan – Yafahan Oroncon and Birar 
 
 The Solon and Dagūr, in contrast, brought to the culgan over 10,000 pelts in the 
early 1820s, but roughly only 6,000 pelts by 1850 (See Figure 30). 
Figure 30: Sable Tallies from the Cicigar culgan – Solon and Dagūr 
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Likewise, the smaller Moringga Oroncon community brought over 600 pelts to 
the culgan in the early 1820s, but only 400 by the 1850s. 
Figure 31: Sable Tallies at Cicigar culgan – Moringga Oroncon 
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In sum, the decline in sables was geographically uneven, but widespread: the 
small community of Yafahan Oroncon, for example maintained steady rates of 
participation in the culgan; the Solon, Dagūr, and Moringga Oroncon, who accounted for 
most tribute-payers, saw fewer and fewer households participating. Indeed, while the 
number of participants in the Cicigar culgan declined throughout the nineteenth century, 
with the year 1850 and the onset of the Taiping rebellion marking a major turning point, 
the number of sables brought to the fair declined even faster: there were fewer sables 
brought each year per man.  Moreover, despite the lower quantity of furs presented, the 
quality of those accepted was rising, suggesting that tribute-bearers had increasingly less 
choice in what they submitted.  The culgan itself had become a different event: it was no 
longer for both tribute and trade; it was now used solely for tribute. 
 
Conclusion 
  Significantly, all three of Manchuria’s most precious resources – pearls, ginseng, 
and sable – became increasingly scarce in the period 1750-1850.  First ginseng, then 
fresh-water oysters, than sables disappeared from the wild.  The depletion of these natural 
resources was perceived primarily as a problem of insufficient state control as poachers, 
black market traders, and corrupt officials proliferated.  While reforms to contain the 
problem differed for each commodity (moratoriums on pearling, licensing private 
ginseng-picking, increased oversight at the culgan for tribute and trade sables alike), the 
thrust of reforms was always similar: more centralized controls over production and a 
strengthening of the territorial order.  Guard posts were permanently established at 
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strategic choke-points, placards erected around the restricted areas, and roving patrolmen 
were dispatched to arrest illegal trespassers and seize contraband. 
 The logic behind these measures had environmental, economic, and ideological 
dimensions.  The land had its limits: it needed to “rest,” like a person, in order to be 
productive: moratoriums, lower tribute quotas, and efforts aimed at making production 
more extensive and less intensive by opening new rivers and mountains all took this 
sense of ecological limits into account.  At the same time, sustained demand in the 
metropole for these products necessitated long-term conservation.  The Qing court in 
particular required a constant inflow of pearls, ginseng, and furs not only as tradeable 
commodities, but as emblematic objects of Manchu ethnicity and required ornaments at 
court.  The nature of this demand, in turn, insisted upon authenticity: Manchurian pearls, 
ginseng, and furs had to be produced the right way, by the right people, to be endowed 
with full value.  Cultivating ginseng or buying furs from another location and passing 
them as tributary items was prohibited.   
 The conservation effort reflected the unique interests and position of the Qing 
court in Manchuria.  The primacy of tribute and the banner system made the court an 
unusually important actor: nowhere else in the empire was so much land marked off and 
set aside for the emperor.  In Mongolia, where the local nobility controlled the territory, 
the court played an altogether different role in facilitating production and movement of 
commodities.  In Mongolia, tribute was of relatively minor importance, and, at least 
officially, most commodities came to the metropole through licensed trade.  It is from 
Manchuria and the world of tribute to Mongolia and the world of licensing that we turn in 
Chapter 3.    
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Chapter 3: Resource Production and Commercial Licensing in Qing Mongolia  
 
Introduction 
 
Mongolia, like Manchuria, was deeply immersed in the metropolitan economy of 
the Chinese interior.  Just as the pearls, sables, and ginseng produced under court 
supervision in Manchuria found their way into markets in Beijing and elsewhere, so, too, 
did the produce of Mongolia’s taiga and steppe lands end up entering the fast-growing 
commercial networks of the Qing empire.  However, while some of its natural resources, 
such as wild boar and venison, were levied as an annual tribute to the court, the legal 
mechanism for moving most products in Mongolia was licensed trade: with a proper 
permit, a merchant was granted the right to conduct trade in Mongolia – a privilege not 
granted to merchants in Manchuria.  Thus, in the first half of the nineteenth century, as 
the economy of Mongolia became increasingly commercialized, Chinese merchants and 
their caravans became common sights in the major trading hubs, such as Kiakhta, 
Uliasutai, and Khüree (modern-day Ulaanbaatar), and on the roads between them.  The 
enormous traffic in frontier commodities, in turn, inspired new rules and institutions to 
mediate contacts between Mongols and Chinese.   
Yet, as this chapter argues, the growth of licensing of Chinese merchant activity 
was not some simple form of liberalization or sinicization.  Rather, the Qing state used 
licensing to reinforce the multiethnic imperial ideal.  Just as modern passports facilitate 
movement while inscribing upon travelers their territorial and national identities, licenses 
allowed internal borders of the empire to be crossed while confirming their 
existence?relevance.  China’s booming commercial markets of the eighteenth and 
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nineteenth centuries did not undermine the Qing imperial order, they helped define it: 
increasingly, the lines between ethnic groups and their homelands were drawn at the 
market place.  Commercial production and empire building were complimentary, not 
conflicting, processes.   
To understand the production and movement of frontier commodities in 
Mongolia, one must begin with the invention and practice of commercial licensing.  In 
Qing Mongolia, where the court recognized the right of local nobility to rule within their 
domain, the role of central authorities was to mediate trans-jurisdictional matters, 
including long-distance trade. In the years 1750-1850, commercialization and new 
stresses in the pastoral economy dramatically transformed the economy of mid-Qing 
Mongolia, encouraging expanded natural resource production.  Frontier and metropole 
were integrated to an unprecedented degree, as commercial markets came to play a 
central role in mediating contacts between Mongols and Chinese, locals and migrants.  
As trade and resource exploitation boomed, the Qing state intensified efforts to identify 
and better manage its changing subject populations.  Finally, as commercial resource 
exploitation began booming, the court moved to strengthen the imperial order by 
allowing the licensing of not only trade, but production.1   
 
Boundaries and Boundary Crossing: Licensing Travel in Qing Mongolia 
 
                                                
1 They were not the only ones to emerge; similar systems were also put in place for gold mining.  See High 
and Schlesinger, “Rulers and Rascals: The Politics of Gold in Qing Mongolian History,” Central Asian 
Survey 29.3 (2010): 289-304.   
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Qing administration over Mongolia was premised upon robust borders and legal 
restrictions on movement.2   Outer Mongolia was divided into three nested layers of 
administration, with clear jurisdictional lines dividing each.  The primary territorial 
Map 3: Qing Outer Mongolia, c. 1820 
 
administrative unit was the banner (Ma: gūsa; Mo: qosiγu(n); Ch: |), which was headed 
by a single authority, the jasaγ (Ma: jasak; Mo: jasaγ; Ch: rĀ).  Above the banners 
were four aimaγ (Ma: aiman; Mo: aimaγ; Ch: İý), each named for the prince who was 
its titular head: namely, from east to west, Cecen Han (Mo: Secen Qan; Ch: Ĥõ¢), 
Tusiyetu Han (Mo: Tüsiyetu Qan; Ch: :ė9¢), Sain Noyan (Mo: Saiyin Noyan; Ch: 
                                                
2 On the historical territoriality of Mongol and Inner Asian political units, and a critique of the idea of the 
unbounded nomad, see David Sneath, The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society, and 
Misrepresentations of Nomadic Inner Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
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ġ5Ėņ), and Jasaktu Han (Mo: Jasaγtu Qan; Ch: rĀ9¢) (see Map).  The aimaγ 
were also known as “leagues” (Ma: culgan; Mo: ciγulγan; Ch: Ò), and were 
administered under “League Chiefs” (Ma: culgan i da; Mo; ciγulγan u daruγa; Ch: Òķ).  
Beneath the banner were local units called “arrows”  (Ma: niru; Mo: sumu(n); Ch: Ņ).  
The number of arrows per banner, and banners per aimaγ, was irregular (see Figure 32).  
At a regional level, the Inner Mongol banners, for example, contained on average 23.6 
arrows.  In Outer Mongolia, in contrast, the banner itself was often the smallest unit of 
territorial governance, with fifty-five of eighty-six banners lacking arrow subdivisions 
altogether.3 
Figure 32: Territorial Administrative Units of Outer Mongolia, Early Nineteenth Century 
Aimaγ  Name League Name 
Number 
of 
Banners 
Number 
of 
Arrows 
Cecen Han Kerülün Bars City 23 48 
Tusiyetu Han Qan Mountain 20 58 
Sain Noyan Cicirlig 24 39.5 
Jasaktu Han Lake Biduriya 19 24.5 
 
Every Mongol subject was identified by their banner and, by extension, their 
governing jasaγ.  Indeed, Qing documents invariably refer to the name of the jasaγ when 
discussing the banners; being part of a banner entailed singular lines of authority running 
up to jasaγ.  Aristocratic privilege was at the center of this order: only men of the 
                                                
3 David Farquhar, “The Ch’ing Administration of Mongolia Up to the Nineteenth Century,” 71. 
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Borjigid (Chinggisid) lineage were granted imperial recognition and administrative, 
pecuniary, and legal authority of a jasaγ.4    
The banner system restricted movement for all Qing subjects, regardless of their 
identity.  Prohibitions on settlement and movement (Ch: Ő) were not limited to 
Chinese settlers, but extended to everyone on the frontier: Chinese, Russians, Mongols, 
and Manchus alike.5  Boundaries were long fundamental to the banner order.  Chinese 
civilians could not cross into Mongol banners; Mongol bannermen could not cross out.6  
Restrictions on mobility extended to the banner nobility themselves: by the high Qing, if 
a nobleman left his banner, or wished to marry outside the banner, he requested the 
appropriate travel permit from the military governor in Uliasutai.7  As early as 1629, even 
prior to the Qing conquest of Beijing, the state first prohibited crossing banner 
boundaries; it then established a schedule of fines for those who “escaped” their home 
banner in 1634; and it criminalized hunting outside the home banner in 1662.  To make 
the order manifest, physical boundary markers were used on the ground, including 
                                                
4 As David Sneath has argued, the continuity of local aristocratic privilege in Mongolia was striking: 
Though he perhaps underplays the role of the Qing state in upholding the aristocratic order, David Sneath, 
The Headless State. 
5 Li Baowen first impressed the point upon me. Personal communication, 2009.  
6 According to the Lifanyuan zeli, “bannermen and civilians who live within the [Great Wall] boundary 
may not cross the boundary and plow fields in Mongol lands.  Punish the those who break the prohibition 
in accordance with laws for illicitly farming pastureland.”  In parallel fashion, a similar rule existed for 
“illicitly inviting in Mongols from other banners to cross the border and homestead on state land” (Ma: 
siden i ongko ba; Mo: alban u belciger γajar).  GMQJ 34: 8a, 10: 9a-10b; TGKH 10: 1a-b, 34: 8a, 10; 14a-
15a. 
7 Li Yushu, Waimeng zhengjiao zhidu kao (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiu suo, 1978), 75. 
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physiographic landmarks (mountain ridges, forests, etc.), placards, and cairns (Mo: 
oboγa).8    
Like international borders today, imperial subjects could legally cross banner 
boundaries only with a special travel permit (Ma: jugūn yabure temgetu bithe).  For 
Chinese merchants in particular, an edict in 1720 (KX59) established the requirement that 
all those travelling to Khüree obtain a special license.9   In 1727, the court established 
inspection points at the existing garrison posts of Xifengkou (Ch: VF), Gubeikou 
(Ch: G>F), Zhangjiakou (Ch: zF), Hohhot (Ch: ï=]), and Shahukou (Ch: ð
ơF) to better regulate cross-border commerce, with merchants required to carry 
passports (Ch: ǡŏ).10  In 1800 (JQ4.12), to handle increased commercial traffic, the 
court reformed the passport and licensing system once again.  Paperwork was 
standardized across jurisdictions: 
People going to trade in Khüree, Kiakhta, Uliasutai, and the four 
Khalkha aimaγ should be permanently organized according to 
established rules and regulations. Henceforth the names, amounts of 
merchandise, and dates of departure will be clearly written on 
government permits (jurgan i temgetu bithe) obtained through the 
various yamens by the merchants.  Having attached the government 
permit and affixed it with a seal, the officials’ yamen at the trade-
                                                
8 Farquhar, “The Ch’ing Administration of Mongolia Up to the Nineteenth Century,” 7, 67-68.  Farquhar 
rightfully described the Mongol banners as “rigidly delineated parcels of territory.”  I have translated the 
Mongol oboγ-a as “cairn” in most locations in the text, despite limits to the translation.  The Mongol oboγ-
a, unlike the English “cairn,” is imbued with spiritual dimensions and cultural importance specific to the 
Mongol context, a sense which cairn fails to capture.  At the same time, translating the term as “cairn” is 
adequate in the context of using obuγ-a to mark boundaries on the ground.  On the multiple uses and 
meanings of obuγ-a, see Charles Bawden, “Two Mongol Texts Concerning Obo-Worship,” Oriens 
Extremus 5 (1958), 23-41. 
9 Li Yushu, Waimeng zhengjiao zhidu kao, 109-110. 
10 Zhang Zhengming, Jinshang xingshuai shi (Taiyuan: Shanxi guji chubanshe, 2001), 43, 46, 73-74.  The 
checkpoints doubled as customs offices. 
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destination will be notified. [For all these activities] records will be 
kept.11   
 
The system required constant cooperation between merchants and the local 
yamens.  Six months prior to issuing trade licenses for travel from Khuree to Uliasutai, 
for example, the amban’s office in Khuree would receive a request for a number of blank 
permits affixed with the amban’s seal; these permits were then transferred to the trade 
supervisor’s office, where clerks issued them to merchants.12  For merchants travelling 
from Shanxi or Beijing, the application process usually began in Hohhot or Kalgan, 
where the caravan leader registered his name, merchant house, destination, number of 
camels or ox carts, types and quantities of goods, and the names, home jurisdictions, and 
sometimes physical descriptions of all Chinese and Mongol caravan members.  The 
yamen then issued a permit with a designated length of stay on it – either 100 days, 200 
days, or a year, depending on the destination.13  
While the licenses opened up trade, they also served to identify merchants to the 
state and facilitate supervision.  The license itself was a form letter, in block print, with 
Mongol text on the left and Chinese text on the right.  At the top was printed 
“TEMPORARY PASSPORT” (Mo: quγusaγan temdegtü bicig; Ch: ŏǹ).  Beneath it 
were written the rules for conduct in Mongolia (prohibitions against entering restricted 
areas, etc.) and a message granting safe passage; only the dates and names of the 
                                                
11 Cited in M1D1-3935.15b (DG11.7.28). 
12 M1D1-4079.53 (DG17.2.29). 
13 The length of stay was calibrated to estimated travel times and the time needed to do business. A permit 
for a trip from Hohhot to a Khalkha banner was good for one year.  One-hundred days was given for the 
Khuree-Kiakhta round-trip.  Two hundred days were the allotted norm for Khuree-Uliasutai permits, and 
three months usually allotted for banner closer by. M1D1-4079.13a (DG17.10.4); M1D1-4079.15a 
(DG17.12.24); M1D1-4079.26 (DG17.3.30). 
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recipients were left blank.14  To ensure the timeliness of each departure, merchants had 
twenty days to leave town or else the permit would be invalid.15  When they arrived at 
their destination, the full caravan reported to the local yamen; when they returned home, 
they reported again and submit their used permits to the clerk’s office.16   The yamens 
alerted one another to all caravan movements; if someone failed to show at their expected 
destination, reported to the wrong destination, came with the wrong number of people or 
merchandise, or lacked a license altogether, they were arrested.    
Licensing, however, was not limited to Chinese merchants and Mongol caravan 
workers.  The state was vested in documenting and restricting all manner of cross-border 
movement, especially of large groups, no matter their ethnic identity.  Like merchants, 
pilgrims’ parties also required special travel permits (Ma: jugūn yabure temgetu bithe), 
with teams of Buddhist pilgrims regularly heading to Khüree, Amdo, Lhasa, and 
Wutaishan throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.17  It was standard practice 
for pilgrims’ travel permits to include a list of names, ranks (if applicable), number of 
riding and pack animals, and lists of positions, especially weapons. As with travel permits 
for merchants, pilgrims’ were similarly prohibited from “unruliness” (balai baita) while 
                                                
14 M1D1-4319.45a (DG27.12). 
15 M1D1-3697.6 (JQ24.12.20). 
16 M1D1-4079.53 (DG17.2.29). 
17 Qing documents list two types of pilgrimages: “going to pay respects” (Ma; hengkileme genembi; Mo: 
mörgükü (lit. “prostrating oneself before”) and “offering tea” (Ma: manja fuifume).  For an in depth 
discussion of pilgrimage in the Mongol world, see Isabelle Charleux (forthcoming); Charleux, 
“Padmasambhava’ s Travel to the North: The Pilgrimage to the Monastery of the Caves and the Old 
Schools of Tibetan Buddhism in Mongolia,” Central Asiatic Journal 46 (2002), 168-232; Charleux, 
“Mongol Pilgrimages to Wutai Shan in the Late Qing Dynasty,” JIATS 6 (2011), 275-326; and Gray Tuttle, 
“Tibetan Buddhism at Wutai Shan in the Qing,” JIATS 6 (2011): 163-214.  On historical pilgrimage 
practices in China, see Susan Naquin and Yu Chunfang, Pilgrims and Sacred Sites in China (Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1992). 
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on the road.18 Licenses were good only one way: when travelers reached their point of 
destination, they had to register with the jurisdictional office and, before leaving, apply 
for a permit for the exit trip. According to the law, “if any Mongols request permission to 
make a pilgrimage to places such as Khüree or Mt. Wutai, [the petitioned office] will 
both memorialize the throne and issue the travel permit.”19  Thus while requests were 
never denied, they had to be made nonetheless – and the emperor had to be informed of 
these movements.20  
In 1793 (QL58.10), seven years prior to the standardization of merchant licensing, 
the court finally streamlined the licensing process for pilgrims: “Henceforth, if there are 
more than ten people [in a group] going to Tibet to pay respects to the Dalai Lama or 
Bancen Erdeni (Pancen Lama), offer mang ja (boiled tea), or learn sutras, they must 
                                                
18 See, for example, the language in M1D1-3840.18 (XF7.9.20). 
19 See M1D1-3840.32 (DG7.2.7): “kooli de yaya monggoso u tai alin, kuren i jergi bade hengkileme geneki 
seme baime aliburengge bici, gemu emu dergi wesimbume, emu dergi jugūn yabure temgetu bithe bahabufi 
unggimbi.” 
20 Not all pilgrims were equal, with some Mongol groups trusted more by the law then others, depending on 
their historical relationships with the court. Oirat Mongols, for one, had special procedures which limited 
their movement. By rule, whenever Turgūt or Hoošot Mongols went on pilgrimage to Küke Noor 
(Qinghai), the responsible authorities were required to send a memorial. Thus when a party of fifteen that 
included the Turgut han Dzedendorji’s wife, the queen (katun) Rasipil, his two adult sons, a jalan i janggin 
and a lama petitioned to make a pilgrimage to the monasteries around Xining and Küke Noor (Qinghai), the 
petition was first forwarded to the Daoguang emperor.  By rule, their request was only granted if the 
pilgrimage was made in good faith – if the “Mongols truly are honoring the Yellow Dharma [i.e. 
Buddhism] and have honest intentions in accordance with the law” (Ma: monggoso suwayan šajin be 
wesihulere unenggi gūnin hono kooli de acaname).  Only after first petitioning were they then granted 
travel permits (Ma: jugūn yabure temgetu bithe), with the key administrative authorities at their destination, 
and in each region through which they passed, notified in advance of their travels, the size of the party, the 
names of the members, etc.  The entire process of imperial confirmation took about a month. (In this case, 
the memorial informing the emperor of their movements was sent out on DG7.4.25, a vermilion rescript 
endorsed the pilgrimage three weeks later (DG7.+5.13), and notices were sent out the relevant parties on 
DG7.+5.21)).  In the case of a pilgrimage from the Ili region (Hara Šar) to Qinghai, the law thus required 
alerts sent to the Lifanyuan and eleven regional offices: the governor-general of Shaanxi and Gansu, the 
Provincial Commander-in-Chief of Gansu, the military governor of Uliasutai, the horon be algimbure 
jiyanggiyūn [see Norman], the amban at Xining, the assistant amban at Kobdo, the amban at Ikh Khüree, 
the Lieutenant-General of Urumci, the ambans at Hami, the brigade general at Suzhou, the commandant of 
forces at Gucheng and Turfan, and the brigade general at Barkol.   M1D1-3840.23a (DG7.4.4); M1D1-
3840.7 (DG7.+5.21). 
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obtain a permit.  If there are less than ten people [in the party], and they want a permit, let 
them have one.  If without a permit, there is no need for the ambans in Tibet to pursue the 
matter too far.”  Special leniency to pilgrims, he explained, was consonant with “My 
loving compassion for all Mongol subjects (Ma: geren monggo ahasi) who make 
Gelukpa Buddhism (lit. “Yellow Teaching”) flourish.”21  
Uniquely, and unlike trade caravans, women were prominent travelers in 
pilgrim’s parties.  A group of Turgut Mongols who made the trip in Khüree in 1811, for 
example, was led by the Turgut khan Tzendendorji’s queen mother, Rasipil; their journey 
began in Kara Šar and stopped in Urumqi before veering north to Turpan, Gucheng, 
Kobdo, Uliasutai and finally Khüree.  She was escorted by sixty-eight “men and women,” 
including the khan himself.  They departed their home pastures in the late spring, on 
April 20, 1811 (JQ16.3.28).  Rasipil had, in fact, written the Turgut league chief, prince 
(beise) Guntan, to set in motion the licensing process, informing him of the planned trip 
and notifying him of Tzerendorji’s replacement while he was away and requesting 
official permission to carry on the trip.22  Such parties also doubled as trade caravans.  In 
1857 a party of twenty-four “lamas and laymen, men and women” (lama kara haha hehe) 
from the Šarabulak postal station district (near Kobdo) likewise came to Khüree to pay 
respects to the Jebtsundamba Kütuktu.23  They came in a caravan laden with goods: 
                                                
21 M1D1-3840.55a (DG7.9). 
22 M1D1-3675.86 (JQ16.+3.24).  The age of Tzerendorji is not clear, but is clear from the chain of 
command that his mother, Rasipil, was in charge of Tzerendorji’s banner.  Her letter is cited within the 
document by Guntan in a communication to Urumci.   
23 M1D1-3840.18 (XF7.9.20).  Khüree was a common destination for Turgūt pilgrims. In the same year of 
1827, the ambans’ office in Tarbagatai sent notices of yet another relative of a Turgut prince, this time the 
cin wang Engkjirgal’s younger brother, a gelung lama, requesting permission to make visit to Khüree to 
“pay respects” (hengkileme) to the Jebtsundamba Kutuktu.  The travel permit specified that his party 
included twenty one men, nine camels, twenty horses, and six muskets; he would have to reapply for 
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fifteen riding horses, fifty camels with miscellaneous trade items, one Mongol-style ger 
each, one tent (maikan) each, and two muskets (miyoocan).24  As the muskets suggest, the 
road was a dangerous place.  While pilgrims often armed themselves, it was the 
responsibility of the highest officials in Outer Mongolia, the ambans in Khüree and the 
military governor in Uliasutai, to make the roads safe.  
 
Empire at the Interstices: Keeping Merchants in Line 
 
Through licensing and monitoring even the most innocuous types of population 
movement, the Qing state was more broadly involved in maintaining the physical and 
legal infrastructure that bound Mongolia to the Chinese interior: it kept up roads, 
protected those with permits, and arrested those without.  The offices responsible for 
these activities stood above the banners: a military governor (Ma: jiyanggiyūn; Ch: Sĥ) 
in Uliasutai, and an imperial representative in Khüree (Ma: hesei takūraha Kuren de tefi 
baita icihiyara amban; Mo: jarliγ-iyar jaruγsan Küriyen-dur saγuju kereg sidkegci sayid; 
Ch: !ǓfƄ; lit. “official dispatched by imperial decree to Khüree to manage 
affairs” in Manchu and Mongol).  Both officials were dispatched from Beijing, and 
belonged to the Eight Banners; the vast majority were Manchu; after 1800, the imperial 
representative in Khüree was given oversight over the eastern aimaγ, and the military 
                                                                                                                                            
another permit for his return trip from the ambans’ office at Khüree.  (In Khüree, the ambans office had 
capable jaisang and halgaci called up to look after them while in town. Another Turgut party registered as 
five people, 10 camels, and gun received travel permits on DG7.3.10, good for sixty days.  See M1D1-
3840.55a (DG7.9). 
24 M1D1-3840.19 (XF7.8.18). 
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governor over the two western aimaγ.25  The post of imperial representative in Khüree, or 
“amban,” was established in 1762; he was charged primarily with managing relations and 
trade with Russia.  The office quickly assumed other jobs as well, all involving cross-
jurisdictional matters: maintaining the postal roads, coordinating with the Jebtsundamba 
Khutukhtu and the Buddhist establishment, overseeing the Chinese merchant community, 
and handling cases of inter-ethnic crime and marriage.  As trade grew, so, too, did the 
size and stature of the office, with new offices for trade supervisors, directly responsible 
to the amban, established in Kiakhta and Khüree.26  It was the ambans’ responsibility to 
ensure that the imperial order, based on the integrity of the Mongol banner system, 
remained in place.  Banner jasaγs kept control over local affairs; Uliasutai and Khüree 
intervened only to maintain order in inter-banner, interethnic, and international relations.   
In this function, a basic task of the two offices was to maintain the imperial road 
network.  The Qing court invested heavily in new postal roads and ferries linking Beijing, 
Kalgan (Ch: zF), and Hohhot to Khüree, Kiakhta, Uliasutai, and Khobdo.  The 
highways were guarded by postal stations placed thirty miles, or a days’ ride, from 
another, and were subject to regular inspections by top authorities in Mongolia, including 
the military governor at Uliasutai and imperial representatives in Khüree.27  At regular 
intervals in the autumn, when camels and horses were in top condition, the top authorities 
in Uliasutai and Khüree were required to inspect the post-stations (Ma giyamun) in their 
                                                
25 There were two Imperial Representatives in Khüree, one a Mongol aristocrat who served a life term, and 
a second a Eight Bannerman, almost always a Manchu, who served a three-year term.  
26 Li Yushu, Waimeng zhengjiao zhidu kao, 46-78, 95, 105, 121-130, 149-154, 167. 
27 On the main trunk-lines connecting Kalgan, Hohhot, Khüree, and Uliasutai, these postal stations were 
placed about every 100 li from each other, and between Uliasutai and Kobdo the postal station were thirty li 
apart. Wuliyasutai zhilue, 2.   
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jurisdictions; in the two eastern aimaγ, they included twenty post-stations on the southern 
road.  Likewise, all newly arrived military governors at Uliasutai were required to inspect 
all giyamun and karun in the jurisdiction.28  Despite the inconvenience of the trip and the 
burden it imposed on the local population, it was considered state work of the foremost 
importance, and archival records attest to the faithfulness with which military governors 
performed their duty, checking that the horses and camels were properly fattened up and 
that the posts’ arsenals were in order.  If necessary, extra horses from the area were 
pressed into service to ensure that post had a sufficient number of healthy animals.29  
Considerable resources and time were sunk into the inspection tours, which lasted 
up to three weeks.  In the summer of 1825, to take a typical year, the military governor at 
Uliasutai inspected a total of forty-one relay stations around Uliasutai, including the 
fourteen west of Uliasutai, on the way to Aldar and Qara Usu; the eight north of Kobdo, 
around Šara Bulak, and the nine north of Uliasutai in the vicinity of Cagan Dologai and 
Coboriya.  He reported he had personally ensured that after rigorous inspection, the 
stations’ weapons were all in order, the horses and camels were all strong, and banditry 
was nonexistent.30  Such tours were taxing on the local population pressed into postal 
duty.  The relay station, and the community in which it was based, was responsible for 
hosting the official and his accompanying party.  In difficult years, the authorities 
requested exemptions from making tours on grounds that locals were already “suffering” 
                                                
28 M2D1-176.11a (DG14.5.16). 
29 M2D1-176.31b (DG14.9.8). 
30 M2D1-176.15b (DG14.6.26). 
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enough.  In 1834, for example, the new military governor of Uliasutai, Kingšan,31 was by 
law required to perform an inspection tour of the karun and giyamun in his jurisdiction as 
new appointee.  However, since the authorities in Kobdo had already conducted an 
inspection tour that year, Kingšan memorialized the emperor that a “great number of 
Mongols” would be affected by the undertaking, and it was better to conserve 
resources.32    
The state also maintained ferries along the postal routes.  Authorities in Mongolia 
were not unusual in this regard.  In Manchuria, the law required postal station ferries 
(Ma: dobonggo, giyamun i dogon), grain transport, and military training in Heilongjiang 
to be renovated at regular intervals, some every ten years, other every five years, and still 
other every three years.  Each year, the military governors had to memorialize on the 
number of boats in need of repair, the type of boat, its location, its date of its last 
renovation, and its current state (“falling apart at the seams,” “rotting planks,” “pegs 
coming loose.”).33  He then prepared a budget for the Board of Works, so that materials 
(“tung oil, etc.”) could be dispatched from Beijing.  Thus in 1804, for example, twenty-
five boats received funding for renovation in Heilongjiang, including two ferries in 
Cicigar, two in Sahaliyan Ula (Heilongjiang) department, and two in Mergen.34   In 1806, 
forty-five boats were renovated in Jilin, including ten postal ferries, and thirty-four 
different boats were renovated again in 1810.35 
                                                
31 Kingšan (©), Manchu; military governor 1833-34.   
32 M2D1-176.11a (DG14.5.16). 
33 MWLF 3709.27.175.1478 (JQ11.10.18). 
34 MWLF 3673.30.172.806 (JQ9.9.4). 
35 MWLF 3709.27.175.1478 (JQ11.10.18); MWLF 3791.46.181.148 (JQ15.10.19). 
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In Mongolia, banners assumed the costs and procured men and supplies, and ferry 
services usually came with an unofficial price.  As Pozdneyev described the toll system 
in Qing Mongolia:  
I learned from conversations with Mongols that this ferry was 
maintained by decree of the hoshun [i.e. banner] authorities and that 
local Mongols served a term here as a hoshun duty.  The ferrymen are 
obliged to ferry across, free of charge, anyone traveling at official 
request as well as any neighboring Mongols; they receive no pay either 
from the hoshun or from the local community; they are granted only the 
right to levy a charge on Chinese merchants and their wares and 
likewise on Mongols living farther away.  There is no set fare in this 
case; the ferrymen set the price at their own discretion, taking into 
consideration the amount of their own labor and circumstances of the 
person being ferried, with their personal feelings towards a given 
person, of course, entering in.  They customarily charge Chinese 
merchants five silver rubles for ferrying across one hundred sheep, 
thirty to fifty copecks for a cart and horse, and ten copecks for a riding 
horse.36 
 
While the permit system placed limits on mobility (one could not diverge from 
one’s plans), it also guaranteed a measure of predictability.  There of course remained 
inherent in dangers to travel and limits to state protection.  Taking to the road meant 
exposure to disease and the elements, and travellers often died from sickness.  Banditry 
also remained a problem.  Even Buddhist pilgrims were not foolish enough to travel 
without weapons, including muskets; many parties brought several muskets (See Figure 
33).37 
                                                
36 Pozdneyev, Mongolia and the Mongols, 1: 5. 
37 These pilgrimages in particular were made in advance of the Jebtsundamba’s arrival in Khüree.  See 
M1D1-3675.29a (JQ24.4.9), M1D1-3675.38a (JQ24), M1D1-3675.42a (JQ24.2.26), M1D1-3675.62a 
(JQ24.2.21), M1D1-3675.63a (JQ24.2.2), M1D1-3675.64 (JQ24.2.26), M1D1-3675.69b (JQ24.2.6), 
M1D1-3675.72 (JQ24.2.20).  The travel parties on the occasion of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu’s arrival 
from Tibet were exceptionally large.  In the spring of 1819, the Ambans’ Office reported the departure, 
following a personal inspection of the ambans, of the team of 539 armed lamas and laymen headed by 
wang Manibdara on the occasion of the arrival of the Fifth Jebtsundamba Kūtuku.  Additional officials and 
lamas were called up to act as their escorts up to the edge of the Kalka border to the south.  The kuren i 
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Figure 33: Armed Pilgrims’ Caravans from Cecen Han aimaγ to Tibet, Spring 1819 
Leader’s 
rank 
Number 
of 
Pilgrims Horses Camels Guns Quivers Swords Spears 
taiji lama  12 4 35 1 3 2  
lama 15 30 30   1 1 
gelung 12 2 31 1  2  
lama 6 2 28 2 2   
lama 9 6 30 2 7   
lama 17 22 35 2 1   
lama 11 11 25 2 3   
 
While the Qing state’s control over highway robbery was limited, and caravans 
felt it necessary to fend for themselves, the state used other measures to help secure the 
property of travellers and provide a measure of dependability to long-distance trade.  
Even in cases of caravans overcome by prairie fires, for examples, merchants’ goods 
were protected.  In one case from 1831, a flash prairie fire in the banner of beise 
Pungcukdorji destroyed 742.39 taels worth of goods owned by the merchant Yin 
Zhengtong, known locally as “Sengge.”38  For Sengge, the situation was a disaster, as he 
                                                                                                                                            
g’ambu nomun han Jangcubdorji and the Šangjotba, Gombujab, were immediately responsible for 
overseeing that welcoming the hūbilgan would be Mongol-style gers, large tents (Ma: cacir; cf. Mo. 
cacar), carts and sedan chairs covered in red cloth, and parasols, according to precedent.  Other gifts 
included a scepter (Ma: keksebuku), rosary, and saddle (Ma: enggimu) personally granted by the Emperor, 
Manjusri.  The travel parties on the occasion of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu’s arrival from Tibet were 
exceptional large, (literally) a once-in-a-lifetime event.  A year before the event, the Šangjotba’s office 
coordinated logistics, splitting up teams of lamas to pasture horses and camels in Qinghai and Alašan, 
which required an exit-permit for crossing the gate at San Yan Ging.  Led by the jaisang lama Isicerin and 
halgaci lama Lobsangdubjur, their team included a total of twenty-six men, 200 camels, 300 horses, 300 
sheep, five large tents, three guns, five sets of quivers, and two swords.  Even high lamas had to be armed. 
A round up of the suspected “bandits” was conducted all the same.  Three men, led by a man named 
Baburung, were arrested in Hohhot, with the news reassuringly transmitted to the emperor himself. The 
Lifanyuan and all the top jurisdictions in Khalkha Mongolia, religious and secular, were kept apprised of 
the situation and kept on alert. The procedures were a scaled down version of heightened upkeep for 
imperial tours.  M1D1-3675.17a (JQ24.2.21), M1D1-3675.81a (JQ24.10.20), M1D1-3675.85a 
(JQ24.+4.12), M1D1-3675.87 (JQ24.+4.12). 
38 I return to the question of the acculturation of Chinese merchants below. 
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found himself deeply in debt to his merchant house.39  An investigation into the source of 
the fire was carried out and tracked down to the ger door of a man named Mandahū and 
his mother, a live-in nun named Angke.  He was twenty-five, and his mother sixty-eight.  
When questioned, his mother admitted to letting ashes from the stove catch the grass 
around doorway on fire, unleashing a prairie fire that burned for a week, consuming mile 
after mile a grassland, before ever reaching the merchant’s tent.  Mandahū had left home 
to fulfill his service duty (alban) in his banner, leaving his mother alone; she never knew 
there was a problem until she suddenly heard her neighbors yell ‘Fire!”  The only crime 
she had commit was destroying the merchant’s property; starting a wildfire was not a 
crime in itself.  The Mongol Code was clear on the matter: “if any Mongol starts a fire 
which consumes the possessions of an irgen, a clear investigation of the amount of 
destroyed items shall be made and the irgese shall be repaid [by the offender] according 
their value.”  742.39 taels, though, was beyond Mandahū and Angke’s means: they only 
had two gers and two horses to their name.  The insolvent Mandahū was thus ordered to 
be whipped.40  
Off the road, the Qing state assured licensed merchants a dependable, albeit 
segregated, place within towns.  In the each of the main trade hubs – Uliasutai, Kiakhta, 
and Khüree – Chinese merchants were allotted special districts, each walled off from the 
Mongol neighborhoods around them.  In Khüree, Chinese merchants were enclosed in a 
                                                
39 M1D1-3935.33 (DG11.12.3).  Chinese merchants in Mongolia that accidently started prairie fires were 
punished according to the same laws used to prosecute Mongols found guilty of starting fires while 
smoking out animal dens.  If they did not have livestock, they were to pay an equivalent indemnity in 
silver. TGKH 55: 6a-b. 
40 M1D1-3935.33 (DG11.12.3). 
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designated “trade quarter” (Ma: hūdai hashan). 41  In Uliasutai, where merchants was 
fewer, they were kept on a smaller “trade street” (Ma: hūdai giya).  The privilege was not 
free.  Each year, the government rented out the land allotted to merchants in Kiakhta for 
400 silver taels per year and the Khuree for 300 taels, with a representative of the trade 
community for paying the Trade-Inspector’s office.  If split evenly, with twelve trading 
firms in Khuree, represented each by a headman, the rent amounted to 25 taels per 
merchant house.42  After the establishment of the merchant quarter in Kiakhta, it was 
made illegal for any women to reside there.  Most merchant and caravan workers thus 
came without their families as single men, with many between the ages of eleven and 
thirteen.43  Some merchants took Mongol wives.44   
The merchant houses forged close ties with the trade supervisor, who was 
immediately responsible for the district, and the trade supervisor in turn relied upon the 
cooperation of the leaders of the merchant community for tax and rent collection, 
registration activities, and law enforcement.45  In Kiakhta, for example, the prohibition on 
arms trading with the Russians was enforced not by inspecting individuals, but by 
                                                
41 M1D1-4079.15a (DG17.12.24). 
42 M1D1-3697.16a (JQ25.10). 
43 Zhang Zhengming, Jinshang xingshuai shi, 80. 
44 M1D1-843.1 (DG4.8.9).  A register was made of all mixed Chinese-Mongol households, composed of 
Chinese fathers and Mongol mothers.  The register took their names, home jurisdiction (county for the 
Chinese, otok daruga for the Mongols), and ages, as well as the names, gender (male, female, and infant), 
and age of all children and dependents, including adopted children, children-in-law, nieces, and nephews; 
all children were registered with Mongol names and subject to the jurisdiction of their mother’s daruga.  A 
register from 1824 divided the couples into those on registered eight years prior and those newly registered, 
suggesting that a separate registration drive had been made in 1816.  Eighteen mixed households, 
comprised of seventy-two individuals, were listed on record before 1816.   
45 Judging by their names, the trade supervisors were Manchus dispatched from Beijing.  In Uliasutai, trade 
was managed through the separate institution of Trade Judges (maimai jargūci i ba).  See M1D1-3697.31 
(JQ5.8.6). 
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meeting with the leaders of each merchant house in the city.46  The men responsible for 
governing the district were “zone leaders” (Ma: giyai da) and and heads of merchant 
houses (Ma: hūdai da).  Beneath them, a separate policing apparatus was installed for 
dealing with Chinese crimes, with those pressed into service given the rank of bailiff 
(Ma: undeci); the bailiffs were drawn invariably from amongst Han Chinese men in 
intermarried households.  Mongol men occupied all other service positions in town, 
including clerks (Ma: bithesi; Mo: biciyeci), night sentries (Ma: manaci; Mo: manaγaci), 
and postriders (Ma: ulaci; Mo: ulaγaci). A register kept of all men performing police 
service in Khüree was compiled in 1824; it listed their names, postings, home 
jurisdictions, wives, and names and ages of dependents (See Figure 34).  The profile of 
an average Mongol serviceman was a thirty-six year old man, with thirty-five year old 
wife and four dependents; in contrast, the average Chinese undeci was fifty-five years 
old, with a thirty-eight year old wife and four dependents.  The families were similar, but 
the Chinese men were generally two decades older, suggesting how some unmarried Han 
men may have come to the frontier looking for wives as well as for business 
opportunities.  
Figure 34: Men Serving Police Duty in Khüree, 1824 
Name Posting Man's age 
Wife's 
age 
Home 
jurisdiction type 
Dondob postrider 44 43 banner 
Dasi postrider 38 34 banner 
Tanggūt postrider 43 38 banner 
Namdak postrider 37 35 banner 
                                                
46 M1D1-3697.22 (JQ25.12.8) and M1D1-3750.10a (DG3.12.18 ).  In both years there were reported to be 
eight such headmen (Ma: hūdai da).  
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Batunasun postrider 28 23 banner 
Wacirajab postrider 18  banner 
Cimet clerk 30 27 banner 
Cibakjab clerk 46  banner 
Baldan 
lead 
sentry 
60 60 Monastery otok 
Tūman senty 32 37 Monastery otok 
Aysui postrider 23  Monastery otok 
Hūrgangkuo clerk 29 29 Monastery otok 
Namjil 
lead 
sentry 
53 28 Monastery otok 
Basutu senty 36 39 Monastery otok 
Norbo senty 40 38 Monastery otok 
Mingjur bailiff 43 34 Monastery otok 
Erincin senty 30 29 Monastery otok 
Gombudorji postrider 18 24 Monastery otok 
Damdin postrider 17  Monastery otok 
Jampil senty 33 31 Monastery otok 
Kisiktu senty 50 52 Monastery otok 
Ciwang senty 32 30 Monastery otok 
Najil senty 54  Monastery otok 
Ciwang senty 42 50 Monastery otok 
Bayar senty 21 22 Monastery otok 
Gombudorji postrider 22 18 Monastery otok 
Wangtan postrider 27 24 Monastery otok 
Ceden postrider 60 40 Monastery otok 
Ceringkuo senty 52 43 Monastery otok 
Šakdur senty 43 43 Monastery otok 
Ma Zhaofu bailiff 72 28 junxian 
Li Shiqi bailiff 61 54 junxian 
Wu Zheng bailiff 50 38 junxian 
Ma Wanbao bailiff 70 49 junxian 
Tian Shilu bailiff 49 22 junxian 
Wang Guda bailiff 37 30 junxian 
Zuo Paifang bailiff 50 33 junxian 
Wang Zichang bailiff 45 37 junxian 
Tuan Jinding bailiff 57 56 junxian 
Wu Eryuan bailiff 46 30 junxian 
Lü Yangbi bailiff 75 47 junxian 
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Qiu Fende bailiff 42 50 junxian 
Wu Yingkui bailiff 39 36 junxian 
Fang Dacheng bailiff 78 34 junxian 
 
If discovered, undocumented merchants and migrants were arrested and 
repatriated.  Some attempted to use expired licenses; other forged permits from scratch.  
It was better to pass off a fake license than to have none at all: the punishment for 
traveling in Mongolia undocumented was eighty blows with the cane.47  Yet “vagrancy” 
remained such a problem that, in 1820, the imperial representatives began to keep 
registers of all undocumented Mongol migrants who had left their banners and relocated 
to a ramshackle community encircling the Chinese quarter of Khüree.  The first survey 
turned up no less 417 households.48   Thereafter, the ambans’ office was notified of 
round-up activities of “vagrants” (Ma: norome tehe urse) caught around Khüree.49  
Policing also stepped on the main highway.    In a single day in 1828 at the Sair Usu 
postal station, guardsmen arrested a young Chinese man from Urumqi, an unemployed 
lama, a twenty-six-year-old Karacin Mongol man with his fourteen-year-old wife.  All 
were undocumented, and all were punished and repatriated.50 
Those with licenses, on the other hand, were guaranteed protection over property 
and safe haven within the merchant’s quarter.  In cases of fire, for example, similar 
guarantees over property for caravans on the road extended to merchant houses in town.  
The seriousness with which the Qing state upheld these obligations is attested in the case 
                                                
47 M1D1-3935.13a (DG11.4.19). 
48 M1D1-3697.41a (JQ25.6.5). 
49 M1D1-3833.36a (DG6.4). 
50 M1D1- 3874.15 (DG8.3.10); M1D1-3874.16 (DG8.1.24); M1D1-3874.17 (DG8.9.24). 
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of a fire that destroyed much of Kiakhta in 1779.  The Qianlong emperor had shut down 
the Kiakhta trade the year before, and the merchants had returned home; there was no 
reason to stay.  Since there was no one to look after their homes, one hundred troops were 
specially called up to guard them.  The city was run as a military camp, and total order 
was demanded.  The Ambans’ Office thus made it a top priority to investigate the fire: 
how did such chaos get unleashed?  According to the initial reports, the fire had broken 
out spontaneously at dawn on June 27, 1779 in the empty merchant’s quarter, on the 
southeast end, by the northeast corner of the temple to Guandi.  A patrolman on guard 
described how troops rushed to the scene and doused the flames with water, and 
neighboring karun troops were called to the scene to help.  The Chinese man who looked 
after the temple came out to help.  The attendant had no idea how such a disaster had 
bafellen the merchant’s quarter.  At sunset he had locked up for the night, and was inside 
the temple with his friend, a cook, when the “fire came out from a heavenly spirit” (abka 
enduri ci tuwa deijihe).  The houses built of earth and wood went up in flames in a flash.  
Altogether seventy-one units were destroyed, including forty-six owned by merchants.   
The patrolman reported there was nothing suspicious about the affair.51 
Witnesses all agreed that nobody was cooking or boiling tea when the fire started: “it was 
truly a fire that came down from heaven” (Ma: abka ci wasinjiha tuwa inu).  The Ambans 
Office considered the story of the miraculous fire a “total farce” (fuhali injeku ohobi), 
and further investigations were ordered.52  They suspected arson: had “hustlers” (Ma: 
buya aisi be kicere urse; lit. “people hustling for small profits”) started the fire to create a 
                                                
51 M1D1-3033.6 (QL44.5.20). 
52 Ibid. 
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diversion to rob the merchant houses?53  Tellingly, the locks to some of the merchant 
houses had been damaged and the doors pried open; in some houses valuables, such as 
decorative copper and iron horse bridles, were missing.  Then a ladder tall enough to 
scale the merchant quarter’s walls was found.   Suspicion immediately fell upon the 
guardsmen posted to the wall: Jikmet and Dorji, who already had a prior history and were 
pegged as trouble-makers.  Under interrogation, Jikmet admitted to starting the fire. He 
had been out with a torch on the evening of the 26th, but he was not a thief.  Before 
finishing his duty and going home to sleep, he had tossed the torch away, and it must 
have started the fire.54 
 Yet when they interrogated Dorji, he had a different confession.  Two days before 
the fire, he and Jikmet had broken into several of the merchant house branch offices to 
take a look around.  Then, on the night of the fire, they climbed over the merchant 
quarter’s walls by standing on a big wooden bucket, hauled the ladder over, then 
scrambled down.  With a torch in hand, they searched through the houses looking for 
loot, but found nothing.  They dropped the torch behind them, and when the wind kicked 
up its flames and the houses caught fire, they spread word that the fire had descended 
miraculously from the sky.  He named another accomplice as well, a uksin named 
Rabtan.  Finally, when Rabtan was interrogated he admitted to breaking into the 
courtyards of the branch offices and stealing garden tools, cooking pots, ladles, 
porcelains jars, and half-full bag of flour.55  He was caught by two patrolman, but they 
                                                
53 M1D1-3033.2 (QL44.7.28). 
54 Ibid. 
55 The exact amount stolen was two cooking pots, two porcelain jars, two perforated spoons (used for 
lifting things from water) [cf Norman hereku maša], three axes, one sickle, one hoe, and a half-full bag of 
flour.  Apparently the merchants did not trust the guardsmen enough to leave behind any valuables.   
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failed to report the case, instead taking a cut of the stolen booty as bribes.  The thieves 
were stripped of rank, ordered to wear the cangue for three months, then whipped 100 
times.  The patrolmen who accepted bribes were similarly stripped of rank, whipped 100 
times, and ordered to return the stolen property.56  The case was so outrageous that it was 
feared that the Qing would “become a joke” (injeku obufi) to the Russians.  After 
deliberation, the punishments were stepped up: all the men involved were banished into 
exile in the miasmatic south.  Some were exiled to Yunnan, others to Guizhou, and still 
others to Guangdong and Guangxi.57  Most never made it.  Dorji died of heat related 
illness on route, as did some of the others.58  
 
The creation of a stable, dependable business environment under the umbrella of 
Qing rule stimulated a new commercial integration of Mongolia and the Chinese interior.  
The history of trade across the Great Wall frontier was defined by an ever-evolving 
                                                
56 The commanding officer, Gongcukcerin, was docked three years of fulun, with it instead used as 
compensation for the 15 alban i boo whose homes were lost.  In addition, the guardsmen involved in the 
previous year’s affair were ordered to pay one-ninth of livestock in restitution, and ordered whipped an 
additional fifty times for the grievousness of their various crimes.  (While the reward would normally go to 
the captors, the option was disallowed in this case).   
57 M1D1-3033.38 (QL44.10.24).  Fires again raged through Kiakhta in 1801 and 1819.  On JQ6.4.22, 
Kuren i hūdai giyai i yong tai cang gi puselii irgen Giyan Be Wan arrived in Khuree.  That night, at the 
fifth watch, a fire erupted from his kang and burnt his house down, taking his trade permit and other 
possessions with it.  For failing to mind his surroundings and starting a fire, he was hit with a staff 
(undehen) twenty times.  His story about the permit was checked out with the authorities at Goroki be elhe 
obure hoton.57  There was another fire in Kiakhta in 1819.  This time the source was nowhere the less than 
the kitchen of Dingtai, the Kiyaktu i hūdai irgesei baita be kadalame icihiyara ejeku hafan.  When the fire 
broke out, the Russian mayur took some of his men, and working in a “honest and harmonious” (hono 
hūwaliyasun) spirit together with Qing men, snuffed out the fire.  The responsible cook, Ren Xingming, 
was senteneced to two months in the cangue and a beating with a rod (undehen).  Another Kiakhta fire 
reported in JQ1.10.27 was cited as a precedent.  In that case, an alban boo belonging to irgen Dzao Ki Fa’s 
puseli caught fire (located on the western giya); Zao received forty blows with the rod for his negligence.  
Immediately afterwards, Dingtai’s office sent the Muslim merchant Mu Jinke to the mayur to send a special 
greeting and offer a gift of snuff, with small baskets of bricked tea and sugar candy (juhe šatan) for his 
soldiers.57  
58 M1D1-3041.18 (QL45.12.14). 
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symbiosis between merchants and the state.  From the late sixteenth century, in particular, 
new forms of corporate organization and coordination with the state are apparent with the 
founding the Shanxi merchant houses.59   Zhang Zhengming has argued persuasively in 
this regard that the rise of Shanxi merchants did not reflect increased agricultural or 
artisanal production in northern China, as previous scholars have argued, but rather 
specific policy shifts in Ming military strategies for provisioning Inner Asian garrisons: 
the great Shanxi merchant houses only began to form when the state commissioned 
merchants to supply troops with grain, in exchange for shares in the government’s salt 
monopoly.60  Likewise, as Perdue Perdue argued, processes of state building and 
commercialization were inexorably intertwined during the Dzungar Wars of the mid-
eighteenth century.61  These processes of state building and commercial expansion did 
not end in the peace that came with Pax Manjurica: they continued to be deeply and 
mutually informed. 
Commercial Expansion: The Metropole Pulls, The Frontier Pushes 
 
The economy of Qing Mongolia was transformed in the early nineteenth century, 
as markets opened up and increasing numbers of herders turned to commercial resource 
exploitation.  
In practice, trade in Qing Mongolia became focused around the imperial road 
network just described.  The licensing system provides an in-depth picture of the long-
                                                
59 Zhang Zhengming, Jinshang xingshuai shi (Taiyuan: Shanxi guji chubanshe, 2001), 4. 
60 Zhang Zhengming, Mingqing jinshang ji minfeng (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2003), 1-14.  Beginning 
in 1492, the provisioning of grain was monetized, with the Shanxi merchants required to supply silver 
instead for the salt licenses.   Zhang Zhengming, Mingqing jinshang ji minfeng, 12. 
61 Zhang Zhengming, Jinshang xingshuai shi, 4-30. 
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distance caravan trade that defined this period.  A typical caravan west from Khüree to 
Uliasutai in the second quarter of the nineteenth century numbered between three and 
twelve men, with an average caravan size of 6.5 men.  The vast majority of caravans 
were large camel trains, averaging 117 camels in size, though some merchants travelled 
by ox-cart as well (with an average size of 129 carts per caravan).  Going west, they 
carried almost exclusively tea, each camel bearing four boxes of tea bricks.62  Heading 
east, the caravans were significantly larger and carried a wider range of goods.  
Originating in Gansu, the average train had twenty-two men, 292 camels, and twenty-
three horses; they carried rhubarb, tobacco, rice, and noodles.63  Eastbound caravans were 
also more diverse, with men from counties from Shanxi to Gansu represented; of a 
sample of 237 caravan workers in 1847, ninety-one were from Shanxi, 144 were from 
Gansu, and two were from Shaanxi.  Heading west, in contrast, the merchants were 
almost exclusively from Shanxi.64 
The composition of caravans differed by region.  Caravans that worked the local 
Mongol banners along the Hohhot-Khüree-Kiakhta trunkline were also primarily staffed 
by Shanxi merchants: of a sample of 537 caravan members tallied between 1826 and 
1847, all were from counties in Shanxi.  The average caravans working the north-south 
route were also notably smaller, composed of twelve men, fifty-one pack camels, seven 
                                                
62 Based a description of nineteen caravans in 1847.  M1D1-4319.20 (DG27.1.30), M1D1-4319.20 
(DG27.1.30), M1D1-4319.20 (DG27.1.30), M1D1-4320.21a (DG27.11), M1D1-4320.21a (DG27.11), 
M1D1-4320.21a (DG27.11), M1D1-4320.27a (DG27.12), M1D1-4320.27a (DG27.12), M1D1-4320.27a 
(DG27.12), M1D1-4320.27a (DG27.12), M1D1-4320.37a (DG27.12), M1D1-4320.37a (DG27.12), M1D1-
4320.37a (DG27.12), M1D1-4320.51a (DG27.3.1), M1D1-4320.51a (DG27.3.1), M1D1-4320.25 
(DG27.5.29), M1D1-4320.25 (DG27.5.29). 
63 Based on a description of thirteen caravans in 1847.  M1D1-4320.19 (DG27.6.10), M1D1-3845.2b 
(DG7.8.20). 
64 Ibid.  Of the 237 Chinese individuals listed in the thirteen caravans to Khüree, ninety-one were from 
Shanxi, 144 were form Gansu, and two were from Shaanxi.  
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riding camels, and three riding horses.  The dominant commodity they sold was brick tea, 
which comprised 30% of the camel load, but their goods they carried were relatively 
more diverse, including textiles, tobacco, rice, noodles, leather, cooking oil and pots.65 
Merchants plying the Khüree-Kiakhta route, on the other hand, specialized almost 
exclusively in selling brick tea; merchants arriving from Uliasutai and the west carried 
other products, such as rhubarb.  The short trip from Khüree to the border town was 
usually made in teams of twenty-six ox carts, though camel caravans of comparable size 
were not uncommon.  A minority of these merchants specialized in supplying food to the 
border towns, bringing boxes of grapes, noodles, and cooking sauces.66  In return they 
brought back furs: foxes, squirrels, ermine, and others.  At its peak, each merchant house 
imported hundreds of thousands of pelts each year.67   
The growth of the domestic caravan trade in Mongolia was stimulated by the 
dramatic rise of the Kiakhta trade: both boomed at the same time.  The rules of trade with 
Russia were initially established in 1727, on the principles of firm boundaries and 
controlled exchange.  Yet the Dzungar wars slowed trade through the first half of the 
                                                
65 Based on a sample of fifty-eight caravan licenses issued between 1826 and 1847.  M1D1-3822.45 
(DG6.11.15), M1D1-3822.51 (DG6.11.24), M1D1-3822.47a-1 (DG6.11.3), M1D1-3845.33 (DG7.9.22), 
M1D1-3845.10a (DG7.9.20), M1D1-3845.27a (DG7.11.20), M1D1-3845.34a (DG7.1), M1D1-3845.34a 
(DG7.1), M1D1-3936.13 (DG11.11.8), M1D1-3936.36a (DG21.9.24), M1D1-4319.32 (DG27.11.28), 
M1D1-4320.1 (DG27.11.15), M1D1-4320.2 (DG27.11.8), M1D1-4320.42 (DG27.11.22), M1D1-4320.55 
(DG27.12.12), M1D1-4320.10a (DG27.1), M1D1-4320.22a (DG27.11.1). 
66 Based on a sample of forty-six caravans in the years 1831-1847.  M1D1-4320.35a (DG27.7.1), M1D1-
4079.15 (DG17.12.24), M1D1-3936.16a (DG24.8.1), M1D1-3936.42 (DG11.4.29). 
67 For figures, see MZWYH 27.1.1.42 (JQ21.5); 26.19.125.162 (JQ25.3.9); 26.18.83.124 (DG1.3.2); 
31.21.69.115 (DG2.3); 29.4.41.75 (DG5.2.20); 29.10.94.143 (DG7.3); 3.8.120.166 (DG9.2.30); 
30.21.80.133 (DG15.3.8).  In the late nineteenth century, A.M. Pozdneyev described how the permit system 
was still in effect at Kiakhta: “We did not enter the Mai-mai-ch’eng but skirted its southeast side on the so-
called ‘caravan’ street.  It has received this name because it is traversed by all caravans coming to the Mai-
mai-ch’eng.  At the southwest end of this street a sentry box has been erected, where the local Chinese 
authorities check the permits of the Chinese arriving here, and no trading caravan is allowed into the Mai-
mai-ch’eng without the presentation of the latter.”  A.M. Podzneyev, Mongolia and the Mongols, 1: 2. 
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eighteenth century, and border closings in 1764-1768, 1779-1780, and 1785-1792 stalled 
trade for much of the second half.  After 1792, as the dependability of the route was 
established, cross-border trade took off.  The value of trade was already four times 
greater by 1805 than it was in 1775 (See Figure 35).68  
Figure 35: Kiakhta Trade by Value (rubles), 1755-1813 
 
In the period 1825-1850, the Kiakhta trade witnessed exponential growth (See 
Figure 36).69  
Figure 36: Chinese Tea Exports at Kiakhta (pud), 1750-1850  
                                                
68 Aleksandr Korsak, Istoriko-statisticheskoe obozrenie torgovykh snoshenii Rossii s Kitaem (Kazan: Izd. 
Knigoprodavtsa Ivan Dubrovina, 1856), 67, 73, 97, 105. 
69 Zhang Zhengming, Mingqing jinshang ji minfeng (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2003), 56; Mi Zhenbo, 
Qingdai Zhong-E Qiaketu bianjing maoyi (Tianjin: Nankai daxue chubanshe, 2003), 22.  Citing Korsak. 
The Russian pud is equal to approximately 16.4 kilograms. 
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One result of all this activity was increased commerce within Mongolia itself.  
With more merchants plying the roads, Mongol bannermen had greater access to markets, 
and increasing numbers of pastoralists turned to alternative forms of work to capitalize on 
it.  The history of this commercial boom, however, involved not only the pull of 
opportunity, but the push of poverty.  Tellingly, much of the new economic activity 
became focused on the exploitation of natural resources.  Yet commercial hunting, 
foraging, and mining were not the preferred livelihood for most Mongols, pastoralism 
was: most tended livestock; most wanted to tend livestock.70  Hunting and gathering were 
last resorts.  In other stories, foraging is a metaphor for destitution, as in practice it often 
                                                
70 David Millar Farquhar, “The Ch’ing Administration of Mongolia Up to the Nineteenth Century,” (PhD 
Dissertation, Harvard University, 1960), 5.  Farquhar argues that hunting declined after 1800, but does not 
describe why: “In earlier times hunting had been an important subsidiary economic activity of all the 
Mongols, but by 1800 its significance was greatly reduced.  In northern Mongolia where there were forests, 
a fair amount of hunting was still done, mainly for fur-bearing animals like the sable and the squirrel.  In 
the steppe, however, hunting had largely degenerated into a sport.  The only animals that were hunted for a 
practical purpose were the marmot, which provided both food and fur, and the wolf, which was hunted at 
all times because it was a menace to the herds.” Farquhar, 4-5.  
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was: they were famine foods.71  When the Dzungars were at their most desperate, they 
were thus described as “slaughtering horses and camels and hunting wild animals (Ma: 
gurgu) for food.”72   To Nurhaci’s court, the idea that trappers and ginseng pickers lived a 
life of hardship was common sense.  The Old Manchu Chronicles record an exchange in 
1615 with a nobleman named Baban: 
The amban Baban replied to the khan:  “At the marriage banquet, why 
not have the two families slaughter a lot of livestock?  If they only kill 
a small amount of livestock, the feast will be dull.”  Sure Kundulen 
Khan said in reply:  “Baban, your suggestion that everyone should eat a 
lot is well and good.  But if we say that they should all eat a great deal, 
will we have fed the poor and suffering people who work the fields and 
grow hungry and thirsty?  Will we have fed the people who undergo 
hardship to transport wood, earth and stone to erect the fortifications, 
the people who go for two or three months in the wilderness to gather 
ginseng and catch sable and squirrel.  If people like you fed those who 
endure privation and suffer distress, what you are saying would indeed 
be correct.73   
 
Archives from the first half of the nineteenth century are littered with desperate 
communities turning to alternative ways of surviving.  In the first half of the nineteenth 
                                                
71 In the classical tradition, the disposition was exemplified by the case of young Temujin, who before 
becoming Chinggis Khan, scavenges for marmots and wild onions to support his family.  A similar tale was 
told of the young Nurhaci, who collected pine seeds, ginseng, and other wild pharmaceuticals from the 
forests of Manchuria after his own father’s death.  See, for example, Dai Yi and Li Wenhai. Qing tongjian 
(Taiyuan, Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 1999), 1: 2-3.  On wild onions and destitution, see Altan Tobci, 
Bawden translation (1955), 189.  See also A.G. Sazykin and D. Yondon, “Travel-Report of a Buriat Pilgrim, 
Lubsan Midzid-Dordzi,” Acta Orientalia 39.2-3 (1985): 237.   
72 Chuang Chi-fa, Qingdai zhungaer shiliao chubian 140-141, 180-181. See also the Han-i araha manju 
monggo gisuni bileku bithe (Mo: Qaγan-u bicigsen manju mongγol), a dictionary published in 1708, in 
which the secondary role of hunting and forestry was shown graphically in the ordering of listed 
professions: a first chapter (Ch: juan) was devoted to the most respectable professions (scholar, official, 
soldier, herder), a second to the less respectable ones (farmer, merchant, artisan, hunter, forester).  See 
Han-i araha manju monggo gisuni bileku bithe / Qaγan-u bicigsen manju mongγol ügen-ü toil bicig, 
niyalmai hacin. 
73 MBRT 1.4.41-42. 
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century, life could indeed be brutal in the banners.  In Sonomwangcuk’s banner,74 a 
relative hotbed of mercantile activity, one finds the case of a Mongol bannerman (Ma: 
uksin) named Dorji who sold his son, G’aldancerin to a merchant.  Regretting his 
decision, and desperate to reclaim his son, he had approached the head of his arrow (Ma: 
niru), janggin Coijab, who forwarded the matter to the ambans’ office.  When asked why 
he had sold his son, he explained that he, his wife, and his son were beggars.  A 
merchant, a Muslim (Ma: hoise irgen) with a Mongol name (“Dasi”), had stopped on his 
return trip from Kiakhta, and the family approached him for a pittance.75   That night, the 
merchant offered to buy Dorji’s son for three leather skins (Ma: bulgari sukū),76 three 
bricks of tea, and bag and half of flour, and in the hopes of giving his son a better life, he 
agreed.77 
Much more common were cases of herders turning to hunting, foraging, and 
mining.  In a more typical case from 1837, herders in the region of the Iruge River owed 
a merchant, Lü Changrong, over 20,000 bundles of “yellow tea” (Ma: suwayan cai).  The 
community was poor (yadahūn) and had a “hard time getting by” (ergen hetumbure de 
mangga), and so were forced into hunting.  Their debt proved impossible to settle in a 
                                                
74 Sonomwangcuk (Ch: ãĖ~), rvÞ()ď6YğJiĻďrvĵ7.  Jasaγ for 
the left wing, right banner of Tusiyetu Han aimaγ.  Fourth generation descendant of Ø?» (assumed rank 
1693).  Assumed his rank in QL58, held until his death in DG17 (1793-1837).  Succeeded by Baldardorji.  
Bao Wenhan et al, Menggu huibu wanggong biaozhuan (Hohhot: Neimenggu daxue chubanshe, 1998), 
160; Jin Hai et al, Qingdai menggu zhi (Hohhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 2009), 90. 
75 Though “Dasi” never stated it himself, and the case was ongoing, the trade supervisor guessed that he 
was probably engaged in the thriving rhubarb trade with Russia, which Muslims from the Northeast 
dominated.  
76 The Manchu bulgari is derived from the Mongol word bulγari, which Lessing defines as “yuft, Russian 
leather.”  Lessing, Mongolian-English Dictionary, 134. 
77 M1D1-3697.27a (JQ25.7.9).  Selling Mongols to Chinese merchants was illegal, and the authorities were 
able to track down the merchant for interrogation. 
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single season; in the words of the Šangjotba, the chief administrator for all ecclesiastical 
estates under the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu,78 they had the absolute minimum number of 
animals to be self-sufficient, they “managed to get by hunting” (butašame ergen hetume).  
They thus agreed to pay back their debt the following spring and summer using “what 
they obtained through the hunt.”  The following spring, however, the community was 
only able to pay back 3,400 bricks of tea: the “squirrels and other wild animals” (Ma: 
buthašame baha gurgu ulhu) were too few to support the entire community.79   
Livestock and population censuses conducted triennially for all monastic land in 
Outer Mongolia provides some perspective into the state of pastoralism in the early 
nineteenth century.   For forty years between 1773 and 1812, the Buddhist establishment 
made a census of all households, lamas, individuals, and livestock living under the 
Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, whose land holdings were spread throughout the region.  The 
tallies were compiled by the office of the Šangjotba, sent to the amban in Khüree, then 
forwarded to Beijing in a Manchu language attachment (See Figure 37).80   The figures 
reveal, in short, that Mongol herders were growing poorer.  In the years 1773-1812, the 
population rose by 9.87%, while family size declined from 6.0 to 5.3 individuals per 
household.  While the human population rose, livestock populations declined: sheep fell 
by 36.90%, cattle by 20.62%, and the reindeer population (tended by a lone Urianghai 
                                                
78 On the office of the Šangjotba and ecclesiastical estates, see Charles Bawden, The Modern History of 
Mongolia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), 106. 
79 M1D1-4079.1 (DG17.9.13).   
80 MWLF 2559.33.101.1064 (QL38.12.6), 2700.6.110.1345 (QL41.11.4), 2947.44.126.213 (QL47.12.11), 
2947.44.126.213 (QL47.12.11), 3220.7.143.2502 (QL53.12.12), 3220.7.143.2502 (QL53.12.12), 
3487.13.159.1420 (QL59.12.1), 3575.57.164.1823 (JQ2.11.25), 3575.57.164.1823 (JQ2.11.25), 
3663.35.171.1387 (JQ8.12.19), 3712.27.175.2415 (JQ11.12.15), 3779.10.180.641 (JQ14.12.14), 
3825.28.183.995 (JQ17.12.14), 3825.28.183.995 (JQ17.12.14).   
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community in the far north) collapsed entirely.  Only the population of camels rose – and 
it rose a staggering 74.91%.  The average household in 1773 commanded 1.74 camels, 
seventeen horses, twenty-four cows, and 146 sheep; the average household in 1812 
possessed 2.5 camels, fourteen horses, fifteen cows, and seventy-four sheep.  It had lost 
30% of its wealth.81 
Figure 37: Triennial Census Records for 17 otok of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, 1773-
1812 
Year 
House-
holds Lamas People Camels Horses Cows Sheep Reindeer 
1773 12,122 11,297 72,604 21,096 211,491 287,928 1,775,413 259 
1776 12,441 12,069 73,354 24,479 223,389 227,550 1,544,641 226 
1779 13,875 13,042 74,038 27,919 263,906 280,030 1,749,112 85 
1782 14,186 13,795 76,649 28,097 274,763 298,538 1,793,784 94 
1785 14,362 14,482 77,462 26,564 267,915 259,071 1,319,300 58 
1788 14,670 14,875 77,654 29,747 289,896 309,484 1,377,734 97 
1791 14,889 15,339 76,415 29,611 289,130 332,516 1,262,938 107 
1794 15,262 16,153 78,277 31,758 304,676 334,402 1,335,081 109 
1797 15,580 16,209 81,602 33,139 266,569 268,460 1,235,126 103 
1800 15,630 17,561 82,408 34,743 268,365 269,482 1,245,634 32 
1803 15,683 17,720 82,585 36,197 270,230 270,987 1,262,495 30 
1806 15,107 17,779 76,815 37,579 223,826 283,958 1,363,392 59 
1809 15,068 17,902 77,739 34,864 206,830 221,348 1,265,846 61 
1812 15,073 18,402 79,773 36,900 208,875 228,570 1,120,337 16 
% change 24.34% 62.89% 9.87% 74.91% - 1.24% - 20.62% - 36.90% 24.34% 
  
Similar patterns held for the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu’s personal pastures (See 
Figure 38).  While his pastures experienced a striking 40% growth in horses (and yak 
populations grew as well), other types of livestock conformed to the broader trend: 
camels rose by 115%, cattle fell by 55%, and sheep fell by 51%.   
                                                
81 Prices for livestock in the Qing have yet to be compiled from the archival evidence.  From passing 
evidence I have seen in the archives, I have roughly calculated the price of camels as 14 taels, horses as 10 
taels, oxen as 6 taels, and sheep as 1 tael per head.  The Menggu zhi, published in the early twentieth 
century, gives inflated prices for all four types of livestock and comparatively low prices for horses, with 
camels at 30-35 taels, horses at 12-15 taels, oxen at 12-15 taels, and sheep at 2-3.  
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Figure 38: Livestock Holdings of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu 
 
Year Camels Horses Cows Sheep Yaks 
1773 1,591 19,988 1,782 64,986 2,906 
1776 1,829 20,868 1,336 47,946 1,584 
1779 1,864 24,511 1,304 50,939 2,361 
1782 2,571 29,336 1,409 50,876 4,403 
1785 2,060 24,978 713 27,573 4,316 
1788 1,843 27,685 1,065 30,731 6,783 
1791 2,041 33,114 1,428 32,366 6,503 
1794 2,212 34,060 2,017 36,025 6,728 
1797 2,217 24,856 1,335 42,960 7,796 
1800 2,291 26,011 1,338 22,498 6,472 
1803 2397 27,515 1,525 24,295 6,483 
1806 3,457 31,015 1,833 33,991 7,003 
1809 3,244 27,155 707 31,960 5,269 
1812 3,426 27,868 810 32,103 5,272 
% change 115.34% 39.42% - 54.55% - 50.60% 81.42% 
 
Previous scholars have attributed such economic distress that to a rise in 
indebtedness and a new, empowered position of Chinese merchants and bankers.82  The 
reality was more complex.  The decline in sheep and cattle populations after 1795, 
together with the rise in camel populations, for one, suggests the possibility of problems 
endemic to the pastoral economy, and in particular distress from increased aridity.  
Indeed, pronounced and increasing dryness marked the years 1795-1820, and rainfall 
during the entire period 1800-1850 stood below the 350-year mean.83  1827 and 1835-37 
                                                
82 The classic statement of this position in English is M. Sanjdorji, Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in 
Northern Mongolia (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1980).  See also David Millar Farquhar, “The Ch’ing 
Administration of Mongolia Up to the Nineteenth Century,” 154.  
83 Davi, et al. “Extension of Drought Records for Central Asia Using Tree Rings: West-Central Mongolia,” 
Journal of Climate 19 (2005), 294. Similar patterns were found by D’Arrigo, et al, “1738 Years of 
Mongolian Temperature Variability Inferred from a Tree-Ring Width Chronology of Siberian Pine” 
Geophysical Research Letters 28.3 (2001), 544.  Other studies, however, have yielded differing results.  
See, for example, Pederson, et al, “Hydrometeorological Reconstructions for Northeastern Mongolia 
Derived from Tree Rings: 1651–1995” Journal of Climate 14 (2000), 876.   
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in particular were years of drought.84 At the very moment the pastoral economy was 
suffering, commercial opportunities and demand for natural resources were offering new 
alternatives: selling objects such as squirrel or other animal pelts on the market.  It is 
these new forms of resource exploitation that we now turn.  
 
Empire Building at Production Sites: Farms, Fuel, and Pharmaceuticals 
 
 Amidst the new economic climate, the logic and administrative infrastructure 
used to govern cross-border movement was extended to the exploitation of high-demand 
natural resources, including farmland, timber, and deer horn.  As in trade, the offices of 
the ambans and trade supervisors played the key role in licensing and regulating these 
activities.  In licensing these emergent forms of commercial production, moreover, the 
Qing state in Mongolia aimed to better control and segregate mobile populations, and so 
strengthen the territorial and sovereign integrity of the imperial banner system.  
Farmland 
 
In 1828, Gao Yumei arrived at the merchant’s quarter in Khüree, modern-day 
Ulaanbaatar.  He came to the trade supervisor’s office and “requested to open new farms 
on Mongol land” (Ma: monggo bade usin suksalara be baime).  Gao Yumei was a known 
troublemaker.  Seventy years old and from Fuqi county (Taiyuan prefecture), Shanxi, he 
had been banished from Mongolia in 1815 for lacking a proper trade license, but had 
quietly returned.  In 1826 (DG6), he ran afoul of the business leaders in Khüree’s 
Chinese quarter.  He was arrested for “disturbing the peace,” banished a second a time, 
                                                
84 See M1D1 Catalogue, Mongolian National Archives. 
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and again secreted his way back across the border.  In 1828 he was brought to the trade 
supervisor’s yamen for a special interrogation.  Finally, under torture, he confessed to a 
larger conspiracy: rich benefactors in Beijing had put him up to delivering the petition.  
These four merchants, led by one Zhang Xi, were bullish about farmland in Outer 
Mongolia.  The petition was theirs; Gao Yumei was only the messenger.85   
In a report to the emperor, the amban accused Gao Yumei of feigning ignorance 
of a fundamental law: Han homesteading in Mongolia was prohibited.  Given Khüree’s 
proximity to the Russian border, discipline and order were necessary: it was 
“unacceptable” to have undocumented Chinese from the interior wandering about on the 
Mongol steppe.  In this case, however, Gao Yumei was already 70 years old, and 
seemingly had lost his senses, so it was decided to simply banish him once more to his 
home county.  This time, the governor of Shanxi was warned to keep him under better 
control. The area he proposed for farming was called Tulber, just west of Khüree under 
the jurisdiction of Uliasutai.  While farming had once been permitted there, it had since 
been discontinued.  As the trade supervisor explained in his report to the amban in 
Khüree, farming was also licensed in four other regions, all to the north of Khüree.  From 
this it would appear that the problem was not farming in Mongolia per se, but 
unauthorized farming.86 
While never on a scale comparable to Inner Mongolia, Chinese homesteading was, 
in fact, legalized in certain parts of Outer Mongolia.  These farmers came to be identified 
and regulated through licenses, supervised by the ambans, and confined to segregated 
                                                
85 M1D1-3874.27 (DG8.6.4). 
86 Ibid. 
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territories.   The first scheme for opening up farmland to undocumented Chinese migrants 
in Outer Mongolia can be dated to 1775 (QL40) at the latest, when the Ambans’ Office 
proposed legalizing their status and granting farmland north of Khüree.87  All those 
selected were registered, with the name of each farmer kept in one record book locally, 
and in another sent to the Lifanyuan.  They were not altogether welcome.  In 1801, the 
local banner jasaγ proposed that the number of farming families be reduced to ten 
households, with the remaining “made to return back to their homelands.”88  He no longer 
wished to support them: “migrant Chinese farmers have become many, without any 
benefit to pasturing animals.”  
In 1803, in response to a rise in “vagrancy” in Khüree, the imperial representative 
and the emperor cleared room for Chinese refugees to open land north of Khüree, and 
banner and monastic authorities agreed to provide pastureland in four locations: Ibeng, 
Burgaltai, Kiseyetu, and Usu Seir.89  They were thereafter put under the joint supervision 
of the Trade Inspector’s office, banner authorities, and the Šangjotba’s office, which 
managed monastic lands.  All Chinese farmers were issued permits (Ma: temgetu bithe) 
and identification placards for their homes (Ma: men pai).  The trade supervisor 
personally toured the farming villages each year.90  During the inspection, the men pai 
                                                
87 Military farms had been established at Khobdo and Uliasutai during the Dzungar campaigns. 
88 M1D1-3350.5 (JQ6.5.14). 
89Li Yushu, Waimeng zhengjiao zhidu kao, 80.  Ibeng and Burgaltai fell under the Jebtsundamba’s 
jurisdiction, while Kesiyetu fell under that of the western Namjildorji and Usu Sair under the eastern 
Namjildorji; these two noblemen named Namjildorji are not to be confused.  M1D1-3811.1a (DG5.9). 
90 In 1822, these were led by jaisang lama Jambala, jalan Gombudorji, and taiji Dondob, arranged with the 
help of the aimaγ chief, Cedendorji, the two jasaks Namjaldorji, and the Office of the Šangjotba. See 
M1D1-3744.1a (DG2.10) and  M1D1-3744.3a (DG2.8.21).  On the inspections of 1825, see M1D1-3811.1a 
(DG5.9). 
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were collected and examined and new ones issued with the help of the Chinese village 
heads (Ma: gašan i irgen data).  When making rounds, the banner authorities were to 
ensure prohibitions were “thoroughly understood by both Chinese and Mongols.”  
Mongols heard the law decreed in Mongol, Chinese heard it in Chinese, and a written 
proclamation was issued to the village leaders and hung from the gates of the village 
walls.  the inspections completed, a four-volume Chinese-language register (one for each 
community) was compiled for all the farmers then sent to the Ambans’ Office, then 
forwarded to the Lifanyuan.91   
Expansion was prohibited.  The villages were themselves responsible for ensuring 
that no unregistered Chinese entered the community, and were expected to arrest and 
report illegals to the Ambans’ Office.  Local soldiers were also called to inspect the 
villages.  They were on alert for four types of criminals: 1) migrants with expired or 
forged permits; 2) undocumented relatives of legitimate farmers; 3) undocumented 
homesteaders (who “erected homes and courtyards, lorded over Mongols and ravished? 
them with misdeeds”); and 4) Mongols who sheltered undocumented homesteaders. If 
they discovered the house of an unlicensed farmer, they were to raze it immediately.  
Each year, the top banner and monastic authorities issued sworn and sealed statements 
(Ma: akdulara doron gidaha bithe) to the trade supervisor’s office that no unlicensed 
Chinese were in the area.92   
The harshness of the land and living conditions led to high attrition rates.  In 1821 
there were altogether 200 Han farmers.  In 1822 inspectors found that twenty-nine 
                                                
91 M1D1-3811.1a (DG5.9). 
92 M1D1-3744.2a (DG2.8.10). 
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farmers had died or “returned home” (Ma: da susu de mariha) in the intervening year.  
By 1823, the number of registered farmers had slipped to 143, and by 1824 the 
population was down to 139.  The population had plunged 30% in three years.  Yet the 
concern of the inspecting troops and the trade supervisor’s office was not the declining 
yields or households: it was the search for  “Chinese that live aimlessly as vagrants and 
secretly hide away” amongst the villagers and local Mongols; their basic aim was to 
maintain segregation.  If anything, local herders and banner authorities felt the farmers to 
be too many, and a rash of complaints provoked a formal investigation by the Amban’s 
Office in 1824.93  Banner authorities petitioned to have the farmers removed and 
repatriated to the Chinese interior.  The amban suggested taking it more slowly: the 
harvest was coming, and depriving the farmers of their livelihood could cause trouble.94  
The Lifanyuan likewise recommended caution to avoid unnecessary quarrels.  The 
emperor needed a solution that “benefited both Mongols and Chinese” and was thus “in 
accord with the compassionate and lofty intentions of the emperor for Mongols and 
Chinese.”95  
The drive to keep Mongols and Chinese separate, and the costs of enforcing 
segregation, inspired efforts to mark clearer territorial boundaries between the two.  Yet 
complaints continued into 1826, when a jurisdictional dispute between banner and 
monastic authorities broke out: neither wanted to bear the costs of licensing, inspecting, 
                                                
93 Li Yushu, Waimeng zhengjiao zhidu kao, 80. 
94 M1D1-3350.16 (JQ6.3.26). 
95 M1D1-3350.5 (JQ6.5.14). 
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and policing.96  That year, the Šangjotba’s office requested that the imperial 
representative help delineate the exact borders of all territories the Chinese farmers 
resided.  Complicating the matter was that, by imperial decree, the farmer’s rent was paid 
to the treasury of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu.  Thus profits went strictly to the Buddhist 
establishment, leaving the banners footing the bill for provisioning the peace.   While the 
banners were required to inspect the farmers monthly, to cut costs and make the 
arrangement more equitable, the two responsible jasaγs, both named Namjildorji, 
proposed that inspections be made annual and conducted in tandem with ecclesiastical 
authorities.   
Spurred by similar pressures in 1805, the amban had overseen a general survey of 
all bannerland in Tusiyetu Han aimaγ.  Boundaries were “newly revised and established” 
and maps and registers produced for each banner.  According to the 1805 maps, the farms 
were spread over three banners: that of Prince Cedendorji, and two under jasaγs named 
Namjildorji. Thus during the 1826 inspection tour, the trade supervisor had a separate 
charge: finalize “which jasaγ’s banner territory the farmland settled by Chinese ultimately 
should be,” as well as exact boundaries of pastureland.  He ultimately concluded that 
“although the lands of Ibeng and Burgaltai were indeed their banner territory, none of 
their subject peoples lived there.”  Instead, monastic serfs (šabi) lived in the adjacent 
                                                
96 Even the inspection tours cost money, and required pressing supplies and services from the postal 
stations along the Khüree-Kiakhta route, with Ibeng was located near Postal Station Four (duici 
aruganggatu giyamun).  Supplies for the postal stations were taken from nearby bannermen and monastic 
šabi.  Before the trade supervisor’s tour, each postal station required fifteen fresh horses, four properly 
saddled camels, six cavalry guards, three gers, one tent, and food.  M1D1-3855.1a (DG7.9). 
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pastures.  Ultimately, the Amban’s office agreed to a proposal to let banner and Buddhist 
authorities have more equal share in the costs.97    
Fuel 
A similar overriding concern with identifying and segregating illegal migrants 
dominated firewood collecting.  Herders traditionally used two types of fuel for cooking 
and heat: animal dung (Mo: arγal) and charcoal.  Compared to arγal, firewood was 
relatively scarce and expensive.  Yet it was also in high demand: a single banner 
collected as much as 30,460 pieces of firewood in tax each year.98  From the 1820s on, as 
the cities expanded, so too did the black market for firewood around the major trading 
hubs of Kiakhta and Khüree.  Forests, as fuel sources, tended to attract migrants, and it 
forced the state to decide: should migrant wood collectors be arrested or licensed? 
In most cases, such woodcutters were simply arrested.  Authorities first alerted the 
Ambans Office to the problem in 1825 in the banner of prince (gung) Mingjuor, just 
outside of Khüree.  That winter, four unlicensed Chinese had trespassed on his banner, 
erected “one-room village houses” (Ma: emu giyalan baising boo), and were cutting 
down trees, building wood carts, and selling liquor.  He “repeatedly tried to drive them 
                                                
97 M1D1-3855.2 (DG7.1.11).  In 1805, in the language used to describe the event by banner officials of the 
Namjildorjis, the area “became territory of the two banners” (Ma: juwe gūsai nukte obume) and was 
thereafter to be administered as such.    According the maps and registers, as well as the locations of the 
cairn erected following the general survey, Ibeng belonged unequivocally to jasak dergi Namjildorji’s 
banner.  Burgaltai Bira was a more complicated case, as it cut through borderlands of cin wang Cedendorji 
and jasak wargi Namjildorji.  The investigator found that the border was not clear locally or from names 
used at the scene, but a careful examination of the locations of cairn and the description of the border in the 
1805 survey found that the entirety of the Burgaltai River region occupied by Chinese farmers belonged to 
the western Namjildorji, not wang Cedendorji.    
98 Farquhar, “The Ch’ing Administration of Mongolia Up to the Nineteenth Century,” 150.  The Ambans’ 
Office in Khüree pressed altogether fifty silver taels of silver annually from Tusiyetu Han and Cecen Han 
aimaγ and monastic lands for its fuel expenses.  In 1794 (QL59), they were able to save 32.16 taels, and in 
1795 (QL60), they were able to take in 59.56 silver taels for charcoal and firewood, yielding a total 91.72 
taels currently in the fund. Their estimated purchases for the upcoming year were estimated to be 37.10 
taels, leaving 54.62 in storage.  M1D1-3271.8 (JQ1.1). 
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away,” but no avail: they were in his banner to stay.  The league chief, prince 
Sandubmingjuor, referred the matter to the Amban’s Office, which assigned the case to 
the trade supervisor.  Officers, sentries, and Chinese bailiffs (Ma: bošokū, manaci, 
undeci,) were dispatched to the scene.99  Several months later, in 1826, the troops 
managed to detain five men.100  Their housed were razed, and they were sent under guard 
to Khüree for sentencing.  According to their confessions, they had come to the forests 
north of Khüree to collect “a little wood” and to build ox carts.101  Two of the poachers, 
Jia Zhen and Yue Yongzai, were registered wood artisans; they were sentenced to be 
caned twenty times and handed over to the Chinese quarter-master, Zhang Zhaoji.  The 
other three men were repatriated to their home counties.102  
 Two year later, in 1828, five whole teams of wood poachers, led by unlicensed 
migrants from Shanxi were discovered and arrested in Sandubmingjuor’s own banner.103  
Yet their crime extended beyond trespassing. Sandubmingjuor complained not only had 
they illegally settled in his banner, but that the very act of logging trees violated his 
proprietorship over the land.  Again, the trade supervisor took charge and dispatched 
armed police to the scene, this time led by the Chinese bailiff Gao Zhang, and one 
Mongol guardsman, Namjil, who corralled the poachers, arrested them, and took their 
                                                
99 M1D1-3833.26a (DG6.1.12). 
100 Their names were Giya Jen (Jia Zhen), Yuwei Yong Dzai (Yue Yongzai), Wang Lu Gi (Wang Luji), Du 
Jung Ling (Du Zhongling), and Jang Ting De (Zhang Tingde). 
101 M1D1-3833.23a (DG6.3.20). The document names three locations within the banner where illicit 
logging took place: Gūngtu, Hargana, and Burinbulak. 
102 M1D1-3833.27a (DG6.4.6). 
103 They were Chinese in an administrative sense.  Nine of the captured loggers were Chinese with Mongol 
names: Xiao Liao (“Dumbedu”), Yu Haopiao (“Šajindalai”), Qin Shao (“Ulangdai”), Kang Bao 
(“Bujantu”), Lan Shige (“Dalai”), Wang Xuan (“Bayartu”), Fan Ji (“Bayan”), Wu Qiang (“Buyantu”), and 
Bai Tong (“Arbing”). 
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names and identification.  According to the testimony of one poacher, Xiao Liao (also 
known as “Dumbedu”), they had ventured to Sandubmingjurdorji’s banner to try their 
hand at forestry because they were destitute (Ma: fungsan yadahūn); he had no intention 
of permanently settling there.  Their crime, however, merited serious punishment: they 
were sentenced to be whipped, then caned, then banished back to the interior.104  
Yet, as the problem grew, authorities shifted tactics began to register and license 
wood collectors.  Similar outbreaks of poaching confronted the trade supervisor in 
Kiakhta.  In 1828, after reports of rampant wood poaching around Kiakhta surfaced, the 
ambans’ office in Khüree ordered the trade supervisor to inspect the identities of all 
“vagrant Chinese and Mongols” logging in the Logar Hiya area, south of Kiakhta, where 
Mongol migrants had formed a small community as wood collectors.105  Later reports 
revealed the laborers to be working for Chinese entrepreneurs who had illegally made 
homes and erected enclosures (Ma: boo hashan ilibuha) in the area.  These illegal 
settlements were ordered to be razed immediately.106   
Mass arrests, however, proved impracticable.  At first, the amban mandated the 
authorities to arrest everyone, clear away the camps, and make the area “pure” (Ma: 
bolgo; Mo; ariγun) – a stringent call for social and environmental order, as we shall see 
in Chapter 4.  Yet the sheer number of people congregated at Logar Hiya suggested the 
need for more flexibility: these were not all single men and vagrants, but whole families 
working as woodcutters. Many of the people on site were so poor they lacked even the ox 
                                                
104 M1D1-3874.12b (DG8.3.23). 
105 M1D1-3874.13a (DG8.11.21). 
106 M1D1-3913.9a (DG9.1.20). 
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carts to leave.107  When troops proved incapable of dispersing the crowd, the local jasaγ, 
Namjildorji, decided to halt their campaign and “keep an eye on the matter” (Ma: yasa 
tuwame) through the winter and proposed waging a mop-up campaign the following 
spring; the amban endorsed the plan as an expedient measure.108  The wood-collectors 
were allowed to stay.  In the meantime, he demanded registers of the identities of all 
implicated “Mongol men and women” (Ma: haha hehe monggoso): to properly manage 
the situation, he needed the names, ages, household sizes and home jurisdictions of every 
individual on the scene.  Policing was also stepped up: no further outsiders to be allowed 
in: not “lamas nor laymen, men nor women, [Mongol banner] people nor Chinese 
people” (Ma: ba ba i lama, kara, haha, hehe, urse, irgese).109  When the census was 
complete, a register was compiled in Manchu, and forwarded to the amban and the 
emperor in Beijing. 
Logar Hiya, however, was only one of several new logging sites near Kiakhta.  
There was an additional community of fourteen poachers active to the southwest of the 
town, at Bayangbulak, on the southern bank of the Boora River.  All of these poachers 
were Chinese men known to be “mixed up living with Mongol women.”  Given its 
proximity to the Russian border, the amban explained, it was entirely “improper to have a 
profusion…of Mongol and Chinese firewood and charcoal sellers in the area.”  When, 
again, the trade supervisor and jasaγ Namjildorji took charge, no demonstrated no 
leniency.  To head off criticism that they were providing a necessary service to the city, 
                                                
107 M1D1-3874.9b (DG8.12.15). 
108 M1D1-3913.9a (DG9.1.20). 
109 M1D1-3913.9b (DG9.1.29).  Urse and irgese here are juxtaposed.  
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the trade supervisor emphasized that a group of Mongol brothers already served the town 
with charcoal, and they had official permission.110  All the wood poachers were thus 
tracked down and arrested.111    
Poaching was likewise a problem in the military game parks outside Khüree, 
which were treated with the same severity as borderland surrounding Kiakhta.  Illegal 
logging was prohibited in both.112  All wood that entered the town had to be certified that 
it had not come from the restricted game parks.  Throughout the 1820s, however, illegal 
logging became an increasingly serious problem.  In 1830, the banner jasaγ wang 
Nasunbatu113 reported that his policemen had detained a team of two Mongols, with 
altogether sixty carts of wood, leaving the protected hunting grounds with stolen wood.  
An additional twenty carts filled with wood were latter found on a separate logging team. 
All those accused of logging pleaded that they were transporters; they had never chopped 
down trees themselves.  Finally, one man admitted to logging twenty birch trees with his 
partner.  He maintained, however, that he had only eight carts, not sixty, and he disputed 
that he had even been in the protected park.  The driver of the twenty separate carts 
likewise claimed he had never chopped down any trees: he had only bought while on the 
wood banks of the Narin River from a Chinese merchant named “Mookuo.”  When 
detained, the merchant pleaded that he was on commission: Lobsangcultem, a high-
                                                
110 M1D1-3874.9b (DG8.12.15). 
111 M1D1-3913.9a (DG9.1.20). 
112 M1D1-4144.3 (DG10.8). 
113 Nasunbatu (Ch: ĮĬ]9), dolo jun wang.  Jasaγ for the center-right banner of Tusiyetu Han aimaγ.  
Fifth generation descendant of Sidisili (Ch: ĐÝ., enfeoffed 1691).  Assumed rank DG19, passed on 
rank to his son, Wacirbatzar in DG30 (1839-1850). Bao Wenhan et al, Menggu huibu wanggong biaozhuan, 
426; Jin Hai et al, Qingdai menggu zhi, 88. 
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ranking lama (Ma: da lama) had paid for “several thousands [pieces of] fence wood,” for 
use at his monastery, and he had only sold the surplus wood to a contact passing through 
the restricted area.  An investigation ensued into the ultimate veracity of each of these 
reports and whether or not Lobsangcultem had obtained his wood with the proper permit 
(Ma: temgetu).114 
That year, a midlevel official at the Amban’s office,115 Pungcukdorji, took matters 
into his own hands and began licensing logging and wood collection from designated 
parts of the park.116  The scheme involved allowing properly vetted Chinese loggers 
access to the restricted area for a year and a half.  When time limit expired, he planned to 
once again remove loggers from the park and “make the land pure.”117  In a gesture of 
magnanimity, no revenue was to be extracted from the licensing fees: the banner had 
been impoverished by natural disasters (Ma: gashan tušafi yadahūraha), and earnings 
were thus to be channeled back to the local community. 1900 carts of “coarse” (muwa) 
wood and 400 carts of wood were thus “chopped down and ravaged” (Ma: sacime 
gasihiyabuha) that spring.  Confronted with a choice between licensing woodcutters and 
protecting the military game park, however, the court ultimately decided to stand by the 
military: Pungcukdorji and all the guardsmen were punished with 40 lashes each for 
corruption.118  The more important the jurisdiction, and the more disruptive the activity of 
woodcutters, the louder the calls were for a strong top-down intervention.   
                                                
114 M1D1-4144.18a (DG20.10).  
115 His rank was Judge at the Office of the Seal (Ma: doron i baita be icihiyara jakirokci). 
116 The locations were the south side of Burgaltai, Bayangkükui, and Aru Übere Tarbagatai. 
117 The problem of parks and “purity” is discussed at length in Chapter 4.  See below. 
118 M1D1-4144.2a (DG10.10.7). 
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Deer Horn 
 
As with logging, a strong impetus for instituting the licensing scheme for deer 
horn was the nearby game parks, where poaching was a constant problem.  Deer horn 
was big business, by far the most valuable commodity in Mongolia by weight. As the 
price of elk horn rose, so too did the poaching problem: in 1841, poachers could sell a 
large set of elk horns for 180 bricks of tea – enough tea to fill thirty-five ox carts, a full 
caravan.119  Licensing schemes were applied to the deer horn trade after the late 1820s; 
like in farmland and forestry, they functioned to identify participants in the market and 
provide a mechanism for oversight and control.120  
According to the law, “For all Mongol people, when coming to the market in 
Khuree to engage in trade, if there is a person selling elk-horns, that person must be 
brought to the trade supervisor’s office by the relevant Chinese [buyer] for registration.  
Every month a report shall be prepared for the ambans.  This is a strict mandate for all 
merchant houses.”121  It was enforced using both banner authorities and the trade 
supervisor’s office, with “all Mongol people coming to Khüree to trade” made aware of 
                                                
119 M1D1-4166.15a (DG21.12.28).  The man who shot the deer, Pungcuk, originally registered the horns to 
a legal location, but was later blackmailed by his friend, Darmajab, who threatened to reveal his secret, into 
giving up his prize.  Their ensuing argument led to the investigation.  Pungcuk later testified that he went 
out hunting with taiji Darmajab in their banner’s west region at a place called Sonin Hanggai.  On the road 
there, at the east side of noyan alin, near the forest of Bayanggon, they spotted a deer and shot it with a 
musket.  Though it was the first time Pungcuk and Darmajab had committed such an act, the amban’s 
office saw the crime as “truly detestable” (Ma: yala ubiyacuka) and “exceedingly brazen” (Ma: jaci fahū 
amba), and so levied heavy punishments on the men.  Pungcuk, who took responsibility for thinking up the 
crime, was removed from his post and whipped eighty times, and taiji Darmajab was fined five-ninths of 
his livestock and the 180 bricks of tea were confiscated.   
120 Deer horn was not always the precious commodity it would become: the Shengjing tongzhi makes note 
of the antler as a valuable part of the elk (Ch: ȪȨ), but includes it amongst the full range of other parts 
(such as tail and other cuts) of equal importance (it also notes the historical connection between 
Shengjing’s deer and those of the ancient Fu Yu).Qinding shengjing tongzhi 27.30a. 
121 M1D1-3697.1 (JQ25.5.13).   
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the regulation.  It was assumed, as the directive for keeping registers stated, that the 
market would only have “Mongol sellers” (Ma: uncaha monggoso) and “Chinese buyers” 
(Ma: udaha irgese).122   
Yet the situation was not so clear-cut: it is clear from the archival evidence that 
marketplace and ethnic identities did not overlap so neatly.  Memorializing on the 
problem in 1826, the amban’s office conceded that deer horn was not always hunted by 
the people who submitted it; they bought it on the black market without knowledge of 
where the deer horns actually came from.123  Registering sales inserted the state, and the 
trade supervisor’s office in particular, into this market in new ways. The registration 
book, kept in either Manchu or Chinese, listed the names of all buyers, buyers’ merchant 
houses, sellers, their home banner or otuγ, the date of the transaction, the number of 
antlers sold, its price (tallied in bricks of tea), the place the animal was killed, and the 
name of a guarantor for the transaction, who could vouch for the information.   
The registers reveal how deer horn prices shot up during the 1820s.  In the 
twenty-one-day span between May 31, 1820 and June 20, 1820, the trade supervisor’s 
office registered the sale of thirty-three sets of deer horns.  Their average value was 
ninety bricks of tea, though the range in prices varied from eleven to 165 tea bricks per 
pair.124   
Figure 39: Merchant Houses in the Deer Horn Trade, 1820 
 
                                                
122 M1D1-4320.54 (DG27.12.20). 
123 M1D1-3822.23 (DG6.4.20). 
124 M1D1-3697.2 (JQ25.4.28), M1D1-3697.1 (JQ25.5.13). 
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Merchant House 
Racks of 
Deer horn 
purchased 
Bricks 
of Tea 
Paid 
Average 
Price per 
Rack  
(in tea) 
Market 
share 
(volume) 
Market 
share 
(value) 
Linshengyuan  (Ñ) 10 1076 107.6 30% 36% 
Xinglongyong (öĻ¡) 7 839 119.9 21% 28% 
Tianchunyong (D¡) 4 331 82.8 12% 11% 
Wanchangrong (ü`) 2 212 106.0 6% 7% 
Yongrongsheng (¡øÑ) 2 165 82.5 6% 6% 
Guangheyuan (e+­) 1 138 138.0 3% 5% 
Fushunyuan (lń) 1 100 100.0 3% 3% 
Wanshenglong (üÑĻ) 4 82 20.5 12% 3% 
Yuanshunlong (ńĻ) 2 36 18.0 6% 1% 
TOTAL 33 2979    
 
By 1831, the price and volume of deer horn had risen considerably, while the 
number of houses engaged in the trade was whittled down to three: Linshengyuan (Ch: Ú
ń(), Xinglongyong (Ch: Ɔǻô), Tianchunyong (Ch: gÌô).  In eighty-three days 
between May 14 and August 10, a total of fifty-nine pairs of deer horns were sold in 
exchange for 6,259 bricks of tea (see Figure 40).125  
Figure 40: Merchant Houses in the Deer Horn Trade, 1831 
 
Merchant House  
Racks of 
Deer horn 
purchased 
Bricks 
of Tea 
Paid 
Market 
share 
(volume) 
Market 
share 
(value) 
Linshengyuan  (Ñ) 39 4640 66% 74% 
Xinglongyong (öĻ¡) 15 1173 25% 19% 
Tianchunyong (D¡) 5 446 8% 7% 
  
                                                
125 Each of these three houses took on Mongol names.  They were known, respectively, as the merchant 
houses of Buyandalai, Sanggaidalai, and Bayandorji. 
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In 1820 the average rack of deer horn sold for 90 bricks of tea, but in 1831 sold 
for 106 bricks (with prices ranging from 20-202 bricks of tea per pair).  The rising prices 
may have been a result of shrinking supplies, as the deer became increasingly scarce.  An 
average day in 1820 brought in 1.65 antler racks; in 1831 the figure was .71 racks per day 
for the year, and .85 racks per day in the high season.  The average per diem haul had 
dropped by half.126    
Rising prices for deer horn encouraged the state to license production in Xinjiang 
and Manchuria as well, as the Qing intervention in Mongolian deer horn trade during the 
1820s and 1830s was mirrored by similar efforts in throughout Qing Inner Asia.127  In 
Manchuria, where a general prohibition on deer horn trade was in place, an investigation 
in 1827 revealed that Korean poachers were smuggling deer horn across the border, 
Chinese merchants were buying it up, and Manchu border patrols had been taking bribes 
for “several years” from the smugglers.128  After an initial crackdown, the court moved 
towards commercial licensing for bannermen hunters.  Smugglers and poachers should be 
                                                
126 M1D1-3935.3 (DG11.12.14).  The record book for all sales for the year, kept in Manchu, listed a total of 
fifty-two transactions involving fifty-nine pairs of antlers. Thirty (51%) pairs of antlers came from 
Dorjirabdan’s banner, five (8%) from the that of the amban beise, sixteen (27%) from jasaγ Cerindorji’s 
banner, and eight (14%) from various monastic otok. 
127 Unlike ginseng and precious furs, deer horn was not a commodity limited to the northern frontiers.  In 
the Qianlong period, it was a famous local speciality in provinces such as Guangxi, Guangdong, and 
Yunnan as well.127  In 1779, Chinese poachers were crossing into tusi (Ch: ZK) land from the Lan Xang 
region (Ch: @½, overlapping with northern Laos) to collect elephant tusks, rhinoceros horn, deer horn, 
and peacock feathers; the leader of the party, Chen Wenqing, had been caught four times previously by 
authorities, and was sentenced to exile in the far north illegal crossing borders and running a blackmarket; 
authorities in Guangxi, Guangdong, Sichuan, and Guizhou were alerted of the new precedent. Gaozong 
shilu, 1080: 509a. 
128Xuanzong shilu, 123: 1062a-b, 126: 1099b-1100a, 131: 1178a-b. 
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kept out, but Manchus should have better access to merchants within their assigned 
territory.129  
The discussion of this issue made it clear that in Manchuria, the opening of deer 
horn trade to commercial licensing was meant to strengthen, not usurp, the position of 
Manchu bannermen.  In 1831, Fujun, a minister in the Lifanyuan who in 1830 had served 
as acting military governor of Mukden, was the first to memorialize on allowing 
bannermen to participate in the trade.  Crackdowns on deer horn merchants in Shengjing 
were keeping away the merchants, and so keeping Jilin bannermen out of the game.  
Fujun thus had to convince the emperor that allowing bannermen to hunt for profit was 
good for them, good for the state, and not a threat to discipline:  
 One cannot compare Jilin bannermen to villagers dwelling in the 
Chinese interior (*[Ĵǣ×).  They live along rivers and against 
mountains; they are widely dispersed, with settlements sometimes two 
or three hundred li apart, and sometimes four or five hundred li apart.  
Outside the off-limits hunting grounds and restricted mountains, they 
hunt, practice musketry and horse-riding, and through practice they 
perfect their natures? (Ch: Ŵƅ£¬)130 
 
Licensing, Fujun, reassured the throne, posed no threat to the territorial order.  
Though widely dispersed, Manchuria’s bannermen were nonetheless restricted in how far 
they could travel.  As Fujun wrote, “officers personal conduct roll-calls according to the 
law, and the bannermen are all listed in registers. They do not dare go far.”  Yet because 
the deer in restricted hunting grounds in Mukden had become scarce, Yi Hao was 
pushing through an initiative to curtail the use of muskets and curb the blackmarket in 
medicinal horn.  As a result, “merchants have their feet bound, and bannerman have 
                                                
129 Xuanzong shilu, 202: 1171a-b. 
130 Xuanzong shilu, 202: 1171a. 
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nowhere to sell [deer horn]. They no longer study musketry, and they do not have enough 
to live on.”131   His proposal was to loosen the laws on desertion and the deer-horn trade.  
It was a radical idea: if bannermen were freed to hunt deer for profit, then it would both 
enrich them and sharpen their martial skills. 
Licensing deer horn trade had an altogether different function in Xinjiang’s Ili 
valley, where Military Governor Teišunboo (Ch: ěȎ ) proposed a new scheme in 
1833.  Here, licensing was used not to enrich bannermen, but to help finance local 
waterworks.  As in Manchuria, the trade was originally completely prohibited. In 1834, 
the Grand Council endorsed the plan on grounds that “many in the four Mongol aimaγ 
survive by hunting (Ch: ±ĚĎå),” and “from time to time they take the deer horn they 
captured and sell it in town.”  The danger to the Mongol way of life was not hunting, but 
Chinese merchants that haphazardly travelled into the aimaγ.  Given that Teišunboo’s 
plan called for Mongols to sell their product in town, and restricted the movement of 
merchants, the plan was harmless.132  
Smuggling and poaching dogged all three frontiers, and in all three licensing was 
the solution.  It entailed consolidating borders, maintaining differences, and keeping the 
imperial peace.  Yet important differences emerge from the three cases: in Mongolia, the 
court aimed to stem poaching and monitor the market; in Manchuria, the hope was to 
support impoverished banner troops; in Xinjiang, the key concern was drumming up tax 
revenue.  Yet in all three cases, at least ideologically, the court was unwilling to part from 
the multiethnic ideal: Mongols and Manchus were to keep their distinctive and protected 
                                                
131 Xuanzong shilu, 202: 1171a. 
132 Xuanzong shilu, 249: 761a-b. 
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positions in the empire.  The quick comparison with Manchuria and Xinjiang underlines 
the importance of understanding institutions within their context: commercial licensing 
had a different significance in each frontier. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In Mongolia, as this chapter has argued, commercial licensing over trade and 
production was designed to reinforce imperial order in the face of rapid economic 
changes during the early nineteenth century.  The market was bringing disparate peoples 
together in new ways, and stresses in the pastoral economy threatened inherited means of 
making a living.  Faced with drought and falling livestock populations, many turned to 
new livelihoods, such as gathering firewood or participating in trade caravans.  At the 
same time, infrastructure and institutions established under Qing rule, such as the 
highway system and travel permits, fostered an unprecedented integration of the Mongol 
frontier with the Chinese metropole; through Kiakhta, the stability of empire ultimately 
helped integrate Qing markets with Russian and broader global ones as well.  As cross-
jurisdictional movement and exchanges accelerated, so too did state efforts to identify, 
segregate, and control participants.  Licensing, in this sense, was a form of empire 
building: it expanded the reach of the Qing court, while maintaining the ethnic 
distinctions that characterized the greater imperial project.   
Commercial licensing was ultimately one of many responses of the Qing state to 
the challenges posed by the new commercial environment.  As discussed in Chapters 4 
and 5 below, in some contexts, licensing was deemed inappropriate given the nature of 
the land or the impact of the business.  The perceived impact of logging and deer-hunting 
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was limited enough to permit some degree of legalization.  Sometimes, however, as in the 
case of loggers at Logar Hiya, the initial response was more ambiguous: could logging be 
legalized, or, to borrow the language of the documents, should the area instead be made 
“pure”?  The answer hinged on the properties of the commodity itself, the methods of its 
exploitation, and the jurisdiction in which the resource was removed, all of which 
affected the balance between people, product, and place.  In the case of mushroom 
picking, with its unexpectedly dramatic political and environmental consequences, local 
authorities had no doubts: the practice was a disaster for Mongols.  As the next chapter 
discusses, the activity became the focal point of a new campaign to make Mongolia as 
“pure.”  
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Chapter 4: Purity and Mongolia: The Mushroom Crisis 
 
Introduction: In Pursuit of Purity 
 
In 1836, the emperor received an alarming complaint from the amban in Khüree: 
“Mongols and Chinese, lamas and laymen, men and women…are mixed up in chaos”   
(Ma: suwaliyaganjambi).  In some cases, undocumented Chinese migrants brazenly 
trespassed on Mongol lands, and Mongols quietly allowed it to happen.  On other cases, 
the Mongol land itself was changing beneath people’s feet, as increased exploitation of 
resources transformed the very nature of the steppe. The top secular and ecclesiastical 
authorities in Khüree (modern Ulaanbaatar) sent a join petition: let the emperor “bestow 
grace” and unite behind their “plan for purifying the interior of Khüree” (Ma: Kuren i 
dolo bolgo obure arga); they aimed to repatriate undocumented Chinese migrants and 
arrest Mongols who sheltered them.1  In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, 
booming trade with Russia and increased traffic in domestic products like deer horn, 
timber, and steppe mushroom swelled the city with unlicensed peddlers, seasonal 
laborers, beggars, street performers and other illegal “vagrants.”  Segregation laws were 
ignored; the Mongol and Chinese quarters bled into one another.  After 1800, memorials 
streamed into Beijing: remove women from the monasteries; banish Chinese from 
Mongolia; clean out all “filth, manure, bones, and ashes” from the city.  Let Khüree, and 
all of Mongolia, be “pure.”2 
                                                
1 M1D1-4079.57 (DG17).   
2 M1D1-3840.6 (DG7.8.18).  
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To many, it seemed the licensing system was a failure: Mongol authorities were 
simply not enforcing it. In the judgment of the Lifanyuan, “originally there were no 
Chinese self-indulgently and selfishly going to the four Khalkha aimaγ, and there was 
also no rule for making excuses for vagrancy” (Ma: Kalkai duin aiman de daci umai 
irgese gūnin cihai cisui generengge akū, inu umai kanagan arame norome tehengge kooli 
akū).3  Common Mongols, too, tacitly undermined the commercial order: “it has come to 
the point that a great deal of [cases] accumulate of Mongols seeking profit and privately 
giving refugee to Chinese” (Ma: amala ulhiyen i monggoso aisi be kiceme cisui halbume 
bibufi iktambuhai geren labdu de isinafi).4   In 1805 (JQ10), the military governor of 
Uliasutai thus proposed an extreme solution: all Chinese merchants – including licensed 
merchants – should be driven from the four Khalkha aimaγ.  The edict he received in 
response was unambiguous: the law was not the problem, enforcement was.   Illegal 
migrants should be targeted more forcefully: “inside the said territories let unlicensed 
vagrant Chinese be driven out and returned [home]; let not one be sheltered” (harangga 
nuktei dolo temgetu akū norome tehe irgen be baicafi bašame maribufi emke seme 
halbume biburakū obuki).5  Thereafter, the league chiefs were to conduct irregular 
inspections.  Their mandate was twofold: “we should make all banners pure and bring 
profit to common Mongols” (gūsa be bolgo obume fejergi Monggoso de tusa obuci 
acambi).6  
                                                
3 M1D1-3744.7a (DG2.10). 
4 M1D1-3811.4a (DG5.4). 
5 M1D1-3744.7a (DG2.10). 
6 M1D1-3811.4a (DG5.4). 
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Why were Mongols and Chinese, men and women, lamas and laymen “mixed up 
in chaos”?  And what, for that matter, did it mean to be “pure”?   By the early 19th-c. a 
crisis was at hand: the ties between people and their homeland were being cut; Mongols 
were losing their way, and Mongol lands were losing their territorial and constitutional 
integrity.  This chapter argues that the new resource economy and its associated 
environmental problems were at the center of this new sense of dislocation.  Using 
mushroom picking on the eastern steppe as a case study, the chapter documents state 
efforts to contain unlicensed production, repatriate undocumented migrants, and restore 
the steppe to traditional form.   Mushroom picking in Mongolia, unlike licensed 
woodcutting or deer-hunting trade, was wholly illegal.  Though neither as deadly nor as 
lucrative as other restricted activities, mushroom picking, it turns out, was still every bit 
as dangerous for the imperial order.  Unheralded and forgotten, the rush for wild steppe 
mushroom (tricholoma mongolicum) was in fact at the center of a new elaboration of the 
Qing imperial project on the eastern steppe. 
Mushrooms were big business, and each year undocumented Chinese workers 
crossed the border to Mongolia for the summer harvest.  While unlicensed mushroom-
picking began in the 18th century, memorialists denounced the practice only after 1818: 
by then an exploding number of pickers threatened the Mongol “way of life” and 
environment.  They stripped the steppe of mushrooms, removed trees, hunted marmots, 
and fished; still more disturbing, they induced local Mongols to participate in the 
destruction.  The state’s response was “purification,” a drive to repatriate undocumented 
Chinese, investigate Mongol collaborators, and restore the steppe to its ideal form. “Pure” 
Mongolia, like its wild mushrooms, was a Qing product of the early modern economy. 
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On Purity 
 
The vision and practice of “purification” (Ma: bolgo be obu; Mo: ariγun bolγa; 
Ch: žĄ) applied to the Mongolian steppe in the early nineteenth century was congruent 
with an order previously mandated for jurisdictions of exceptional imperial importance – 
such as game parks, holy mountains, and gold mines – where the court prohibited any 
form of unauthorized human intrusion.  In the years 1820-1840, against the backdrop of 
rampant poaching, all of Qing Mongolia became such space: untouched, hallowed 
ground.  Crucially, control over territory and natural objects required control of human 
subjects; indeed, for those who experienced it, the most insidious aspect of the resource 
economy was neither the exploitation of the land, nor the coming of undocumented 
migrants, but the fact that Mongols themselves proved willing accomplices in the 
enterprise of their own disappropriation.  That is to say, Mongol subjects were acting no 
different than Chinese mushroom pickers.  As Anna Tsing argued of modern resource 
frontiers, “the activity of the frontier is to make human subjects as well as natural 
objects.”7  The court’s project in nineteenth-century Mongolia was act against this 
activity: to separate, clarify, and institutionalize the Mongol “way of life” as distinct from 
the Chinese.  Only then could Mongolia be put back together again, in its original 
“purity,” under the protective guardianship of empire. 
Before moving onto a case study of mushroom-picking and a discussion of pure 
places, it is worth first briefly discussing “purity” (Mo: ariγun; Ma: bolgo) in its broader 
Qing and Inner Asian context.  In the Mongol world, “purity,” or ariγun, had long been a 
                                                
7 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, “Natural Resources and Capitalist Frontiers,” Economic and Political Weekly 
38, no. 48 (2003), 5101. 
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cultural touchstone.  Like its Turkic variant, arik, the word was a commonplace in Turko-
Mongol names; famous examples include Ariq Böke (1219-1266), the grandson of 
Chinggis Khan that lost a succession struggle Khubilai, two medieval Mongols rulers of 
Persia, Arghun Aqa (r.1243-1255) and Arighun Khan (r.1284-1291), and the Mogul 
“Arghun dynasty, ” which competed with Babur and his descendants for control of 
Kandahar and Sindh (c.1479-1591).  In the Qing, as today, Ariγun (Arigūn in Manchu) 
was a common element in names for both men and women.8   
The term had a wide semantic field, denoting various ideal forms of order.  The 
Qing Manchu-Mongol dictionary, Han-i araha Manju Monggo gisun-i buleku bithe (Mo: 
Qaγan-u bicigsen Manju Mongγol ügen-ü toil bicig), published in 1708, defined the 
Mongol ariγun and its stated equivalent, the Manchu bolgo, as “1) incorrupt actions and 
unselfish motives; 2) everything being without a blemish and extremely beautiful; or 3) 
clear water” (Ma: yabun hanja. gūnin doosi akū be bolgo sembi. geli yaya jaka icihi akū 
umesi gincihiyan be inu bolgo sembi. jai muke genggiyen be inu bolgo sembi. Mo: 
yabudal cenger, sanaγ-a qobtoγ ügei ji, ariγun kememui, basa aliba yaγum-a ikir ügei 
masi ke ji, mön ariγun kememüi, jici usu tongγalaγ i, mön ariγun kememüi).9  The 
Manchu-Chinese Daqing quanshu gives four characters for the Manchu bolgo (rendered 
“bolho” in the text): qing («, “pure”), jing (©, “clean”), jie (°, “clean”), and xiu (Ú, 
“beautiful”).10  The lexical range of the word, like the English word “clean,” included 
                                                
8 See, for example, NWFZXD 629.1.15.219 (YZ10.1.12).  See Daicing gürün ü dotuγadu yamun u monγol 
bicig un ger ün dangse, 2: 233, for tribute presenter in 1680 named da lama arigūn. 
9 Han-i araha manju monggo gisuni bileku bithe / Qaγan-u bicigsen manju mongγol ügen-ü toil bicig, 6: 
65a (tondo bolgo i hacin). 
10 Daqing quanshu, 6: 8b. 
 217 
moral, physical, and aesthetic dimensions.  A later dictionary, the trilingual Yuzhi 
Manzhu Menggu Hanzi sanhe qieyin Qingwenjian (Ch: kĊ®Èÿ&¯K+Ń«
yĶ), published in 1780, is organized thematically and makes this range explicit (See 
Figure 41).11  While the world invariably signifies “clean,” in context it takes on 
specifically physical, military, or moral meanings.  In its verbal forms, the dictionary an 
even broader range, including Buddhist dimensions: the verb “to abstain or fast” (Ma: 
bolgomimbi), for example, found under “Monks and Priests – Buddha-related” (Ch: Ī
İŇ), denoted “purification” through self-denial (Ch: Ŗ; Mo: ariγulamui).12  
Figure 41: Translations for Manchu word “bolgo” in the Qingwenjian (1780)  
Lexical 
Department  
(İ) Sub-category (Ň) 
Chinese 
translation 
Mongol 
translation 
Text 
location 
Rites 
 
Mopping 
 
jiejing 
°© ariγun 6.40a 
Military Feats 

 
Infantry and Archery 
	 
ganjing 
© ceber 8.47b 
Humanity 
 
Loyalty and Honesty 
o 
qing 
« ariγun 11.62b 
 
The same range for “purity” extended to the Qianlong Pentaglot Dictionary (Ch: 

Ō«yĶ), which gave a standard definition in Tibetan and Uighur as well:13 
                                                
11 Qingwen jian, 6: 40a.  A fourth definition of bolgo, listed under “Humans – sounds,” is given as “tonal 
harmony” (Ch: ŽĄ, Mo: iraγu).  See Qingwenjian, 14: 23b. 
12 Qingwen jian, 19: 3b.  See also bolgombi, “to clean up” (Ch: ö:ǈ; Mo: suγudumui, “to win in 
gambling”) under “Arts – Gambling” (Ch: ·Ɯǡǌ®Ȕ). 
13 Gotai shin bunkan yakukai, no. 2593, 3573, and 5476. 
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Figure 42: Bolgo in the Qianlong Five-Language Dictionary 
Language 
Defintion 1 
(Rites) 
Defintion 2 
(Military Feats) 
Definition 3 
(Humanity) 
Manchu bolgo bolgo bolgo 
Tibetan gdzang, dzang 
ts'uks gdzang, 
ts'ukdzang 
gdzang ma, 
dzangma 
Mongol ariγun ceber, ariγun ariγun 
Uighur arik pakidza sylik arik 
Chinese jiejing () ganjing (©) qing () 
  
While ariγun and bolgo served as consistent translations for one another, Chinese 
translations were more variable.  In dictionaries, the term is often translated as variant of 
qing («) – the very name of the dynasty, though the connection, it seems, was never 
made in texts.14  In texts, it is usually translated as qingjing («©) or suqing (ð«).  The 
former carries strong Buddhist and religious overtones (as in “pure land” [Ch: «:]).  
The latter carries a military meaning, in sense of “mopping up” an area and pacifying it.15  
In contexts in which its aesthetic meaning is primary, as when Tulišen described a 
mountain as “pure and beautiful” (Ma: bolgo saikan), he rendered the Chinese as 
“contending for beauty” (Ch: ÜÚ).16 
                                                
14 Manchu and Mongol documents never translate through “Qing,” they always transliterate the state name 
from Daqing (Ch: fĄ) to Daicing.  In contrast, the state name “Jin” (Ch: Ǧ), used by the Jurchen courts 
of the medieval (1115-1234) and pre-Qing (1616-1636) periods is invariably translated through as “Gold” 
(Ma: aisin; Mo: altan) in Qing documents.  See Schlesinger and High, “Rulers and Rascals,” Central Asia 
Survey 29.3 (2010): 301 n.27.  For a contemporary translation of “Qing” as ariγun, see Enhbayaryn 
Jigmeddorj, Halk-Manjiǐn uls töriǐn hariltsaa (Ulaanbaatar: Mongol uls shinjleh uhaany akademi tuuhiǐn 
hüreelen, 2008), 27. 
15 In Southeast Asia during WWII, the concept of suqing – remembered as “sookching” – was applied as a 
form of ethnic “cleansing” by the Japanese army to extermination campaigns directed at overseas Chinese 
in Malaysia. 
16 Tulišen, Lakcaha jecen de takūraha babe ejehe bithe, 96. 
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The concept was closely associated with the ideals of Qing rule.  As with other 
words identified with the imperial person (dele, Mukden, etc.), the spot at Summer Palace 
where lamas read sutras, called the “pure place” (Ch: «©;), was raised up a notch in 
Qing documents as a sign of respect.17  Likewise, the word was used to describe other 
ideal imperial places, such as the summit of Changbaishan.18  As I make clear below, 
some places thus needed to be more pure than others.  Imperial hunting grounds, holy 
mountains, the borderland with Russia, and other uniquely “important” or “strategic” (Ma: 
oyonggo; Ch: đ) spaces closely associated with the empire, were to be pure.  All forms 
of trespassing were strictly prohibited, and maintaining “purity” was a basic task of 
governance: purity did not just happen; it required vigilance and work.  As the petitions 
to separate “Mongols and Chinese, lamas and laymen, men and women” suggested, the 
interior of Khüree was one such special space.  Registration, segregation, and repatriation 
were the solutions.  It involved, among other activities, registration of intermarried 
couples (see Appendix B), repatriation of undocumented migrants, and, in one case prior 
to emissaries arriving from the Dalai Lama, literally cleaning up the town.  Outside the 
city, on the open steppe, an analogous process was put into effect.  In eastern Mongolia, 
the catalyst for the new mobilization was the mushroom trade. 
 
Mushrooms 
 
                                                
17 NWFZXD 142.514.76 (DG2.10). 
18 See the use of qingjing (Ch: ĄĂ) in the Chinese translation of Umuna’s account to Kangxi of his trip up 
Changbaishan in 1677. Yang Bin, Liubian jilue, in Longjiang sanji (Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin 
chubanshe, 1985), 30. 
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In the summer of 1829, 103 seasonal laborers illegally crossed the border from 
China to Mongolia.  As in previous years, they came in anticipation of the wild 
mushroom harvest – a lucrative but illegal trade.  As they knew border police awaited 
them, they brought protection: fake permits, signed with vermilion ink (the color of the 
emperor), to help pass for legitimate pickers.  The mushroom pickers had no intention of 
getting caught.  Though unarmed, they were ready to defend themselves with the tools of 
their trade: wooden poles, iron spades and hatchets.  Setting off from Chengde in June, 
they arrived in the eastern tip of Outer Mongolia in July.  In Mongolia, the Qing cavalry 
awaited them.   
Map 4: Mushroom Picking Zone, 1820 
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The mushroom pickers, all Han Chinese, braved the journey for mushrooms (Ch: 
mogu Ăû; Mo: mögü; Ma: sence, megu) to sell in the markets of Beijing.  While it is 
possible they collected common field mushrooms (Agaricus campestris) – the wild 
cousin of the modern champignon – it is more probable they came for the Mongolian 
steppe mushroom, tricholoma mongolicum (Ch: ÿ&%Ă,  or%Ă; Mo: talyn tsagaan 
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muug), today one of the rarer mushrooms in the world.19  In the late eighteenth century, 
the customs office in Beijing appraised one catty (approximately .609 kilograms) as equal 
in value to a newly made sable-fur coat.20    
The leader of this particular 1829 picking team leader was one Liu Deshan (Ch: 
 j/; jY).  Born in Zhaoyuan county, Shandong, he left home after his marriage 
prospects fizzled.  He later settled in Chaoyang county, a hard-scrabble frontier of 
Chengde prefecture, where he hired himself out as a petty laborer in the mushroom trade.  
In 1824, with help from Chen Wu (Ch: ĺ
), a clerk from Shandong at the county 
yamen, he became an independent foreman.21  Chen Wu later explained (under torture) 
that finances were tight at the yamen; they had run the office for a year without funds.  So 
for a steep price of one tael per page, he agreed to furnish Liu Deshan with yamen 
letterhead: blank paper pre-sealed with the magistrate’s chop.  Liu pooled together funds 
with a partner and bought seventeen slips, writing on each a vermilion decree: “Give 
these men safe passage to the front-left-wing banner of Cecen Han aimaγ to collect a 
                                                
19 A relative of the matsutake (tricholoma matsutake), the Mongolian steppe mushroom sprouts in late 
summer into thick white bulbs up to eight centimeters high; rarely growing alone, they form fairy rings 
twelve meters across in open pastures. They are fleshy, fine textured, pungent, and famously delicious; 
modern guidebooks even claim they fight cancer. In Mongolia today, rural families near Ulaanbaatar put 
them out to dry for two or three days and eat them roasted with butter or steeped in mutton soup; they use 
them medicinally as a febrifuge.  Tanesaka, Fukata, Okada, and Kinugawa, “Mongoru sōgenni jiseisuru 
tricholoma mongolicum Imai,” Memoirs of the Faculty of Agriculture of Kinki University 26 (1993), 33; 
Mao Xiaolan, Zhongguo daxing zhenjun (Zhengzhou: Henan kexue jishu chanbanshe, 1998), 69. 
20 Customs rates provide only a faint indication of market value, as they were infrequently adjusted. 
Chongwenmen Gate was located on the southwest side of the Beijing city wall.  In the years 1669 (KX8) 
and 1780 (QL45), the mushrooms were taxed at a rate of .402 silver taels per 100 catties, or 
approximately .66 taels per kilo.  By comparison, a new sable fur or a leopard skin coat (Ď) were taxed at 
the same rate, and a catty of sea cucumber – a rare delicacy – was taxed at half the rate. In 1902, the 
customs rate was recorded at .9 taels per 100 catties (about 1.5 taels per kilo) – which was still double the 
sea cucumber rate, but 100 times lower than the rate for low-grade wild ginseng. See Chongwenmen 
shangshui yamen xianxing zeli, v.6.1, 6.2 and 7. 
21 M1D1-3913.10 (DG10.4.16). 
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tribute of mushrooms.” He later hired an educated Mongol lama to translate his Chinese 
text into Mongol, and the forged bilingual permits were complete.22  
By law, undocumented mushroom-pickers were arrested on sight.  Guardsmen 
were posted at the border, and authorities in Chengde, Khüree, and Beijing awaited status 
reports as soon as the summer picking-season began.  In 1828, the year before Liu 
Deshan’s first foray, unlicensed pickers had arrived “in swarms” 300 strong from 
Chifeng (Ch: ĢZ, Ma: Ulan Hada), in the northeast corner of Chengde prefecture.23  
While they had slipped through the border undetected, their camps proved impossible to 
hide.  After scouts spotted them, troops arrived on the scene; two veteran foremen in the 
camp, Hui Wanzong and Ding Weilian (Ch: mĨ), took responsibility and bargained 
for time.24  Not longer after, as one guard later remembered, the mushroom-pickers soon 
began “speaking altogether in Chinese” and formed a mob.  They wielded hatchets and 
clubs, beat the guards off, and managed even to steal four of the patrolmen’s horses.  
After they fled, the guards went hut to hut on foot and razed the pickers’ camp.25   
 A banner-wide manhunt ensued through the autumn of 1828.  The cavalry tracked 
down Hui Wanzong’s men first, though they were only subdued with force, and Ding 
                                                
22 M1D1-3913.5a (DG9.11.15); M1D1-3913.10 (DG10.4.16).  This was not the first corruption case 
involving blank, yamen-sealed paper.  Just four years prior, in 1825 (DG5), twenty fake documents with 
official letter head had been reportedly issued, with twelve put to use.  The previous gūsai amban, 
Nacingga, and yamen authorities in Chaoyang county were punished, and the practice strictly prohibited.  
See M1D1-3913.10 (DG10.4.16). 
23 M1D1-3913.14b (DG9.1?).   
24 M1D1-3913.14b (DG9.1?); M1D1-3913.17a (DG8.11.1).  
25 M1D1-3913.14b (DG9.1?).   
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Weilian’s team was captured soon after.26   Hui Wanzong was sentenced to a harsh 
penalty: three months in the cangue, one hundred strokes with a cane, and banishment 
under guard back to his home county.27  He escaped due to bungling, leading to a second 
manhunt in the spring of 1829.28  Liu Deshan, operating in his own unit, heard of the 
initial raids and managed to cross back across the border undetected.29  His men returned 
to Chengde laden with dried mushrooms.  He later testified that “there was no other 
business” (Ma: gūwa maimai akū ofi) in town, so he prepared to return the following 
season; Hui Wanzong and Ding Weilian braved the return trip as well.30  Humiliated, the 
amban drafted into service bannermen from throughout Outer Mongolia, and the head of 
Cecen Han aimaγ, Artasida, rode to the scene to take charge.31  
 The record says that, indeed, pickers returned – again, “in swarms” – in 1829.  
The border patrol was again outnumbered; Liu Deshan’s men beat them back with rocks, 
kitchen knives, hoes and clubs.  Yet their success proved short-lived, and by September 
19, nearly everyone was arrested, with their camps razed (Ding Weilian managed to 
escape, but Hui Wanzong was again captured32).  Bureaucratic processing began: workers’ 
                                                
26 M1D1-3913.17a (DG8.11.1).  The trade supervisor’s office found his name and home jurisdiction in their 
registers.  He was from Chang’ai county, Shandong (Laizhou prefecture).  In his confession, he testified he 
had migrated from Shandong to the village of Kisiktu, near Chifeng.   
27  M1D1-3913.18a (DG9.5.2).  Two foremen working beneath him wore the cangue for two months.  They 
were named Jiao Shi (Ma: Giyoo Si and Kui Qiufan (Ma: Kui Cio Fan). 
28 He escaped at a place called Zaoniangao.  See M1D1-3913.18a (DG9.5.2) for the extended list of people 
accused of helping him along the way. 
29  M1D1-3913.18a (DG9.5.2). 
30  M1D1-3913.10 (DG10.4.16). 
31  M1D1-3913.5a (DG9.11.15). 
32  M1D1-3913.10 (DG10.4.16). 
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names and home jurisdictions were registered, and forced repatriation ensued.33  Liu 
Deshan and eleven sub-foremen (see Figure 43) were singled out as leaders; all were 
escorted to the Board of Punishments in Beijing for sentencing.  Under torture, everyone 
confessed.  
Figure 43: Arrested Mushroom-Pickers’ Foremen, 1829 
Foreman Age 
Men 
Led 
Province 
of Birth 
Prefecture 
of Birth 
County 
of 
Birth 
Resident 
Prefecture 
Resident 
County 
Resident 
Town 
Li Dengkui 46 13 Henan Zhangde Wunan Chengde Qifeng Shanzuizi 
Li Dengli 49 7 Henan Zhangde Wunan Chengde Qifeng Shanzuizi 
Feng Xiang 45 7 Shanxi Pingding Yu? Chengde Qifeng Šanbutu 
Shen 
Chenglin 49 6 Henan Zhangde Wuzhi Pingquan   
henan 
yingzi 
Dai Han n/a 4 Henan Zhangde Wunan     Chifeng 
Fu Wan n/a 9 Henan Zhangde Wunan     Chifeng 
Zhai 
Laosan n/a 11 Shanxi         Chifeng 
He Laosan n/a 11 Shanxi         Chifeng 
Xing Wan n/a 7   Rehe   Chengde Qifeng Rehe 
Song Duan n/a 3 Zhili Chengde Qifeng     Rehe 
Xing 
Meng'er n/a 7 Zhili Chengde Qifeng     Rehe 
 
That December, the Daoguang emperor issued a special decree.  Illicit mushroom 
picking was  “extremely detestable” (Ma: jaci ubiyada).  The responsible officials were 
cashiered for negligence and incompetence.  Chen Wu was ordered to repay the 
seventeen taels he accepted in bribes, then caned one hundred times and sentenced to 
become a bondservant to a military garrison in Shuntian prefecture, a “somewhat close 
frontier” (Ma: hanciki jecen).  Liu Deshan was also caned one hundred times, but with a 
heavy rod, and exiled for three years.  Hui Wanzong, in contrast, was caned seventy 
                                                
33  M1D1-3913.5a (DG9.11.15). 
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times and exiled half a year.34  On February 14, 1830, the emperor confirmed their 
sentences, and they were dispatched to Shuntian to receive their punishments.35  
Adjudicating the case had taken months.  In part, the delay reflected the 
strangeness of it all: as of 1830, there was still no precedent for dealing with illegal 
mushroom picking.  The phenomenon had taken off too fast.  There were, however, 
analogous crimes.  One precedent was found in prohibitions “leading hired laborers 
across the Great Wall boundary (Ma: jasei tule, lit., “outside the passes”) to pick rhubarb.”  
If the rhubarb-pickers numbered less than ten, then the foreman’s punishment was one 
hundred blows with a cane and a year in exile; if the foreman took more than ten men, the 
punishment was made one notch more severe: a caning followed by three years of exile 
in Ili.  It was by the logic of this decree that a relatively light punishment was handed 
down for Hui Wanzong: his picking team had fewer than ten men.  Significantly, a 
second precedent was found in a prohibition on poaching in imperial “game parks” (Ma: 
aba hoihan).  In such cases, first time offenders wore the cangue for a month; second 
time offenders wore it for two months.36  As repeat offenders, all the arrested mushroom 
pickers were thus ordered to wear the cangue.37 
                                                
34 Hui Wanzong was ordered to receive one-hundred blows, but no hard-labor or exile.  Because he resisted 
arrest, the punishment was stiffened.   M1D1-3913.10 (DG10.4.16).  
35  M1D1-3913.10 (DG10.4.16). 
36  Ibid. 
37 M1D1-3697.29 (JQ25.2.7), M1D1-3697.26 (JQ25.9.13), M1D1-3913.10 (DG10.4.16). The punishments 
were comparable to similar, serious crimes. If a Chinese man swore at the amban he sentence also wore the 
cangue a month, received 100 strokes with the heavy staff, and was banished back to the Chinese interior. 
Likewise if a Chinese man was expelled from Mongolia and returned, he was sentenced to wear the cangue 
in the marketplace for two months, after which he was whipped one-hundred times and expelled again. 
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The analogy with rhubarb picking seems relatively intuitive.  Yet how was 
Mongolia at all analogous to an imperial game park?   The answer lies in a more basic 
question: what was wrong with mushroom picking in the first place?  There is evidence 
of Chinese mushroom pickers in Outer Mongolia as early as 1759.  It was not until 1818, 
however, that any complaints surfaced.38  That year a banner jasaγ, Dasigeleng,39 
reported to the head of Cecen Han aimaγ, Artasida, that undocumented migrants had 
become unmanageable: they were not only picking mushrooms, he explained, but 
engaged in other types of behavior that were problematic:  
Self-indulgently digging holes, cutting down trees, pitching tents, 
planting vegetables, catching fish, and driving off the sheep, goats, 
horses and cattle Mongols live on.   
 
Artasida reported the matter to the Amban’s Office in Khüree, which forwarded the 
report to Beijing.  Without even waiting to receive a response, however, he mobilized 
troops from neighboring banners to “clean up the area.”  The first step was bureaucratic: 
compiling registers of all known mushroom-pickers (442 from Chifeng, 28 from Dolon 
Noor, 42 from Rehe).  The register was forwarded to Artasida, the Ambans Office, and 
(ultimately) Beijing, the governor-general of Zhili, and county-level authorities in 
Chengde.40  In his own jurisdiction, Artasida took responsibility for (and expressed 
                                                
38 In 1759 they were noted for accidentally starting a prairie fire. 
39 Dasigeleng (Ch: ī<), rĀĵ7.  Jasaγ of left wing, front banner of Cecen Han aimaγ.  
Fourth generation descendant of Cebden.  Ascended to rank in QL51, passed rank onto his eldest son 
Dorjibolam in DG1 (1786-1820). Bao Wenhan et al, Menggu huibu wanggong biaozhuan, 165; Jin Hai et al, 
Qingdai menggu zhi, 101. 
40  M1D1-3744.7a (DG2.10), M1D1-3913.20 (DG9.1.19). 
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deepest concern over) collaborating Mongols, and he ordered a special investigation into 
collaborators who harbored migrant Chinese.  None were discovered.41  
New complaints were elaborated four years later, in 1822, when the mushroom 
pickers arrived 1,200 strong, equivalent in size to a military battalion.  The banner jasaγ, 
one Sonomdarjya,42 issued the intitial alarm to Artasida, mobilizing the Ambans Office, 
the Lifanyuan, the imperial court, and county- and provincial-level authorities in Zhili.43  
To get their attention, Sonomdarjya emphasized the most serious complaints: the workers 
degraded the steppe by mowing grass for straw, hunting marmots, fishing, and cutting 
down trees.44  Still worse, the camps were built of wood, straw, mud, and stone – 
suggesting they were built to last.   The mushroom pickers, moreover, were but drifters 
and vagrants: people “without property” (Ma: hethe akū), of whom “not one was 
[originally] from the province of Zhili.”  Most damning, Sonomdarjya complained, was 
that they made it impossible to govern.  They “took over my banner’s pastures.”  He 
reiterated the point (they “lorded over the rivers that Mongols use to herd animals in my 
banner”), or invoked a higher ideal than personal authority: they “took over Mongols’ 
territory” (Ma: Monggosoi nukte ejelefi) and “Mongols’ pastures.”45  The result was that 
the “way of life” (Ma: banjire doro) of his subject Mongols (Ma: fejergi Monggoso) was 
                                                
41  M1D1-3744.8a (DG2.6.27). 
42 Sonomdarjya (Ch: ãĖī», ãĖī»²ļ), rĀħ7.  Jasaγ of the left wing, front 
banner of Cecen Han aimaγ.  Sixth generation descendant of Cebden.  DG2 ascended to rank, passed on to 
his younger brother Erdenitoγtagal in DG24 (1822-1844). Bao Wenhan et al, Menggu huibu wanggong 
biaozhuan, 303; Jin Hai et al, Qingdai menggu zhi, 101. 
43  M1D1-3744.8a (DG2.6.27). 
44  Ibid. 
45  M1D1-3744.7a (DG2.10). 
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under duress.  Yet some Mongols dared now to profit from the arrangement and secretly 
shelter the Chinese.46  Good Mongols lived the honest life of a herder; these Mongols 
acted “blindly” (Ma: balai) and “impulsively” (Ma: gūnin cihai) and knew only the 
“chase for profit” (Ma: aisi be kiceme).47    
State intervention grew ever more involved.  In 1825, a total of 700 mushroom 
pickers braved the prohibition and arrived in Sonomdarjya’s banner.48  More 
reinforcements arrived on the scene: this time, Artasida appointed a “capable, rather high-
ranking official who understands this matter,” Sonomdobcin, to serve as a permanent 
special deputy, tasked solely with solving the mushroom-picking problem and facilitating 
coordination between banner and aimaγ authorities.49  He issued an ultimatum to the 
mushroom-pickers: leave by the start of the eighth lunar month (September 12) or face 
immediate arrest.50  When the appointed day arrived, only two groups, comprised of 
thirteen men, remained behind.51  They were accused of the most serious crimes: using 
mushroom picking as a “pretext” for “settling down as vagrants and thieves,”52 and 
inducing Mongols to “provide shelter” (Ma: halbure bibure) and collaborate.53  While 
these thirteen stragglers were being rounded up, a group of 393 who were being 
                                                
46  Ibid. 
47 Ibid.; M1D13913.14b (DG9.1?). 
48  M1D1-3811.5a (DG5.8.20). 
49  M1D1-3744.7a (DG2.10). 
50  M1D1-3811.4a (DG5.4). 
51 There were ten men under one Chao Wanxiu (from Dolon Noor) and three men under Qing Luosan (from 
Ulan Hada). 
52  M1D1-3811.5a (DG5.8.20). 
53  M1D1-3811.4a (DG5.4). 
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repatriated across banner lines staged a small uprising, subdued their Mongol guards, and 
pitched camp for the winter.54  Sonomdobcin confidently predicted the winter would 
decimate them, and tactically waited for spring.55  In the meantime, he took comfort that 
the workers were confined to the Buhan River area, a “steppe wilderness” (Ma: bigan 
tala) that “Mongols will not use as pastures.”56   His response suggests that the problem 
was less Chinese settlers in Mongol territory per se, than the disturbance to the Mongol 
ways of life and livelihood.   
Sharp contrasts emerge from these official narratives: Chinese and Mongol, pure 
and corrupted, legal and illegal, our territory and yours.   The mushroom pickers’ 
settlements destroyed the environment, upset the territorial order, and corrupted local 
Mongols.  In so doing, their presence violated the historical responsibility of the emperor 
towards his Mongol subjects.  “Purity” meant removing permanent Chinese residents and 
their profit-driven way of life and restoring the environment and proper lines of authority.  
It was also a call to mobilize the banner system and the highest levels of Qing 
government.  
The situation on the ground was not so black-and-white, as the documents 
themselves betray important shades of gray.  Arrested mushroom-pickers contested the 
complaints against them and the basic state narrative.  In the spring of 1826, for example, 
before the authorities took police action on the winter camps, a fresh wave of migrants 
                                                
54  M1D1-3811.5a (DG5.8.20). 
55  M1D1-3833.25a (DG6.1.21).  Tree-ring and stream-flow data from Northeastern Mongolia show that the 
years 1826-1830 were the eighth wettest in the 350 years between 1651 and 2001.  See Pederson et al, 
“Hydrometeorological Reconstructions for Northeastern Mongolia Derived from Tree Rings: 1651–1995,” 
877.  Mongolia experienced particularly devastating blizzards in the winter of 1828-1829. 
56  M1D1-3811.5a (DG5.8.20).  The locations were šereneke kūwangbaci i hotduk and salkitu. 
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arrived, 200 strong.  Scouts discovered them erecting houses and cutting hay along the 
Khalkha River.57  Troops were drafted from throughout the aimaγ,58 and authorities 
issued another ultimatum: leave by August (DG6.7) or face severe consequences.59  The 
foremen pleaded for leniency.  Their statements, as recorded by officers at the scene, 
conceded that they indeed came annually to pick mushrooms – and that they fished, 
chopped down trees, and hunted marmots as well.  Yet they did so only because they 
were poor.   They also admitted that they came without permits.  Yet each year, they 
emphasized, they returned home without any intention of permanently settling down.   
Revealingly, they insisted they had been coming to the banner for years, through 
the rule of three consecutive jasaγs, without ever being harassed.  Only in recent times, 
under the rule of Sonomdarjya, were they under attack.  They returned each summer 
because they “had no faith in those Mongols” (Ma: tere monggoso be akdarakū jalin) 
who razed their camps: they were not being sincere.  They never mixed with “Mongol 
herding groups” (Ma: monggo falga).  They only stayed behind because their oxen were 
sick and starving.  All these facts “local Mongols know well” (Ma: ere ba i monggoso inu 
getuken sambi).60  Their historical memory was the opposite from the official narrative: 
they had been part of the landscape for generations.  Yet their pleas fell on deaf ears.  On 
                                                
57 Listed men included Co Sii, Wang U, He Ju Lu Dangjigū and Jang Jin Lu. 
58 These men were organized under aisilara taiji Cerindorji and meiren i Burgut. Daiselaha ilhi culgan i da 
gung Coijunjab also dispatched men to the scene: jasak taiji Darmajab and janggin Cerindasi.  M1D1-
3833.25a (DG6.1.21).  Other units under jurgan i janggin Wesingge, jurgan i bošokū Hengling and 
monggo uju jergi taiji Gongcukdasi, had departed Khüree on July 17, 1825, and a team led by 
Sonomdobcin departed the following day.  At Sonomdarjya’s banner they were joined by uju jergi taiji 
Pungcukdorji, and still more tusalakci hafasa sent by Artasida.   M1D1-3822.58a (DG6.6.9). 
59  M1D1-3822.58a (DG6.6.9). 
60  M1D1-3833.20 (DG6.7.19). 
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August 14, the special deputy and Sonomdarjya issued a Chinese-language proclamation 
announcing their banishment.  The mushroom-pickers were rounded up, their names 
compiled in a Mongol-language register (523 men, divided into sixty picking teams), and 
they were banished from the banner.61 
Similar discrepancies were apparent in the negotiations of 1827.  That year, 700 
men had arrived in the banner, armed with wooden cudgels.  “Although as a lone taiji I 
repeatedly ordered them to leave,” a patrolman named Bayandelger meekly reported, 
“they paid no attention.”62  Sonomdarjya and the new special deputy, Coijunjab, issued a 
copy of the proclamation of banishment, then headed for the camps. They succeeded in 
compiling a fresh register of names.  Reports revealed the desperate condition of the 
pickers.  Some lived in ramshackle cave dwellings and others in wooden thatched-roof 
huts.  Over 300 had come on foot without any pack animals.  When ordered to disperse 
by the first of the seventh lunar month, the foremen challenged the case against them.63  
As they argued, “we came to an understanding and returned as usual [muse inu an i 
jalgiyanjame amasi jifi].”  They had a deal: “we pick mushrooms, cut down trees, fish, 
and hunt marmots then return back [home] in the eighth lunar month.”64  Both foremen 
representing the group, Menggetu and Haisandai, were fluent in Mongol and known by 
                                                
61  Ibid. 
62  M1D1-3855.7a (DG7.6.4). 
63  Ibid.  Wesingge at the time was posted in Kiakhta, and there were no other janggin available for the job; 
ilhi culgan i da gung Coijunjab and wang Toktohoturu were called to the scene with troops.  Due to a 
broken foot suffered after falling from his horse, Toktohoturu was replaced on the fly.  Coijunjab, however, 
arrived at the banner on August 10, 1827, and coordinated with Sonomdarjya on a plan. See M1D1-3855.9a 
(DG7.7.30). 
64 The original draft of this document left out “cutting down trees” (Ma: moo sacime); it was inserted in a 
later draft.   
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Mongol names.65  Menggetu – later identified from a past register as Zhang Yishang of 
Chifeng66 – pleaded to keep their deal.  The officials relented; their arguments seemed to 
carry weight.67  
The phenomenon of Chinese mushroom pickers in these borderlands was thus 
neither alien nor novel.  Further, just as Mongols were acculturating to the ways of 
mushroom pickers, the Chinese were likewise acculturating to the ways of Mongols.68  
Indeed, documentary evidence of Chinese mushroom pickers in the banner extend back 
to at least 1759, and it was this history the pickers invoked in their testimonies.  Like 
Menggetu and Haisandai, many had Mongol names and spoke Mongol fluently; others 
had Mongol wives.  Some lived in Mongol style gers – the traditional nomad’s yurt.69  
Many local Mongols, on the other hand, married Chinese, spoke Chinese, actively 
participated in commerce, labored in caravans, and supported the mushroom trade – just 
as the state feared.  Distinctions between Mongols and Chinese were blurring.  Concern 
about Chinese influence on traditional “ways of life” even extended to the very word 
“mushroom.”  In one case, when a clerk at the Ambans Office rendered it with the 
                                                
65  M1D1-3855.9a (DG7.7.30).   
66  M1D1-3855.7a (DG7.6.4). 
67  M1D1-3855.9a (DG7.7.30). 
68 See Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (New York: American Geographical Society, 1940), 481. 
As Lattimore argued, “the edge of the steppe was not abrupt by shaded by an indefinite margin of debatable 
terrain, in which there worked spontaneously and in varying degres both the tendency for some of the 
steppe tribes to evolve toward the Chinese norm and for some of the Chinese borderers to devolve away 
from the norm.”  For Lattimore, Chinese acculturation to Mongol ways was the necessary outcome of a 
changed environment and mode of production: “the steppe was not suitable for occupation by unmodified 
Chinese communities.  Lattimore, 473. 
69 See the case of two wood-sellers from Chifeng in Sonomdarya’s banner in  M1D1-3822.58a (DG6.6.9).  
The names of the men were given as Bayartu and Mujang.  
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colloquial Chinese mogu, his superior crossed it out. Instead, the official proofed in the 
Manchu word, sence, leaving a lingering “mogu” in the original draft.70    
Mushroom picking was not limited to Sonomdarjya’s banner.  It was also taking 
place in Sandubmingjur’s banner.71 In 1826 (DG6), the ambans submitted a report to the 
Lifanyuan lamenting that even though they were policing the area, with culgan i da gung 
Coijunjab himself on the scene, the migrant laborers driven out, their huts destroyed, and 
soldiers stationed on the road, that year had brought more of the same: in the sixth month, 
“Chinese again came swarming in” (irgese geli feniyeleme jifi).   That year, they had only 
been able to catch a few men for punishment, but they had not been organizers.  In the 
ninth month, over 200 more loggers and mushroom pickers (under one Li Tai) were 
dispersed by authorities. The incident was not without violence, with one leader of camp 
named Zhang Zhenglun of some 20 “men punching (šolo gala de tantame) an official 
(kunde) and causing a small injury.” It was during the raid of these 200 men that Hui 
Wanzong was first detained.  Zhang Zhenglun was a Shanxi man living in Ulan Hada.  A 
leader of over forty mushroom pickers, he was fluent in Mongol.  Though each year he 
had been driven out, he kept coming back, while his men had built twenty-seven modest 
huts (coron) in the area.72   
                                                
70  M1D1-3744.8a (DG2.6.27).  The Manchu megu, another word for mushroom, was interestingly not used 
in either draft.  The text is a useful reminder of how much is missed when we rely on Chinese translations 
of Manchu documents. 
71 Sandubmingjur (Ch: ı_È», ı_wÈ», ı_È»), rĀħ7.   Jasaγ of the right 
wing, right-end banner of Tusiyetu Han aimaγ.  Fifth generation descendant of Bahai (enfeoffed 1732).  
Ascended to rank in DG3, passed onto son Dasidorji in DG11 (1823-1831). Bao Wenhan et al, Menggu 
huibu wanggong biaozhuan, 297; Jin Hai et al, Qingdai menggu zhi, 92. 
72 M1D1-3913.20 (DG9.1.19).  Cf. coron tatan in Norman: “a small, temporary wooden, tent-shaped 
structure.”  Jerry Norman, A Concise Manchu-English Lexicon (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1978), 48. 
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The official narrative was aimed at Artasida, the amban, and ultimately the 
emperor himself; it legitimated regional and imperial intervention at the local level.  As 
Sonomdarjya argued, “if it reaches the point where poor Chinese gradually take over 
(ejeleme) the Mongol steppe and overthrow the Mongols’ way of life, it will not be 
accordance with the lofty aim of the His Majesty (enduringge ejen, lit. “sacred lord”) to 
love his humble Mongol servants (monggo ahasi).”73  Action was justified not only 
because the land was Sonomdarjya’s, or because it was Mongol, but because the 
emperors intended it so.  In other contexts, different justifications would be found for 
state intervention.  The Ambans Office, for example, argued Sonomdarjya’s banner was 
“at the extreme boundary of the Khalkha aimaγ on the borderlands, close to the foreign 
land (tulergi aiman) of Russia” and he called for a coordinated response between 
Artasida, the governor of Zhili, and the Lifanyuan.74  Whether Mongol land or 
borderland, the implication was similar: all of Mongolia commanded a special place in 
the empire. 
 
Pure Places: Precedents 
 
There were spaces in Mongolia that had long been treated as both special and 
“pure” prior to the 1820s, including the imperial game parks, from which mushroom-
poaching laws were later derived.  Mushroom picking was itself tied to the history of 
regulating hunting grounds.  In 1773, a new precedent was set when the military governor 
of Mukden, Hong-šang, memorialized that the existing policy of putting first and second 
                                                
73  M1D1-3913.20 (DG9.1.19). 
74  M1D1-3744.8a (DG2.6.27). 
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time poachers in the cangue for one or two months was “an insufficient warning.”  He 
proposed that whether or not they were first- or second-time offenders, bannerman or 
Chinese civilian, they should be transferred to the Board of Punishments in Shengjing, 
investigated, then banished into exile.  Wood and mushroom poachers were not to be 
treated any differently: they were still trespassing on a restricted area (Ch: Ő[), 
disturbing the animals; they too should be exiled. The Qianlong emperor assented, and 
further ordered an investigation of the environs of the hunting grounds and the discipline 
and diligence of the guards.75  
These sites shared properties of what Caroline Humphrey identified as “chiefly 
landscapes:” an association with heaven (Mo: tnggri), the state, patriarchal authority, and 
spiritual “rulers” or “masters” (Mo: ejen).76  In the Qing period, imperial hunting 
grounds, holy mountains, the interior of Khüree, the borderlands with Russia, and areas 
known to produce gold were all “restricted areas” (Mo: caγalγsan γajar) with certain 
administrative and ideological commonalities.77   Most prominently, no people or 
livestock were permitted within their jurisdiction: all forms of hunting, logging, and 
fishing were prohibited.  In hunting grounds, even “spooking” animals was against the 
law.  Maintaining the spatial order required constant policing by vigilant guards and a 
constant inflow of resources.  
                                                
75 Gaozong shilu, 947: 838. 
76Caroline Humphrey, “Chiefly and Shamanist Landscapes in Mongolia,” in The Anthropology of 
Landscape: Perspectives on Place and Space, ed. Eric Hirsch and Michael O’Hanton (1995), 142-149.  
Humphrey puts chiefly landscapes in contrast in “shamanist landscapes,” which were generally associated 
with the earth (e.g. caves), females, and peripheral lands outside state control.  
77 The phrase appears in Mongol language laws but not in their Manchu language translation. Compare 
GMQJ 5a-b, and TGKH 53.5a-6a.  On gold mines in particular, see High and Schlesinger, “Rulers and 
Rascals,” 293-295. 
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Holy mountains were the classic “chiefly landscape.” As the “lands of the spirit 
palace on high” (Ma: enduri i dergi urdu i bade),78 they were strongly associated with 
both heavenly and state authority; most took the honorary title khan.  The ceremonies that 
took place on the mountains, which involved activities such as wrestling and shooting, 
reinforced the male, martial, and Mongol quality of the space.  At Mt. Khan (Mo: Han 
Aγula; Ma: Han Alin),79 located just to the south of Khüree,80 a grand, multi-day 
ceremony was performed each spring and autumn.81  All of the league’s aristocracy (han, 
wang, gung, jasak sa) was expected to personally participate, giving them the opportunity 
to meet in a single gathering.82  Preparations were made in advance for the requisite 
                                                
78 M1D1-3840.27 (DG7). The site was also called the “place of prayer to the spirit of the great and high 
ovoo” (Ma: wecere enduri i dergi amba obo i bade).  M1D1-3675.30 (JQ24). 
79 In Manchu, Han Alin was also referred to as “Han Colgon Alin” or “Han Colhon Alin.” 
80 The mountain was the namesake of the “Han Aγula League,” the league name for Tusiyetu Han aimaγ. 
The mountain is today protected as a national park. The president’s mansion lies at its northern foot; after 
the disorder following the 2009 elections, riot police trained there. 
81 It is not clear when Qing involvement in the ceremonies began and ended.  The earliest reference I found 
in the archives is to the ceremony of 1787.  See M1D1-3110.1 (QL51).  
82 The trips provided a similar socialization function for the aimaγ elite, that is, as the trips to Chengde and 
Wutaishan did for Mongols as a whole.  At the same time, given the time and resources necessary to travel 
for the trip, fulfilling the obligation could be burdensome.  A late spring in 1819, before the grass had had a 
chance to green and the horses had fattened up, together with the other obligations (specifically providing 
livestock and horses for sending young incarnations to Tibet, made the amban request that the horse races 
by called off that year. In 1819 it was decided that because of the great distances between Ikh Khüree and 
karun of the two western aimaγ, and the difficulty of making the trip twice a year, an alternating schedule 
was proposed: the two jasak from the karun east of Kiakhta would be responsible for the spring ceremony, 
and the two jasaγ for the karun west of Kiakhta would make the trip in the autumn. The participants, 
moreover, were allotted a set amount of sheep to be requisitioned from the banners.  For the ceremonies at 
Kentei Han alin, for example, twenty sheep were allotted to the amban wang, fifteen to the amban, five 
sheep each to two jurgan i janggin and two bithesi, two sheep each to the bošokū and four monggo hafan 
bithesi. At Kentei Han performing the ceremony was complicated by the fact that the river was at high 
water during the spring.  In 1819, the ambans’ office agreed there was a need to make rafts and press into 
service some “good boatmen” (sain šuruci).  In 1819 craftsmen thus built one three-beam boat and eight 
two-beam boats, based at Honggon i Adak, on the Kerlun River.  Eight sailors were brought in from three 
different banners, Cecen Han Artasida’s, gung Senggedorji’s, and jasak Mingdurdorji’s. In 1819, 
requisitioned sheep were compensated at a rate of .7 taels per head.  Altogether, sixty-seven sheep (valued 
at 46.9 taels silver) were requisitioned for the Kentei Han alin ceremony in the spring of 1819.  M1D1-
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number of horses, livestock, and provisions to support the massive party, and yaks and 
other livestock carried the provisions up in advance of the official party.83 It was 
mandatory that “everything for the ceremonies was respectfully purified and prepared” 
(wecere jaka hacin be gingguleme bolgomime belhetebure) in advance.84  On the first 
day, ambans and League Chiefs helped honor the mountain spirit, then presided over 
three days of wrestling, archery, and horse racing.85  The sports “cultivated the propitious 
way of manly virtue” (hahai erdemu be sabingga doroi urebure jalin). After three days 
of ceremonious festivities, they pitched a yellow tent (suwayan cacar) at the archery site, 
                                                                                                                                            
3675.3 (JQ24); M1D1-3675.30 (JQ24); M1D1-3675.83 (JQ24.+4); M1D1-3675.84 (JQ24.+4); M1D1-
3675.44 (JQ24.1.25). 
 Sheep Requisitioned in 1819 (Kentei Han, spring ceremony) 
Officials Tusiyetu Han Cecen Han Šangjotba TOTAL 
amban wang  6 19 25 
amban 18 2  20 
2 bithesi and 2 bošokū 6 8  14 
4 monggo hafan bithesi  8  8 
TOTAL 24 24 19 67 
 
83 M1D1-3840.27 (DG7). 
84 M1D1-3675.30 (JQ24). 
85  M1D1-3675.2 (JQ24.4.4); M1D1-3840.27 (DG7). The spring ceremonies took place on JQ24.5.1 in 
1819 and DG7.5.6 in 1827. To ensure that the execution of the day’s events went without a hitch, the 
responsible noblemen selected capable men and checked the quality of their wrestling and shooting before 
dispatching them.  Two types of archery are mentioned: “strap shooting” (uše gabtabume) and “polo-ball 
shooting from horseback” (mumuhu niyamniyabumbi, aigan mumuhu niyamniyabumbi).  In 1827, the men 
who selected the wresters included culgan i da cecen han Artasida, gung Sonomwangcuk, aisilara 
jiyanggiyūn tusiyetu han Oidubdorji, ilhi culgan i da gung Coijonjab, Baldorji, hebei beise Yondambatzar, 
gung ciwangdorji, and the Kuren i šangjotba Gombujab. Baldorji (]!B»², ]»B»²), rĀÞ
()iďrĀħ7.  Jasaγ of the left wing, front banner of Tusiyetu Han aimaγ.  Seventh 
generation descendant of Balang (enfeoffed 1691 as jasak; his son Wangbu enfeoffed as ħ7 in 1738 on 
account of military merit).  Ascended to rank in JQ9, passed on to his son Dansüründorji in DG21 (1804-
1841). Bao Wenhan et al, Menggu huibu wanggong biaozhuan, 298; Jin Hai et al, Qingdai menggu zhi, 92. 
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where lamas prayed for good fortune (hūturi baime) and read sutras.  The ceremonies 
concluded with a sacrifice of oxen and sheep that had been “well purified” (Ma: saikan 
bolgomime),86 and cloth was tied to the tails of others, which were released to graze in 
peace.87  Similar events were held on other holy mountains, such Mt. Kentei Khan, in 
Cecen Han aimaγ.  Both mountains were associated with the authority of the aimaγ 
League. 
Imperial hunting grounds in Mongolia were long treated with a similar degree of 
reverence.88  Like holy mountains, they were associated with Heaven, the state, martial 
vigor, and masculinity.  There two types of protected parks: those used to catch tribute 
animals (such as wild boar) and those for “training hunts” (Ma: urebume abalara).89 
Hunting cultivated “soldierly virtue”90 and served as “a way of manifesting power in the 
frontier.”91  Given their vital strategic nature, participating in them was a uniquely 
                                                
86  M1D1-3840.27 (DG7); M1D1-3675.2 (JQ24.4.4). Archers and wrestlers reported to Khüree five days in 
advance;  white cloth and incense used in the ceremonies was prepared at the amban’s office at the end of 
each year. M1D1-3840.26a (DG7.11.10). 
87  M1D1-3833.39 (DG6.7.18). 
88 For a detailed study of imperial hunting, including conservation practices, see Allsen, The Royal Hunt in 
Eurasian History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).  On imperial hunting in the Qing 
in particular, see Mark Elliott, The Manchu Way, 57-58, 183-187. On the Manchu hunt, Elliott writes: 
“Recalling as it did the rugged origins of the horse-riding Manchu gurun, which decorated its early palaces 
with the skins of tigers and bears and made the first royal throne out of stag antlers, reenacting the imperial 
hunt demonstrated the persistence of Manchu tradition, even as the custom of hunting grew rarer among 
ordinary Manchus.”  Elliott, 186.  
89 There were multiple such sites used as game parks for the military training.  One was to the northeast of 
Khüree, in land under the formal jurisdiction of the Jebtzundamba Kutuktu.  There were other hunting 
grounds in the far east of Cecen Han aimaγ, on the border with Hulun Buir, near the mushroom fields.  For 
descriptions and geography, see  M1D1-3416.19 (JQ10.8);  M1D1-3416.5 (JQ10.4). 
90  M1D1-3416.7a (JQ10.8). 
91  M1D1-3834.8 (DG6.6.18). 
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“important obligation to the state” (oyonggo alban)92 and “incomparable with standard 
affairs.”93  Qing documents signaled the parks’ close association with the emperor 
himself by commonly raising the words “game park” (Ma: aba hoihan; Mo: aba 
qomoraγ-a; Ch: 8>) a notch above ordinary text.94  Their importance was also signaled 
administratively.  Like the ceremonies at holy mountains, top Mongol authorities 
participated in the hunt, including aimaγ League-Chiefs and Assistant Commanders (Ma: 
aisilara jiyanggiyūn; Mo: tusalaγci jiyanggiyun; Ch: Sĥ).  Also as in holy 
mountains, the hunt was accompanied by public offerings to Heaven, the earth and 
spirits.95  Twenty-one sheep were sacrificed, each one “purified, prepared and dispersed 
to the various banners with the strictest [care].”96 The emperor was kept appraised of the 
proceedings, and assured at hunt’s end that “all [your] Mongol servants kowtowed to the 
Imperial Palace.”97  
The rituals surrounding the hunt likewise reinforced its imperial dimensions. 
According to the law, a battue hunt commenced each year during the seventh month.  The 
battue involved five hundred men, all drawn from the two eastern Khalkha aimaγ under 
the ambans’ supervision.  All able-bodied men between the ages of twenty and forty were 
                                                
92  M1D1-4166.9a (DG21.1.19). 
93  M1D1-2875.2 (QL27.6.4). 
94 See, for example, M1D1-2875.2 (QL27.6.4). 
95  M1D1-3750.1. 
96  M1D1-3416.11 (JQ10.6). 
97  M1D1-3416.1a (JQ10.8).  The men who killed animals were rewarded.  There was a fixed amount of 
rewards each year, amounting to eighty taels of silver, 612 bricks of tea, four bolts of silk, five-hundred 
tobacco pouches, fourteen bolts of cloth, two bolts of pingji (?), two bolts of cotton, two bolts Tibetan wool 
(kubun cengme), two hat tassels (sorson), thirty-two pieces of leather (ilgin), and four pairs of fine leather 
boots (sarin gūlha).  M1D1-3416.30 (JQ10.9.1). 
 241 
eligible to be pressed into the hunt, with each assigned five “good and fat” (tarhūn sain) 
horses.98  If selected for service, substituting in another in one’s place was prohibited.99 
On a prearranged date, the entire hunting party gathered in Khüree, and then proceeded to 
the hunting grounds to establish a base camp.  On the next day, an auspicious day on the 
calendar, the leaders made a public offering to High Heaven and earth and various spirits 
(geren be gaifi gingguleme // Dergi abkai na, geren // Enduri banaji be // Wecefi).100   
According to precedent, twenty-one sheep were slaughtered as part of the ceremonies 
(wecere de baibure); each was “purified, prepared and dispersed to the various banners 
with the strictest [care]” (geren gūsade doigonde selgiyebufi bolgomime belhebure babe 
ciralame afabuki).101  The hunt then proceeded for fifteen days.102  When the hunting was 
complete, “all the Mongol subjects kowtowed toward the imperial palace” (geren 
monggo ahasi yooni hukšeme niyakūrafi aisin gurung ni baru forome abkai kesi de 
                                                
98 M1D1-3416.11 (JQ10.6). 
99 Ibid. 
100 M1D1-3750.1 (DG3.6.9). 
101 M1D1-3416.11 (JQ10.6). 
102 M1D1-3416.7a (JQ10.8). 
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hengkilefi),103 and the men returned home to their banners.104  Altogether, from the time 
they left Khüree to the time they returned, they were in the field for twenty-five days.105 
Maintaining the holy mountains and game parks required constant work and 
complex logistics, and preparations were made months in advance.  When “by an edict of 
grace,” the Qianlong emperor deemed Mt. Kentei Khan and Mt. Colhon Khan “state 
mountains of good fortune” (Ma: gurun booi sabingga alin), he decreed that their  
“wildlife and trees be neither frightened nor defiled” (Ma: gurgu moo be aksabure 
gasihiyaburakū).  Unique rules for the territory were necessary: it was “proper that that 
precedents and laws be established that suitable for the [special] circumstances of the 
locality” (giyan i ba na i arbun de acabume kooli kemun toktobuci acame).106  Patrolmen 
were put on “constant” vigilant for signs of poaching, woodcutting, or haymaking within 
the restricted grounds.107   Special concern was paid to pilgrims – the diverse lot of 
“lamas and laymen, men and women” who traveled on foot from Khüree to the temple of 
the Dongk’or kūtuktu on the far side of the mountain.  The pilgrimage required passing 
through Yeke Tngri and Jaisang Dabagan, both protected areas within the restricted 
                                                
103 M1D1-3416.1a (JQ10.8). 
104 Ibid. The men who killed animals were rewarded.  There was a fixed amount of rewards each year, 
amounting to eighty taels of silver, 612 bricks of tea, four bolts of silk, five-hundred tobacco pouches, 
fourteen bolts of cloth, two bolts of pingji (?), two bolts of cotton, two bolts Tibetan wool (kubun cengme), 
two hat tassels (sorson), thirty-two pieces of leather (ilgin), and four pairs of fine leather boots (sarin 
gūlha).  These were necessarily all distributed.  In 1805, for example, the nobility and soldiers (beise, gung, 
jasak, taiji, hafasa, coohai urse) who killed an animal actually received were 1.5 bolts of silk 6.5 taels of 
silver, 622 bricks of tea, one bolt of cotton and Tibetan wool cloth, fourteen bolts of cloth, one pair of boots, 
two hat tassels, and the thirty-two pieces of leather.  The remaining items were put into storage at the 
yamen. M1D1-3416.30 (JQ10.9.1). 
105 M1D1-3416.11 (JQ10.6). 
106 M1D1-3675.1a (JQ24.5.14).  A replica of this document can be found in M1D1-3675.46. 
107  M1D1-3675.1a (JQ24.5.14). 
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territory.  The amban’s office coordinated with the Šangjotba’s office and the Šangjotba 
for the Dongk’or kūtuktu to ensure a united front: the guards were to keep strict oversight 
to ensure that no passers-by poached on the flora and fauna or started any fires.108 
“Purifying” Mongolia’s game parks similarly entailed protecting “game and 
trees” from being “ravaged” or “spooked.”109  Special edicts criminalized “poaching 
game” as well as “wood-gathering, tea-picking, and trespassing.”  Herders from 
neighboring jurisdictions were evacuated and pressed into service as guardsmen (Mo: 
caγdaγ-a; Ma: cakda) arrived: “not one bannermen or temple serf (šabi) can herd or settle 
[there].”110  Making the area “pure” also meant beating out man-made fires and harsh 
punishments for hunters found guilty of smoking badgers from their dens.111  In the case 
of a fire, guardsmen were required to rush to the scene, organize into fire brigades, and 
beat out the fire.  While wildfires were not considered wrong in and of themselves – 
prairie fires were often set, and allowed to burn intentionally – the restricted hunting 
grounds were different.112   
                                                
108 M1D1-3675.67 (JQ24.3.13). 
109  M1D1-4166.14a (DG21.9.10); M1D1-3750.3 (DG3.5.17). 
110  M1D1-3750.8b (DG3.6.12). 
111 Wildfires were not considered wrong in themselves: prairie fires were set intentionally. See Gilmour’s 
description of a trip from Khuree to Kalgan: “Just before spring, sometimes, large tracts of the desert are 
fired accidentally from the unextinguished fires left by passing caravans, and purposely by the natives, that 
the new grass may grow up better and free from the old.” Gilmour, 79. Special punishments were in place, 
however, for those who accidental started fires while attempting to smoke badgers out from their holes. In 
1846, a women from taiji Gurujab’s banner (Cecen Han aimaγ), named Songingkoo, accidentally started a 
fire while badger-hunting.  Several people were killed. Three-nines of livestock were to handed over to the 
families of those killed.  See  M1D1-4319.46 (DG27.6). 
112 As discussed in the previous chapter, rules were in place for those who started accidental prairie fires.  
For all of Mongolia, however, special punishments were in place for those who accidental started fires 
while attempting to smoke badgers out from their holes. In 1846, a women from taiji Gurujab’s banner 
(Cecen Han aimaγ) named Songingkoo accidentally started a fire while hunting badgers.  Several people 
were killed.  The law stated that the accidental arsonist was to be fined one-ninth of livestock, to be handed 
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The punishments for poaching were harsh.  On holy mountains, aristocrats found 
guilty of poaching were stripped of rank; commoners were tattooed with the word 
“criminal” (Ma: hūlha) and forced to wear the cangue.  Recidivist commoners were 
exiled to another aimaγ, while noblemen found guilty twice were punished like 
commoners.  The legal infrastructure matured through late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.  New precedents were set: merchants who bought elk horns received 
special punishments, as did those who cut down a live tree.  The number of guardsmen 
increased as well.  In 1819, for example, eight patrolmen reinforced the line at Mt. Kentei 
Han.113  In the imperial grounds, those caught poaching flora or fauna, or found to have 
started a wildfire, were “dealt with severely,” with all violations of the law reported up to 
the Šangjotba, the local jasaγ’s yamen, and the local high-ranking lamas (da lamasa).114  
As “matters related to game parks were extremely important” (aba hoihan i ba 
holbobuhangge umesi oyonggo)115 first time offenders wore the cangue a month; second 
time offenders wore it two months; and third time offenders were whipped one hundred 
times.116  
                                                                                                                                            
over to the yamen.  Three-ninths were to handed over to the families of those killed. M1D1-4319.46 
(DG27.6).  
113  M1D1-3675.1a (JQ24.5.14).  These were recruited from amongst šabi and bannermen from Tusiyetu 
Han Cecen Han aimaγs and placed under jasak Cembeljab.  Cembeljab  (Ch: Ĥ_»_), rĀÞ
().  Jasaγ of the center-right-back banner of Cecen Han aimaγ.  Seventh generation descendant of 
Lobzang (enfeoffed 1697).  Passed on rank to his son in in DG1(1821); assumed post sometime after JQ4. 
Bao Wenhan et al, Menggu huibu wanggong biaozhuan, 167; Jin Hai et al, Qingdai menggu zhi, 106.  See 
Cedeng’awa. 
114 M1D1-3416.5 (JQ10.4).   
115  M1D1-2875.3 (QL27.7.17). 
116  M1D1-2875.1 (QL27.9.16). 
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Purity, that is, did not just happen: it took months of work to prepare the hunting 
grounds and make them pure.  Four months in advance of the hunt, the amban put a 
notice through to the league captain-generals of Tusiyetu Han and Cecen Han aimaγs to 
organize a draft a guardsmen.117  Guardsmen assumed posts in the hunting grounds two 
months later.  Though vast (Ma: leli onco ba) and sparsely populated (Ma: urse komso), 
the hunting grounds were still home eight moths of the year to local temple serfs (šabi).  
All local households, and those in the vicinity of the restricted areas, were registered and 
put under the direct supervision of the Director of the Hunting Grounds (Ma: aba hoihan 
i ba be uherileme kadalabuha [gung]).118  They were then pressed into duty as 
guardsmen.  Households in the neighboring areas tended to cluster together in the finest 
pastures, leaving gaps along the perimeter (particularly in “the forested mountains and 
precipitous places”).  One of the first orders of business was to disperse the households to 
the most strategically located pastures for catching intruders.119 
Local noblemen, under the supervision of the Hunting Grounds, were responsible 
for the guardsmen, though Guardsmen provided for themselves by continuing to pasture 
their animals around their posts.120  Substituting out was not easy: if a local guard grew 
                                                
117 M1D1-3750.2 (DG3.4.10). 
118 These were recruited on a circulating basis from neighboring jasaγs. In 1794 (QL59), for example, the 
dergi juwe aimani karun be kadalara beise was Sonomwangjildorji (Ch: ãĖ~r!B»²), rĀB
êğ!iĻďrĀ6YğJ.  Jasaγ of the center-left banner of Cecen Han aimaγ.  Forth generation 
descedant of Budajab (taiji 1688; beizi 1711).  Assumed rank in QL46, removed from rank after 
committing murder in JQ7 (1781-1802).  In 1841, it was gung Gombujab. Gombujab (Ch: __), rĀ
ħ7.  Jasaγ of the center-back banner of Cecen Han aimaγ.  Sixth generation descendant of Cebden 
(beise in 1691, grandson a ħ7 in 1701).  Assumed rank in DG1, passed on to his son Gongcukcerin in 
DG29 (1820-1849). Bao Wenhan et al, Menggu huibu wanggong biaozhuan, 30, 431; Jin Hai et al, Qingdai 
menggu zhi, 100-101. 
119 M1D1-3416.5 (JQ10.4).   
120 M1D1-4166.14a (DG21.9.10). 
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seriously ill or passed away, the highest authority in the Buddhist establishment, the 
Šangjotba had to approve his replacement.121  To help ensure reliability, guardmen had to 
be “men of sufficient means;” impoverished bannermen were not to be drafted into 
service.122  In the hunting grounds in Cecen Han aimaγ, the infrastructure for guard posts 
was put into place as early as 1758 (QL23).  That year, karun were erected in a line 
stretching from the left wing, front banner of Cecen Han aimaγ to Uyumcin territory, 
each 30 to 40 li from the other.  Each karun was assigned one official (hafan) and five 
uksin.  As with border-karun, game-park guards had to patrol daily in search of 
“criminals, frauds, and escapees” (hūlha holo ukanju).  On the first and fifteenth of the 
month an official of the rank taiji [aisilara taiji hafan] audited their work with his own 
tour of inspection, though these were later replaced with tours at irregular intervals.123   
Yet despite the strict legal code and elaborate policing apparatus, the “restricted 
areas” suffered nonetheless during the resource boom of 1820-1840, as poaching and 
corruption grew endemic.  As discussed in Chapter 3, commercial deer hunting and 
logging frequently encroached upon the restricted areas.  Yet poachers came in all forms, 
from commercial hunters, trying to make a living, to sportsmen; they included both 
                                                
121 M1D1-4166.8a (DG21.4.20).  By rule, he was to be replaced by a man from the same otok. 
122 M1D1-4166.13a (DG21.10.6).  Likewise, those already laden with other service obligations or were 
located too far away could be exempted from duty.  When Ongdubciwang, the nobleman charged with 
overseeing the stewardship of the hunting grounds north of Ikh Khüree (aba hoihan i ba be giyarime tebuhe 
ursebe kadalabuha gung) died in 1822, finding a gung or jasaγ from the area to fill his post proved 
difficult, since everyone else’s pastures were so far away.  It was on these grounds, not by automatic right, 
that Ongdubciwang’s son, Mingjudorji, was nominated for the post. M1D1-3750.5 
123 M1D1-2875.3 (QL27.7.17). 
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Chinese and Mongols, commoners and noblemen.124  As early as 805, hunters 
complained that animals were “scarce” in the game parks around Khüree because “many 
bannermen and šabi in said hunting grounds herd livestock, scare away animals, and 
destroy the forests.”  Still worse, “many” Chinese merchants induced people to “pitch 
tents along mountain streams, cut down trees, and reap hay.”125  (kemuni hūdai irgese 
alin bira de boo ilibufi moo sacime orho hadume bargiyahangge inu labdu, tutu gurgu be 
aksabume jailabufi ele komso oho).  More guardsmen were pressed into service and 
dispatched to the source of the Tula, Bürku, and the northern parts of Terelji, as well as to 
Noyan Agūla, Gūrban Urtu, Gahai Habcagai, Narin Burgaltai, and Tushaltu.  The official 
charged with cleaning up the park, Pungcuk, put special emphasis on putting a stop to 
merchants stealing into protected land to reap hay and log trees.  While the focus was on 
the “local people” (nuktei urse) in an initial draft, the final draft put the emphasis on 
nikasa, the “Han Chinese.”126 
                                                
124 There was a case, for example, of a nobleman’s son and two friends chasing a deer into the restricted 
area just a month prior to the hunt.  Officials agreed on leniency in this case, noting that the boy, Sengge, 
was not yet mature. 
125  M1D1-3416.19 (JQ10.8).  The official charged with managing the park, Pungcuk, put special emphasis 
on merchants as the central problem.  While initial concern was on the “local nomads” (Ma: nuktei urse), 
his proposals focused on nikasa, the “Han Chinese.” More guardsmen were immediately pressed into 
service and dispatched to the most threatened parts of the park. 
126 Ibid.  Amongst the memorials housed in the Mongolian Central Archives, this nikasa was the lone case 
found from after the Qianlong period in which “nikan” or “nikasa” appeared in a document.  Instead, the 
common term for Chinese was “irgen” or “irgese” – literally a civilian subject whose jurisdiction was 
outside the banners (), but in Inner Asia used in practice to refer to Chinese whose home jurisdiction lie 
in the įè system. Irgen had the flexibility to apply, for example, to Chinese Muslims, while nikasa, from 
what I have seen, did not.  Here, nikasa can be understood as outdated or otherwise inappropriate for this 
context.  Further research is needed into the use of nikan in earlier documents.  At least in the case of trade 
licenses at Kiakhta, early Qianlong period documents use Kiakhta, whereas later ones do not.  See M1D1-
128.1 (QL22); M1D1-128.2 (QL22); and M1D1-128.3 (QL22).  See also M1D1-2875.2 (QL27.6.4), 
discussed below, for an example of nikasa picking mushrooms and starting a prairie fire.  
 248 
Just like with mushroom picking, however, the court often proved most concerned 
that Mongols themselves were the primary problem: achieving “purity” was an 
enforcement issue; either negligence or the tacit complicity of Mongol authorities was to 
blame for violations of restricted areas.  In one case from 1759 (QL24), a wildfire tore 
through Soyolji, an area neighboring the imperial hunting grounds of Cecen Han aimaγ, 
along the border with Heilongjiang.  The source of the fire was later traced to a place 
known as Aru Bulak, in the banner of a jasaγ named Jamcan,127 where a group of Han 
Chinese (Ma: nikasa) mushroom pickers had been camped out in the region.   For his 
negligence, Jamcan was originally sentenced to be caned with a heavy staff and stripped 
of his title of jasak gung.128  In his edict settling the affair, however, the Qianlong 
emperor showed leniency and granted that Jamcan not be stripped of his rank of “jasak 
gung by imperial grace” (kesi isibume jasak i gung) but fined a year’s salary. As the 
emperor wrote, “all the Mongols of the karun are muddleheaded Mongols” (karun i 
monggoso gemu hūlhi monggo), and lamented that Mongols were “incomparable with the 
troops called up from the karuns of Heilongjiang” (sahaliyan ula i karun de tucibuhe 
hafan cooha be monggoso de duibuleci ojorakū).  Jamcan was, in the end, only first time 
offenders.129  
                                                
127 Jamcan (Ch: r×), rĀĵ7.  Jasaγ of the left wing, front banner of Cecen Han aimaγ.  Third 
generation descendant of Cebden (enfeoffed in 1691. Ascended to rank in YZ11, passed on to his son 
Yundan in QL32 (1733-1767).  Sixth generation descendant was Sonomdarja. Jin Hai et al, Qingdai 
menggu zhi, 101. 
128 M1D1-2875.2 (QL27.6.4). 
129 Ibid. 
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In other cases, travellers describe authorities willfully but quietly neglecting the 
law.  The late nineteenth century missionary James Gilmour witnessed the sentencing of 
a man that accidently started a prairie fire: 
Another case was peculiarly Mongolian.  A young lama was brought up 
accused of causing a prairie fire, which ran for miles and scarched a 
caravan of Halhas, encamped with their camels and loads of tea in the 
long dry grass.  The accused admitted the charge, but pleaded that it 
was unintentional; and appealed to the mercy of the court, reminding 
them that he was a quiet and orderly subject, and the sole support of his 
father, an old man aged eighty years.  The court was evidently satisfied 
with the explanation, but the law must be magnified, which was 
supposed to be done when thirty nominal lashes were laid on lightly, 
not even his coat being removed; and the count being so cooked that 
though thirty was counted, hardly more than fifteen were 
administered.130 
 
Such resistance would never have shown up in the archival materials, but other 
forms did, such as with guardsmen themselves caught poaching or starting fires.  Just 
three years after the 1759 conflagration, in 1762, yet another man-made wildfire swept 
through Soyolji.131  The fire started when hunting ground’s top guardsman, Batu, went 
smoking out badgers (manggisu) on the southern sand bank of the Numurge River.132  At 
first he claimed that he had not caused the fire while hunting; rather he had been smoking 
tobacco when a smoldering ember fell to the ground and ignited the prairie.  He 
                                                
130 James Gilmour, Among the Mongols (London: Religious Tract Society, [1888]), 303. 
131 The fire was located n the jurisdiction of meiren i janggin Nomhon, in the banner of jasak wang 
Demcuk.  Demcuk (Ch: n), rĀBêįÇ.  Jasaγ for the center-right banner of Cecen Han 
aimaγ.  Third generation descendant of Pungsuk (enfeoffed 1691, promoted in rank in 1696).  Assumed 
title in YZ13, passed on to his son in QL45 (1735-1780). Jin Hai et al, Qingdai menggu zhi, 98-99.  
Another small fire had started earlier that summer.  M1D1-2875.1 (QL27.9.16). At the time of the fire, 
Demcuk was carrying out service duties at the Uliyasutai coohai kūwaran. At the time of the fire, Demcuk 
was carrying out service duties at the Uliyasutai coohai kūwaran. M1D1-2875.1 (QL27.9.16).  
132 The Numurge River ran through the north end of Soyolji.  Five karuns under Kalka jurisdiction dotted 
the river, continuing off from the Solon and Barhū karuns.   Urgin Nolon was made a karun under jasak 
taiji Sonomdondub; Adaki, Hūsun Tohoi, Bahirga, and Hūjirtu karun were put under wang Demcuk, while 
three karun of Hūsutai were under the jurisdiction of Jamcan. M1D1-2875.3 (QL27.7.17). 
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scrambled to stamp it out but failed; so too did the four troops from his karun who 
hastened across the river to help.  The wind picked up and quickly carried the fire to the 
southeast, and by evening almost 60 li of land had burned; with the wind at its back, the 
prairie fire (dekjin tuwa) continued to spread quickly.133 
Yet most of the guardsmen proved to be remarkably diligent.  That night three 
men from the neighboring karun, Adaki, arrived at the scene. According to Jambala, 
Adaki’s karun leader, he had spotted smoke coming from the west, he climbed to a 
highpoint for a better look, and saw a prairie fire near Hūjirtu karun.  He had immediately 
dispatched one man to the banner jasaγ to file a report, another to Halhūn Muke karun, 
the next karun to the east to spread the news, then personally set off on horseback with 
the remaining three troops to the scene of the fire.  When alerted of the fire, the jasaγ had 
dispatched two men, Dasi, and another man, Ayusi, to the scene of the fire.  With the full 
authority of the jasaγ’s yamen, they had pressed all able bodied men into service that 
they came across on the road, and thus were able to draft approximately 60 men to the 
cause.134  When they arrived at the scene at sunset (šun kelfike erinde), they called an 
emergency meeting took place that evening (yamji), and the fire was ultimately put out 
the early evening (yamjishūn) of the following day, the fifteenth.  It was a true prairie fire: 
the territory that burned was described as “bare mountains without any forests” (gilajan 
alin moo bujan akū ba).  The estimated dimensions of the land were 60 li north to south, 
                                                
133 Prairie fires, as a rule, spread quickly but burn at lower temperatures (allowing people to stamp them out 
from close); forest fires, on the other hand, move relatively slow but burn at much higher temperatures.  
134 M1D1-2875.3 (QL27.7.17). 
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and 30-40 li east to west at the widest points and over ten li at the narrowest.135  The 
affair would later be personally inspected by the Imperial Representatives’ office and the 
league captain-general of Cecen Han aimaγ, Manibdara and met with wang Demcuk, 
gung Jamcan, and the juwe gūsai aisilara taiji hafasa and proceeded to investigate the 
affair 136 Batu and his company of karun soldiers were all punished for negligence, and 
Demcuk faulted for promoting “the useless, weak, and dim” (budun eberi ulhicun akū 
niyalma) as janggin.137  Guards were previously supposed to go out on patrols on the first 
and fifteenth of every month. It was decided that a man be called up to lead irregularly 
spaced (and thus less predictable) patrols through the hunting grounds.  The man picked 
for the job was wang demcuk i gūsai sula beile Danjin, as he lived close to Soyolji and 
the five neighboring Khalkha karun.138  
As a man “specially called up to guard the hunting preserve” (cohome aba hoihan 
be seremšeme tuwakiyabure de tucibuhe niyalma), Janggin Batu was expected to “keep in 
                                                
135 M1D1-2875.3 (QL27.7.17). From its source, the fire burned all the way to the southern ridge of Berke 
Bulak, the mountain ridge on the eastern boundary (ujan) of Hūjirtu Bulak, on the southeast ridgeline of the 
mountains on the western boundary, at Baica Bulak. When solon i nirui janggin Gabcikan (under the 
meiren i janggin of Hulun Buir, Hūrgi) was questioned on the matter as a “man who knew the hunting 
grounds well” (aba hoihan i babe getuken i sara), he stated that although the burnt land encircled the 
hunting grounds, it was not part of the hunting grounds proper.135  Indeed, Gabcikan stated that the land 
that burned was the part of hunting grounds (hoihan) called Hokiyagol Bayan Ger, but the boundary of the 
fire was for from the hunting ground’s boundaries.  He placed the southern ridge of Berke Bulak, where the 
fire was extinguished, at over 10 li from Halhūn Muke Halhūn Muke at over 30 li from Halbagatai Alin, 
and Halbagatai Alin at 70 or 80 li from Bayan Ger. Thus the land that burned was ultimately deemed 
“unconnected” (daljakū) with the hunting grounds.   See M1D1-2875.3 (QL27.7.17) and M1D1-2875.5 
(QL27.7.15).  
136 M1D1-2875.9 (QL27.7.14).  The amban left Khūree on QL27.6.16.  All the while, he was in touch with 
various officials, including the meiren i janggin of Hulun Buir; he reported to Hulun Buir an estimated 
arrival date of QL27.7.3; meiren i janggin Nisihai uheri da, buthai meiren i janggin jergi uheri da were 
dispatched to meet him. The Hulun buir i solon barhū cooha be uheri kadalara meiren i janggin isihai 
uheri da i kadalan be daiselame icihiyara fulu uheri da had another go for him, claiming he was too sick to 
go. The Cecen Han Manibdara personally arrived at Hūjirtu on QL27.7.7.  
137 M1D1-2875.1 (QL27.9.16). 
138 Ibid. 
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strict order the people under his jurisdiction and diligently and properly keep guard” 
(giyan i fejergi urse be ciralame bargiyatame, saikan kiceme giyarici acambi).  Yet he 
had started the fire himself.  In this case, starting a fire was “no different from poaching” 
(hūlhame gurgušere ci encu akū).  The punishment for first time offenders (a month in 
the cangue) was insufficient for Batu: he was stripped of the rank of janggin, put in the 
cangue for three months under the jurisdiction of the jiangjun of Heilongjiang.  His four 
underlings were sentenced to a month in the cangue for “knowing no fear” (gelere isere 
be sarkū); they were ordered to be whipped one hundred times at the end of their 
sentence.  According to the law, Demcuk should have been punished with a half-year’s 
salary; given the seriousness of the crime, the punishment was doubled to a full year’s 
salary.139   
Negligence by the guardsmen was a constant problem, and  malingering was 
commonly suspected.140  In other cases, the guardsmen openly flaunted the law.  In 1841, 
                                                
139 Ibid. 
140 Malingering was always suspected, at least pro forma, in cases where men dropped out. M1D1-4166.17 
(DG21.5).   All cases of suspected malingering were investigated. See, for example, M1D1-3416.13 
(JQ10.8) and the case of gung Sonomjab’s illness and his missing of the hunt.  If someone was suspected of 
“recklessly making excuses and continually shunning the duty of the hunt” (balai kanagan arame abalara 
alban ci jailataci) were investigated and punished. M1D1-3416.17a (JQ10.7) In JQ10, they investigated the 
cases of three men (tusalakci Gombujab, jakirukci bayartu, and meiren ceden) who failed to report for the 
hunt the year before. In 1805, several jasaks submitted such requests, including jasak Namjildorji gung 
Sonomjab, and Cembuljab.  The later was granted leave on account of his mother’s health, which had been 
deteriorating for over a year.  He had no one else to take care of her.  For Namjildorji, see M1D1-3416.28a 
(JQ10.7).  For Sonomjab, see M1D1-3416.32a (JQ10.10.14).  For Cembuljab, see M1D1-3416.18a 
(JQ10.7) Requests for sick-leave, however, remained relatively common.  Yet only if a man was 
legitimately sick or had pressing family emergencies was he granted leave.140 The year prior, along with 
Gombujab, jakirukci Bayartu and meiren Ceden failed to report to the hunt.  In his place, [culgan i da] 
Gombujab sent taiji G’alsang; Bayartu sent janggin Nayantu; and Ceden sent a man from jasak 
Cedenwambu’s banner. (Cedenwambu (Ch: ĤÍ~_), rvħ7iĻďrvÞ().  Jasaγ for 
the left wing, back banner of Cecen Han aimaγ. Fifth generation descendant of Ceringdasi (assumed rank 
1691).  Assumed his rank JQ8, and passed it on to his son, Namjildorji, in DG1 (1803-1820). Bao Wenhan 
et al, Menggu huibu wanggong biaozhuan, 32, 165; Jin Hai et al, Qingdai menggu zhi, 102.  Gombujab 
claimed he was “seriously ill” (ujeleme nimkekulefi), Bayartu claimed to have already served alban duties 
in Kobdo, and Ceden also claimed to be sick.  All reported in advance the arrival of a replacement except 
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two junior ranking guardsmen (janggin G’aldan and uksin Cedenjab) reported to 
Gombujab, the Director of the Hunting Grounds, that a guard leader (cakdan šabi daruga) 
in the Gūrban Bayan area, Cerindondob, was not taking his service seriously (giyarime 
yaburengge heolen sula umai alban be wesihulere gūnin akū).  Instead, he was using the 
hunting grounds to pasture his herds, amounting to over a thousand horses, yaks, and 
sheep, while scaring away the wild animals, particularly around Bayansangdahū and 
Dulagan Han.  Furthermore, he had failed to deliver any supplies to the guardsmen.141  
Local herders, for their part, may have had good reason to trespass on the hunting 
grounds or have conflicts with the guardsmen.  Locals, for one, were required to help 
supply the hunting party.  To avoid “needlessly allowing confusion to proliferate” (baibi 
ušan fašan i largin banjinambime), those who were forced to sell sheep to the hunting 
parties were compensated at a flat rate of .5 taels of silver per sheep.  But as they were 
compensated not on the spot, only later, the tax could be heavy in years in which every 
sheep and horse counted for survival.142   In the drought-filled years of 1799-1801, for 
                                                                                                                                            
Ceden, who was found guilty.  For his dereliction of duty, jasak Cedenwambu was fined five ninths of 
livestock. M1D1-3416.33a (JQ10.9). 
141 M1D1-4144.5a (DG20.12.14). 
142 In 1805, for example, twenty-five taels of silver were awarded for fifty compensated sheep, which was 
approved to be dispersed via Cedendorji and the culgan i da of Tusiyetu Han aimaγ’s office. M1D1-
3246.16a (QL59.9.10) Horses and camels to be used in the training hunts were to be taken in equal measure 
from each of the four Kalka aimans.  In QL51 (1786), it was decreed that since Cecen Han and Tusiyetu 
Han aimans were so far from Uliyasutai, but close to Khuree, the ambans at Khuree took charge over the 
training hunts of the two eastern aiman, and the Uliyasutai jiyanggiyūn took charge of the hunts in the two 
western aiman; it was hoped that by breaking the hunt down into two, the state would not be unduly 
wearing out the horses and camels necessary for such long trips.  The demands of the hunt were modest: 
200 horses and 100 camels for each hunt. In 1824, though, even this compromise was proving unbearable 
for those responsible for funding the hunt to the “gradual impoverishment of the various banners” (geren 
gūsade ulhiyen i yadahūn de isibuha) over several years and the weakening of livestock due to natural 
disasters, it was requested the livestock necessary for the hunt be taken not from the two aiman, but from 
some of the “tribute/taxed animals” (albani ulha) herded into the vicinity of Khuree from Uliasutai, in 
effect putting the burden of the both hunts on the western aiman.  In his response, the jiyanggiyūn of 
Uliayasutai, Golfongga [sp?], noted that Uliyasutai was 3,000 li from Khuree, and that animals herded there 
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example, healthy horses were in short supply, but the training hunts were carried out 
nevertheless.143 Acknowledging the problem, the amban often memorialized requests to 
cancel the hunt during years of extreme hardship. Despite preparations during the 
summer of 1823, for example, a drought that had begun in the two months prior to 
hunting season had caused waters to recede and animals to weaken, and it was ultimately 
decided to forego the hunt.144  Through 1826, the hunt was similarly called off due to the 
devastation caused to the economy by “drought and hunger” (hiyan yuyun) in the two 
aimaγ.145  It was again cancelled for “several years” (ududu aniya; hanciki aniya) through 
1840.146  In the summer of 1841, upon again cancelling the hunt, the amban conceded, 
                                                                                                                                            
are could not be used for being too skinny and weak, and there was no profit (tusa akū) in using the alban 
ulha for the hunts. M1D1-4166.13a (DG21.10.6) 
143 M1D1-4144.13 (DG20.5); M1D1-3416.7a (JQ10.8). In JQ4 and JQ6, it was recorded that the supplies 
and soldiers were insufficient in number and the horses too weak to carry out the hunt successfully, the 
number of soldiers and supplies were insufficient as well, leading to harshwords and punishments (gebu 
jorime wakalame) for the implicated culgan i data, aisilara jiyanggiyūn, ilhi culgan i da hebei harangga 
jasak and hafasa. In 1805 the quota for horses was met, but the riding horses from three southern banners 
in Tusiyetu Han aimaγ – those of wang Dorjijab, jasak Urjinjab, and jasak Dasijab’s -- were described as 
“grossly emaciated and exhausted” (hūsun turha143 šadara macurangge labdu bimbime).  The banner 
authorities all attributed the problem to both draught the distances of their banners from the hunting 
grounds. Dorjijab (Ch: B»²_), rĀBêįÇ.  Jasaγ for the left wing, central banner of Tusiyetu 
Han aimaγ.  Sixth generation descendant of 621 (enfeoffed 1691).  Assumed his rank QL47 to JQ21 
(1782-1817). Urjinjab (Ch: ·»¥_), rĀÞ().  Jasaγ of the left wing, right-end banner of 
Tusiyetu Han aimaγ.  Forth generation descendant of Mucuk (enfeoffed 1697).  Ascended to rank in QL36, 
passed on to his his son Dondubdorji in DG2 (1781-1822). Dasijab (Ch: ī_), rvÞ().  
Jasaγ for the second central banner (|) of Tusiyetu Han aimaγ.  Forth generation descendant of 
Chenggunjab (enfeoffed 1719).  Assumed rank in JQ10; passed onto to his eldest son, Jamchubdorji, in 
JQ11 (1805-1806). Bao Wenhan et al, Menggu huibu wanggong biaozhuan, 28, 158, 161; Jin Hai et al, 
Qingdai menggu zhi, 88-89, 93, 95. 
144 M1D1-3750.11 (DG3.10). 
145 M1D1-3834.8 (DG6.6.18).  In 1826, an investigation was called for into exactly which banners were 
experiencing devastation, and which had finally been washed by rain; when the inquisition left the amban’s 
office on DG6.6.18, all banners were given ten days to respond on their preparedness. 
146 M1D1-4144.13 (DG20.5). In part, the exhaustion of the animals reflected the fact that they were being 
used already for other types of service.  In 1840, other forms of service (alban) cited included escorting 
Russian mission-men to Beijing and patrolling the relay-stations (giyamun).  Indeed it was as a result of a 
“full-on inspection of all [Tusiyetu Han] aimaγ’s bannerlands during the summer” that the “people’s horses 
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“due to the relentless decimation of the pastures in the aimaγs and the emaciation of the 
horses and livestock, for already several years there has not been a hunt.”147  In 1842, a 
deadly combination of fierce winds in the spring and drought in the summer ended the 
hunt yet again.148  Moreover since Mongols had already performed the service obligation 
of escorting Russian schoolchildren (tacikūi juse) back to Russia from Beijing, it was 
argued that that one obligation had been taxing enough.149    
 
Conclusion 
 
In the period 1820-1840, the Qing state mobilized language and institutions used 
to govern “restricted grounds” and applied them to Mongolia as a whole.  In practice, the 
project was limited.  Campaigns for “purification” were confined to banners on the most 
lucrative trade routes or containing the most valuable production sites: the caravan 
highway linking Beijing to Kiakhta, the northern taiga which yielded fur, the mushroom 
fields of the far east, the mountains around Khüree with their elk-horn and lumber, the 
scattered alluvial deposits of gold.  Since the establishment of Qing rule, other 
                                                                                                                                            
and livestock have not yet recovered their strength,” rendering the training-hunt impossible. M1D1-4144.14 
(DG20.8.27). 
147 M1D1-4166.5 (DG21.5).  Still the call went out for 250 soldiers aged 18-40 from each aimaγ, with 
requisite riding horses, weapons, Mongol-style gers, tents and tools.147  While emphasizing the importance 
of the hunt, the authorities conceded that it would have to be postponed for another year. M1D1-4166.6 
(DG21.6). 
148 M1D1-4166.3b (DG21.6.5). As the league captain-general for Tusiyetu Han aimaγ (the han aγula [han 
alin] league), Pungcukdorji wrote, Wang Lasurunbatzar and other’s banners in desert pastures (gobi nuktei) 
had been hit the hardest. Lasurunbatzar (Ch: 0â3],», tāĻ]r»), rĀBêįÇ.  Jasaγ of 
the left wing, center banner of Tusiyetu Han aimaγ.  Ascended to rank in DG7 (1827), passed on after 
[1850]. Bao Wenhan et al, Menggu huibu wanggong biaozhuan, 425; Jin Hai et al, Qingdai menggu zhi, 
88-89. 
149 M1D1-4166.3a (DG21.12.3); M1D1-4166.4 (DG21.12.28). 
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institutions, such as tribute and licensing, had supported trade and migration; the empire 
had found space for Mongols and Chinese to live together.  Undocumented migrants, 
poaching, and the black market inspired a more radical vision: “pure” Mongolia.  At 
production sites like the mushroom fields, unlicensed exploitation and its environmental 
consequences became the key friction point between registered Mongols and 
undocumented Chinese; “purity” was this friction’s administrative and ideological 
expression.  A vision of untouched steppe, uncorrupted Mongol, and pure ethnic space 
came to the fore.  Environmental protection, that is, was not tangential to the greater 
project of multiethnic empire: it was central to it.   
Yet the state proved remarkably successful in preserving these spaces as “pure” in 
their time, and “natural” in ours: the holy mountains and hunting grounds survive today 
as protected national parks.  In the nineteenth century, too, visitors were struck by them. 
In 1821, a Russian traveller on his way back from Beijing was struck by Mt. Khan: “the 
forests which cover it are held sacred by the Mongols.”150  Yet he also learned that “in the 
clefts of the Khanola [i.e. Mt. Khan] there are tents, where sentinels are stationed to 
hinder people from ascending the mountain.”151  The nature of the mountain, that is, was 
not an original nature: it was an expression of manufactured wilderness.  Empire 
produced this peculiar purity, not nature. 
Ideologically, the Mongol subject was meant to be simple herder, not a reckless 
and profit-driven mushroom-picker.  One could not act “blindly” or “impulsively:” the 
maintaining the welfare of Mongolia required long-term vision and temperance.  In this 
                                                
150 Egor Fedorovich Timkovskii, Travels of the Russian Mission through Mongolia to China and Residence 
in Pekin, in the years 1820-1821 (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1827), 426.  
151 Timkovskii, 427. 
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sense, the Mongols were not altogether different from Manchus, for whom frugality was 
a defining virtue.  Imperial order required Qing subjects to follow their appropriate ways.  
Austerity, as much as martial vigor, sustained the empire.  As the Yongzheng emperor 
declared in 1727 on the perils of luxury:  
It is an established principle that the practice of frugality means not 
falling into poverty while extravagant spending always ends in cold and 
starvation.  The ordinary disposition of us Manchus is to be pure (Ma: 
gulu) and plain,…[but] lately the Manchus have not been doing well at 
making ends meet and their livelihoods have been sometimes meager 
or even miserable.152  
 
Later, in the Jiaqing and Daoguang reign periods, the influence of the market 
similarly seemed to the court to threaten the viability of the Mongol way of life.  Like 
Manchus, as a Daoguang era gazetteer of Uliasutai explained, the Mongols too were 
“endowed with an pure and honest nature” (Ch: ÿ&Ġpª).153  Emperors had long 
warned, however, that this original virtue was easily corrupted: in Kangxi’s words, “it is 
the Mongols’ nature to be easily deceived” (Ma: Mongoso i banin eitereme hūlimbure de 
ja bime).154  By the first half of the nineteenth, it was easy to be led astray.  Temptation 
was everywhere: leave your pastures behind, and become a logger, join a caravan, 
collude with Chinese mushroom pickers.   Mongol lands were changing under the very 
feet of its people as plants, animals, and fish were disappearing and the land was taken 
over and converted to other uses.  Seeing in this a threat to essential “Mongolness,” 
                                                
152 Cited and translated in Mark Elliott, The Manchu Way, 287.  For the original Manchu, see Dergi hese 
jakūn gūsade wasimbuhangge, 5:36b. 
153 The writer of the Wuliyasutai zhilue was not convinced, however, that Mongol ways were entirely right-
headed.  He recorded that Mongol medicine was practiced by lamas and left something to be desired; 
likewise, for his Chinese-reading audience, he notes the curiosity that Mongols do not cloth the dead, but 
leave them in the wilderness to be ravished by wild animals (éXzYĲĲÅŉ). Wuliyasutai zhilue, 
65.   
154 Chuang Chi-fa, Qingdai zhungaer shiliao chubian,148-149. 
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starting in the early 1800s, the court sought a solution by treating Mongolia a notch more 
important than it normally had: to make Mongolia “pure” required that the territory as a 
whole be handled like an imperial hunting ground or a holy mountain.   
Anxieties about the corrupting influence of the market, however, were hardly 
limited to Manchus and Mongols.   Indeed, as the final chapter shows, the closer one got 
to the Russo-Mongol borderland, the greater the need to protect imperial subjects from 
reckless behavior, and the more active the interventions to establish social and 
environmental “purity.”  Similar dynamics, however, were at work.  As in the Mongol 
territories to its south, the years 1820-1840 proved transformative for the northernmost 
borderlands of the empire, as uncontrolled “mixing,” black-market commerce, and an 
environmental crisis – the collapse of fur-bearing animal populations – inspired new calls 
to discipline both Qing subjects and their natural environment. 
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Chapter 5: Purity and the Qing Borderlands: Fur and Lake Khovsgol in the Early 
19th Century 
 
Introduction  
 
In the spring of 1837, the Qing empire’s representative in Khüree assembled a 
small entourage of secretaries, attendants, and guides and prepared for a journey to Lake 
Khovsgol, near the Russian border.1   His name was Dorjirabdan, and as the Mongol 
amban, he was one of the most powerful figures in all of Qing Mongolia.  He packed 
with him bundles of silver, tea, and tobacco – gifts to be distributed on the trip – and set 
off on a seven days’ ride for the borderland.  Tensions were high then between Qing 
border guards and the people they knew as the Tannu Urianghai.  In the middle and late 
Qing period, the Urianghai were known for providing a lucrative tribute in wild furs – 
tens of thousands pelts each year.  Like other tribute-payers, these helped outfit the 
imperial family with clothing and accessories, including the distinctive sable-lined 
dragon-robes worn by the emperors in Beijing.  During the boom years of the eighteenth 
century, these furs also found their way into elite fashion, as the craze for fur, described 
in Chapter One, swept through the cities of the Chinese provinces.  Given the 
circumstances, then, it is perhaps not surprising that in 1837, at Lake Khovsgol, the 
dispute between Tannu Urianghai and border guards centered on fur and trapping rights.  
Tensions had flared when a hunter’s trap mistakenly killed a border-guard’s horse.  Now, 
trappers and guardsmen were feuding about the boundary between them: where, exactly, 
did the restricted borderland begin?   
                                                
1 The following account is taken from M1D1-4092.1 (DG17.4.20).  
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Map 5: Lake Khovsgol and the Russo-Mongol Border Region 
 
In a Manchu-language memorial to the throne, Dorjirabdan reassured the emperor 
that he knew the borderland with Russia was of the “utmost importance,” and he intended 
to “make the borderland pure” (Ma: jecen be bolgo obure).  At the same time, he aimed 
to ensure that fur-trapping, the Urianghai “livelihood” (Ma: banjire were), continue 
undiminished.  Within a day of arrival – after the tea, tobacco, and silver was handed out 
– he secured a settlement, and a new boundary was drawn between the two jurisdictions.  
To finalize the accord, the amban hired a local lama to draw a map, wrote a summary 
memorial to the throne, and returned home. 2  Why, of all decades, did tensions over land-
                                                
2 M1D1-4092.1 (DG17.4.20).  
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use flare up in the 1830s?  And what did it mean, in practice, for the borderlands to be 
“pure”? 
This chapter argues that the boreal forests of the Qing taiga, like the Mongolian 
steppe, became the objects of “purification” amidst an environmental crisis.  Whereas 
mushroom picking broke the nexus between people and place on the Mongol steppe, the 
depletion of fur bearing animals had the same dislocating effect on the northern 
borderlands.  Stakes were high in the northern borderland: the closer one moved to 
Russia, the greater the need to maintain order.  There was no room for ambiguity.  Just as 
Mongol bannerland was administratively, territorially, and environmentally distinct, so 
too were the two key jurisdiction types of the far north: borderlands (Ma: jecen i ba; Mo: 
kijiγar un γajar; Ch: ) and lands of the Urianghai (Ma: urianghai; Mo: uriangqai; 
Ch: ďàā).  The Qing empire protected both from outside intervention.  The 
borderlands were ruled to be like holy mountains or imperial hunting grounds: empty and 
“pure;” Urianghai lands were to serve the Urianghai “way of life,” defined as hunting and 
fur trapping.  Both were protected from Mongol herders and Chinese merchants.  Herders 
and merchants were fit for the steppe; border guards and Urianghai trappers were fit for 
the northern forest (Ma: taiga; Mo: taiγa). 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, however, the environmental order was 
thrown into chaos, as rampant over-hunting decimated local animals.  First sables, then 
foxes, then squirrels disappeared from the forest.  The Urianghai were under duress, and 
the line between borderland and Urianghai land – like the boundary between Mongol 
herder and Chinese agriculturalist much further south – was getting “confused” (Ma: 
suwaliyaganjaha).  In response, the Qing state mobilized itself to “make the borderland 
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pure:” to repatriate trespassers, defend boundary lines, and ensure the long-term 
sustainability of fur-bearing animals. Just as the steppe embodied the imperial will to 
protect it from mushroom picking, the taiga embodied the will to maintain its association 
with fur-trapping Urianghai and fur-bearing animals.  In both cases, the Qing empire 
elaborated and defended the boundaries and constitution of a jurisdiction, and in so doing 
provided the political framework for the invention of nature as well.  The border with 
Russia, in short, was anything but natural: its nature was an imperial creation. 
The chapter discusses first the administrative and territorial identity of the Qing 
borderlands.  It then shifts to Urianghai lands, highlighting the crucial distinctions 
between border-, Urianghai, and Mongol jurisdictions.  Having established the contours 
of the imperial order, the chapter then delves into the great crisis of the early nineteenth-
century – the collapse of fur-bearing animals – and imperial efforts to maintain stability 
and “purity.”  It concludes where it begins: with the amban Dorjirabdan, trudging up to 
Lake Khovsgol, ready to put the border back in line.    
Pure Wilderness in the Borderland 
 
A basic feature of the Russo-Qing borderland in Mongolia in the high Qing period 
should be established first: the fact that there was a “borderland.”  The term “borderland” 
should not be confused with the empire’s Inner Asian “frontiers” – a realm that 
encompassed two-thirds of all Qing territory, including Manchuria, Mongolia, etc.  
Rather, the borderland (Ma: jecen i ba) was a discrete jurisdiction: the militarized strip of 
land fronting Russia established with the treaties of Nerchinsk (1689) and Kiakhta 
(1726).  It was confined, to its north, by the “border” (Ma: jecen) with Russia, and to its 
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south by a “boundary” (Ma: ujan) with regular “Mongol land” (Ma: monggo i ba).3  In 
some locations, the distance between border and boundary was a short day’s ride on 
horseback; in other locations, such as near Lake Khovsgol, it was perhaps five or six 
days’ ride.4  The only residents of this space were border guards (Ma: karun i urse or 
cakda i hafan cooha), whose guard stations, called karun (Ma: karun; Mo: qaraγul; Ch: 
), were positioned not on the border itself, but closer to the southern boundary.   
The territory possessed an administrative identity distinct from Mongol 
bannerland.  This is clear from the fact that karun guardsmen reported up to the ambans 
in Khüree or the military governor in Uliasutai, not to Mongol jasaγs.  There were 
altogether twenty-three karun in the Uliasutai jurisdiction, staffed by a rotating group of 
850 soldiers (each karun with 30-50 men), twenty-three taiji (each karun with one), and 
six assistant taiji (Ch: ?įIN, each in charge of three or four karun each).5  Following 
administrative divisions, Qing documents contrasted these “border guards” with 
“bannermen” (Ma: gūsai urse) and “Mongols” (Ma: monggoso) living to their south: they 
were different types of imperial subjects, governed under different administrative 
hierarchies, and with differing claims to their territories’ resources.  The space, in this 
sense, was more akin to “restricted areas,” such as holy mountains and imperial game 
parks, than to standard Mongol bannerland. The Huidian, for example, defined the karun 
                                                
3 M1D1-3834.7a (DG6.1.12), for example, explicitly contrasts “borderland” (jecen i ba) with “Mongol 
land” (monggo i ba).   
4 Russian diplomats later pointed to this peculiarity of the Qing borderlands to justify expansion into certain 
areas, including Tannu Urianghai lands, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  See Thomas E. 
Ewing, “The Forgotten Frontier: South Siberia (Tuva) in Chinese and Russian History, 1600-1920,” 
Central Asiatic Journal 25, no. 3-4 (1981), 189. 
5 Wuliyasutai zhilue, 45. 
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to be “wherever there are borders or restricted areas” (Ch: ƌǞƬƌŐ[3A!w
).6  Both types of space were held to be of top importance and held to the highest 
standards; both had to be “pure.” 
The basic principles for governing the borderland were outlined in the treaties of 
Nerchinsk and Kiakhta.7  All Russian subjects (lit. “people of Russia” (Ma: Oros i 
niyalma) who, by the time of the treaties, had already settled in designated Qing territory 
were removed north, and thereafter all “escapees” (Ma: ukanju) who crossed the border 
were to be arrested and returned to their homeland for punishment.  All travelers to the 
border region would need a special “passport” (Ma: jugūn yabure temgetu bithe; lit. 
“permit for travelling on roads”), and, after 1727, the Treaty of Kiakhta limited cross-
border trade to the town of Kiakhta.  The core principles of these treaties were: 1) clear 
delineation of sovereign jurisdiction; 2) strict segregation of imperial subjects; 3) special 
oversight over cross-border commerce; and 4) a licensing system for travelers.8  Not only 
                                                
6 Cited in Li Yushu, Waimeng zhengjiao zhidu kao, 55. 
7 These principles became domestic law, with the same language used in the Treaty of Kiakhta inscribed 
into the Laws and Precedents for the Board Governing Outer Dependencies (Ch: Lifanyuan zeli), the 
compendium of laws governing Outer Mongolia. The text was published on six different occasions: 1789 
(juan 12, as the Menggu lüli), 1817 (juan 63), 1826 (juan 63), 1841(juan 63), 1891(juan 64), and 1908 
(juan 64).  See Farquhar p. 206-207, n. 176. The Mongolian State Library holds multiple copies of the text, 
testifying to the broad dissemination of the regulations in the region. 
8 Significantly, the treaty also maintained special provisions on fur trappers. The Treaty of Bura and 
Kiakhta adopted the same language: “The Uriankhy [people], to whichever side they pay five sables of 
yasak, on that side they shall remain and continue to pay [the yasak].  Those Uriankhy [people], however, 
who paid one sable to each side, from the day the frontier is established, will never again be required [to 
pay it].” Translated in Mark Mancall, Russia and China; Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1971), 285.  Just as on the Russo-Qing border, poaching similarly helped 
institutionalize the Chosǒn-Qing border.  Sable poaching outside Chosǒn and a cross-border black market 
was recorded as early as 1409. Korean ginseng poaching was at the center of disputes between the Later Jin 
and Choson courts in the 1630s. After a significant expansion in ginseng poaching from the early 
eighteenth century on, the problem became instrumental in the creation of the border infrastructure. In the 
first half of the nineteenth century, Korean poachers increasingly targeted not only ginseng, but sable and 
medicinal deerhorn, with incidents reported across both the Yalu and Tumen River areas. Yet the poaching 
of all three major commodities was already endemic by at least 1772, when extensive black markets in 
these key resources was investigated in the Chosǒn border areas. For sable poaching in 1409, see T’aejong 
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Russians, but Mongols and Chinese were prohibited from entering the borderland.  All 
who trespassed were found guilty of “haphazard mixing” (Ma: suwaliyaganjame); none 
but guardsmen were permitted to “rule over the pastoral territory” (Ma: nuktere babe 
ejelefi).9   If someone trespassed, they were arrested.  If someone built a home, it was 
razed.  By law, illegal migrants to the area were “to be driven back to their homelands” 
(Ma: da ba; Mo: uγ γajar), in order that, as we have seen before, the “borderland be made 
pure” (Ma: jecen be bolgo obu; Mo: kijiγar i ariγun bolγa; Ch: žĄǞĹ).” 10   
Searching for any signs of human activity was thus the primary job for 
guardsmen, who swept the border on their regular “patrol routes” (Ma: karun i jugūn).  
Each spring and autumn, top officials, including jasaγs and newly appointed Military 
Governors of Uliasutai (Ma: jiyanggiyūn, Mo: jiyanggiyun; Ch: Ǒ) audited their work 
with two inspection tours of the forty-seven karun dotting the Russian border with 
Mongolia.11  After each inspection – and whether or not any border violations were 
discovered – they submitted a memorial to the emperor confirming that inspections had, 
indeed, taken place.  In Mongolia’s far northwest, in the Ketun River region, for example, 
a team of 120 Durbet, Urianghai, and Khalkha soldiers annually assembled for the job.  
Beginning their patrol in Hak Noor, they rode to Oimon Gool, Ike Hotoronggoi, and 
finally Baga Hotoronggoi.  If there were no irregularities, they reported that having 
                                                                                                                                            
sillok, 17. On ginseng in the making of the Qing-Chosǒn border, see Li Huazi, Qingchao yu Chaoxian 
guanxi shi yanjiu (Yanji: Yanbian daxue chubanshe, 2006): 14-22, 123-135, 162-164.  On Qianlong period 
black markets, see Yǒngjo sillok, 119. 
9 TGKH 63: 4b-5a. 
10 TGKH 63: 4b-5a; GMQJ 63: 5a. 
11 M1D1-3750.11 (DG3.10). 
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“thoroughly investigated every place,” they found “no people residing in or using 
pastures” (Ma: umai nukteme tere niyalma akū).12  As the wording suggests, the land 
could be neither inhabited nor worked; even livestock were prohibited from the territory.  
Prohibitions against trespassing were pragmatic: they made the border guards’ job 
easier.  During their patrols, the authorities had to confirm that having “thoroughly 
investigated” the borderland and had found “no person living within the territory” (Ma: 
umai nukteme tere niyalma akū).13   Patrolling for Russian incursions was the primary 
task, but it involved thoroughly “keeping look-out over the land” (Ma: baran karara) and 
“tracking” (Ma: songko faitara).14  As the amban explained in 1826, when Mongols were 
haphazardly using the borderlands, their activities resulted in the destruction of other 
tracks, making it impossible to find signs of possible Russian trespassing.15  
Exclusion also had a broader strategic function, as the territory was conceived, in 
part, as a natural defense.  When the Kangxi emperor agreed to the Treaty of Nerchinsk, 
it was on condition that the border lay astride natural barriers whenever possible:  
If in the vicinity of places ruled by Russian subjects there are 
mountains, rivers, or taiga, use the mountains, rivers, or taiga as the 
border.16  If in the vicinity of Mongol guard-posts and cairns (Ma: obo) 
there are mountains, rivers, or taiga, make the mountains, rivers, or 
taiga the border.  If there are no mountains or rivers but there is an open 
plain (Ma: šehun necin ba; Mo: jildam tübsin γajar), divide [the plain] 
exactly in the middle, erect cairns, and establish the border.17     
                                                
12 M2D1-176.78a-b (DG15.+6), M2D1-177.12a (XF1.6), M2D1-177.35b (XF2.6).  The language in the 
three documents is identical.  The emperor responded “saha” -  “acknowledged “ - in each case.    
13 Ibid.    
14 M1D1-3834.1a (DG6.7). 
15 Ibid. 
16 “Taiga” is the word used in all texts.  The English word “taiga” derives from Mongol via Russian.  
17 TGKH 63: 3a-3b; GMQJ 63:3a-b.  
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To the Kangxi emperor, empty space could be used as a bulwark against intruding 
armies.  In this spirit, when Kangxi dispatched the emissary Tulišen to Russia in 1712, he 
ordered Tulišen, if asked by the Russians, to report that his travel route had “a great many 
mountains, forests, and steep and narrow places” (Ma: jugūn i tuwaci, alin hada bujan 
weji haksan hafirahūn ba umesi labdu; Ch: ûǔŀțÚÔEŞǽǼƢĵ
d).18  The basic strategic uses of wooded areas as “strong positions” (Ma: akdun ba) was 
well understood.19  Such spaces had two advantages: they were difficult to pass through, 
and they made it difficult to support an army.20  Any eighteenth-century army would have 
found formidable such treacherous terrain.21    
It was the absence of usable life – either in the form of fodder or people – and 
disconnection from the wider world that made such spaces so strategically formidable.  
During the Dzungar Wars, when Qing armies had to cross through lifeless expanses 
Outer Mongolia, it was described as “backcountry” or “bush” (Ma: bigan; Mo: keger-
e).22  Troops were paid extra commission for time served in the bigan, and any army that 
                                                
18 Tulišen, Lakcaha jecen de takūraha babe ejehe bithei, 14. 
19 Chuang Chifa, Qingdai zhungaer shiliao, 46. 
20 For a discussion of scale and the logistics of supporting an army, see Peter Perdue, “Military 
Mobilization in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century China, Russia, and Mongolia,” Modern Asian Studies 
30, no. 4 (1996), 757-793. 
21 The pre-conquest Manchu records characteristically celebrate Nurhaci (r. 1616-1626) and Hong Taiji (r. 
1626-1643), the founders of the Qing ruling house, for their superior ability to use terrain to their 
advantage, manipulating, for example ill-fated Ming armies into quagmires and marshes, only to set 
ambushes. Qing (and aisin gurun) generals were to avoid such areas at all costs. Cf. MBRT 1.8.126.13, 
3.38.1484.6, 3.4.940.15, 3.8.1007.6c. 
22 Chuang Chifa, Qingdai zhungaer shiliao, 72-73.  In Manchu dictionaries published since the late 
nineteenth-century, “bigan” is the word most consistently translated as wilderness.  See Norman: 
“wilderness, an uncultivated area, wild;” Hauer, “unbebautes Land, Ödland, freies Feld, Wildnis;” and 
Zakharov, “всякое дикое, необитаемое, вне жилья находящееся место, открытное чистое поле; 
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could truly conquer it was unusually imposing.23  Defenses could nevertheless be 
augmented by evacuating the land of people – a strategy pursued at the same time, in a 
similar way, in the borderlands with Korea and, most famously, on the southwest coast 
during the war with Zheng Chenggong.24  Such a space was different entirely from 
Mongol “steppe” (Ma: tala; Mo: tala): according to one Manchu-Mongol dictionary from 
1728, the “steppe” was “backcountry with roads” (Ma: bigan de jugūn bisirengge; Mo: 
keker-e [d]ür jam bui).25  The implied meaning of “backcountry,” defined in the 
dictionary simply as “open plains” (Ma: onco šehun ba; Mo: aγuu saraγul γajar), was a 
land through which no roads passed. The Mongol steppe was defined by its accessibility 
– a world of vital linkages with the outside, not isolation.  The borderland was defined for 
its impenetrability.     
Beyond this strategic function, excluding settlement was also meant to safeguard 
the guardsmen’s livelihood.  In 1826, for example, the ambans’ office led an effort to 
                                                                                                                                            
пустыня, стень; пустынный, степной, дикий.” Jerry Norman, A Concise Manchu-English Lexicon, 29; 
Erich Hauer, Handwörterbuch der Mandschusprache 2nd rev. ed. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz GmbH & 
Co. KG, 2007), 49; Ivan Il’ich Zakharov, Polni man’chzhursko-ruskii slovar’ (St. Petersburg: Tip. I. 
Akademii nauk, 1875), 495. 
23 Chuang Chifa, Qingdai zhungaer shiliao, 72-73, 108-109.  The bigan “wilderness” as described in early 
Manchu records was similarly difficult to survive in. Warm hats and gowns were offered as gifts to keep 
one warm while hunkered down there. See MBRT 2.60.869-872.  In Qing documents, bigan spaces 
likewise figure as spaces outside the direct gaze of the state and as a refuge for criminals: bandits, poachers, 
and spies hide in wilderness, and murder investigations begin when locals discover bodies there. M1D1-
3935.36 (DG11.8.12); M1D1-3936.18a (DG11.9.2); M1D1-3936.2a (DG11.8.30).   As an adjective, it was 
also term reserved for undomesticated plants and wild peoples. For the example of bigan’s use in both 
senses, see Tulišen, Lakcaha jecen de takūraha babe ejehe bithe, 30, 174. 
24 A similar border was maintained between Manchuria and Korea.  It was not unusual for Korean travellers 
passing through on their way to Manchuria to write as if they were isolated on an ancient and broken 
steppe:  “Going to bed I think of home.  It is truly silent [at the water’s edge].  There is no one to be seen, 
only dense grass and mature forest.  I suddenly recall Du Fu’s poem, ‘I travel amongst northern barbarians 
[ƀ], as if in an empty valley.”  Zhang Jie, Hanguo shiliao sanzhong yu shangjing manzu yanjiu (Shenyang: 
Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2009), 185. 
 
25 Han-i araha manju monggo gisuni bileku bithe / Qaγan-u bicigsen manju mongγol ügen-ü toil bicig 
(1708). 
 269 
reassess the boundaries of all Kalkha banners which adjoined the borderland.  For each 
banner, their boundary line with the borderlands was renegotiated, remapped and new 
boundary cairns erected.26  In the process, guardsmen had a chance to air some of their 
grievances.  Such conflicts over pastures suggest ways in which segregation was used not 
only to protect the guardsmen’s mission but their economic interests as well: the 
guardsmen needed pastures large enough to support their households.  Over time, the 
borderland became, in practice, a strip of land broad enough to support the troops. If the 
quality of the land was high, the strip was relatively small; if the land was mountainous, 
dry, alkaline, or otherwise poor for grazing, the allotted strip was allowed to be larger.  
Knowing the exact location of the southern boundary line was thus fundamental 
to the integrity of the borderland, and disputes over access rights were not uncommon.  
The years 1820-1850 in particular witnessed a series of conflicts over land-use between 
border guards and neighboring populations.  1826 in particular witnessed a flurry of such 
conflicts, when six of the fifteen Kalkha banners that adjoined jecen borderland had their 
territory reassessed.  The boundaries were renegotiated, remapped and new cairns (Ma: 
obo; Mo: obuγ-a[n]) erected.27  In a typical case, the land that had been designated the 
boundary (Ma: ujan obuha ba) in the vicinity of Asinggū karun, in Cecen Han aimaγ, was 
deemed “extremely close” to the regular summer pastures of bannermen.  While the 
                                                
26 These were the banners of the two jasaγs need to fix these gammas named Namjildorji in Tusiyetu Han 
aimaγ, those of güng Gombujab and jasaγ Mingjurdorji in Cecen Han aimaγ, and those of güng Šakdurjab 
and jasaγ Jikmitcebden in Jasaktu Han aimaγ.  Their banners stretched along the border between Jijilik 
karun (on the road from Uliasutai) and Kubuljek karun (the last before the Heilongjiang karuns began). 
M1D1-3822.1a (DG6.9.1). 
27 These were the banners of the two jasaγs named Namjildorji in Tusiyetu Han aimaγ, those of güng 
Gombujab and jasaγ Mingjurdorji in Cecen Han aimaγ, and those of güng Šakdurjab and jasaγ 
Jikmitcebden in Jasaktu Han aimaγ.  Their banners stretched along the border between Jijilik karun (on the 
road from Uliasutai) and Kubuljek karun (that last before the Heilongjiang karuns began). M1D1-3822.1a 
(DG6.9.1). 
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matter had been raised the previous fall, and cairns established on the southern perimeter, 
land management was proving to be “lax” (Ma: sulfakan), and animals from the two 
jurisdictions were getting “mixed up” (Ma: suwaliyaganjame).  All herders were thus 
transferred south to avoid further conflict.28   
In the banner of jasaγ Mingjurdorji,29 abutting thirteen karun to the east of 
Asinggū karun, in the far northeast corner of Mongolia, boundary infringement involved 
both Mongol pastoralists and Chinese merchants.  In the winter of 1826, having 
trespassed on karun land, both herders and four caravans of merchants had been trapped 
in the borderlands.30  Though the border guards ordered them to leave, their condition 
was pathetic: the snow had decimated their horses, and finding fuel (either firewood or 
dung) was virtually impossible.  As things stood, they were living in “extreme violation 
of rules and principles,” since it was “inappropriate to continue having people from 
                                                
28 M1D1-3834.1a (DG6.7). 
29 Mingjurdorji (Ch: wÈ»B»², wÈB»²), first degree taiji jasaγ of the center-front banner of 
Cecen Han aimaγ.  Seventh generation descendant of Ananda (enfeoffed beise in 1691; demoted to taiji in 
the fourth generation).  Ascended to rank in JQ11, passed on to younger brother, Yitsingnorbu, in DG27 
(1806-1847). Bao Wenhan et al, Menggu huibu wanggong biaozhuan, 432; Jin Hai et al, Qingdai menggu 
zhi, 108. 
30 The Mongols were locals from Mingjurdorji’s banner, under the jurisdiction of “Mingjurdorji i gūsai 
emu tanggūta boigon i taiji.” M1D1-3822.1a (DG6.9.1).  The winter of 1825-1826 was a disaster 
throughout Mongolia.  Border guards around Hathūlbom karun perhaps suffered the worst, when flooding, 
followed by a blizzard, washed away the Eg River at its source, at the southern tip of Lake Khovsgol.  
When the snow melted the following spring, a wall of mud and rocks remained, leaving the Eg dammed at 
its source.  Downstream communities which depended on the water for its pastures – including the 
guardsmen at Hatgal – were in desperate straits: their only short-term solution was to remove to different 
pastures. But when they issued a panicked plea to the amban’s office, the response returned was ice cold: 
leaving the karun was out of the question.  Instead, they were upbraided for bringing misfortune upon 
themselves by failing to pay proper respects to mountain and river sprits (Ma: amba alin, bira muke i 
enduri geren banji be weceme hukšeme jalbarihakūci banjinahabi).30  The amban ordered that all the 
soldiers and lamas in the community gather together to read sutras, pray for good fortune, and pay more 
earnest respect to Lake Khovsgol, local mountains, and the Eg river. Then, with Heaven’s help, water 
would come forth on its accord. M1D1-3834.2a (DG6.3.21).  On the seriousness of state rainmaking and 
similar stories from the Chinese interior, see Jeffrey Snyder-Reinke, Dry Spells: State Rainmaking and 
Local Governance in Late Imperial China (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009). 
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banner-lands and Chinese merchants haphazardly mixing in karun land on the Russian 
border.”  An agreement was decided upon by Artasida (the league captain-general for 
Cecen Han aimaγ), the coordinating authority for the eastern karun (Ma: karun be uheri 
kadalara gung) and the local jasaγ, Mingjurdorji, to resolve the matter.  It would require 
“renewing what has been established and living segregated,” which meant erecting new 
cairns, tightening the travel permit system, and finally “putting a stop to haphazard 
nomadizing” (Ma: suwaliyaganjame nukteburakū obume).  By doing so, they would 
“make the land borderland” (Ma: jecen obuha ba).31  
The case was not singular. In Mingjurdorji’s banner, however, it was clear that 
merchants were regularly crossing the Kherlen and engaging in loan-and-trade practices 
with the local Mongols and guardsmen.  Even more egregiously, they were conducting 
trade with Russians as well.  Thus after the investigation of 1826, the merchants were 
ordered once again south of the Kherlen River, and authorities in Hohhot, Dolon Noor, 
and Kalgan forced to double check the status of all Chinese who applied for travel 
permits to Mingjurdorji’s banner .32   
Total exclusion of trespassers was, of course, impossible: the border was too long 
and guardsmen too few.  Difficult terrain exacerbated problems posed by the sheer length 
of the border and great distances between karun.  Inspection tours, moreover, were 
expensive and demanding. The “extremely important” (Ma: umesi oyonggo) karun north 
of Uliasutai and Khobdo, for example, proved woefully under-supervised.  In the wake of 
                                                
31 M1D1-3834.7a (DG6.1.12). It is perhaps worth underlining the flexibility the officials demonstrated in 
allowing the migrants to pass the winter in the border-zone.  Whether out of humanity, inability to change 
the situation, or both, the difference with twentieth-century style “ethnic cleansing” provides an interesting 
point of comparison. this point may deserve consideration again in the conclusion 
32 M1D1-3822.1a (DG6.9.1); M1D1-3845.1 (DG7.4.4). 
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the Dzungar wars, the court had endorsed a system whereby these twenty-three karun 
were jointly administered through two headquarters (Khobdo and Uliasutai).  Below 
headquarters, a guard (Ma: hiya) was appointed at five karuns to manage the neighboring 
four or five karuns.33  The distances involved were large: the three karun under the 
jurisdiction of the hiya at Alak Obu karun reached approximately 165 miles (500 li) from 
one end to another.  To facilitate better oversight, the hiya was allowed to appoint an 
assistant (Mo: tusalaγci) to patrol the road connecting the karuns, police for illegal 
activity, and inspect all travelers’ permits.34  When it was conceded that such a large 
jurisdiction rendered the assistant’s job impossible for a “lone Mongol official” (Ma: emu 
monggo hafan), a request was sent to Beijing to put extra guard-leaders on the payroll.  
By 1830, two extra hiya were appointed to the post, decreasing the area-per-administrator 
ratio by 40%, but still leaving the border fundamentally understaffed.35   
The border and boundary lines were not impassable walls, but embodied standard 
procedures for common violations.  Whenever detected, violations of the border were 
                                                
33 They were based out of five designated stations: Alak obu, Bodogoni holo, Sogok, Canggistai, and Honi 
mailahū The later two karuns – Canggistai and Honi Mailhahū – were administered via Kobdo, and the 
others administered by Uliasutai. 
34 M1D1-3909.2 (JQ[10?].6). The document notes that Alak Obu jurisdiction was particularly important for 
holding Jinjilik karun, located at the junction of the postal route from Uliasutai and the karun patrol route.  
North of Jinjilik was “Tangnu Uriyanghai pasture land” (tangnu uriyanghai i nuktere ba).  Jinjilik thus 
served as an important junction for representatives of Kalka nobility (kalkai wang gung) who traveled north 
to make contact with Urianghai.   
35 M1D1-3909.2 (JQ[10?].6). An additional hiya was addided to Jinjilik karun, making a total of six hiya, 
who responsible for Samgaltai karun as well as two other karun; the Ilak Obu hiya would henceforth be 
responsible for only three karun, including Ciciragana.  The aid to the hiya, the tusalakci, formerly based 
out of Domilbuki, was transferred to Ersun karun.  A steady number of hiya were added, such that by 1830 
there were altogether six hiya based out of the karuns north of Uliyasutai and Kobdo, with three stationed 
between the two cities (hoton) and off-duty, including two in Uliasutai and one in Kobdo. Uliasutai held 
jurisdiction over four of six hiya, and Kobdo held juridction over the other two.  With the addition of the 
post at Jinjilik, which was filled at the prerogative of the general, one hiya was transferred to Kobdo, giving 
Kobdo a total of three hiya, including the two karuns of Honi Mailahū and Canggistai. The hiya was to 
have jurisdiction over all local legal matters as well. 
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taken seriously, even in cases where only domesticated animals made the crossing.  In 
one case from 1786, a horse with a dangling lasso about its neck “running wild” (Ma: 
tuilame) towards Russian territory was considered a scandal; after a young guard 
managed to corral it, an investigation involving no less authority than the amban himself 
ensued.36  Other, seemingly minor infractions were reported all the way up to the throne.  
In the summer of 1815 alone, three separate incidents triggered bursts of diplomatic 
correspondences and paperwork.  The first involved five horses crossing into Qing 
territory; the second Russian children who chased a loose bellwether across the border, 
then again yet another case of escaped horses.  The displaced animals and children were 
all returned according to proper procedure.37  
By 1815 dealing with border-crossing Russians had become routine.  Those 
caught were arrested, and their goods confiscated and assessed.  A bilingual guardsman 
then interrogated them in Russian.  If they were found to be simple refugees or lone 
hunters (and not smugglers or spies), they were given fresh clothes, escorted to the 
border, and discharged back to the Russia, with their original possessions returned at the 
border.  The process was formalized in 1780 (QL45), when the Qianlong emperor sent 
down the order: “hereafter, with regards to Russians who have illegally escaped (Ma: 
ukame tucike), capture and interrogate the man or woman whether or not they are 
                                                
36 M1D1-407.14a (QL51).  The horse was not held responsible; its negligent owner was.  
37 The case of children and the bellwether can be found in M1D2-307.7 (JQ20.5.14).  For the five-horse 
affair see M1D2-307.9 (JQ20.7.18), and for the second horse affair (involving eight lost horses), see 
M1D2-307.10.  This final document is a bilingual Russian-Mongol diplomatic correspondence dispatched 
to the captain of Boora karun, Teksurun.  A brief document, totaling a page in length, the letter follows the 
rules of Qing official writing: it opens with the title of the sender, followed by the tile of the intended 
receiver, a brief synopsis of the purpose of the communication, and finally a discussion of the issue. 
According to standard form, it also concludes with the date, but breaks convention by dating the letter June 
8, 1815 using the Julian calendar (June 20, 1815 Gregorian), not using the Qing imperial date (JQ20.5.14).      
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important (Ma: oyomburakū).  If they have no ulterior motive, send them back as 
usual.”38  At the border, the guards assured Russian authorities that all refugees had been 
returned with their possessions.  Thereby the Qing state made known the “magnificence” 
(Ma: ambalinggū) of their “great country” (Ma: amba gurun).39  Patrolmen were ordered 
to be on guard for those who “feigned ignorance” or claimed to have innocently gotten 
lost.40  Much less common were cases of potential spies.  In one such case, the presence 
of an unidentified Chinese man, whom the merchants’ houses in Kiakhta refused to 
vouch for, led to suspicions that he was a Russian spy (Ma: helen).41  Given Kiakhta’s 
proximity to the border, the problem was serious, but proved impossible to manage: the 
man seemingly slipped in and out of merchant’s quarter’s gates at will.42  
 In the first half of the nineteenth century, such reports of Russians crossing the 
border trickled in at steady but relatively low rates, with the vast majority of cases 
handled in routine fashion.  On the Argun and Amur River border, for example, the years 
1811-1843, less than one incident on average was reported each year.43  The arrests were 
                                                
38 MWLF 3802.50.181.2912 (JQ16.6.15). 
39 Ibid. 
40 M1D1-407.36a 
41 M1D1-3935.36 (DG11.8.12); M1D1-3936.18a (DG11.9.2).  I was unable to find documents on how the 
case was resolved.  
42 M1D1-3936.18a (DG11.9.2).  The document states that he had traveled to Kiakhta from the Chinese 
interior via Ikh Khüree. No follow-up documents could be found to verify the identity of the man, and I 
have seen no evidence that the Russians employed vagrant Chinese as spies, so I have doubts about the 
official story.  The fear of spies, however, is suggestive of the official fears, stereotypes, and bureaucratic 
pressures operating within the government in Qing Mongolia and is a researchable topic. 
43 The following synopsis is based upon a survey of thirteen cases.  See MWLF 3802.50.181.2912 
(JQ16.6.15), 3806.3.182.71 (JQ16.9.10), 3806.3.182.71 (JQ16.9.10), 3806.3.182.71 (JQ16.9.10), 
3820.48.182.3437 (JQ17.8.17), 3834.52.183.3260 (JQ18.9.6), 3854.12.185.1030 (JQ19.10.13), 
3879.63.187.658 (JQ21.7.6), 3928.2.190.1493 (JQ24.8.9), 3928.2.190.1493 (JQ24.8.9), 3928.2.190.1493 
(JQ24.8.9), 3928.2.190.1493 (JQ24.8.9), 4008.27.195.666 (DG4.8.18), 4023.1.196.240 (DG5.8.3), 
4023.1.196.240 (DG5.8.3), 4023.1.196.240 (DG5.8.3), 4023.1.196.240 (DG5.8.3), 4023.1.196.240 
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made almost exclusively between the months of July and November, with half taking 
place in the month of September alone. All captured Russians were men.  Roughly half 
had traveled by canoe and half had passed into Qing territory on horseback.  In the 
interrogations, while the border-guards were required to obtain interpreters who 
“generally understood Russian,” their testimonies were recorded exclusively in Manchu.  
These were taken according to a standard formula: first the name of the man, then his 
home town or province, whether he had any living family, how he had come to the border 
area, what crimes he had committed in the past, and the story of his illegal entry into 
Qing territory; the memorialist also included a physical description, centered on clothing, 
and a list of confiscated possessions; these were usually limited to a knife and the dirty 
clothes on their back, but sometimes including fine furs and leather - suggesting these 
men might not have all been such simple refugees.  Most captured Russians claimed to 
have fled their homes amidst an unbearable famine and pleaded they were only trying to 
survive by hunting and fishing, when they inadvertently crossed the border.  Others cited 
the cruelty of their overseers,44 or the wish to live the life of an itinerant holy man.45  
Many had slashed noses and tattooed faces – the marks of a convict.  They generally all 
looked “like beggars” (Ma: giohoto adali).  If so, they were given fresh shirts and pants 
                                                                                                                                            
(DG5.8.3), and 4039.1.197.170 (DG6.8.22). Cases of Russians crossing the border before this period 
appear to have been relatively rare.  A case from 1811 (JQ16) cites only two direct precedents, dating to 
1794 (QL60) and 1802 (JQ7), as if no other incidents had happened in the intervening years.  See 
3802.50.181.2912 (JQ16.6.15) 
44 MWLF 4008.27.195.666 (DG4.8.18). 
45 Such was the case of the man named “Gerig’uri” [i.e. Gregory] from “Uriyeski.” According to his 
testimony, he had quit his service obligation (alban kara be nakafi), become a “lama,” and set out on the 
road treating the sick and begging for alms.  He had gotten lost and arrived at the mouth of a small tributary 
to a “big river” (the Amur?) during a violent storm.  According to the guardsmen who caught him, he was 
found at the mouth of the Hūmar River.  He was fifty years old.  See MWLF 3802.50.181.2912 
(JQ16.6.15). 
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(Ma: gahari and fukuri), and escorted back to Küke Dobo karun, on the Argun river, 
where the karun officer transferred them back to the authority of the mayur.  Altogether, 
from capture to discharge, the process took about three weeks.46   
In the early nineteenth century, that is, the threat of Russian intrusion was the 
raison d’être for the borderland, but not the primary challenge to its viability.  In practice, 
the borderlands served not only to keep Russians out, but to keep Qing subjects in, and 
though meant to be empty, increasingly the jurisdiction began to draw trespassers from 
within the Qing empire itself.  For like other nineteenth-century production sites on the 
frontier, the borderlands produced a uniquely valuable resource, and one vital to the 
livelihood of trappers: fur.  It is to the fur trappers, the Urianghai, that we now turn.  
Between Borderland and Bannerland: Urianghai Territory 
 
There was one exception to the general ban on human settlement in the 
borderland: a people called the “Urianghai” were granted either permanent or seasonal 
access and allowed to work the land as hunters.  They were unique in this regard.  Yet 
while they lived within borderland geographically, administratively they remained apart.  
Indeed, the court governed Urianghai lands in a way that made them territorially, 
commercially, and environmentally distinct both from neighboring karun lands and 
Mongol land alike.  While regulation over them was not as strict as in the borderland – 
the court expected Urianghai to work the land – their strategic positioning near the 
border, and their identity as people of the taiga, demanded special protections.   
As just mentioned, the Urianghai were administratively and territorially set apart.  
Altogether, there were distinct three polities organized under the Urianghai rubric in Qing 
                                                
46 MWLF 3802.50.181.2912 (JQ16.6.15). 
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Mongolia, known as the Altai, Altan Noor, and Tannu.47  All lived west of Kiakhta, in 
areas incorporated into the Qing empire after treaties with Russia had defined the border; 
all became Qing subjects through the course of the Dzungar wars and the failed rebellion 
of a Khotgoid general, Chinggunjab, in 1756.48   Before the conquest, the Urianghai were 
subjects of either Dzungar or Khotgoid Mongol rule; some simultaneously paid tribute to 
Russia as well.  They were organized into decin (literally “forties”), each headed by a 
demci, and larger units of otok.  Rulers of several demci were ranked jaisang.   The polity 
dubbed by the Qing court “Tannu” Urianghai had previously been organized into sixteen 
otok, each ruled by a jaisang.  The 16 otok, in turn, were divided into four geographical 
categories: the Tes, Kem, Toji, and Sarkiten.  After 1756, they were formed into banners: 
Urianghai decin became companies, otok became banners, the demci assumed the rank of 
nirui janggin, and the jaisang took the rank of uheri da.49  At first, some Urianghai 
groups straddled the southern boundary of the borderland: the Sarkiten, for example, a 
subgroup of the Tannu Urianghai, “lived in a jumbled mess both within and outside the 
karun (Ma: ceni nuktei ba karun i dolo tule suwaliyaganjame tehebi).”50  After the 
conquest, most Tannu Urianghai continued to hold territory within the borderland, while 
others were based south of the boundary.  All Urianghai banners, however had defined 
                                                
47 Today, the Altai ethnic minority trace descent to the Altan Noor Urianghai, Tannu Tuvans ot the Tannu 
Urianghai, and the Urianghai minority of Mongolia to the Altai.  Christopher P. Atwood, “Altai 
Uriyangkhai” in Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2004): 
9.  For a general discussion of the history of the Tannu Urianghai, using Chinese sources, see Fan Mingfan, 
Tangnu Wulianghai lishi yanshi (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2007). 
48 For background on the Chinggunjab rebellion, see Bawden, “Some Documents Concerning the Rebellion 
of 1756 in Outer Mongolia.” Bianzheng yanjiusuo nianbao (1970), 1-23. 
49 MWLF 1663.29.46.3298.  The language on this transition was unambiguous.  In imperial decree on the 
Altan Noor Urianghai, for example, the Qianlong emperor ordered simply: “decin i dorgi dahalaha data 
weci, aiman gemu demci oci, uthai demci i songkoi nirui janggin i jergi hafan sindakini.” 
50 MWLF 1748.35.52.799 (QL24.3.7). 
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territorial bounds with distinct chains of command, leading up from the arrows, to the 
banners, to the office of military governor in Uliasutai.   
While they belonged to banners, and reported to Uliasutai, the Urianghai 
remained culturally peripheral to the Mongol world.  An early-twentieth-century 
ethnologist might have confirmed their distinctiveness from neighboring Mongols on 
objectivist grounds, pointing to their Turkic language, how many used teepee-shaped 
tents instead of a Mongol-style ger, and so on.  In Qing times, however, the Urianghai 
were regularly described as “Mongols.”  In dealing with them, documents regularly used 
the trope that “the emperor’s people of the aimaγs, whether near or far, are all like one” 
(Ma: enduringge ejen i hanciki goroki aiman i urse be emu adali).51  Acting harshly 
towards Urianghai was thus “not in accordance with the loving intention of the emperor 
towards Mongols.”52  Along these lines, the court made few attempts to civilize or 
intervene in Urianghai affairs: it embraced the imperial responsibility to protect the 
Urianghai way of life, just as it did for Mongols.  
Unlike Mongols, however, the court identified the Urianghai way of life as 
hunting and fur trapping, not nomadic pastoralism.  In 1758, the Military Governor of 
Uliasutai, Cenggunjab (not to be confused with the just-mentioned Chinggunjab), 
described the newly incorporated Tannu Urianghai otok as including a great number of 
poor people who were living “like birds and beasts” (Ma: gurgu gasha i adali).53  For two 
years, since the end of hostilities, they had been “without a person to rule over and bring 
                                                
51 MWLF 3601.28.166.1520 (JQ4.9.21). 
52 MWLF 1786.20.54.2057 (QL24.9.29). 
53 MWLF 1734.7.51.1373 (QL23.12.13). 
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them together” (Ma: bargiyatame kadalara niyalma akū). Thus “it was as though the 
otoks had all dispersed and gone into the mountains and valleys in search of fish and 
game” (Ma: otok gubci facafi, gurgu nimaha baime babuci alin holo de dosifi 
genehengge bisire adali); many could not survive.   Likewise, a group of over twenty Tes 
Urianghai, under jaisang Onom, were described of “going in search of game and fish” 
(Ma: gurgu nimaha baime genehebi) were so impoverished that Onom was stripped of 
his rank, and his households were combined with thirty Kirgis households to create a new 
otok.54  As with the tales told of Chinggis Khan foraging for wild onions or Nurhaci 
scouring the forests for ginseng, their livelihood suggested desperation. 
Their livelihood was central to distinguishing the Urianghai from their Mongol 
neighbors to the south. The Draft Gazetteer of Uliasutai (Ch: ďƯǾƞI¢ĺ), a guide 
for incoming officials in Uliasutai,55 explained, for example, that Mongols had an 
abundance of livestock, and they did not depend on hunting; they “herded for a living” 
(ĩ½¶).  The rich had camels, horses and tens of thousands of cattle and sheep, while 
the poor still had “dozens” of sheep. Given their prosperity, Mongols were largely self-
sufficient: they ate meat in the winter and dairy in the summer, made spirits of cow, 
sheep, and mare milk, used dung for fuel, and crafted utensils and furniture from wood.56  
The Urianghai, in contrast, “lived by hunting wild animals and fishing” (Ma: gurgu 
                                                
54 MWLF 1786.20.54.2057 (QL24.9.29). 
55 On the text, which is undated but can reasonably be traced to the first half of the nineteenth century, see 
David Farquhar, “The Ch’ing Administration of Mongolia up to the Nineteenth Century,” 311-312, n. 92. 
56 This was all the more impressive given the harsh and even unhealthy environment of the “extreme 
frontier” ([ƢçǞ).  As the Wuliyasutai zhilue  recorded, “The warmth comes late, and the cold comes 
early.  The summers are not hot, and the winters are severe, so much so that simply moving about causing 
one to wheeze (Ʃ8U).” Wuliyasutai zhilue, 66. 
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nimaha butame banjime tehe bihe).57  When two Urianghai arrows based south of the 
karun line asked to be transferred north to former pastures on grounds of poverty, 
investigation into their living conditions revealed that: 
They depend on reindeer for riding and pack animals, and, for food 
their custom [Ma: taciha] was to fish Lake Khovsgol for food or search 
for the snakeweed [Ma: meker] and bulbous roots [Ma: tumusu] 
growing around the lake.  They know nothing at all of the way [Ma: 
doro] of raising livestock or seeking good pastures.58    
 
While Urianghai and Mongols had different ways of making a living, they also 
had differing relationships to the market.  Mongols were profoundly dependent upon 
broader networks of exchange.  As the Draft Gazetteer of Uliasutai explained, no 
household could do without tobacco or tea (¸ÔùV¶đŁOO'U).  Their 
clothing, too, represented a mix of foreign and domestic products: both men and women 
wore leather and fur hats (Ða), and the winter covered themselves with fur coats (Ðĉ) 
in the winter and cloth (_Ć) in the summer, though the rich also wore silk (åæ).  To 
get what they needed, they traded livestock and skins (¾ÌÐh) with merchants to get 
what they needed.59  At the same time, the Mongols were ultimately a simple people, and 
easily led astray: trade could be legalized be had to be controlled. 
Urianghai, in contrast, were more prone to be led astray by the market, which was 
unacceptable given their strategic location on the border.  Along these lines, the court 
prohibited merchants from entering their territory: it was simply not suitable to the 
                                                
57 MWLF 3601.28.166.1520 (JQ4.9.21). 
58 MWLF 3601.28.166.1520 (JQ4.9.21) Ere Uriyanghai i urse…ceni yalure, jaka acirangge, gemu oron 
buhū de akdaha, an i ucuri uthai Kusugel Noor i nimaha be butafi jembime, noor i šurdeme banjiha meker, 
tumusu be baifi jeme taciha, ongko muke be baime nukteme ulha fusembure doro be asuru sarkū. 
59 Wuliyasutai zhilue, 67. 
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Urianghai way of life.  In one case, Tannu Urianghai were discovered to be conducting 
black market trade with the Russians, leading the Qianlong emperor to order them 
relocated south of the borderland.  After another case, in 1783 (QL48), a Chinese caravan 
was robbed by armed Russians and Urianghai on the banks of the Eg, prompting a special 
decree prohibiting merchants from not only crossing into the borderlands, but an ever 
broader “strip of land” (Ma: girin i ba) extending to the Eg, Selengge, Onon, and Kherlen 
rivers and the Cisa Baracihai, Bayanburdu, Bindurje mountain chains.  While Mongol 
pastoralists could herd right up to the southern boundary of borderland, Chinese 
merchants had to adhere to a separate geography.  
While the Urianghai may have disagreed with the policy: they themselves sought 
out merchants and petitioned the court to legally allow them into their territory.  In 1796, 
the young Jiaqing emperor relented: if proper permits were obtained, merchants would 
henceforth be allowed to journey to – but not past – the karun line to trade with those 
Urianghai based south of the borderland.  Yet the ambiguous status of the Tannu 
Urianghai posed a problem that remained unsettled for the next decade.  To Fugiyūn, the 
military governor in Uliasutai in 1806, the answer was simple: prohibiting trade to only 
some Urianghai was impracticable, as the Urianghai would collaborate with outsider-
Urianghai in smuggling goods across the karun line.  As he wrote the emperor in 1806, a 
full fifty years after the formal incorporation of the Tannu Urianghai into the empire: “the 
Tannu Urianghai are newly subjugated and rebellious Mongols; their situation is 
incomparable with that of Khalkha Mongols.”  Furthermore, Fugiyūn explained, “there 
are no higher officials (Ma: ambakan hafan) besides a jalan and nirui janggin in the 
territory of the three Urianghai niru [living south of the karun line], and it is also difficult 
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to round up the Chinese merchants that travel there” (Ma: hūdašame genehe irgese be 
bargiyatara de inu mangga).  Merchants were bound to “entrap” (Ma: hūbišabufi) the 
Urianghai into unmanageable debts, which would lead to unending trouble.  In sum, he 
argued, trade was a “great hindrance to the Urianghai way of life” (Ma: uriyanghai i 
banjire doro de inu ambula goicuka babi).  He thus proposed that trade be cut off to the 
three niru located within the karun line, as well as the nine post-stations leading up them 
between Uliasutai and Jinjilik karun.  The Urianghai could conduct trade with merchants 
when they came to Uliasutai to present fur tribute and only then.60  The emperor endorsed 
the plan.61 
The Urianghai were not only distinct in their administration, territory, livelihoods, 
and relationship to the market: environmentally, too, the Urianghai lived in world apart.  
The Draft Gazetteer of Uliasutai captures the unique identities of borderland, Urianghai 
land, and Mongol bannerland in its description of local specialty products.  The text 
provides a suite of products for each jurisdiction type: Mongols (ƙGZķ), Urianghai 
(ďàāZķ), and border karun (A!Zķ).62  The author recognized the difficulty of 
neatly associating people to product: the section on Mongol resources has an extended 
footnote next to it, warning:  
The land is vast with endless mountains and rivers, and each locality 
has its own products.  If I thus recorded in detail all the regular grasses, 
                                                
60 MWLF 3573.38.164.1251 (JQ2.10.25). 
61 MWLF 3695.35.174.637 (JQ11.26). 
62 Wuliyasutai zhilue, 70-71.  The author of the text is unclear, as is the date it was written (the latest dated 
entry is JQ9 (1804).  See Farquhar, “The Ch’ing Administration of Mongolia Up to the Nineteenth 
Century,” 311-312, n. 92. 
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trees, wild birds, wild animals, and unusual objects, there would be a 
great number of types.  I fear there would be errors and mistakes…”63   
 
The text, however, proceeds to make broad environmental distinctions.  Some 
plants and animals were located in multiple jurisdictions: moose (Ch: `ǙŰ; cf. Ma: 
kandahan), for one, inhabited both Mongolia and the borderland.  Yet most plants, 
animals, and minerals were more like humans: identifiable with a single territory.   
Mongolia alone, for example, contained livestock, mushrooms (Ch: ƟƑ) and “rocks 
from the Gobi” (Ch: ċāŊ), while the border karun were unique for their salt rocks. 
Urianghai lands, in turn, were defined by their fur-bearing animals: sable (Ch: Ǆȯ), 
squirrel (Ch: čȯ), river otter (Ch: óĨ), lynx (Ch: Ģġĥ), corsac fox (Ch: øĝ), 
stone marten (Ch: ¼Ȃ), [pine] marten (Ch: ƋƕǄ), fox (Ch: ĝğ), wolf (Ch: Ġ), and 
badger (Ch: ĩs).64  There was an idealized, unbreakable nexus of people, place, and 
product; jurisdictions overlapped with local ways of life and a unique suite of natural 
products. Mongolia was the land of Mongols, livestock, and mushrooms; Urianghai 
territory was the land of fur.    
Fur Tribute: the Mechanics of Homeland Conservation 
 
From the start, fur tribute was at the center of Urianghai-Qing relations: it was the 
only legal type of material exchange afforded them.  In a way, the Qing court was 
following convention: Urianghai payments of fur tribute had predated Qing rule.  Prior to 
Qing rule, the Tannu Urianghai paid tribute to Khotgoid Mongol noblemen (Ma: noyasa).    
                                                
63 Wuliyasutai zhilue, 70.  The Chinese text reads [;ǝǵŪǚƢƢLÐZķƌǗŦǒ3ƾĎƹ
ǁ&LƢÐęƖ}ÅȔĎZķ#bƶ 
64 Wuliyasutai zhilue, 70-72. 
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The Altan Noor Urianghai, on the other hand, offered a tribute of five sables per 
household to the Dzungar lord Galtzangdorji and one pelt to the Russians, though the 
Qing documents state the Dzungars lowered this initial tribute of six pelts to four pelts.  
In 1757, the Qianlong emperor modified the system only slightly, when he “bestowed 
grace” and lowered the quota to two pelts per household.65  The emperor also worked to 
standardize quotas across disparate Urianghai polities.  When the emperor decreed that 
one Urianghai group, under the nobleman Cadak, be organized into companies and 
banners – thus creating the “Altan Noor Urianghai” – he stated: “The newly submitted 
Urianghai (Ma: ice dahame dosika Uriyanghai) all have presented tribute (Ma: alban 
jafaha).  If the Urianghai under Cadak and company do not present any tribute, it will not 
be fair (Ma: neigen akū ombi).”   
Submitting furs represented the fundamental act of submission and incorporation 
into the empire.  Indeed, the emperor explicitly linked compensating Cadak with an 
official stipend (Ma: fulun) to paying tribute: “Furthermore, because the Urianghai under 
Cadak all offer tribute, Cadak should indeed receive stipends”  (Ma: jai Cadak sei fejergi 
Uriyanghai se gemu alban jafabure be dahame, Cadak sede inu fulun bahabuci 
acambi).66  The obligations on the Tannu Uriangahi were equally basic.  The Tannu 
Urianghai “became the subject of the Divine Lord [Emperor]” (Ma: enduringge ejen i 
albatu ofi with the collapse of Cinggunjab’s rebellion.67  The duties of a “subject” (albatu) 
were limited to a single “obligation” (alban): they were “without any other kind of 
                                                
65 MWLF 1663.29.46.3298 (QL22.12.5). 
66 MWLF 1663.29.46.3298 (QL22.12.5). 
67 Similar stock-phrases in the documents include “become the subject/tributary of the great lord” (amba 
ejen i albatu obumbi) [MWLF 1748.35.52.799 (QL24.3.7)] and “entering into service” (alban de 
dosimbuha). MWLF 1786.20.54.2057 (QL24.9.29).    
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onerous service/tax” (Ma: umai encu hacin i joboro alban akū) except for an annual 
payment of three sable pelts per household.68   
The very decrees creating the Urianghai banners also established terms for 
submitting fur tribute.  In 1758, when the Khotogoid general Cinggunjab rebelled, the 
Qing army dispatched a ranking officer and Mongol nobleman to conduct a census of the 
Tannu Urianghai that surrendered.69  Later that year, in early summer (QL23.3), the 
generals dispatched an officer to inspect the condition of the six otok and conduct a 
census; this man, Cikdu, was later followed by a junior officer, Monijab.  They found the 
Tangnu Urianghai comprised 1112 households of 5028 men, women, and children.  Of 
these 1112 households, however, only 515 were deemed capable of supplying tribute.  
519 households were found “extremely poor and unable to pay tribute,” and an additional 
seventy-eight households had only seniors or small children.   These 515 households 
provided the Qing with its first tribute payment: 155 sable pelts, thirteen lynx, 346 fox, 
thirty-six wolf, nine corsac fox, two marten, and 2294 squirrel pelts, as well as seven 
eagle pinions, forty-six hawk pinions, and various other knickknacks.70   That year, the 
jaisang of the three Tes and three Kem otok paid a personal visit to the Qing general (Ma: 
daiselaha jiyanggiyūn) Namjil and the Kalka noblemen wang Cencukjab.  They claimed 
willingness to pay a fur tribute, but requested leniency due to famine conditions in their 
                                                
68 Several times in the document, a single sentence is used to describe this connection.  Besides the above 
mentioned example, the text also states that “since becoming subjects of the great lord, besides at once 
offering tribute, there have been no other kinds [of tribute]” (amba ejen i albatu obuha manggai jingkini 
jafara alban ci tulgiyen, umai gūwa jobobure hacin akū bime). MWLF 1748.35.52.799 (QL24.3.7). 
69 The man was jalan i janggin Cikdu; he was soon followed by meiren i janggin Monijab.  That year six 
jaisang had paid a personal visit to the Qing general (daiselaha jiyanggiyūn) Namjil and the Kalka 
noblemen wang Cencukjab, offering to pay fur tribute, but requested leniency due to famine conditions in 
their otok. 
70 MWLF 1734.7.51.1373 (QL23.12.13). 
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otok.71  After a reprieve of several years, each capable household was thereafter 
responsible for submitting three “good, naturally colored sables” (Ma: da bocoi sain 
seke).  Dyed pelts were not accepted, nor were furs obtained through trade.72    
Thereafter, annual tribute payments became routine.  For every ten sables offered 
as tribute by the community, the court returned one “small bolt of porous silk” (Ma: emu 
ajige kofon suje).  For every twenty “black squirrel” (Ma: yacin ulhu), the court returned 
a bolt of “fine blue linen” (Ma: emu samsu boso).73  Significantly, while it assessed the 
Urianghai by household, no census was conducted after the inaugural year.  In the blithe 
language of Qing documents, it was instead expected that the Urianghai would naturally 
“lead joyful and leisurely lives under Heavenly grace and multiply.”74  Linear growth of 
ten households per year would be expected: the Tannu Urianghai by five households, the 
Altai Urianghai by three, and the Altan Noor Urianghai by two.  Each year the expected 
number of sables (or their equivalent in other furs) thus rose by thirty.   
As the prohibitions against dying and trade suggest, tribute was meant embody to 
an authentic connection between the product, the land, and the people.  All contraband 
pelts seized by the state were confiscated and forwarded immediately to the Imperial 
Household Department.75 Any officials who failed to properly investigate a case of 
outsiders poaching on Urianghai land punished: Mongol noblemen received a fine valued 
                                                
71 MWLF 1734.7.51.1373 (QL23.12.13). 
72 Ibid. 
73 M1D1-3909.2 (JQ[10?].6). 
74 M1D1-3909.2 [JQ10]. 
75 TGKH 53: 5a-6a; GMQJ 53: 5a-6a. The criminals were punished under the legal jurisdiction of the 
Board of Punishments, suggesting they were expected to be Han Chinese.  
 287 
at a year’s worth of stipends (fulun faita), while banner authorities were fined three 
“nines” of livestock.76  Punishments illegally buying or selling sables were comparable: a 
year’s suspension of stipends and two “nines” of livestock for nobility and banner 
authorities. A Mongol commoner who bought sable pelts received 150 lashes with the 
whip.  If a Mongol had acted as middleman and bought sable on behalf of another, he 
was still whipped eighty times.77  Other provisions prohibited Mongols from venturing to 
Heilongjiang or “Solon lands” to buy sables. Fur tribute, in short, was not to be obtained 
in any other way except locally by the act of hunting.   
The very mechanics of tribute collection were designed to ensure territorial hunt’s 
boundedness in space.  Furs had to be provided every year from designated borderland 
hunting-grounds.  Each winter, for example, the Tannu Urianghai based south of the 
borderland sent a hunting party of twenty-five men north across the boundary line.  At 
Hathūlbum karun (modern-day Hatgal), guardsmen registered their names and tallied the 
number of horses and muskets.78  While in the borderland, the hunters were ordered to 
“thoroughly wipe away their tracks,” leaving no trace behind of their presence.79 After 
the hunt, they reported back for a roll call.  Those caught hunting outside the designated 
zone were sentenced to forty lashes with the whip.   
The tribute system also designed to create long-term sustainability and annual 
success.  From the start, meeting the tribute quota from such limited hunting grounds 
proved difficult.  In 1759, the leader (daruga) of the Sarkiten Urianghai came to the 
                                                
76 Ibid. Curiously the fine was reduced between the years 1826-1841 to two nines  
77 TGKH 53: 7a-8a; GMQJ 53: 8a-b. 
78 Until 1802 they also passed through Darkhintu karun. 
79 M1D1-3976.7b (DG13.12.10).  
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generals with a tribute of animal pelts and bird-of-prey pinions, but no sables.  As the 
man explained,  
Since the time of my grandfathers (mafa ama) until now, [my people] 
have nomadized in places like Lake Khovsgol and the Arik river.  Since 
in the environs of our territory there is absolutely no sable, in past times 
we presented tribute in accordance with the various things we 
captured.80  
 
A latter investigation confirmed the complaint: the territory “produced no sable.”  
The choice facing the Qing court was stark: either move these Urianghai otok to a land 
with more sable, or accept substitutes according to the capabilities of the land.81  From 
the first year of collecting tribute in 1758, Qing authorities thus agreed to collect sable 
tribute according to an old Khotogoid exchange rate.  As the document establishing 
tribute over the Tannu Urianghai explained: 
Having investigated [the matter], when this type of Urianghai originally 
could not provide sables as tribute to their noblemen, they gave two 
foxes, corsac foxes, martens, or wolves as equivalent to one sable.  
They gave forty squirrels as equivalent to one sable.  Hawk pinions 
were equal to one sable each, and leopards, lynx, horses, and eagle 
pinions were equivalent to three sables each.82  
 
If sables were scarce, the Tangnu Urianghai could use the exchange (See Figure 44).   
Figure 44: Exchange Rates for Urianghai Tribute  
Animal 
Value  
(in sable pelts) 
Lynx 3 
Otter 3 
Leopard 3 
Sable 1 
                                                
80 MWLF 1748.35.52.799 (QL24.3.7). 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
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Yellow Fox 0.5 
Sand Fox 0.5 
Wolf 0.5 
Stone Marten 0.5 
Grey Squirrel 0.025 
 
The Altai and Altan Noor Urianghai, by comparison, were ordered to submit a 
lower quota of sables: only two per household.  Living in lands thought to be relatively 
rich in sable, however, the Altai Urianghai could substitute only foxes, while the Altan 
Noor Urianghai were not granted exchange rights until 1842, after sable populations had 
already crashed. 
Sustaining Purity: The Depletion Crisis 
 
Though the court aimed to protect the integrity of the Urianghai homeland, the 
environmental stability upon which the imperial order depended began to come undone in 
the early nineteenth century as fur-bearing animals disappeared from Urianghai lands.  In 
response, the court began a series of reforms to ensure the sustainability of the tribute 
system.  The results on the ground were mixed: some communities managed to conserve 
fur-bearing animals; others saw them depleted entirely.   
Serious problems in the tribute system became apparent in the year 1800, when 
Tannu Urianghai hunters protested that they now had “insufficient land” to survive: wild 
plants (Ma: tumusu; Mo: tömüsü), fish, or animals were too scarce to support their 
community.  Acknowledging the problem, the court responded flexibly: it granted them 
new pastures in the borderlands, by the shores of Lake Khovsgol (see Map 5).  In 1802, 
after continuing complaints about animal scarcity, the court halted all tribute-hunting 
parties east of Lake Khovsgol, at Darkintū karun, to allow sable populations there to 
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recuperate.83  Relocation, however, proved an insufficient response, and complaints 
persisted. 
Three years later, in 1805, the Qing court conceded a more fundamental reform.  
The court had always assessed the Urianghai by a per capita head tax, calculated on the 
assumption that the Tannu Urianghai community would grow by five households per 
year, the Altai Urianghai by three, and the Altan Noor Urianghai by two.  For all three 
Urianghai groups, after factoring in their differential tax rates, the court thus raised the 
overall tax rate by twenty sables each year – an increase of 40% between the years 1765 
and 1805, from 2944 to 4144 pelts.  Recognizing the problem in 1805, however, the 
amban conceded that while population growth and tax hikes could be expected, “the 
number of sables and other small animals changed from year to year” (Ma: seke i jergi 
ajigesi gurgu aniyadari labdu komso toktohon akū).  As a result, the policy was proving 
to be a failure: fulfilling the tribute requirement was “difficult” (Ma: mangga), and the 
Urianghai were being driven to poverty.84  In 1805 (JQ10), it was thus ordered that the 
sable tribute be no longer tied to the size of the Urianghai populations.  Thereafter the 
quota was fixed at 4144 pelts, the commensurate rate for an estimated population 1679 
Altai, Altan Noor, and Tannu Urianghai households.85  It represented, in effect, a shift 
from taxing the productivity of households to taxing the productivity of the land, which 
was deemed to be ecologically fixed.  
                                                
83 M1D1-3427.18a (JQ13.11.3); M1D2-223.2b (JQ13.+5.24). 
84 M1D1-3909.2 [JQ10]. 
85 M2D1-176.88b (DG15.8). 
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Yet the Urianghai continued to have problems securing even this lowered tribute 
requirement. In 1808, a report surfaced that “small wild animals have now gradually 
become rare” (Ma: te ajige gurgu cun cun i tongga oho) in the Eg River valley, near 
Hathūlbom karun.  Indeed, throughout the protected borderlands, from Lake Khovsgol to 
Darkintu karun, hunting had made animals there “scarce” (Ma: seri).  The amban 
memorialized a request to the emperor that the hunt be allowed to take place further to 
the east, out of Arhūn Booral booi karun. A move, however would be a delicate matter – 
Arhūn Booral was much closer to the Russian border than Hathūlbom, and thus more 
strategically sensitive.  The pastures, moreover, were already occupied, making life again 
“difficult.”86  When authorities at Arhūn Booral were questioned, they confirmed that the 
border (Ma: kili i ba) was only a half-day journey on horseback from the karun.  It was 
thus ordered, after six years of rest, that hunts resume again from Darkintu.87  
Still, problems meeting the quota continued to plague the system, growing 
increasingly frequent in the 1820s and 1830s.  In 1822, for example, only eighteen of 
twenty-five hunters returned to Hathūlbom after the official hunt.  When the military 
governor at Uliasutai caught wind of the deficit and ordered an investigation, the leader 
of the hunting party, Cultumg’umbu, admitted that the seven missing men had separated 
themselves from the group to trap furs in other territories.  Although they ultimately 
surrendered their furs and returned without incident, the breach in the law was serious 
enough to warrant each man being whipped forty times; Cultumg’umbu was threatened 
                                                
86 Further complicating the matter was the fact that Arhūn Booral karun lay under the jurisdiction of the 
ambans’ office in Ikh Khüree, while Hathūlbom belonged to the military governor’s office in Uliasutai. 
87 M1D1-3427.18a (JQ13.11.3). 
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with demotion if it happened again.88  Hunters made other attempts to use the land they 
had more intensively.  In the summer of 1830, an Urianghai leader requested that the 
number of permissible hunters in a trapping party be expanded to thirty.  Animals were 
simply harder to find, and the customary twenty-five-man parties now seemed too 
“small.”  The prospects for procuring fur tribute were thus “extremely worrisome” (Ma: 
ele facihiyašara).  The military governor, however, summarily denied the request: since 
tribute had been procured successfully each year up to this point, he found insufficient 
reason to change the status quo.89   
By 1836 – the year before Dorjirabdan’s arrival at Lake Khovsgol –the problem 
in the sable population was apparent, and the court was once again willing to experiment 
with reform.  This time, it was not the official tribute burden, but an added burden of 
corruption that was held accountable for the decline.  In this regard, there was certainly 
evidence that there corruption in the fur-tribute system was pervasive.  As early as the 
Qianlong period it was documented, for example, that guardsmen were embezzling fur 
from official treasuries.90  In 1836, it was revealed that representatives of the beise of 
Sain Noyan aimaγ, who were dispatched to Urianghai territory to receive the fur tribute, 
were extorting tea, tobacco, and other gifts from the Urianghai and engaging in illegal 
trade.91  When the matter was brought to light, the emperor endorsed a plan by which the 
Urianghai would deliver the furs to banner authorities themselves.  This policy proved 
                                                
88 M1D1-3976.5a (DG13.5.24). 
89 M1D1-3909.1 (DG10.7.6).  That spring, officials confirmed that a hunting party of 25 left from 
Hatholbom.  See M1D1-3909.3 (DG10.8.19). 
90 M1D1-279.220a.  
91 This collection team was by law composed of two officers and fifteen soldiers. M2D1-177.1a (XF1.2.15) 
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just as ruinous.  With their precious cargo, the delivery parties were the targets for 
banditry “numerous times” (Ma: mudan labdu), and Urianghai were falling into debt to 
cover the expenses for the journey.  Thus, in 1851, the court allowed the old system to go 
back into effect, with the policy shift in delivery method blamed for causing the “decline” 
(Ma: edelehe) in fur tribute.  A request to return to the pre-1836 setup was agreed to by 
the young Xianfeng emperor in the second month of his reign.92  Though tribute 
continued to be delivered at this rate until the collapse of dynastic rule in 1911, the 
ecosystem was roiling: after the collapse of sable, the second half of the nineteenth 
century would witness the total collapse of the yellow fox, corsac fox, and Siberian 
squirrel populations, with hunters left to focus on the remaining lynx and wolf.93  Despite 
the consistent flexibility of the court, a constituent element of the wild frontier – its 
animals – were disappearing from Tannu Urianghai lands.  
A sense for the scale of the decline emerges from tribute tallies compiled by the 
military governor’s office in Uliasutai and the Imperial Household Department in 
Beijing.94  Tribute returns for sable and substitute animals were tallied each year for the 
all Urianghai groups, pre-collated, by the Imperial Household Department and archived 
as part of the Neiwufu zouxiao dang (Ch: *9jǫê).  Similar records were tallied 
by the military governor at Uliasutai’s office for all three groups separately, which were 
stored in the Grand Council’s collection of copies of Manchu-language memorials (Ch: 
ǑéƢĆÆǬ4j¸).  The former are exclusively in Chinese, while the latter are either 
                                                
92 M2D1-177.1a (XF1.2.15). 
93 Thomas Ewing, “The Forgotten Frontier,” 208, n. 84.  Citing Potanin, Ewing notes that up to 7000 
squirrel pelts were exported to Russia each year in the 1870s.   
94 For a complete listing and discussion of the sources, see Appendix A. 
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in Manchu or Chinese.   The numbers from the two fonds do not always tally with each 
other; when they do not, I have used those of military governor’s office (see Appendix A).     
For the Tannu Urianghai, a steady decline in sables began after 1817, from a high 
of 3800 sables caught in 1817, to 1342 sables in 1846, and only 800-1000 sables caught 
after 1860 – almost an 80% decline (See Figure 45).  Records of the other animals 
presented as tribute indicate that the Urianghai made up for the loss sable by substituting 
foxes and squirrels.  When the fox and squirrel populations crashed, they substituted lynx 
and otter (see Figures 46-51). 
Figure 45: Sable Tribute – Tannu Urianghai, 1771-1910 
 
Figure 46: Fox Tribute – Tannu Urianghai, 1771-1910 
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Figure 47: Corsac Fox Tribute: Tannu Urianghai, 1771-1910 
 
Figure 48: Squirrel Tribute – Tannu Urianghai, 1771-1910 
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Figure 49: Stone Marten Tribute – Tannu Urianghai, 1771-1910 
 
Figure 50: Lynx Tribute – Tannu Urianghai, 1771-1910 
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Figure 51: River Otter Tribute – Tannu Urianghai, 1771-1910 
 
The decline in sable populations, to which the court was most sensitive, was not 
limited to the Tannu Urianghai, but extended from the Altai mountains to the Amur. 
From the viewpoint of conservation, the Tannu Urianghai were in fact a relative success 
story: the Altai and Altan Noor Urianghai experienced much more dramatic declines in 
sable populations, perhaps in part because no other types of animals could be exchanged 
in.  For both of these groups, the 1820s proved a pivotal decade, with the Altai Urianghai 
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witnessing a steady decline in sable thereafter, and the Altan Noor a sudden collapse (See 
Figures 52-55).  To make up the difference, the Altan Noor increasingly submitted 
squirrel pelts in replacement.  Further, as they were originally only allowed to use 
squirrel in exchange for sable, in 1842, the court instituted the standard Tannu Urianghai 
exchange, and the Altan Noor began to substitute in leopard, otter, lynx, stone marten, 
fox, corsac fox, and wolf as well.95  Yet because the Altan Noor jurisdictions had few of 
these animals, no more than several dozen of each were presented in the last two decades 
for which they submitted tribute.  The Altai Urianghai, by law, were only allowed to 
replace sable with fox.  
Figure 52: Sable Tribute – Altan Noor Urianghai, 1772-1864 
 
Figure 53: Squirrel Tribute – Altan Noor Urianghai, 1772-1864 
                                                
95 MWLF 4238.27.211.1940 (DG22.8.29). 
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Figure 54: Sable Tribute – Altai Urianghai, 1772-1867 
 
Figure 55: Fox Tribute – Altai Urianghai, 1772-1867 
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Commercialization and the market lurked behind these dramatic environmental 
changes.  Indeed, hints for the cause of the decline can be found in some of the problems 
endemic to the tribute system.  At every stage the governing norms were undermined.  
Merchants crossed into the borderlands, and Urianghai illegally sold them fur.  Yamen 
officials in Uliasutai extorted pelts from the deliverymen.  Later, furs would be stolen 
from the local treasuries in Mongolia,96 and in Beijing, officers of the Imperial 
Household department cooked the books, embezzled the finest furs, and sold off the furs 
rejected by the court at unbeatable rates.97  In short, tribute as designed by law was much 
less lucrative than other alternatives.  A crude measure of the gap between the norms and 
practice of fur tribute can be gleaned through a comparison of the official exchange rates 
used for tribute with the comparable market rates for furs at Kiakhta. Roughly speaking, 
an Urianghai tribute-payer might double the value of their lynx of fox pelt, get 2.5 times 
                                                
96 M1D1-279.220a.  In this case, guardsmen were embezzling fur from the treasury. Six sable pelts and 
seven fox pelts were found missing.  The amount was not much, but the value was high: perhaps equivalent 
to thirteen or more taels of silver, depending on their quality. 
97 This is reflected, in part, in discrepancies between the tribute tallies compiled in Uliasutai and Beijing; it 
is also reflected in the static market prices for furs cited by the Neiwufu after 1800.  
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value of their squirrel, and triple the value of wolf and fox pelts if they sold it on the open 
market.98    
From Environmental Crisis to Jurisdiction Building: the 1837 Boundary Dispute 
 
Throughout the crisis, the court responded by fixing territories and clarifying 
jurisdictions.  The case of Dorjirabdan’s trip to the border in 1837, which opened this 
chapter, was typical in this regard.  The importance of the process of delineating and 
segregating imperial jurisdictions was signaled by the presence of the amban: Russians 
had not penetrated the border, but the problem was comparable: it had prompted a 
personal visit from the highest official in Outer Mongolia.99  Prior to the dispute, the 
Urianghai had used the southern slopes of the Kükge River valley in the summer to 
pasture their animals, and then moved back south through the passes in the winter before 
their annual sable hunt.  It had proved to be a workable arrangement.  As Dorjirabdan 
later summarized the matter, “when we looked into the condition of each side’s territory 
[Ma: nukte], the guardsmen’s land was limited in size but had much pastureland for 
herding livestock, while the Urianghai’s territory was large but had a great deal of forests 
and steep mountains.”   
In the end, the nobleman representing the Urianghai, Mandarwa, agreed to allow 
the old wintertime boundary to be made permanent, effectively conceding the southern 
slopes of the valley to the guardsmen.  Dorjirabdan remained confident that the loss was 
                                                
98 Based on prices in the year 1794.  Further research in Russian archival materials to get a full price series 
at Kiakhta is necessary. 
99 We can thus update Thomas Ewing’s claim, made without the benefit of access to archival records, that 
“there is no evidence that Tannu-Urjankhai was ever visited by a senior Ch’ing official (except perhaps in 
1726).” Ewing, “The Forgotten Frontier,” 189.   
 302 
minor, having caused “no harm or injury to [the Tannu Urianghai] way of life.”100  When 
the agreement was finally struck, both sides agreed to not cross the boundary to the other 
side, with the boundary’s permanence announced in sworn, written statements by the 
noble leaders of both communities. Worried that livestock would still cross this line, 
hunters were further ordered to stop setting traps in the valley just south of the boundary 
line, creating an even larger buffer zone between the communities.  Dorjirabdan hired a 
local lama, named Jamcu, to draw a map with the boundary line clearly delineated, and 
five cairns were erected on the ridgeline to mark the boundary on the ground.  Copies of 
the new agreement, along with the sworn statements and the map were drawn up, and, 
having attached them his summary memorial to throne, they were forwarded to the 
Lifanyuan in Beijing, then back to the amban’s office in Ikh Khüree for clerical use.101   
Map 6: Disputed Urianghai-Borderland Boundary Line, 1837 
                                                
100 M1D1-4092.1 (DG17.4.20). 
101 M1D1-4092.1 (DG17.4.20); M1D1-4092.5 (undated); and M1D1-4092.7 (DG17.3).  
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On Jamcu’s map (Map 6), a thick red line cuts across the territory from east to 
west, marking the borderline between the Urianghai, who live to its south, and frontier 
guards, who live to its north.   Five black triangles – the cairns – are placed along the line.   
North of the line are teepee-shaped markers, showing the location of karuns, including 
Hathūlbom karun, on the southern shores of Lake Khovsgol.102  Black dotted lines wove 
through the landscape and connected the karuns; they represent the guardsmen’s patrol 
routes, with a northern route following the ridgeline and a southern route the valley of the 
Kükge River, which cut through the valley just north of the border.103  The map, 
however, was made to represent a social segregation that was yet to exist.  The clean, red 
                                                
102 This karun is the predecessor for the modern town of Hatgal, which today serves as the final staging 
point for outdoorsmen and tourists heading to Lake Khovsgol.  
103 On the top right corner is written the Manchu word “asara” – “store away [for the files].”  
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line cutting through the middle was drawn because the line had been consistently crossed.  
The line represented an ambition, an attempt to reestablish the borderlands. 
In many ways, this process of making a border was typical for Qing Mongolia.   
Imperial authority was limited on the ground, and internal boundaries were frequently 
transgressed – in this particular case by fur-trappers.  Local-level actors, focused on 
local-level problems, generated the demand for boundary lines.  The imperial 
representative was an outsider, and his arrival marked a break in the rhythm of local 
politics.  Significantly, he leveraged his position to claim impartiality: the Urianghai 
needed to trap furs; the borderland had to be secure.  Dorjirabdan played the role of 
intermediary, not advocate: the identity and integrity of both jurisdictions was to be 
respected.  In the end, though the border guards had their way, the empire’s authority and 
material resources helped create a working peace.   
Conclusion 
 
Significantly, the immediate cause behind the map-making and “bordering” 
process104 arose in response to a dramatic local depletion of fur-bearing animals.  The 
identity of people, place, and product was to be upheld: if the nexus was broken, it 
represented an artificial intervention and a break with the aims of empire.  Laws 
prohibiting fur-dying or fur trade reveal how it was less important to receive furs from 
the Urianghai, per se, than to receive “authentic” products, that is, furs the Urianghai had 
trapped and came directly from their homelands.  Rather than condone a Mongolization 
                                                
104 On “bordering,” see David Newman, “From the International to the Local in the Study and 
Representation of Boundaries: Theoretical and Methodological Comments,” in Holding the Line: Borders 
in a Global World, eds. Heather N. Nicol and Ian Townsend-Gault (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 401; 
and Henk Van Houtum, Olivier Kramsch and Wolfgang Zierhofer, B/ordering Space (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 1. 
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of the borderlands, or promote Chinese mercantile activity, the empire aimed to maintain 
differences: to segregate, define, and allocate.  The environmental crisis posed by the 
collapse of fur-bearing animal populations was at the center of this process: like the 
mixing and dislocation wrought by mushroom picking, the depletion of fur-bearing 
animals forced the Qing state to make distinctions and enforce the differences between 
taiga and steppe, pure and mixed, natural and foreign.  
From the court’s point of view, each jurisdiction needed to be stable and 
untouched, particularly in the far north: not only was the taiga a shield against Russian 
incursions, it was also the basis for the Urianghai way of life.  The institutional 
geography of the far north was designed to ensure maximum stability as one approached 
the border.  At the furthest extreme was the borderland, managed to be absolutely “pure.”  
The borderland was followed by Urianghai territory, where Mongols and Chinese 
merchants were prohibited. Next came Mongol land bordering Urianghai land, where 
trade remained prohibited.  Only south of the Eg and Kherlen Rivers was it safe enough 
to license trade.   The closer the jurisdiction was to the border, the more direct and top-
down the type of state intervention in cross-jurisdictional exchanges.  The court had 
proved flexible and creative in its efforts to ensure the integrity of the borderland and the 
sustainability of fur-tribute: it did everything in its power to ensure that each of its 
jurisdictions was sustainable and identifiable. 
Despite the limits to imperial rule on the ground, the Qing project was not a total 
failure.  Indeed, the first modern European travellers to Urianghai territory were struck by 
the changes one encountered when crossing into the borderland: it seemed completely 
untouched by Russian, Mongol, or Chinese influences.  Douglas Carruthers, in one of the 
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earliest European-led expeditions through the Tuvan mountain ranges in 1910, captured 
the mood.  As he reported of Khovsgol region:  
Swampy bottoms, half lake, half forest, looked so mysterious, that if 
some prehistoric monster had raised its snaky head to have a look at us, 
it would not have been surprising.  We should have felt its presence 
was all in keeping with its surroundings, and was, in fact, more natural 
than our own. 
 
There were, of course, people indigenous to this cut-off borderland.  But as Carruthers 
dryly observed of them, “in such a secluded region a peculiar inhabitant can be guessed 
at.”  They were the Tannu Urianghai, and like the place itself, they had been left behind 
in time.  To Carruthers, the borderland wilderness represented an atavism and an 
opportunity: the survival of primordial environments threw doubts on the presence of the 
Qing state.  Wilderness through this lens was an anomaly: it was a place left untouched 
by the commercial dynamism of the nation and, by extension, represented a natural 
border between states.  
While the nature of the borderland in the Qing period existed, above all, as a 
strategic buffer, it was hardly untouched.  If anything, however, the nature of the 
Urianghai borderland was more manufactured wilderness than a neglected one.  If it was 
a world apart, it was because empire helped facilitate the separation.  This space was not 
a bigan-type wilderness; it was, in Manchu terms, a bolgo jecen, a “purified borderland.”  
On the one hand, it was an historical bastion of Qing rule – a Green Wall of Inner Asia.  
On the other, it was a tailored economic zone for fur-production.  The Urianghai were 
never so isolated.  Rather, they were participants in empire and producers for distant 
markets; they were deeply integrated into the wider world.  To cross the boundary into 
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Urianghai land was not to exit modern times: the boundary itself, like the taiga and furs it 
protected, was product of early modern empire.  
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Conclusion 
 
For men like H.E.M. James and Douglas Carruthers, who discovered the nature of 
Manchuria and Mongolia in the late nineteenth century, wilderness lacked history; it 
remained in what they believed to be its original, primordial form.  Later scholars, 
writing in the national tradition, came to a similar conclusion: the Manchu court, acting 
against the natural interests of the nation, preserved these lands from the world beyond; 
only with the arrival of homesteaders did the “modern” history of the frontier begin.  Yet, 
as this study has shown, Qing Manchuria and Mongolia were no less of their time than 
China proper was of its.  The natural frontier was defined, not through its isolation, but 
through its integration with the world around it; “Nature” was created in the nineteenth 
century, not destroyed, proving that in this part of the world, as elsewhere, total 
wilderness can only exist in a context of total state control.  
As we have seen, in the years 1750-1850, the Mongol steppe, Urianghai taiga, and 
Manchurian mountains were changing rapidly.  Indeed, they seemed on the way to 
becoming almost indistinguishable from the jurisdictions around them; the line between 
steppe and sown, Mongol and Chinese, frontier and metropole began inexorably to 
dissolve.  In response, the Qing court and its servants worked to elaborate the territorial, 
cultural, and environmental boundaries of Manchu imperial homelands, Mongol 
pasturelands, and northern hunting grounds; in order to defend against unbridled 
“mixing” and motion, the state repeatedly attempted to reconstitute each jurisdiction as 
“pure:”  borders were tightened, migrants repatriated, and idealized steppe and forest 
environments newly protected.  The difference between pure and corrupted, original and 
refashioned, was defended at the boundary line between Urianghai and Mongol, 
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pastoralist and merchant, Manchu and Chinese.  It was in its pursuit of “purity,” where 
the native overlapped with the alien, that the Qing state produced nature: a realm 
supposedly untouched by outside intervention.  
If the Qing invention of nature was above all a process of fixing the physical, 
administrative, and commercial position of people, the Western invention of nature was 
not altogether different: it too imagined connections between natural environments and 
indigeneity.  This alignment of natural and native, in turn, was inseparable from modern 
contexts of empire and nation building.  In the colonies of European powers, 
metropolitan actors were imagined as the sole agents of change, while genetic 
connections to a native land were used to place those without agency within a rigid 
hierarchy.1  On the homefront, natural European landscapes were only preserved as they 
began to disappear, and modern commercial dislocations generated new anxieties about 
the survival of the state.2  From the nineteenth century onwards, nations, too, became 
aligned with a primordial nature of their territory.3  In both cases, nature was a political 
project whose antiquity was as imagined as nationhood and nativeness themselves. 
The distinction between “natural” and “artificial” is not only historically variable, 
but is itself a cultural artifact.  Indeed, humans have left an indelible mark on the land; it 
                                                
1 Sumit Guha, Environment and Ethnicity in India, 1200-1991 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 4; Carolyn Merchant, “Shades of Darkness: Race and Environmental History,” Environmental 
History 8.3 (2003), 380-394. 
2 Karl Appuhn, “Inventing Nature: Forests, Forestry, and State Power in Renaissance Venice,” The Journal 
of Modern History 72.4 (2000), 861-889. 
3 See Thomas M. Lekan, Imagining the Nation in Nature: Landscape Preservation and German Identity, 
1885-1945, 4.  Also Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory. 
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is impossible to read them out of even prehistoric landscapes.4   Modern attempts to read 
humans out of landscapes, without understanding the complex role we play in local 
ecosystems, has led to surprising or counterproductive results: forests sometimes arose 
because of human activity, not in spite of it.5  As William Cronon wrote on the concept of 
wilderness as antipode to civilization: “Far from being the one place on earth that stands 
apart from humanity, it is quite profoundly a human creation – indeed, the creation of 
very particular human cultures at very particular moments in human history.”6  
Along these lines, while the modern invention of nature posits a complete divorce 
between the natural and social worlds, in practice this divorce is never realized.  In this 
sense, as Bruno Latour so provocatively argued, “we have never been modern.”  Instead, 
“nature” has served as a production site for new cultures – those practiced, for example, 
in the lab or in the park.  Natural spaces are fashioned to uphold localized values within a 
splintered, but constitutionally coherent, polity.7  Modern park rangers cut trails to look 
uncut, pluck invasive species from the forest, and direct human traffic to designated, 
segregated grounds.8  From the American park, to the German forest, to the Soviet 
reserve, modern nature has survived because, as A.R. Agassiz suggested, states “rigidly 
preserved” it, whether for participatory politics, primordialism, or technocratic rule.9   
                                                
4 P.S. Martin and H.E. Wright, Pleistocene Extinctions: The Search for a Cause (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1967). 
5 Fairhead and Leach, Misreading the African Landscape: Society and Ecology in a Forest-Savanna 
Mosaic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  James Scott, Seeing Like a State. 
6 William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” in Uncommon 
Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed. William Cronon (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), 69.   
7 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern. 
8 William Cronon, Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature. 
9 Douglas Weiner, Models of Nature: Ecology, Conservation, and Cultural Revolution in Soviet Russia 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988). 
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 “Pure” places in Qing Inner Asia were no different.  There was no separation of 
nature from culture per se, but a separation of two types of culture: one the native, 
imperial culture of Mongols and Manchus; the other the metropolitan culture of Chinese 
merchants and migrants.  The material construction of purity embodied the highest values 
of Manchus and Mongols: manliness, martial vigor, and rusticity.  If early modern 
European states manufactured in nature a “caricature of society as a military parade 
ground,”10 the Qing state manufactured the order of a game park.  Both projects were 
meant to engender productive, ordered, and coherent landscapes.  Both were aimed 
against the chaos and dynamism of their immediate historical context.   
In the period 1750-1850, an unprecedented level of commerce, migration, and 
resource exploitation upset the political, ideological, and environment foundations of the 
empire.  A foundation of Qing rule, and the banner system in particular, was clear 
distinctions between ethnic identities and jurisdictional territories.  In practice, however, 
the turbulence and opportunities of Pax Manjurica did not produce such a clean or simple 
world.  Caravans, mushroom pickers, soldiers, tribute bearers, pilgrims, refugees, drunks, 
entertainers, convicts, escaped slaves, and runaway wives transgressed imperial boundary 
lines.  Chinese took Mongol names and Mongol wives; Mongols became caravan 
workers and commercial fur trappers. Laymen entered monasteries, monks into the 
merchants’ quarter; Chinese camped on the steppe, Mongols meanwhile bivouacked 
around Beijing.  Exotic commodities and contraband flowed and circulated throughout 
the empire.  Tea, tobacco, silver, silk, and cotton found their way into Mongol gers and 
Manchu garrisons; furs, freshwater pearls, mushrooms, ginseng, deer horn, and game 
                                                
10 Jamees Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 82. 
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meat emptied onto the streets of Beijing.  In the new Qing fashion, furs were stitched 
onto silk, and silver inlaid with pearls.  
The land itself was changing in unprecedented ways.  Fur-bearing animals 
disappeared from the taiga; fresh water oysters vanished from riverbeds; marmots, 
mushrooms, and fish were emptied from the steppe.  Ginseng farms and pickers’ huts 
appeared on the slopes of Changbaishan, while hunters and loggers worked the holy 
mountains of Mongolia.  Such destruction was unheard of: as far as anyone knew, sables, 
pearls, wild ginseng, and mushrooms had never been so recklessly exploited.  It was a 
crisis the Qing court could not ignore: it upended the livelihood of local Manchus, 
Mongols, and Urianghai; disrupted the flow of high-demand goods; and reflected poorly 
upon the emperor’s commitment to maintaining order and destabilized a strategic 
frontier. 
Amidst the dislocation, then, the Qing state worked to “purify” the land: a dual 
process of creating bordered, coherent imperial territories on the one hand, and 
consolidating sovereign control on the other.11  Migrants were met with registration 
drives, licenses to settle or work, or repatriation campaigns; to properly govern, the 
banner system demanded clear, singular lines of authority running from individual 
subjects, to local authorities, to emperor.  Indeed, a critical problem with the national 
narrative of “prohibition policy” (Ch: ŐÄŜ) was its focus on prohibitions upon 
Chinese settlement in the frontier; it failed to capture how the same policies restricted the 
mobility of Manchus, Mongols, and people like the Urianghai as well.  The notion of 
                                                
11 On the congruent processes of making bordered space and consolidating sovereign, see Thongchai 
Winichukal, Siam Mapped: A History of a Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1994), 100-107. 
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Mongol and Manchu bannermen leaving home to work as woodcutters or commercial 
deer hunters was as problematic for imperial stability as the increase of Chinese migrants 
on the frontier: they, too, wrought administrative, environmental and social havoc.  
Chinese migrants were not a problem as much as undocumented migrants were, for only 
undocumented merchants and migrants stood outside the gaze and administration of the 
state.  In this sense, clarifying and maintaining the integrity of banner territory, and so 
making it “pure,” entailed making the banner administratively simple and governable, as 
“purification” dovetailed with an underlying drive to achieve legibility from the complex 
“social hieroglyphic” of Qing frontiers.12  
At the same time, in the eyes of the court, the most insidious threat to imperial 
order was not physical “mixing” and migration, but the sense that Mongol and Manchu 
bannermen lost their way in the chaos.  Hunter, herder, and soldier were ideally 
uncomplicated men: simple, temperate, and sincere.  While they participated in markets, 
the court envisioned a limited engagement: one of the defining aspects of the “Manchu 
Way,” alongside competence in Manchu language and skill with horse and bow, was 
frugality.13  This Spartan spirit of the Manchu way was expressed in words like “purity” 
or “plainness” (Ma: gulu; Mo: siluγun; Ch: ª) or), as, at least ideologically, one’s 
livelihood reflected one’s inner disposition.  Sumptuary laws of the eighteenth century 
were intended to promote this spirit of frugality.  To wear the finest furs meant exceeding 
one’s means and, in the long run, courting ruin: the frugal and the diligent thrived; those 
                                                
12 James Scott, Seeing Like a State.  To quote James Scott, “The utopian, immanent, and continually 
frustrated goal of the modern state is to reduce the chaotic, disorderly, constantly changing social reality 
beneath it something more closely resembling the administrative grid of its observations.”  James Scott, 
Seeing Like a State, 82. 
13 Mark Elliott, The Manchu Way, 276, 347. 
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who overstepped their bounds did not.  Yet living a modest life was not only a Manchu 
virtue, but one that befitted the rustic simplicity of Mongols and Urianghai as well. 
For each group, temptation was everywhere: at the fur market, in the mushroom 
patch, and on at a guardpost at the Great Wall.  Mongols and Urianghai were plain 
peoples; mushroom pickers, venal officials, and illicit fur traders were fundamentally 
different subjects, driven by blind cupidity.  Unlike those of “pure” spirit, they were 
“reckless,” “blind,” or “negligent.”  Unfettered access to markets subjected Mongols and 
Manchus to wastefulness and greed, and provided the opportunity to lose their way.  The 
Urianghai were kept to even stricter standards: their way of life could not even support 
any interactions with merchants.  On their own, they lived as humble subjects of the 
empire, trapping furs, respecting the border, and maintaining strong contacts with the 
Qing court.  With merchants, they cut secret deals with Russians and let their homeland 
be stripped of its most precious resources.  Mediated through their livelihood, Qing 
subjects ideally had fixed relations to the material objects about them; the “purity” (bolgo) 
of the disciplined landscape was mirrored in a “purity” of the disciplined self.  The 
“mixing” described in Qing documents thus represented both a physical and cultural 
confusion, and purity demanded both a territorial segregation of peoples and the 
promotion of ethnic norms.   
Defense priorities played a key part in the formulation and execution of these 
policies.  The closer one lived to the Russian border, the greater the stakes of failure, the 
higher the expectation to conform to the martial ideal, and the more intense the effort to 
protect bannermen from the enervating temptations of the market.  In the borderland, all 
trade and permanent settlement was banned.  The borderland gave way to Urianghai 
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lands and adjacent Mongol banner-land, where the court prohibited all mercantile 
activity, then to standard banner land, where trade was legal only if licensed, then 
ultimately the Chinese interior, where administration lost any connection to the demands 
of the border.  In a similar, but simpler, way, spatialization of dependability held for 
Manchuria.14  The most severe standards of purity were reserved for lands where stakes 
were highest.  Taiga and steppe, served as a natural bulwark against incursions from the 
north. Mongols and Manchus, as the military backbone of the empire, further required 
steppe and forest for their martial way of life, based on riding and the hunt, to flourish.  
This strategic geography correlated to differing institutions for moving the 
production of the frontier to the metropole, including prohibition, tribute, and licensed 
trade.  The line between threatened and safe jurisdictions shifted as commerce intensified, 
migration increased, or environmental challenges arose.  Thus the court specially licensed 
the deer horn, farmland, and firewood trades in the early nineteenth century, while it 
banned Manchurian pearl production.  In practice, moreover, all three types of 
institutions – prohibition, tribute, and licensing trade – changed significantly over time in 
response to these pressures.  In Manchuria, ginseng and fur tribute came to incorporate 
increasingly elaborate oversight mechanisms and market opportunities.  In Mongolia, 
after 1800, the licensing system was standardized across jurisdictions.  Prohibitions on 
extralegal trade mobilizing increasing number of guards from increasingly distant 
                                                
14 Jonathan Bone, “Socialism in a Far Country: Stalinist Population Politics and the Making of the Soviet 
Far East, 1929-1939” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 2003).  Both the Qing empire and its 
national Chinese successors – as well as in the frontiers colonized by the Russian and Soviet states – each 
state endorsed the view that the frontiers were made safe by the presence of only certain types of people.  
The securing process involved both entrenching the right kind of people and removing the wrong kind.  In 
the modern Chinese nation state, it meant promoting Chinese migration and settlement; in late Romanov 
empire, it meant promoting Russian settlement and removing Chines migrants; in the Soviet state, it meant 
the mass-repatriation of Koreans and the deployment of more seemingly dependable nationalities.  
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banners.  Yet while all three types of state interventions in trade were deployed in 
different contexts, and entailed differing expectations and oversight from the court, all 
were deployed for a similar end: empire building.  Like other empires, integration was 
achieved through segregation, “self –consciously maintaining the diversity of people they 
conquered and incorporated.”15   Each state intervention in the market was used to 
maintain difference, coherence, and stature of subject groups –in the words of the “plan 
for the purification of Khüree,” to separate “Mongols and Chinese, lamas and laymen, 
men and women.”   
At the same time, the Qing court worked to achieve a balance between protecting 
imperial stability and encouraging production and exchange throughout the period 1750-
1850.  Multiethnic empire did not preclude the marketplace; it often depended upon it, a 
reality reflected clearly in Qing institutions.  In a nod to the importance of commerce in 
supporting the livelihood of Manchus and Mongols, the court legalized trade in most 
frontier jurisdictions.  Manchurian tribute systems incorporated market mechanisms 
through institutions such as the culgan and the farming-out of ginseng permits to private 
pickers.  In Mongolia, the court supported the licensing system and created a legal 
infrastructure for the deer horn and timber trades.  Mongolia and Manchuria served not 
only as ethnic homelands, but as complex zones of interaction, and the growth of the 
ambans’ office, the creation of institutions such as the undeci, and the elaboration of 
trade mechanisms within fur and ginseng tribute were administrative responses to this 
emergent order, where vigorous exchange between frontier and metropole was the norm, 
at least along the major trade hubs and connecting roads.   
                                                
15 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power the Politics of Difference 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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Indeed, while concerned about bannermen indulging in the market, the Qing court 
actively encouraged commercial production.  When resources such as pearls, ginseng, 
and furs were plentiful, as they were in the early eighteenth century, the court rewarded 
surplus yields and steadily pressed more laborers into service.  Later, as resources 
became depleted, the court instituted mechanisms to ensure sustainability: it rotated 
production sites, created flexible exchanges for tribute, and rejected petitions to intensify 
and expand the hunt.  Further, to facilitate conservation measures, the court strengthened 
territorial controls on the ground, with increasing numbers of border guards, irregular 
patrols, contraband raids, permit inspections, and permanent karun.  
Indeed, the productivity of the frontiers was essential to their very identity, as 
homelands were constructed, in part, as a catalogue of resources.16  Just as gazetteers 
celebrated the uniqueness of Chinese counties with lists of local products, so too did 
writers and statesmen identify Manchuria and Mongol with precious commodities.  
Nurhaci, Qianlong, and the writer of Muwa gisun alike all celebrated the suite of products 
associated with Manchuria.  Its lush biodiversity was on display both in the forests 
around Mukden and on merchants' stalls in Beijing: sable, ginseng, pearls, tigers, deer, 
and the multitude of other notable flora and fauna.  At court and in the marketplace, 
commodities from the frontier maintained their strong association with their homelands; 
they were inseparable from the creation narrative that bound object to ethnicity and 
environment. They were critical components of what made a jurisdiction a homeland: 
they facilitated and embodied a unique way of life of local inhabitants.   Each authentic 
                                                
16 Shepard Krech III, The Ecological Indian (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1999), 173. 
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fur pelt carried with it the imagined environmental and social context of the production 
site.17   
The Mongol and Manchu homelands, however, were always more than simple 
production sites.  Qing documents describe the Mongol steppe in environmental, ethnic, 
and political terms: the steppe had mushrooms, trees, and fish; it supported Mongol 
herders and Mongol noblemen; it was governed through banners and upheld by the Qing 
emperor.  Productivity had its limits: if picking mushrooms destroyed the environmental 
and social fabric of the steppe, or if fur trapping or pearling were carried out recklessly, 
the enterprise demanded regulation.  The value of production was neither grossed up to 
nor reduced to a cash value; if a livelihood was inappropriate to the subject group, the 
Qing state did not encourage it.  Rather, each group was encouraged to be productive in a 
way befitting the ethnos: Tannu Urianghai as trappers, Mongols as herders, and so on.  If 
the Qing state was “developmentalist,” it was only within the context of a multiethnic 
empire.  While Chinese merchants and migrants played expanded roles in frontier 
economies, the state continued to value the production and roles of others, whether they 
belonged to the jurisdictions of Manchus, Mongols, Urianghai, or borderland karun.   
* * * 
In 1887, H.E.M James thought he discovered pristine wilderness on the slopes of 
Changbaishan.  He was, as we have seen, mistaken.  For generations, Changbaishan had 
been a major production site for commodities such as fur and ginseng, which were 
                                                
17 Brian Spooner, “Weavers and Dealers: the Authenticity of an Oriental Carpet,” in The Social Life of 
Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective, ed. Arjun Appadurai (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), 199.  As Spooner noted of oriental carpets: “The real thing is not simply an artifact; it is made 
by particular individuals, from special handcrafted materials, in particular social, cultural , and 
environmental conditions, with motifs and designs learned from earlier generations…Our desire for 
authenticity prompts us to reconstruct that context.”  
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poached and ravaged half a century prior to his arrival.  Yet, like the holy mountains of 
Mongolia, Changbaishan stood out nonetheless as a relative success story: while not as 
diverse or lush as they were in 1750 or 1800, the “pure” spaces of the Qing remained 
special.  Today, many of the restricted areas of the Qing – including Changbaishan, the 
holy mountain of Bogd Uul, the imperial hunting grounds at Terelj, and the Urianghai 
borderlands near Lake Khovsgol – have been reconfigured as national parks.  Modern 
“nature” is genealogically linked to imperial purity.   
In the worlds of the Qing Mongolia and Manchuria, as in the colonial West, 
nature became aligned with indigeneity, not commercial dynamism.  Today, the political 
positioning of natives, as ethnic minorities (Ch: ÅòÇ), has changed.  Like furs, 
national parks in modern China are not Han, but “Chinese”: they have been appropriated 
by the majority for the multiethnic nation of the Zhonghua minzu.  Yet nature continues 
to hold a strong association with ethnic space.  Elements of the imperial heritage can be 
found not only in national parks, but in modern ethno-tourism and the ideal of the 
“Ecological Mongol” or the “Ecological Oroncon,” as exemplified in the recent boom in 
scholarly literature, noted in the Introduction, on the supposed environmental wisdom of 
ethnic minorities.18  Both the ethnic and the natural are juxtaposed against the same 
Other; both are deployed as a retreat, critique, or comfortable counterpoint to the urban, 
cosmopolitan world of China.  Modern tourists seek a common refuge.    
                                                
18 See Boldbaatar, Z.  “Mongolchuudyn Baigal’ Orchnoo Hamgallah Zan Zanwhil, Huul’ Togtoomhilin 
Höghliin Tuuhen Toim,” Tuuh: Erdem Shinzhilgeenii Bichig 188, no. 14  (2002), 80–98; Gagengaowa and 
Wuyunbatu, Menggu minzu de shengtai wenhua (Hohhot: Neimenggu jiaoyu chubanshe, 2003); Ge Zhiyi, 
Zhidu shiyuxia de caoyuan shengtai huanjing baohu (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2008); He 
Qun, Huanjing yu xiaominzu shengcun – Elunchun wenhua de bianqian (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian 
chubanshe, 2006); Wu Feng and Bao Qingde, Mengguzu shengtai zhihuilun: Neimenggu caoyuan shengtai 
huifu yu chongjian yanjiu (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2009). 
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The fast and dramatic changes of the twentieth century have cast a long shadow 
over the historiography of Manchuria and Mongolia.  From stronghold of the Qing 
empire, to a flashpoint between the expanding Russian, Japanese, and Chinese states, the 
demographic, political, and economic transformations the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries were astounding, and they have justly captured the imagination of 
scholars ever since.  First, as the “reservoir” of Qing military power, the nineteenth 
century crises struck Mongolia and Manchuria hard: beginning in 1850, troops began to 
be drafted to fight in the Taiping Rebellion; immediately, participation in institutions like 
the Cicigar culgan dropped in half.  In 1858 and 1860, with the signing of the Treaties of 
Aigun and Beijing, the Qing court ceded Manchuria north of the Amur and east of the 
Usuri to Russia.  In 1881, with the Treaty of St. Petersburg, it granted new rights to 
Russian merchants to live and work in Mongolia. The opening of the treaty ports and the 
lowering and standardization of foreign customs put Shanxi merchants at new 
disadvantage to foreign competitors.19  Finally, with the onset of the New Reforms, an 
altogether different vision of the frontier was realized: nationalization. The opening of the 
Mohe mines and the granting of access to de Groot to open mines in Mongolia signaled 
further change: the central government would be explicitly in the business of frontier 
development.  Railroads were built, coalmines opened, fields cleared for soybean, and the 
steppes and forests were connected to international wool, lumber, and fertilizer markets.  
Sable trappers turned to squirrels and marmots; wild ginseng pickers became ginseng 
farmers; deer hunters started ranches.20   
                                                
19 Zhang Zhengming, Mingqing jinshang ji minfeng, 60-63. 
20 For a synoposis of these events, see Robert Lee, The Manchurian Frontier in Ch’ing History.  On 
domesticated deer and the production of deer horn in the Altai region, amongst descendants of the Altan 
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Yet, as this dissertation has emphasized, dramatic political, commercial, and 
environmental change came to Qing Mongolia and Manchuria well before 1850.  The 
histories of these imperial homelands, to an overwhelming degree, have been written 
from the perspective of Russian, Japanese, and Chinese states and settlers; as such, they 
have been studied primarily as frontiers.  By emphasizing the role of those who dwelt in 
those frontiers, this study has pointed to the value of Manchu and Mongolian-language 
archives in writing a different, and more vivid, history of empire.  It is impossible, for 
one, to study the discourse of “purity,” which was perceived as a Mongol problem and 
administered to in the Mongolian and Manchu languages.  Likewise, one cannot study the 
operation of the Inner Asian tribute systems without Manchu records: the tributary 
records and tallies for furs, pearls, and ginseng were all kept in Manchu, either by 
military governors in the field or at the Imperial Household Department in Beijing.21  The 
Mongolian licensing system similarly operated in a complex, multi-lingual field: most 
interoffice communications were in Manchu or Mongolian; many had Chinese-language 
registers attached, but many did not.  If the historian’s reach is limited to Chinese 
materials, key governing concepts, such as “purity,” or dramatic events, such as the 
collapse of fur-bearing animal populations or the mushroom picking crisis, are hidden 
from the historian’s gaze altogether.  Manchu materials and the process of translation 
were likewise fundamental to the scholarly, informational, and imagined connections 
between frontier and metropole: knowledge of stone martens and corsac foxes, as much 
as foreign peoples, was generated first in Manchu, and only later translated into Chinese.  
                                                                                                                                            
Nuur Urianghai, see “National Treasures,” in Russia: A Journey with Jonathan Dimbleby, directed by 
David Wallace (BBC, 2008), DVD. 
21 Duplicate records kept in Chinese, moreover, do not tally with the Manchu numbers.  See Appendix A. 
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The lesson of the New Qing History remains relevant: the more we rely on late 
nineteenth and twentieth sources, or confine ourselves to the lens of Chinese-language 
documents, the easier it becomes to read the assumptions of “sinicization” and national 
development narratives onto a past.  Only with a multilingual approach can we 
understand the Qing empire on its own terms, in its full complexity, prior to the rise of 
modern nationalism and imperialism.  
The Qing invention of nature, and territorial order at its foundation, emerged 
through processes endemic to the Qing world; unlike in other parts of the world, the 
bordering process is not the story of the rise of the modern European state system.22  
Rather, declines were caused by problems endemic to the Qing empire and its growing 
connections to outside markets, including those accessed through Kiakhta and Korea. The 
Qing invention of nature derived from processes of empire building and 
commercialization that typified China prior to these great disruptions.  Crucially, it is in 
the first half of the nineteenth century, not the second half, that the pearls, sables, and 
other natural resources began to disappear.  It was neither Russian and Western 
imperialism nor the demographic expansion of Chinese nationals that drove these 
declines; colonialism and nationalism, the key touchstones of modern historiography, 
were not directly relevant. The commercial dynamism of the frontiers, the “mixing,” 
dislocation, and depletion it inspired, and the territorial response and invention of nature 
were all reflections of the same early modern moment.  If they resemble the European 
                                                
22 Since the groundbreaking work of Thongchai Winichukal in Siam Mapped, historians have faceted onto 
the problem of territory as a modern invention.  According to this view, the hegemony of the modern 
European state system (and its intendant understanding of geography) clashes with and displaces the many 
past conceptions of sovereignty and space.  Nebulous frontiers become bounded territories, sovereignty 
becomes unitary, religious space becomes secular.  
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experience, it is a reflection of convergences in the Chinese and European economic 
experiences.23  
Study of Qing frontiers allows for an approach to understanding the place of the 
Qing empire in its global context.  As Brett Walker argued for the case of Japan, frontier 
is history is international history, only without the teleology of the nation state and 
Rankean ideas about foreign relations and the European states system.24  Mongolia and 
Manchuria were constituent parts of the Qing empire, yet their histories are integrated 
with those of other territories in the Pacific world.  Segregation, licensed trade, 
territoriality were hardly limited to Qing frontiers: congruent dynamics were at work in 
Southeast Asia, Australia, and California, where the alien was often the same person: the 
miner, the merchant, the assimilating migrant.  Further research on the greater Pacific 
could offer insights to help transcend entrenched distinctions between north and south, 
coast and continent: to a provocative degree, Mongols, Malays, and Americans worked 
with the state, and defined an indigenous identity, amidst convergent upheavals.    
Differences that became central in the twentieth century were contested first, in 
their own way, at the frontiers of empire: it was there that ethnicity, foreignness, and 
relationship to the court were challenged, defended, and made visible. Indeed, from the 
vantage of the twenty-first century, there is something peculiarly familiar about the 
imperial arrangement.  Borders and passports, migration and exchange: we cherish the 
differences between each other, but what makes us distinct seems perpetually under 
                                                
23 On this great convergence, see Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the 
Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
24 Brett Walker, “Foreign Affairs and Frontiers in Early Modern Japan: A Historiographical Essay,” Early 
Modern Japan 10.2 (2002), 44-62. 
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threat.  We are freer to move across boundaries than ever, but the more we move, the 
more we are monitored, inspected, and forced to cooperate.  As some people cross lines, 
others redouble efforts to build walls.  All-under-heaven is united, but uneasily and 
ambivalently.  The environment surrounding us changes quickly, dramatically, and 
uncontrollably: the problems of empire linger in the globalized, modern world.    
 325 
Appendix A: Fur Tribute Tallies 
 
Archival fur tribute records for the Tannu, Altan Noor, and Altai Urianghai, 
discussed in Chapter 5, are available for the entire period in which tribute was collected.  
For the Tannu Urianghai, records are available for the 152 year span between 1759 and 
1911 for the Tannu Urianghai.  Almost all of the records are held at the First Historical 
Archives (FHA) in Beijing; the National Palace Museum in Taiwan holds records for the 
years 1850 and 1889-1898.1  Tallies from fourteen years appear to be missing: 1776, 
1778, 1786, 1797, 1808, 1819-1821, 1862, 1901-1902, 1907, 1909, and 1911.   
                                                
1 For the records in Taiwan, see NPM-174661 (DG30.8.21), NPM-170779 (GX15.11.1), NPM-171123 
(GX16.10.20), NPM-171477 (GX17.10.24), NPM-171885 (GX18.10.28), NPM-172227 (GX19.10.29), 
NPM-172806 (GX20.11.6), NPM-173223 (GX22.11.13), NPM-173605 (GX23.11.11), NPM-173869 
(GX24.10.12).  For records in Beijing, see MWLF 2441.14.94.209 (QL36.5.29), 2456.24.95.488 
(QL37.5.17), 2521.24.99.468 (QL38.4.20), 2854.26.103.11 (QL39.5.19), 2635.14.106.769 (QL40.5.24), 
2717.7.111.2133 (QL42.5.22), 2795.10.116.2662 (QL44.5.19), 2830.31.118.2902 (QL45.5.17), 
2881.25.121.2676 (QL46.5.24), 2932.36.124.3606 (QL47.5.28), 2967.2.127.1255 (QL48.6.2), 
3025.39.131.1532 (QL49.6.4), 3073.10.134.1629 (QL50.5.25), 3169.18.140.715 (QL52.6.19), 
3197.5.142.678 (QL53.6.24), 3248.41.14.2616 (QL54.7.26), 3300.22.148.3323 (QL55.6.7), 
3346.20.151.1728 (QL56.5.28), 3391.33.153.3169 (QL57.6.2), 3434.26.156.1537 (QL58.6.13), 
3473.3.158.2326 (QL59.6.24), 3504.36.160.1392 (QL60.6.6), 3544.28.162.1510 (JQ1.6.4), 
3582.49.165.202 (JQ3.6.19), 3599.33.166.1018 (JQ4.7.3), 3613.31.167.1223 & 3613.29.167.1206 
(JQ5.7.10), 3628.29.168.1988 (JQ6.7.5), 3642.34.169.2452 (JQ7.6.25), 3659.36.171.225 (JQ8.7.2), 
3671.41.172.161 (JQ9.7.13), 3686.9.173.1160 (JQ10.7.1), 3705.25.175.83 (JQ11.7.12), 3427.32.176.2180 
(JQ12.7.20), 3770.20.179.2259 (JQ14.8.11), 3788.25.180.2858 (JQ15.6.20), 3802.20.181.2772 (JQ16.6.6), 
3819.19.182.3116 (JQ17.6.26), 3833.15.183.2840 (JQ18.7.11), 3849.20.184.3328 (JQ19.7.12), 
3863.27.185.3290 (JQ20.6.15), 3878.52.187.373 (JQ21.+6.13), 3909.10.189.947 (JQ23.7.7), 
3925.41.190.1057 (JQ24.6.20), 3975.15.193.600 (DG2.7.20), 3990.43.194.459 (DG3.8.11), 
4006.1.195.152 (DG4.+7.8), 4021.46.195.3507 (DG5.7.7), 4037.20.196.3360 (DG6.7.20), 
4049.12.197.2763 (DG7.8.10), 4062.21.198.2806 (DG8.8.8), 4078.27.199.3044 (DG9.8.13), 
4092.53.200.2959 (DG10.8.7), 4105.52.201.2413 (DG11.8.26), 4118.42.202.2038 (DG12.9.14), 
4139.41.203.1625 & 4130.27.203.1557 (DG13.8.13), 4142.49.204.1142 (DG14.8.9), 4157.3.205.115 
(DG15.8.6), 4169.29.206.824 (DG16.8.18), 4179.33.207.399 (DG17.8.20), 4190.36.208.87 (DG18.8.29), 
4201.41.208.3288 (DG19.8.22), 4211.26.209.2501 (DG20.8.12), 4225.6.210.2462 (DG21.8.25), 
4238.27.211.1940 (DG22.8.29), 4251.43.212.530 (DG23.8.20), 4264.2.213.931 (DG24.8.13), 
4274.38.214.32 (DG25.8.16), 4286.32.214.3004 (DG26.8.17), 4296.62.215.2360 (DG27.8.16), 
4309.13.216.2107 (DG28.9.13), 4321.4.217.1624 (DG29.8.24), 4343.10.219.337 (XF1.9.11), 
4355.50.220.113 (XF2.8.17), 4369.45.221.735 (XF3.9.18), 4385.28.222.1304 (XF4.9.25), 
4399.15.223.1417 (XF5.9.16), 4410.29.224.1372 (XF6.9.16), 4422.19.225.1463 (XF7.9.26), 
4431.45.226.1217 (XF8.10.7), 4441.46.227.1353 (XF9.9.23), 4451.26.228.1641 (XF10.9.26), 
4459.17.229.1453 (XF11.9.26), 4471.43.231.14 (TZ2.10.6), 4477.52.231.3014 (TZ3.10.3), 
4483.70.232.2366 (TZ4.10.22), 4489.22.235.1324 (TZ5.11.9), 4494.7.234.14 (TZ6.10.9), 4500.5.234.2718 
(TZ7.11.28), 4504.14.235.1015 (TZ8.11.13), 4508.16.235.2782 (TZ9.10.5), 4514.61.236.2222 
(TZ10.12.6), 4518.21.237.629 (TZ11.10.25), 4520.33.237.1649 (TZ12.10.25), 4523.2.237.2937 
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Pelt tallies were compiled at the military governor’s office in Uliasutai before 
their dispatch to the court, as well as by the Imperial Household Department upon their 
receipt in Beijing.  In Uliasutai, the tallies were attached to Manchu-language palace 
memorials; today the records from Uliasutai are archived as part of the Manwen lufu 
collection, and are available on microfilm at the FHA.  The Imperial Household 
Department records were kept in Chinese and archived as part of the Neiwufu 
zouxiaodang; they are also currently available on microfilm at the FHA.2  The palace 
memorials from Uliasutai are more detailed then the zouxiao dang: they give the quantity 
and type of pelts submitted by each of the three Urianghai groups (Tannu, Altan Noor, 
and Altai), whereas zouxiao dang records give the aggregate total furs received as tribute 
from the Urianghai.  It is thus impossible to tell the relative contributions of the three 
groups.  
Significantly, the two tallies do not always equal each other, though the numbers 
might appear as if they do.  The number of sables, squirrels, and so on differ.  Yet for 
both tallies, the quantities of animals submitted always equals the quota of 4144 sable 
pelts in value.  Either one set of figures are unreliable, or both are: at least one party was 
cooking the books to make it appear that the tribute returns were accurate and legal. In 
compiling the figures on fur tribute in Chapter 5, I relied on the tribute tallies from 
                                                                                                                                            
(TZ13.9.9), 4526.3.238.1861 (GX1.10.3), 4528.1.238.2085 (GX2.11.3), 4530.54.238.3305 (GX3.9.26), 
4533.57.239.1300 (GX4.9.24), 4536.42.239.2672 (GX5.9.12), 4539.28.240.326 (GX6.9.28), 
4542.62.240.1892 (GX7.9.20), 4545.31.240.3188 (GX8.9.20), 4549.8.241.1566 (GX9.9.24), 
4853.1.241.3489 (GX10.9.10), 4556.62.242.1744 (GX11.9.28), 4589.68.242.3457 (GX12.10.4), 
4564.20.243.2100 (GX13.10.7), 4567.69.244.244 (GX14.10.12), 4571.7.244.1482 (GX21.10.9), 
4574.88.244.2965 (GX25.10.21), 4576.77.245.388 (GX26.9.21), 4579.47.245.1772 (GX29.9.6), 
4881.6.245.2802 (GX30.9.19), 4582.95.246.404 (GX31.9.24), 4583.111.246.1061 (GX32.9.12), 
4587.42.246.3074 (GX34.9.26), 4589.89.247.965 (XT2.9.18). 
2 It is unclear why the records were kept in Chinese.  Neiwufu zouxiaodang tribute reports from 
Heilongjiang, for example, were compiled in Manchu through the early nineteenth century.    
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Uliasutai, not the Imperial Household Department: they yield more information on the 
individual Urianghai groups, even if they are not necessarily more trustworthy.  Together 
with the qualitative evidence, including descriptive palace memorials and later traveller’s 
accounts, however, there is strong evidence that animal populations did in fact suffer in 
the nineteenth century.  Taken as a whole, the tributary records help pinpoint a time for 
the collapse: the 1820s and 1830s for sable, the 1850s and 1860s for fox, and so on.  
Records from on the Cicigar culgan, discussed in Chapter 1, were reported in 
Manchu-language palace memorials from the military governor of Heilongjiang for the 
years 1785-1899, and are today mostly stored on microfilm at the FHA as part of the 
Manwen lufu.  Most of these materials were published in 2001 in the volume Qingdai 
Elunchunzu Man-Hanwen dang’an huibian.3  The years 1785, 1787-1789, 1791-1798, 
1814-1820, 1823-1856, 1858-1862, 1864-1875, 1877-1888, 1895, and 1899 are all thus 
available in Qingdai Elunchunzu volume.  The year 1821 was curiously not published, 
but is accessible at the FHA; the years 1889-1894 and 1896-1898 have also yet to be 
published, but are available at the National Palace Museum in Taiwan.4  Taken as a 
                                                
3 Qingdai Elunchuzu Man-Hanwen dang’an huibian (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2001), no. 199 
(QL50.6.6), 200 (QL52.6.6), 201 (QL53.6.6), 202 (QL54.+5.26), 203 (QL56.6.8), 204 (QL57.6.28), 205 
(QL58.6.10), 206 (QL59.6.16), 207 (QL60.6.12), 209 (JQ1.6.16), 210 (JQ2.+6.6), 211 (JQ3.6.7), 213 
(JQ19.6.12), 214 (JQ20.6.13), 215 (JQ21.+6.1), 216 (JQ22.6.7), 217 (JQ23.6.18), 218 (JQ25.6.7), 219 
(DG3.6.12), 220 (DG4.6.28), 221 (DG5.6.8), 222 (DG6.6.14), 223 (DG7.+5.27), 224 (DG8.6.10), 225 
(DG9.6.22), 226 (DG10.6.22), 227 (DG11.6.19), 228 (DG12.6.24), 229 (DG13.6.25), 230 (DG14.6.20), 
231 (DG15.6.11), 232 (DG16.6.15), 233 (DG17.6.26), 234 (DG18.6.15), 235 (DG19.6.20), 236 
(DG20.6.26), 237 (DG21.6.17), 238 (DG22.6.26), 239 (DG23.7.8), 240 (DG24.6.26), 241 (DG25.6.27), 
242 (DG26.6.20), 243 (DG27.6.20), 244 (DG28.7.1), 245 (DG29.6.25), 246 (DG30.7.4), 247 (XF1.6.28), 
248 (XF2.6.25), 249 (XF3.7.1), 250 (XF4.7.15), 251 (XF5.7.3), 252 (XF6.7.12), 254 (XF8.7.3), 255 
(XF9.7.20), 258 (XF10.6.26), 259 (XF11.7.11), 260 (TZ1.7.27), 261 (TZ3.7.1), 262 (TZ4.6.20), 263 
(TZ5.7.8), 264 (TZ6.6.25), 265 (TZ7.7.13), 266 (TZ8.6.24), 267 (TZ9.7.28), 268 (YZ10.7.18), 269 
(TZ11.7.18), 271 (TZ12.6.28), 272 (TZ13.8.2), 275 (GX1.8.9), 279 (GX3.7.21), 282 (GX4.7.10), 283 
(GX5.7.1), 284 (GX6.7.25), 286 (GX7.7.2), 288 (GX8.7.26), 290 (GX9.8.12), 291 (GX10.7.27), 293 
(GX11.8.3), 295 (GX12.7.26), 296 (GX13.7.28), 298 (GX14.7.19), 304 (GX21.8.10), 307 (GX25.9.4).  
4 MWLF 3960.19.192.877 (DG1.7.10); NPM-170731 (GX15.8.13), NPM-171049, NPM-171050 
(GX16.8.1), NPM-171397 (GX17.7.20), NPM-171770 (GX18.7.11), NPM-172155 (GX19.8.10), NPM-
172728 (GX20.8.10), NPM-173163 (GX22.8.10), NPM-173508 (GX23.8.29), NPM-173790 (GX24.8.23). 
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whole, for the period 1785 and 1899, data for twenty-two years are missing: 1786, 1790, 
1799-1813, 1819, 1822, 1857, 1863, and 1876.   
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Appendix B: Registers of Intermarried Households in Khüree 
 
A register was made of all mixed Chinese-Mongol households, defined as a 
household with a father from a Chinese county and a mother from a Mongol banner or 
monastic otuγ.  The register took their names, home jurisdiction (county for the Chinese, 
otok daruga for the Mongols), and ages, as well as the names, gender (male, female, and 
infant), and age of all children and dependents, including adopted children, children-in-
law, nieces, and nephews; all children were registered with Mongol names and subject to 
the jurisdiction of their mother’s daruga.  A register from 1824 divided the couples into 
those on registered eight years prior and those newly registered, suggesting that a 
separate registration drive had been made in 1816.  Eighteen mixed households, 
comprised of seventy-two individuals, were listed on record before 1816.  Of the thirty 
registered households, the average age of the husband was 11.6 years older than the wife, 
with two children; the average wife bore the first child at age 27, suggesting the 
marriages happened relatively late in life.  A disproportionate number of men came from 
Fenyang county in Shanxi.1   
Figure 56: Registered Inter-Married Couples in Khüree, 1816 
Previously 
registered? 
Man’s 
Age 
Women’s 
Age Children 
yes 61 54 3 
yes 78 [dead] 4 
yes 53 48 5 
                                                
1 M1D1-843.1 (DG4.8.9). Compare with late nineteenth-century descriptions of segregated Kiakhta.  
Pozdneyev, for example, told of how six or seven versts from Maimaicheng “I discovered that all these 
yurts were occupied by Mongol women, the concubines of Chinese merchants at the Mai-mai-ch’eng, since 
it was forbidden for them to live any nearer to the Mai-mai-ch’eng or at the Mai-mai-ch’eng itself.” 
Pozdeneyev, Mongolia and the Mongols, 1: 3.  Further research at the archives into nineteenth century 
gender and marriage dynamics in Mongolia is necessary. 
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yes 70 49 10 
yes 75 47 7 
yes 48 46 2 
yes 45 45 2 
yes 48 [dead] 3 
yes 63 47 3 
yes 62 51 3 
yes 58 50 1 
yes 70 56 2 
yes 60 49 3 
yes 67 57 0 
yes 60 67 1 
yes 65 42 4 
yes 49 52 0 
yes 62 48 1 
no 67 40 1 
no 42 31 1 
no 42 38 1 
no 72 28 0 
no 42 22 0 
no 57 56 4 
no 37 30 0 
no 42 50 1 
no 46 30 1 
no 39 36 2 
no 50 33 0 
no 45 37 2 
 
Figure 57: Registered Inter-Married Households in Khüree, 1824. 
Registered 
before  
1816? 
Husband 
Age Wife Age 
Number 
of 
Children 
yes 61 54 3 
yes 78 [dead] 4 
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yes 53 48 5 
yes 70 49 10 
yes 75 47 7 
yes 48 46 2 
yes 45 45 2 
yes 48 [dead] 3 
yes 63 47 3 
yes 62 51 3 
yes 58 50 1 
yes 70 56 2 
yes 60 49 3 
yes 67 57 0 
yes 60 67 1 
yes 65 42 4 
yes 49 52 0 
yes 62 48 1 
no 67 40 1 
no 42 31 1 
no 42 38 1 
no 72 28 0 
no 42 22 0 
no 57 56 4 
no 37 30 0 
no 42 50 1 
no 46 30 1 
no 39 36 2 
no 50 33 0 
no 45 37 2 
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